SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE WESTERN RESPONSE

JOINT HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE NEAR EAST

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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PREFACE

Some of the more dramatic political and strategic gains of the Soviet Union in the post-World War II period have been in the Middle East. In a region where the Soviet Union had few interests and certainly no real policy in 1945, it now has a deep involvement with implications which also extend to the entire Mediterranean area.

The Soviet Union's policy in the Middle East has been basically opportunistic but often pragmatic. Since the late 1950's, for example, the Soviet Union has supported the Arabs in the Arab-Israeli conflict because it feels the Arabs can serve its interests and help maintain its influence in the Middle East. At the same time, the Soviet Union does not want war in the Middle East and supports United Nations Resolution No. 242—that is, the Arab interpretation of it.

Soviet policy in this area seems to have military, economic and political components although the goals and specific methods of policy implementation remain vague and incoherent.

Three aspects of Soviet military presence are noteworthy. First, until the early 1960's, the Soviet Union did not have a Mediterranean fleet. However, since about 1964, Soviet naval forces have steadily increased to the point where the predominant Western naval presence, and particularly the U.S. 6th Fleet, is challenged.

Second, since the mid-1960's, the Soviet Union has given substantial and continuing military aid to many Arab countries. By the early 1970's, 11 Arab governments are buying Soviet arms and at least six are committed to the Soviet Union for spare parts.

Third, the introduction of highly sophisticated aircraft and air defense systems with missiles into Egypt in recent years along with the presence of some 10,000 Russian military technicians has added a new and potentially crucial factor to the military situation in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The economic and political aspects of Soviet policy and presence are equally important and indicative of long-range commitments in the area. Over $2 billion worth of economic credit, half of which has been drawn down, numerous large construction projects like the Aswan Dam in Egypt and the Tabqa Dam in Syria, and extensive barter trading are evidence of a strong economic tie between the Soviet Union and the Arab world.

The Soviet Union approach to Arab politics has also been both opportunistic and pragmatic. In extensive consultations with Arab leaders, the Soviets have stressed their support for those with political power rather than those dedicated local Communists and Marxists seeking the introduction of specific Communist or Socialist programs and ideologies, and military juntas are often given complete support regardless of their abilities.

Despite the success of the Soviet Union in the Arab world, its policies are fraught with problems: military and economic aid are ex-

pensive; the volatility of Arab politics means regimes can fall quickly, as was the case in the Sudan; the Soviets are not politically well liked by some Arab countries although their aid is appreciated; there is a basic Arab nationalist opposition to communism; and conflict in the Middle East raises the possibility of a confrontation with the United States, a danger the Soviet Union wants to avoid.

But this Soviet involvement and presence in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean creates equally important potential problems for the West in general and our European allies in particular. The fact that the Middle East possesses over three-fourths of the world's proven oil reserves and that Europe obtains about three-fourths of its energy needs from the Middle East adds an important dimension to Western Europe's interest in the Middle East.

The possible implications of Soviet control over Western Europe's access to Middle East oil or of Soviet Mediterranean presence on NATO and the Western alliance are only two factors which concern policymakers in the West and pose dilemmas for United States policy both in the Middle East and the Mediterranean Sea.

Some of these more important questions in need of answers are: What are the goals of the Soviet Union in the Middle East? Does the Soviet Union want war, peace or stalemate in the Arab-Israeli conflict? Why does the Soviet Union have such an extensive military presence in the Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East? What would the Soviet Union do in another Middle East war? Are the Soviets interested in the Middle East for its oil or geographic centrality? Is Soviet policy in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean designed primarily to weaken the West European defense alliance and NATO?

With regard to Soviet foreign policy, many other questions can be raised. What priority does Middle East policy have in Soviet foreign policy? How does that policy compare with policies toward China, Europe, the United States and other developing countries? What pressure groups are there in the Soviet Union both for and against particular policies and presences in this area? Does the Soviet Union have a master plan for the Middle East based on ideology, expansionist designs or history?

For Western Europe, the situation in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean poses still other questions. What should be Western Europe's policy and presence in the Eastern Mediterranean? How do most of our allies view the Middle East crisis? Do they think they can maintain access to Middle East oil for the foreseeable future? What do our allies perceive to be the goals of Soviet policy in this region? What role do they see for NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean? Or can the Eastern Mediterranean possibly be included in any zone of East-West detente?

In a search for the best responses to these and other questions, the Subcommittee on Europe and the Subcommittee on the Near East held a joint series of five public hearings and one executive session in October and November of 1971. The subcommittees heard the testimony of over 10 witnesses and the hearings proved stimulating and productive both substantively and procedurally. An increasing number of interrelated foreign policy issues of relevance to the Committee on Foreign Affairs cannot be thoroughly scrutinized under the jurisdic-

tion of any one subcommittee, so such joint hearings should continue to provide a new and enriching method of inquiry.

The subcommittees benefited from the prepared statements and testimonies of all witnesses, and the record of these hearings will serve as the most important and comprehensive document the Congress has produced on this problem area with which Western Europe, the Soviet Union and the United States are so deeply concerned. While more questions might have been raised than answers given, Members of Congress, policymakers, scholars, and all Americans interested in Soviet foreign policy, the Middle East, or the Western alliance will benefit from the discussion of this difficult issue.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

Because there were so many diverse themes and several important conclusions running through these hearings, it is impractical to summarize them here. But it might be useful to indicate four of the most important points made.

First, the Soviet Union today prefers a state of controlled tension in the Middle East to a situation of war or peace. It would seem that while Marxists claim capitalism needs war to prosper, Soviet Middle East influence needs tension to survive.

Second, the Soviet Union has no timetable or master plan in the Middle East but it has momentum. Its success is due, in large part, to its ability to take advantage of situations, in particular, political instability and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Soviet policy, then, has been generally reactive, flexible, and opportunistic.

Third, Middle East policy is not a top priority item in Soviet foreign policy: Issues involving China, Europe, and the United States are more important. Soviet goals in the Middle East are related to other objectives, particularly the Soviet Union's desire for a strong Mediterranean presence and for the neutralization, or at least the vulnerability, of NATO.

Fourth, while our European allies might be concerned about the Soviet Union's presence in this region and the potential threat to their oil supply in a crisis situation, they appear unwilling to do much about it. Their reluctance to deal with what the United States considers the dangers of Soviet involvement in the Middle East stems in part from the fact that they feel they can accommodate most Soviet goals in the area and also they are not strong nuclear powers and could not, in any case, deter Soviet maneuvering in the Eastern Mediterranean. Europe relies on the umbrella of the Western or NATO defense system with a large American presence.

We hope that these hearings will prove beneficial for every reader and while we consider this record very valuable, many of the topics discussed and developed here might serve as subjects for future inquiries of the subcommittee.

BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe.
LEE H. HAMILTON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on the Near East.

DECEMBER 1971.

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Benjamin S. Rosenthal,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe.
Lee H. Hamilton,
Chairman, Subcommittee on the Near East.

December 1971.

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SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE WESTERN RESPONSE

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1971

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEES ON EUROPE
AND THE NEAR EAST,
Washington, D.C.

The joint subcommittee met at 10 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (chairman of the Subcommittee on the Near East) presiding.

Mr. HAMILTON. This joint meeting of the Subcommittee on the Near East and the Subcommittee on Europe will come to order.

Today's hearing is the first in a series of joint hearings of the European and Near East Subcommittees entitled "Soviet Involvement in the Middle East and the Western Response."

This important subject provides a unique opportunity for the two subcommittees to study one of the significant issues affecting the Eastern Mediterranean, the problem of war and peace in the Middle East, and the relations of the United States and Russia with the countries of the Middle East.

Precisely because of the complexity of so many international issues which cut across the specific jurisdictions of the various subcommittees, we have deemed it beneficial to approach this problem area with a series of joint hearings. It is our hope that this series will lead to other joint hearings involving at least two subcommittees.

Today we are especially interested in examining the premises of Soviet foreign policy and the Soviet approach toward developing countries. We are happy to have with us two prominent scholars, Dr. Herbert S. Dinerstein, who is director of Soviet Studies in Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and who has written extensively on Soviet foreign policy, and is particularly interested in Soviet foreign policy toward developing countries. Within this field Dr. Dinerstein has specialized on Latin American-Soviet ties.

Dr. Walter Laqueur, our other witness, is currently director of the Institute of Contemporary History and the Wiener Library in London. Dr. Laqueur is also interested in the general issue of Soviet foreign policy and has written two books on the topic of Soviet involvement in the Middle East.

Dr. Dinerstein, you have a prepared statement and you may proceed as you see fit, reading or summarizing, and we will have your statement followed immediately by the statement of Dr. Laqueur.

STATEMENT OF HERBERT S. DINERSTEIN, DIRECTOR, SOVIET STUDIES PROGRAM, SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

(The biography of Mr. Dinerstein appears on p. 185.)

Dr. DINERSTEIN. If I may, Mr. Hamilton, I would prefer to briefly summarize this statement since it is available and in whatever time is left, discuss what seem most interesting to your committee.

SOVIET UNION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The point of my written remarks is that the Soviet Union's view of the problems of underdeveloped countries and the opportunities are just the opposite of our theories. Thus we and the Soviet Union fail to mesh in our approach to the problem of underdeveloped countries. Traditionally in this country, what we have feared most is that underdeveloped countries might be subverted and that the Soviet Union might introduce communism into them. I think it is fair to say that this assumption was at the basis of a good deal of our foreign policy for a good many years.

Since we had already brought almost every industrialized country in the world except Sweden and Switzerland into our alliance system, we felt that the opportunities for the Soviet Union would be precisely in the underdeveloped countries and that the problem was subversion and the transition to communism in those countries.

Without remarking on the validity of that assumption, I would like to say that the Soviet Union makes the opposite assumption. Their interest in underdeveloped countries has put the communization of these countries at the bottom of their list of priorities.

I want to make clear that I am not trying to say the Soviet Union is not interested in having more socialist countries. But their priority list is based more on what they think is possible—opportunities and costs. On the whole they have been very bearish about the possibility of bringing communism to other countries and they have been very impressed by the cost of doing so, whether they succeed or whether they fail.

Since 1920 the Soviet Union has held to a theory, formulated by Lenin, that the great opportunities for bringing communism to countries would derive from the anticolonial movement. Later, after most colonies had disappeared, aggressive nationalism became the point d'appui of Soviet policy.

TWO OF THE NEW COUNTRIES ARE SOCIALISTIC

Since 1945, of all the colonies which have achieved independence, only two have become socialistic—North Vietnam and Cuba. All the rest somehow have gone through the travail of gaining independence without adopting communism.

So it is not a very good theory statistically. I will just add that when a country has become socialistic, and you might say when it has become socialistic prematurely, it has cost the Soviet Union a great deal of money. So the only countries that have become socialistic since 1943 have been poor and backward. The only exception is Czechoslovakia and they did pretty well in turning that into a poor country.

So the Soviet Union's experience has been that all new socialistic countries have been poor, they have required Soviet resources greater than the Soviet Union has been willing to pay. Consequently they have been rather jaundiced on pushing backward countries into socialism.

SOVIET UNION ACTS AS GREAT POWER

Then why are they so interested in underdeveloped countries? They devote a lot of attention to it and they spend some money. They are interested in underdeveloped countries because they feel that a great power should have global interests and they feel that they have reached a stage in the world where their interests extend beyond the countries bordering on the Soviet Union. Their interests extend to the whole world.

They try to match what they think the United States is doing or did do and their general attitude towards these problems is like many other Soviet attitudes, very old-fashioned, very 19th century. As someone facetiously said, but also with a certain amount of point, "What the Soviets are trying to do is to reestablish the British lifeline from India to Great Britain."

When you ask why, it is very difficult. When I talked to some of my Soviet acquaintances and I asked them why, the answer is almost like, well, it is there, there is no particular reason except that great powers have to do these things, and particularly in the Near East if you examine the situation, there is very little likelihood of progress toward making Communistic States.

Probably the best prospect would have been Israel itself, but in all the other Arab States the chances for communism are very poor. But that doesn't make any difference, because what the Soviet Union is interested in in the Near East, as it is in the rest of the underdeveloped world, is having a great power presence.

CLIENTS AND POWER

Now I think that in the long run the Soviet Union will discover, as the United States has discovered in part, that when the age of imperialism is over, collecting clients in the underdeveloped and poor world is not adding to your power; it is adding to your burdens. It costs money.

It is an open question from a scholarly point of view as to whether in the imperial age they paid or didn't pay, but now everyone knows they don't pay. Vietnam doesn't pay the United States, Egypt doesn't pay the Soviet Union. So in this age and in the years to come collecting clients means collecting headaches.

Now I think that even though some Soviet people realize this, the people who realize this are people like myself who don't exercise a great deal of power. They are observers, they are scholarly persons, and the people at the top of the Soviet Union don't see it this way. They see this as a necessary and valuable adjunct to power.

FUTURE BIG POWER ATTITUDES

Now I think that in the distant future, the next 20 years or so, the Soviet and the American attitudes toward underdeveloped countries will be modeled on their attitude to sub-Saharan Africa. It doesn't

count, it is not going anyplace, it doesn't make any difference in the power balance, and thus you have a kind of mutual agreement not to pay much attention to the sub-Sahara in Africa.

I think over the long term the same attitude may prevail even in the Middle East, but politics is not very believable in the long run. Politics deals such for short and medium range, and I think that in the Mediterranean we are going to have very severe conflicts.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, Dr. Dinerstein.

(The full text of Mr. Dinerstein's statement appears on p. 22.)

STATEMENT OF WALTER LAQUEUR, DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE OF CONTEMPORARY HISTORY, WIENER LIBRARY, LONDON, ENGLAND

(The biography of Mr. Laqueur appears on p. 186.)

Dr. LAQUEUR. I also would like to summarize very briefly my paper which is available.

SOVIET GOALS IN MIDDLE EAST

The interests of the Soviet Union in the Middle East are those of a superpower, which in an adjacent area has good prospects to expand its political and military influence.

SOVIET PRIORITIES

At this moment the Middle East does not figure very highly in the Soviet scale of priority in view of the Chinese threat and, of course, the intention to remove the American presence. Of course, they know that while they try to pursue these aims there has to be a detente of sorts, even in the Middle East, because you cannot have a detente in Europe and at the same time a war in the Middle East.

MIDDLE EAST OIL

Five years or 10 years ago I would probably not have mentioned oil in this context because the Soviet Union had all the oil it needed, but I am told by the experts in this field that the Soviet consumption will soon outstrip Soviet production and we should take into account that the Soviet Union has to cover the needs of its allies in Eastern Europe, which do not produce oil.

Oil is not a major factor, but it is gradually emerging as one out of several factors.

CURRENT SOVIET POLICY

Soviet policy in the Middle East in recent years has been to neutralize Turkey and Iran. As far as the other countries are concerned, Soviet commentators and presumably also Soviet policymakers, were more or less convinced that events in the Arab world were going their way because there was a process of radicalization in domestic affairs in Egypt and Syria and Iraq and more recently Libya.

But for a variety of reasons in recent years communism has not made that much progress in the Arab world. Political power in these countries is in the hands of the military juntas and these military juntas may use the language of anti-imperialism or Leninism, but they have not the slightest intention to delegate or share any of their power with the communist parties.

ARABS AND RUSSIANS

On the contrary, they are willing to deal ruthlessly with anyone challenging their power. One factor which has in the past helped the Soviet Union in its dealings in the Middle East was, of course, the Arab-Israeli conflict. Up to a point—and I am coming to that in a moment.

The dilemma of the Soviet Union today is that of power which has become involved in the area. All the time the Soviet Union was an outsider it could not commit any mistakes, it could be friends with everyone, in the same way it tried to be friends with India and Pakistan at the same time.

The more the Soviet Union has become involved in the Middle Eastern affairs the more it had to choose, which means to make not only friends but also to make enemies.

ARAB LEADERS

I have mentioned the fact that political power in the Middle East and all the key countries is in the hands of coups of military officers and I think the Soviet Union has more or less become reconciled to that. This by itself is not an unmitigated disaster because, after all, the Soviet bloc is no longer a monolithic block and even the Communist Parties cannot be trusted any longer of following automatically the Soviet lead.

I give an example: Czechoslovakia. At the time of the Czechoslovak crisis quite a few Communist Parties refused to go along with the Soviet line whereas Egypt, Syria, and other Arab governments accepted the Soviet line. Soviet leaders can be forgiven for taking a somewhat cynical view, namely, that in a critical situation you can trust more your clients, simply because they need you, where ideological followers who may stick to their principles.

The Soviet commentators have been asking themselves how to explain that military leaders in the Middle East, mainly in the Arab countries, have not moved closer to their own views. The explanation most frequently given is that these military leaders are still somehow influenced by "petty bourgeoise prejudices."

The real explanation is of course that in the struggle which goes on within these military juntas, ideology is only part of the study and not always, to put it cautiously, the most important part. Many of these Army officers are personally ambitious, career-motivated as a recent Soviet study noted with some sadness.

It is still possible, given the weak political structure of these countries, that a handful of determined people can make a successful bid for power, a coup d'etat. We have seen it in Sudan, it could happen elsewhere. However, even if such an attempt should be successful, victory in one country will almost automatically provoke negative reactions in other countries. In other words, unless the pro-Russian forces in the Middle East make progress steadily, on an even front, the overall balance as far as the Soviet Union is concerned may be negative.

SOVIET UNION AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

In a similar way, the Arab-Israeli conflict has become problematical from the Soviet point of view. On the one hand, it is quite true that

in the past this conflict gave the Soviets a foothold in the Middle East. But if you look at the map, we find that the countries in which the Soviet Union has made most progress are those most remote from Israel, the Sudan, Southern Arabia, Iraq, et cetera.

Moreover, while the conflict continues, nationalism is the leading trend in the Arab world and communism finds itself very much hampered in this climate of "national solidarity."

CONCLUSIONS

On the whole, it seems to me that the Soviet Union is likely to follow a cautious course of action. But it should always be remembered that the Soviet Union is not in full control even of its clients and allies in the Middle East.

(The full text of Mr. Laqueur's statement appears on p. 26.)

Mr. HAMILTON. Gentlemen, we thank you for your statements. They will be made a part of the record, of course, and we appreciate the fact that you have summarized them to allow us more time for questions.

SOVIET GOALS IN MIDDLE EAST

I have an appropriate opening question for both of you to respond to. I know you both touched upon it in your statements, but it would be helpful to have you respond precisely and as precisely as you can, how would you state Soviet goals in the Middle East. How do they differ from Soviet goals in Latin America or Asia or Africa?

Dr. DINERSTEIN. It is quite a challenge to respond to that large a question precisely and concisely, but I will do my best. I think that you can respond concisely, but not too helpfully, when you say that the Soviet Union wants to be a bigger power than it was. That covers Soviet policy in Latin America, in the Middle East, and the Far East, but it doesn't deal with the immediate problem.

Now, I think it is an oversimplification to say that the Soviet Union is uniquely interested in improving the political prospects and political situation of its clients on the assumption that as the clients become grateful, the Soviet Union will gain influence, and perhaps in the distant future, the Communist Party may be able to operate more freely.

I think the Soviet goal in the Near East is more traditional. They want to be the arbiter in the Middle East; they want to be the major big power that makes the major decisions.

So in the last few months, I think it has become pretty obvious that the United States can't bring peace in the Middle East. I don't know if anybody can. But the United States can't, simply because the United States can't deliver an Egyptian agreement acceptable to Israel.

So as long as the Soviets are passive and watch, the political stage is dominated by the American inability to bring peace.

But it became obvious, as I hope it will not, that if the U.S. peace initiative will not bear fruit, then it will be the turn of the Soviet Union. Will they be able to deliver peace in the Middle East? They can deliver the Egyptians more easily than we can, because they have more to withhold.

I should say that the Soviet Union has always been more skillful in dealing with clients, because they never give them everything. They always leave something to give, so there is a basis for applying pressure.

So the Soviet Union can probably push the Egyptians to make more concessions than the United States can, toward some kind of Israeli-Egyptian settlement, but the question is how far can they push the Israelis, and that is a very difficult question to answer without an intimate knowledge of the dynamics of Israeli internal policy, which I don't have.

SOVIET UNION AND A SETTLEMENT

Mr. HAMILTON. The question is also whether or not they want to push toward a settlement, too. Dr. Laqueur speaks of controlled tension in his statement, and there is a real doubt in the minds of many of how much the Soviet Union really wants a peace settlement in the Middle East.

Dr. DINERSTEIN. If the peace settlement bore an American stamp, they would not want it. They would not want the United States to be the sucessful intermediary between the Egyptians and the Israelis and then have the Egyptians looking toward the United States for support, with the prospect of Egypt moving away from the Soviet Union. However, if the peace settlement bore a Soviet stamp, if the peace settlement could mean that the Israelis decided the United States didn't give them enough support, that they had to make the best of a situation and get the best they could from the Soviet Union—in other words, if the Soviet Union could put itself in the same position in the Near East as it occupies in the Indian subcontinent, if the Soviet Union could get that kind of situation, then I think they would be interested in a settlement.

They would be interested in the kind of settlement which would give them a bigger position in the Middle East. I think it is very dangerous to predict the likelihood of their being able to do it. It depends on too many imponderables. But I think you can point out what the general expectations and hopes are.

I think the most likely prospect in the Middle East is a continued situation of no peace, maybe some war, but really no peace. But I think we have to look at the goals of the two major powers, and each of them, I think, would like a peace of a certain kind, not the same kind.

SOVIET AIMS

Mr. HAMILTON. Dr. Laqueur.

Dr. LAQUEUR. Mr. Chairman, the question was the aims of Soviet policy in the Middle East. We ought to bear in mind a historical fact; namely, that expansion in a southward direction has been one of the few constant factors in Russian history.

This goes back to the 18th century; it has a great number of historical, cultural, even religious reasons, the dream of the Russian flag again hoisted over Hagia Sophia in Constantinople.

For the first three or four decades of Soviet power, the Soviet Union was preoccupied with other more urgent foreign issues, but this constant factor has come back into its own right all the more since the Middle East is today a power vacuum. Any Soviet advance in Europe would be risky because these countries belong to a military alliance, whereas the Middle East, as I said, is a power vacuum, and the Soviet advance doesn't involve many risks.

What is the basic Soviet aim? It is to establish a sphere of influence, to establish Soviet hegemony and even domination. If I say "domi-

nation," I do not mean occupation. There are various ways of dominating a country, and we have Soviet influence in Afghanistan, we have the political status of Finland which is not a socialist country, let alone a Communist country, and yet in foreign affairs it is very much influenced, to put it mildly, by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is striving for a similar position in the Middle East.

CONTROLLED TENSION

As I said in my paper, the Soviet Union is interested in controlled tension. I would perhaps compare it with a fever therapy in medicine, to keep the patient at 100 or 101 for several days. In politics, this is difficult, because the fever may suddenly go up, and what do you do then?

It is comparatively easy to produce a temperature, it is very difficult to control it.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Burke.

Mr. BURKE. I have no questions.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Rosenthal.

NIXON'S TRIP TO MOSCOW AND PEKING

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wonder if either one of you would suggest to us what you think the net effect of President Nixon's visit to Moscow and Peking might have in developing a change in Soviet attitudes? Or is it just a superficial and temporary kind of diplomatic or political event?

Do you think it has any potential of altering Soviet attitudes in any way?

Dr. DINERSTEIN. Well, altering Soviet attitudes doesn't necessarily mean altering their behavior, because their behavior tends to respond to crises. The Soviet Union wants to reach certain agreements with the United States in order to hold down the arms race and not to allow China to have a monopoly of American attention, to bring the United States to a European security conference. I think the Soviet leaders in the interest of these goals would want not to precipitate a crisis in the Near East, but I would make a sharp distinction between what they want and what happens to them. For example in 1967 in their pursuit of minor tactical advantage they set in motion the chain of events which precipitated the June war which they didn't want.

So that I would say that when there is negotiation between the United States and the Soviet Union on the highest level, on both sides the inclination is not to arouse sleeping dogs, but the danger is that neither side sufficiently controls the many countries, not involved in these goals of the highest priority, which can plunge the two great powers into unwelcome confrontation.

So I would respond not terribly satisfactorily to your question, that the inclination on the part of the Soviet Union would be to keep things quiet during and right after such negotiations, but they might not be able to succeed.

DOES SOVIET UNION MIMIC UNITED STATES?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. You have suggested in your statement that in a sense the Soviets start out with an inferiority complex. They want to mimic us as a great power. If we appear to be thawing a

frigid relationship, then the Soviets may follow us just the way the hemlines go up and down. If the United States, as leader of the so-called free world, is now starting to thaw relationships, and if they want to mimic us as you say, why don't they also start a period of thaw? If that were the case, couldn't that change events in the Middle East?

Dr. DINERSTEIN. I think they are going to mimic us in the general area of strategically trying to be a great power. But I don't think they feel they have to mimic us in the tactics of thawing and jelling, thawing and jelling.

They are in a thaw period in Europe now. They have convinced a great many European countries that there is little to fear from the Soviet Union, that NATO can safely be reduced, that they can reduce their draft calls. They have convinced people of that but I don't think it automatically follows then that they are going to be willing to give up what they think is their political position in the Middle East just for the sake of an era of good feeling.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I was trying to get into a psychological inquiry, because you are the one who suggested that they start out with this inferiority complex. They mimic us as world style-setters. They don't even recognize the burdens or mistakes of being a great power in terms of client status problems.

Your last answer suggests that they mimic us only in things where they think it is in their interest. Sometimes when you want to follow people in terms of style, you may change your view of what is in your interest.

Dr. DINERSTEIN. They are out of phase with us, especially since the Vietnamese war; in this country there is a great kind of unhappiness about overextension of commitments, burdens of empire. There is a mood of examining any new commitment very carefully.

Now I think that in the Soviet Union they are not at that stage yet and I might point out that there is one great danger in trying to understand Soviet attitudes and that is the danger of knowing the wrong people too well.

Now the kind of people that I and my colleague know are academics like ourselves who spend their time primarily in study, and who share our view that in the long run clients are more trouble than they are worth. But it is dangerous to think that these Soviet academics reflect the view of the party leaders who make the decisions.

They are advisers in the wings and they realize how limited their influence is. For example one highly-placed Soviet specialist on the Near East when indicating that he believed supporting weak clients was a mistake was asked:

How about your bosses? How long will it take them to learn that extending influence in the latter part of the 20th Century is not the same as the beginning?

And he said:

Oh, 10 or 15 years.

So when you are talking about the top leaders of the Soviet Union, the ones who make the policy in the last analysis, I think they take a very simplistic view. If you are a big power, you ought to be every place. If the British could have interests all over, in their future, so can we now.

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NATIONALISM AS A FACTOR

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you really think that is what motivates them rather than some nefarious or nationalistic scheme?

Dr. DINERSTEIN. Yes; I think so. It depends who you are. If emergence of the Soviet Union as a great power means you as a small country will become independent, then it is nefarious for your point of view; from the Soviet point of view it is merely natural: Big powers ought to have influence.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. They don't realize that some big powers are starting to curtail?

Dr. DINERSTEIN. No; I think they are out of phase, as they are in their domestic policy, as they are in their tastes in art and architecture and literature. They are very Victorian, very old fashioned, and I think they really have an image of themselves in the early 20th century terms.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE

Mr. ROSENTHAL. You said that a Middle East peace must have a Soviet stamp from their point of view. How does Secretary Rogers try to get a U.S. stamp on the Middle East peace? How does he feed that into his assessment equation of where events are leading; if he knew that, then how would he try to achieve his objectives and let them put their rubber stamp on it to satisfy their ego?

Dr. DINERSTEIN. I think it is both the disease and the necessary quality of Secretaries of State, of diplomats, that they be optimistic. If they were all pessimistic, they would not take the job or they would resign shortly after they took it.

I think if you are a Secretary of State, you have to believe that if you try something it might work. There is some basis to hope that you can force the Egyptians to give up something, force the Israelis to give some and thus make a bargain.

If you are a diplomat or a Secretary of State, as long as you believe there is some hope you have to try. Now I think if you are sitting on the outside and you are an analyst, as I am, you say the chances are pretty poor. That doesn't mean that you should advise this man not to try, but I think it is a fact that if the United States tries and fails, that it becomes the Soviet's turn and then they take over and try to get the kind of peace settlement which they think would consolidate their problem and that could only be a peace settlement in which Israel felt that the United States was no longer dependable as a supporter and that they had to rely on the benevolence of the Soviet Union.

That is a big order for the Soviet Union, but I think it is possible.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Dr. Laqueur.

Dr. LAQUEUR. Mr. Rosenthal, a general observation first. We are now living in a period in which many people in the West, in this country and also in Europe, mistake a few swallows for a lasting summer.

I am not arguing that Soviet policy and Soviet aims are never going to change. Everything changes, but this change has not taken place yet. What has changed is the climate in the West. The cold war has become a bore, many people would like to see the age of confrontation ended and replaced by the age of dialog.

Unfortunately we have no convincing indications that the basic intentions of the other side have changed.

Until that meeting next year in Moscow between President Nixon and the Soviet leaders both sides will try to restrain their respective friends or clients. But I do not think that the Soviet Union is interested in a package deal which would include the Middle East. There could be, and this is perhaps a maximum that could be hoped for as an understanding, that whatever will happen in the Middle East, the two superpowers should not become involved in a direct confrontation.

But a package deal is difficult for the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is not just a big power, it is the head of the Communist camp and it has certain responsibilities and commitments from which it cannot opt out, particularly not now that its leading position is challenged by the Chinese. In other words, it cannot make far-reaching concessions on behalf of the Egyptians, Syrians, or Iraqis, and for that reason I feel that fundamentally nothing is likely to change as a result of the President's visit.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Yatron.

EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

Mr. YATRON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I have one question. Why are the Russians so interested in pressing for the European Security Conference?

Dr. LAQUEUR. The main factor now in Soviet foreign policy considerations is China. The number of divisions now stationed on the Soviet-Chinese border is for the first time in history bigger than the number of divisions stationed in Europe.

The second reason is the Soviet objective to remove or to reduce American presence. This has been tried for 10 or 20 years without success in the cold war. The Soviet Union has realized that this did not have the desired effect and it now is trying its luck with a European Security Conference.

First, it tried to exclude the United States and Canada from such a conference and then it realized this was not possible. One could go into this in much more detail, but these seem to me the two basic motives as far as the Soviet Union is concerned.

Dr. DINERSTEIN. I might add that finally the Soviet Union has decided that its best opportunities in Europe are to accept and to exploit the status quo. Their changed policy to West Germany is the best example.

There have always been groups in the Soviet Union that wanted to do this. This is not a brand new policy. The Soviets have decided, as Mr. Laqueur said, that the confrontation doesn't work and instead of pushing at Berlin and driving the members of NATO together, they would deal with them individually. They discovered as might have been expected, that as soon as they offered a genuine negotiation to West Germany that the West Germans found that their interests were not identical with American interests. And they had their own fish to fry. The West Germans went ahead and made their arrangements with the Soviet Union without really asking us and we approved afterwards, somewhat grudgingly I suspect.

From the Soviet point of view this is all to the good because it means that as West Germany passes from being a client state to being an independent state, then the differences between the United States and

Germany widen. But all these sticks have two ends. But as this happens the French want to balance growing German power and reverse their policy toward Great Britain and invite them to join the Common Market.

So the price of separating the Germans somewhat from the United States is to increase the possibility of a bigger Western Europe, which is something the Soviet Union doesn't want, and that is why China is very much in favor of the Common Market. So that as soon as the Soviet Union enters into European politics, every coin has two sides and no gain is cost free.

I would agree with my colleague, Walter Laqueur, that for the Soviet Union Europe is much more important than the Near East. The possible economic fall-out from detente in Europe is attractive to the Soviet Union. If there is a possibility of gaining some Soviet goals in Europe which can be queered by a crisis in the Middle East, I think the tendency of the Soviet Union to the extent that they are able to control events would be to hold the situation in the Near East down. Europe has priority, I think, in their view over the Eastern Mediterranean.

Mr. YATRON. Thank you.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Bingham.

Mr. BINGHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to say, gentlemen, that I think these are two of the most interesting statements that we have heard in a long time. I am fascinated by both of them.

I think you said, and it wasn't in your prepared statement, that you referred to the Soviet study that showed that they were distressed to find that the Arab military people were careerists. I just was interested in that reference. Could you develop that a little more?

RUSSIANS ON ARAB LEADERS

Dr. LAQUEUR. Up to a few years ago there were practically no Soviet systematic studies of these problems but during the last 4 or 5 or 6 years quite a few people in Moscow have been devoting their time and efforts to study the third world.

They have begun to realize that definitions like "left" and "right" do not really make sense in the Middle East. Until very recently the assumption in the Soviet Union was that once certain economic and social changes take place, once the banks are nationalized, once the state gets hold of the foreign trade monopoly, then the country will be on the road to socialism.

Of late, Soviet analysts have been far more cautious in their analyses.

SOVIET MOTIVATIONS

Mr. BINGHAM. Would it be a fair interpretation of your statements, both of you, that Soviet motivations today are more traditional nationalism, traditional expansionism of a great power, for example, than it is an effort to explore an ideology?

Dr. LAQUEUR. This is the $64 question always facing us. The Soviet Union is a big power, it is also head of the Communist camp.

There is not the slightest doubt that ideology is now far less important in Soviet foreign policy than it was 30, 40, or 50 years ago. On the other hand, it would be wrong, as some pragmatists, especially

in England and America, are doing, to write off ideology altogether.

All throughout the Communist world, the trend has been away from "proletarian internationalism" which was Lenin's deepest conviction toward some form of national socialism.

Dr. DINERSTEIN. It is very difficult to be precise about ideology because in a sense it fulfills the same function that religion fulfills in other societies and in the Soviet Union as in other societies some people are more religious than others, and you are more religious on one day than on another day.

But there is a general world view that comes out of the ideology. It provides a lookingglass through which they observe the world and although they make changes and they realize owning the banks doesn't necessarily mean owning the country, they still have this general view and they still would like to believe, although they sometimes have doubts, they would like to believe that socialism is a better system than capitalism.

So as far as their internal policy is concerned, they are still very much committed to the proposition that socialism is better than capitalism and if they were not committed to that, how could they explain all the sacrifices demanded of the people? Thus the prospect of loss of control of a Socialist country threatens their legitimacy, their right to rule, and they have been very ruthless, rough and quick in meeting that threat.

Mr. BINGHAM. Would you apply that equally if it is a distant Socialist country?

Dr. DINERSTEIN. No; not if it is distant or if it is too big. Now, in other words, you could have made as convincing an argument for a Soviet invasion of China as a Czechoslovakia on the ground of Soviet interests. But China's size and the complex problems presented by an invasion probably inhibited them.

I think if there were a crisis in Cuba and I can't foresee one, so I am talking in a very theoretical way, but if there were some kind of a post-Castro government and there were a civil war of some kind in Cuba, it would be much more difficult for the Soviet Union to intercede in that kind of thing and to protect true socialism in Cuba as it did in its own terms in Czechoslovakia, because it is distant.

But in general they are much more willing to pay high costs for things that are defined as inside as belonging to them. Now I think that when it comes to outside, and certainly the Nassers and the Sadats of this world are outside, they are not considered belonging to the Soviet Union, then I think they are much more instrumental and pragmatic, and they are subject to the same misjudgments as other people are, in some ways even more.

On the whole in such situation they try to calculate costs and benefits. But this would not be the automatic response if a socialist state were threatened.

U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY

Mr. HAMILTON. Gentlemen, I would like to direct your attention to the implications of your respective analyses to the American foreign policy in the Middle East.

Just before he died, Dean Acheson wrote an article in which he said that the first aim of American policy in the Middle East should be to convince the Soviet leaders that direct involvement of their own forces in the Middle East involves unacceptable risks.

One thing I want to know is if you agree with that, but to go beyond that a little bit, you have both indicated a kind of pessimism about the efforts of the United States toward an interim settlement.

Before the United Nations the other day, Secretary Rogers said this was the only alternative for us to pursue at this time in the Middle East policy. Dr. Dinerstein, you have spoken about the false assumption we have had about Soviet efforts to communize the world. I am having some difficulty in taking all of these things down and trying to come up with some implications of these observations for American foreign policy, so I would like to try to ask you to draw on your own analyses here and your background and tell us what you think is right and what is wrong with American foreign policy in the Middle East today.

1967 WAR

Dr. DINERSTEIN. It is much easier to have a dish put in front of you and say it wasn't made quite right than to be asked to produce it, so it is much easier to be a critic than to say what you should do now. But I think it is fair to ask critics what they would do if they had a choice.

I think the U.S. policy has to deal with the situation as it is. I hope you will forgive me if I make a slight excursion into the past to make my point.

I think the United States had but little choice and, has little choice but to treat Israel as its client. I think that in many ways the United States bears a large share of the responsibility for the 1967 war precisely because it was unwilling to make clear that it would support the Israelis.

Now in that war, to make a long story short, I think the Russians tried to gain a quick political victory by pretending that the Israelis were about to attack the Syrians and making believe that the Egyptian semimobilization and Russian political support stopped this threat, which really didn't exist, and they set in position the whole chain of events including the mobilization of the Egyptian armies, which presented the Israelis with the stark choice between fighting or waiting.

This was a very difficult problem for the Israelis to solve internally, but I think one of the precipitating causes of a change in the internal alignment in Israel and a decision to go to war was the news they got when they came to Washington. When they came to Washington they were told that the Eisenhower-Dulles agreement could not be found, that no one knew where it was. But they had a copy with them. They knew what happened across town when Mr. Rusk addressed a Foreign Relations Committee and 50 people attended and almost unanimously the Senators said one war at a time is all we want.

So the Israelis, after sending Eban back to Washington and sending some other people to check everything out, decided that the United States was not going to be very forthcoming and therefore they had no choice but to react in a military way to the Egyptian mobilization.

So what I am saying is once you have the game set that the Soviet Union is supporting one client and the United States is supporting another client, regardless of whether you would want that situation if we could start all over, then I think the United States can only fail to support its clients at the risk of unbalancing the whole situation.

EVEN-HANDEDNESS AS POLICY

Mr. HAMILTON. You think all of the talk about evenhanded balance and so forth, that it is detrimental to the cause of the Middle East?

Dr. DINERSTEIN. The assumption behind talking about evenhanded, is that if you are fair, people respect fairness and repay you in kind. I think that is not true in politics in general, but certainly not in international politics.

You can't expect people to be grateful because you were fair. They have to pursue what they perceive to be their own interests. So the notion that the Arabs are somehow different from other people, that if you are fair to them they will appreciate it and they will do things against what their interests are, that is one assumption behind the even-handed stance.

But I think the other assumption behind the evenhanded stance is that somehow the United States can move away from supporting the Israelis and be neutral. I think the only ones who believe that U.S. neutrality is possible are the proponents of evenhandedness. Neither Israelis nor Arabs believe it. So I think the only way in which the United States can extricate itself from being the supporter of one party to the conflict is if the Soviet Union simultaneously does the same. I don't see any prospects of that.

So I think when we have to work out a policy which steers between putting pressure on the Israelis to make the kind of settlement that we believe might be acceptable to the Arabs, but not pressuring them so much that they will stop listening to what we say.

Now that is a difficult diplomatic game, but that is the only thing you can do with a client who has some independence and the Israelis have a great deal of independence. There really isn't much choice, for the United States. So I think evenhandedness is not a fruitful appraisal because there isn't enough necessity for the Egyptians and the Israelis to make peace on terms which each of them thinks is damaging to their interests.

Mr. HAMILTON. How far do you go in rejecting the idea of evenhandedness? Does that mean that you cease support of the Arab nations, military and other kinds of assistance that we give, for example, to Jordan? Does it mean we sell Phantom jets to Israel when they want them?

How do you translate your rejection of evenhandedness into specifics?

NO PRECISE RECIPES

Dr. DINERSTEIN. I think you can't give precise recipes. Our policy toward Jordan is not in conflict with the Israeli policy toward Jordan. Jordan in many ways has been a concealed Israeli protectorate. The Israelis have protected Jordan against Egyptian expansion in different periods.

The Israelis, as do we, certainly prefer the present government in Jordan to the guerrillas. So there is not the big difference between American policy and the Israeli policy towards Jordan, the difference is tactical. But I think it is very difficult sitting on the sidelines to say that we should have given the Israelis Phantoms 2 weeks earlier rather than later.

One cannot expect that the United States would give the Israelis whatever they want. I think the Israelis would be very surprised if they got whatever they asked for. They know that even between two states which feel a coincidence of interest, the precise relationship is established by a process of bargaining. Even in the period of the closest Anglo-American confrontation during World War II, bargaining characterized the relationship.

So Mr. Hamilton, I would expect that the Israeli-United States relationship would be in a constant state of negotiation. But the major point I am making is that the United States really has no choice but to back the Israeli horse as long as the Soviets are backing the Egyptian horse. Exactly how is another story.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. But at that very point, the Israelis almost don't have a choice because, according to your scenario, the Russians have to have the stamp of peace to satisfy their needs in the Middle East. The Israelis, according to what you said earlier, would get a shorter end of the stick if it is a Russian stamp of peace, so the Israelis have the same situation we have. They want to cooperate and not be too recalcitrant to the point that the U.S. plan fails and the Russian plan takes over, because at that point they will lose.

They have the same problem we have of being independent, but not being so independent as to cause Rogers to throw up his hands and go home.

PRESENT ATTITUDE PREFERRED

Dr. DINERSTEIN. I think if the Israelis really had to choose between the present American attitude and a hypothetical American attitude of complete disgust, they would pick the present one. But I don't think the Israelis have to worry too much about a Russian peace forced on them by the United States, because the kind of proposals that the Russians might make would not be very attractive to the Americans.

So I think the situation is that as long as the Americans are putting pressure on the Israelis to make concessions to the degree that it will satisfy the Egyptians, the American-Israeli relations will be strained. But when the Americans give up that game and the Russians start to put pressure on the Israelis to make the kind of concessions which will make it possible for the Russians to deliver the Egyptians, American-Israeli relations will improve, because the United States will be worried that the Israelis will give in, in desperation. You can't expect in the relations between any two powers that their interests should be coincidental and that there shouldn't be a great deal of friction between them in this kind of relationship.

Mr. HAMILTON. Dr. Laqueur, would you comment on the general question, on the implications of your analysis for the U.S. policy in the Middle East?

Dr. LAQUEUR. America should have a strong presence in the area, not to dominate it, but to make it possible for the area to keep its independence.

In foreign policies, it does not pay to be ambiguous, and I think quite a few wars, including wars in recent times, could have been prevented if there would have been less ambiguity. It could be made clear to the Russians tactfully but forcefully that the United States has at this time no intention to leave the area.

As for the Arab-Israeli conflict, only time will provide a solution. Meanwhile, attempts should be made to defuse a dangerous situation.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Bingham.

PRESIDENTIAL POWERS LEGISLATION

Mr. BINGHAM. Continuing this particular discussion, I wonder if you would care to comment on this problem. There is, as you know, currently being considered in the Senate, legislation that would attempt to define the President's power to enter into hostilities without the approval of Congress.

If legislation were enacted that appeared to diminish the President's powers to rule militarily in the Middle East, without prior approval by Congress, what would be your view as to the effect of this on Soviet thinking?

Dr. LAQUEUR. My instinctive reaction would be against this, despite the fact that there are great risks involved. But the danger facing a democracy is that it is almost impossible anyway to have a foreign policy which looks ahead more than a few months.

If the powers of the President—or the Prime Minister—are further limited, then it will become almost impossible to pursue a foreign policy, and this is very dangerous in a world in which most states are not democracies. It might reduce a democracy to impotence in foreign affairs.

Mr. BINGHAM. Dr. Dinerstein.

Dr. DINERSTEIN. I think I would put a different emphasis on that, because once you answer that question, I start feeling less like an analyst of international politics and more like an American voter. I share the general mood in the country that we have had too much foreign policy in the last few years, or too much foreign policy that has miscarried, that the interest costs have been enormous, that the Vietnamese war has alienated a whole generation of our best young people, that it has caused a demoralization that will take years to repair. With such an attitude, one would like to see restraints on the Executive.

I agree with Mr. Laqueur that you don't get anything for nothing; and if you introduce those restraints, you pay a certain price for them in flexibility. But I think at the present juncture of American political life, I would be prepared to pay that price largely because I think that what we need is a détente in American domestic life as much and even more than we need a détente with the Russians.

We have to have a period of domestic peace and tranquility where the divisions which have become so disturbing in our own society are closed. So I think that if the Congress indicated by a resolution or by some partial legislation that they were going to exert a larger role in the key question of war or peace, it would have a deterrent effect on whoever was in the White House.

So on the whole, viewing it more from the domestic angle than from the international angle, I would favor such restrictions.

CONGRESSIONAL RESTRAINT

Mr. BINGHAM. It is possible that there could be a measure that would provide a greater degree of congressional restraint, but not necessarily at the instant of the crisis. Some of the proposals suggest

that Congress should approve any military action within 30 days after it is initiated; and another type of approach, which is my own, is that either House should be able to veto whatever the President does at any time.

But I am concerned, as Dr. Laqueur is, that anything that seems to signal to the Soviets that the United States might be impotent to move in the Middle East, is going to create a greater degree of confidence on the part of the Soviets that they can do more or less as they please.

For example, we ought to make it abundantly clear what the 6th Fleet is there for. I took that to mean there would be a response in the event of some Soviet military intervention. But if we flag in advance that this is going to be subject to congressional debate, aren't we just inviting a greater degree of lack of caution on the part of the Soviets?

Dr. DINERSTEIN. It is pretty clear now that the Soviets believed that we would not respond in Korea, that we were not interested in Southern Korea, and that is why we had withdrawn the bulk of our forces. Thus they were shocked that we did respond so promptly.

I think their misjudgment was understandable because no one in Washington knew the day before how Truman would decide. The Soviets also believed that we would not respond in Cuba when they put their missiles in.

They have made mistakes and from them have learned that you must not assume that if the United States is passive on Monday it will not react sharply on Tuesday, thus while I think it is possible that they would be somewhat misled by congressional desire to participate in the formation of policy, they have learned from experience that U.S. response, Executive and legislative, to a new threat can be very rapid.

NOT THE REAL ISSUE

But I don't think that is the real issue. I don't think that the issue is the U.S. President wants to get the United States involved in a war in the Near East and the Congress doesn't want him to. I don't think that is really the issue.

I think the issue, is that even if you agree that the President has a right to react immediately when the safety of American forces are involved or American personnel is attacked, it does not mean then that for the next 10 years that everything that flows out of that initial decision has to be rubberstamped?

I can understand how the Congress feels, that it is very hard to vote against appropriations to support American citizens who are fighting. But that is like the question: "When did you stop beating your wife?"

But I don't believe that legislation which accepted the President's right to respond immediately and independently in the first hours of the crisis, but insisted that the Congress be brought in as soon as possible and consulted at each stage where new commitments were made, would give the Soviet Union false notions about our determination to safeguard our interests.

Mr. BINGHAM. I think we are not in disagreement then at all, because I agree with that and I agree with your analysis of what the situation in Vietnam has done to the American body politic.

Would a treaty arrangement between the United States and Israel either bringing Israel into NATO, which is occasionally discussed, or some bilateral treaty arrangement which would make it clear that the United States was obligated to defend Israel against the Soviet attack contribute to—well, to put the case generally, what would the impact of that be on Soviet policy?

Dr. LAQUEUR. Anything which reduces ambiquity should be welcome and any such form of treaty agreement, in theory at any rate, would be welcome. It would as far as the Soviet Union is concerned reduce the element of doubt and uncertainty. On the other hand, I doubt whether this is practical politics because I do not know how much support there would be in this country and in NATO for this idea.

NATO anyway faces a crisis and it is doubtful whether it would want to accept new members.

Mr. BINGHAM. So am I. I was asking the question to highlight my concern about what the Soviet feeling is and if they faced a definite situation of that kind, I think you have answered the question that this would contribute.

Dr. LAQUEUR. Provided such a treaty is credible.

GREEK GUERRILLAS

Mr. BINGHAM. Let me ask you a couple of very specific questions.

I was a little surprised just historically, Dr. Dinerstein, in your statement that the Soviets had not supported the Greek guerrillas; is that well established today? It certainly was not at the time, as I recall it.

Dr. DINERSTEIN. I must say I was surprised, and the first people who appraised me of it were Yugoslavs who explained to me that when they were supporting the Greek guerrillas, the Soviet Union wasn't and that was one of the main causes of their disagreement with the Soviet Union.

It is quite clear to me that the Soviet Union opposed the Greek guerrilla movement in 1944, 1945, and 1946. You could tell from reading Pravda, but I don't know if the Soviet Union shifted from discouraging the Greek guerrilla movement toward supporting it when they thought it began to have a chance.

There the evidence was not clear and I have no judgment. The Soviets opposed to Greek guerrilla movement for good reasons. They thought it would fail, they thought that the United States and Great Britain were more sensitive to the positions in Greece, than in Poland or in Hungary, and would react, as in fact they did.

So that from the Soviet point of view the Greek guerrillas did the Soviet Union a disservice because they were probably as much responsible for the Truman doctrine and the Marshall plan as anybody else.

Mr. BINGHAM. Was our intelligence at fault at the time in linking this to the Soviet aggressiveness?

Mr. DINERSTEIN. I think what you have is a kind of selective hearing. In international relations and domestic relations you never hear what you are unprepared to hear, it just doesn't come through the noise. It seems to me retrospectively you can make out a very per-

suasive case, not a conclusive case, but a very persuasive case that for the most of the period and certainly for the period that the Truman doctrine was enunciated, that the Soviet Union was opposed to the Greek guerrilla movement as being unwise.

Now I can't mention his name for reasons you will understand, but a good friend of mine who helped draft the Truman doctrine and helped write the speeches and who had access to all the information that our Government had access to, has told me—that there was no inkling in the American Government that the Soviets opposed the Greek effort.

I think such failures in intelligence are common. I have had occasion in my career before I came to Johns Hopkins, to use intelligence materials. They are so voluminous that the choice nuggets are often missed, or fail to make their way upward and command the attention of the people who are making the policy, who are dealing with all the areas at once.

So I think it is too bad that the United States didn't realize that there was more room for negotiation in Greece than there was. I don't think it is abnormal that they weren't aware of it.

FINLAND AND THE SOVIET UNION

Mr. BINGHAM. Dr. Laqueur, I think you remarked, if I don't misquote you, about the foreign policy of Finland with regard to its external affairs that it was under the domination of the Soviet Union. Isn't that going too far? Isn't it a case that while Finland is certainly not going to do anything that the Soviet Union would consider a hostile act, would consider as a major action outside of that sphere, that Finland has followed a remarkably independent foreign policy line at the United Nations, for instance, the candidacy of their own person for Secretary-General? Weren't you being a little unkind to Finland?

Dr. LAQUEUR. I should have said the "right of veto." At times the Soviet Union has made liberal use of this and the Finns have refrained to do anything which might offend their powerful neighbors.

Mr. BINGHAM. One final question. I am a little puzzled as to what your feeling is about the Soviet attitude toward possible solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute. On the one hand, I think in response to a question you said that you expressed a more usual view that if the Arab-Israeli dispute were solved, the Soviets would have no excuse to maintain their large forces, elements in the Middle East, and that this would be to their disadvantage.

On the other hand, I understood you to say in your paper that the Arab-Israeli dispute was becoming a nuisance because so long as it existed, the Arabs would be nationalists first and that the chances of getting them to turn toward communism would be greater if that dispute were solved.

Now I see some inconsistency there and I wonder if you can resolve it for me.

Dr. LAQUEUR. You have put your finger on a real inconsistency. But I ought to say in mitigation that the inconsistency is inherent in the situation. The Soviet Union carefully weighs advantages and disadvantages of various courses of actions.

If there would be peace tomorrow the chances of survival of certain Arab countries would not be very good. They survive as a result of

the general climate of national solidarity in the Arab world in which all the conflicts are swept under the carpet.

The moment there will be peace, all of these conflicts will come out with a vengeance. But this does not mean that the United States should not work for peace in the Middle East.

As for the Soviet Union, peace means that its military presence will lose to a certain extent. Its raison d'être, which, of course, is undesirable from the Soviet point of view. On the other hand the political situation of—shall we call them "friends of the Soviet Union"—will be much easier once the present climate of national solidarity no longer exists, once all the tensions and conflicts come to the fore.

So there is a contradiction here, but the contradiction is inherent in the situation.

Mr. BINGHAM. Could we call it a case of slushing?

SOVIET EXPLANATIONS OF MIDWEST POLICY

Mr. HAMILTON. One of the favorite terms in American foreign policy today is lower profile and lower posture. I take it from what you have said, the same sentiment is developing within the Soviet Union perhaps, and that they are beginning to wonder whether their investments are paying off.

How do the Soviets explain internally their very large investment in the Arab world today?

Dr. LAQUEUR. There is an element of criticism no doubt. People are grumbling, saying why should we give these people billions worth of arms and aid. What do we get out of it? But Russia is not a democracy and the impact of public opinion is strictly limited—unlike in this country.

On the whole, many Russians are proud that their country is now a superpower, whereas to many people in this country this is something undesirable, immoral, anti-American. For this reason, Russians are more willing to shoulder commitments abroad. But of course, they are not asked.

This does not mean that there is no grumbling about commitments and obligations of a big power, but I would say that there is a real difference between the political climate in the two countries.

SOVIET-ISRAELI RELATIONS

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you think the Soviets will try to reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel in the near future?

Dr. LAQUEUR. I think they are moving in that direction. I do not believe that they envisage the full diplomatic relations, but rather to aim at something like the American representation in Egypt. Probably they would like to have a few representatives in the Finnish Embassy which acts as a caretaker.

Mr. HAMILTON. What impact does the problem of Soviet Jewry have on their Middle East policy?

Dr. LAQUEUR. It has little direct impact even though it is a real problem from the Soviet point of view, and while they cannot solve the problem they try to make it less acute.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is it your impression that the Soviet Union has counseled military restraints to Egypt in their relationship to Israel?

Dr. LAQUEUR. Yes.

SUEZ CANAL

Mr. HAMILTON. How important is it to the Soviet Union to open up the Suez Canal?

Dr. LAQUEUR. It is a matter of some importance which, however, is frequently exaggerated. The Soviet Union for a variety of strategic and commercial reasons would like to see the canal opened, so would Italy, so would France. But it is not under any strong urgent immediate pressure. It could wait, if necessary, for years.

PERSIAN GULF

Mr. HAMILTON. With the developments in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, what do you see developing in terms of Soviet policy in that area as the British withdraw?

Dr. LAQUEUR. The general direction of the Persian Gulf has been one of the traditional spheres of interest not only of the Soviet Union, but of czarist Russia.

Once the British withdraw, and I do not envisage the emergence of a strong local force, I think it is quite likely that within a number of years the Soviet Union will emerge as a dominant force in this area. It has already told the Arabs that it is willing to be responsible for the defense of the area.

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, we thank you very much for your excellent statements and also your responses.

(The full text of Mr. Dinerstein's statement follows:)

SOVIET POLICIES IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Sub-Committees: I thank you for the opportunity to address this hearing. We shall proceed in this examination from a consideration of the lowest Soviet priorities in undeveloped countries to the highest. Since we in the United States have tended to regard the lowest priority Soviet goals as the most dangerous to our interests, and have framed our policies accordingly it is useful to start at the bottom of the Soviet scale of priorities.

The lowest Soviet priority in underdeveloped countries is to bring these countries to socialism through the instigation, or the support of, a communist revolution. I shall be arguing that the Soviet leaders and writers generally mean what they say in insisting that they do not believe in exporting revolution. Soviet leaders, whenver they are accused of meddling in the affairs of other countries, respond like a jack-in-the-box with a quotation from Lenin which warns of the folly of exporting revolution and then sit back smugly as if they have proved something. The very automaticity of the Soviet response to the charge of promoting revolution produces knowing, unbelieving smiles. But the historical record shows that the obviously self-serving Soviet claim is nevertheless valid. Let us examine the reasons for the cautious Soviet behavior.

SOCIAL REVOLUTION COSTLY

The costs of promoting social revolutions in foreign countries—whether they fail or succeed, are not negligible. If the revolution fails it discredits the local communist party and the Soviet Union whether the latter had actually inspired the revolt or found itself unable to repudiate a native revolutionary movement in which the local communist party was involved. Also an abortive revolution almost always damages whatever diplomatic efforts the Soviet government is pursuing at the time. Most governments do react sharply to efforts to subvert them, their leaders being unwilling to lose their posts, not to mention their heads. It is only natural that this sober view of the costs of unsuccessful attempts at

revolutions has affected the Soviet analysis of their chances for success. As we know, they were opposed unavailingly to Tito's, Mao's and the Greek guerillas' plans. In each case, they calculated that the time for revolution had not yet come, and that U.S. fears of communist expansion would cause a hardening of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. The Soviet leaders withheld support from Tito, Mao and the Greek guerrilla leader Markos, and as we all know Tito and Mao succeeded despite Soviet misgivings. But the United States was frightened by the expansion of communism and therefore changed its policy toward the Soviet Union. I am not suggesting that in the Soviet casting up of balance sheets, a successful communist revolution is not well worth intensified imperialist hostility. What I am insisting on is that when the expectation is that a communist revolution will fail, the cost of increased imperialist hostility is considered as unnecessary.

With the exception of Czechoslovakia, communist revolutions have all occurred in poor countries. This has meant high maintenance costs for the Soviet Union. These newly communist poor countries must either go through the heroic period of capitalist accumulation as did the Soviet Union in the twenties and thirties of they must founder, or they must continue with the support of the Soviet Union. The economic costs of the support of the Chinese revolution may not have been high by American standards but they were much more than the Soviet Union wanted to pay and the results from the Soviet point of view have been deplorable. The Cuban case is somewhat different. Costs have been very high, but on balance the Soviet leaders probably felt that Castro's conversion to communism has demonstrated that communism has not reached its limit of expansion and that has made it worthwhile.

U.S. AND SOVIET ASSUMPTIONS

This picture of Soviet restraint and caution hardly accords with Soviet decisiveness, the willingness to shoulder risks and assume heavy costs which have characterized their conduct in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. But one must distinguish between taking risks for possible gain and the assumption of costs to prevent a loss. On this question the United States and the Soviet Union share almost identical assumptions. For both the domino theory of international politics is a self-evident theorem of universal applicability. Thus the United States has felt that the loss of any position: West Berlin, Cuba, Taiwan, South Vietnam, Santo Domingo are obvious cases, would automatically lead to rapid and unacceptable further losses of countries within the American system. Similarly the Soviet Union has viewed the loss of East Germany, Poland, Hungary, or Czechoslovakia as the first of what would inevitably become a series which would not only shatter the international position of the Soviet Union but which would undermine communism in the Soviet Union. Given such an apocolyptic vision, it is no wonder that the Soviet Union has been firm, decisive and willing to incur high costs. Parenthetically, one might remark that on the whole the United States has behaved in the same fashion. The response to threats or perceived threats in West Berlin, in Taiwan, in Cuba, in Santa Domingo and Vietnam have been relatively prompt and the costs high. But to collapse the distinction between willingness to pay a lot to avoid losses, and the readiness to pay a lot to make gains is to becloud our understanding. Even at the height of the Cold War, Mr. Dulles, despite his genuine attachment to the battle against communism, was most reluctant to incur risks to make gains when opportunities were offered: the uprising in East Berlin in 1953 and the revolution in Budapest in 1956.

Another Soviet goal in underdeveloped countries is to extend the influence of the Soviet Union. This is the kind of vague and mouthfilling phrase which is often devoid of content. But I shall argue that it means something in this case. Calling it Great Poweritis might make it more concrete. The Soviet Union, like the Russian empire, focused its foreign policy on bordering countries, and saw the opportunities for her expansion and threats to her survival as coming from and through these countries. Since World War II and especially since the Soviet acquisition of inter-continental military means (which neatly coincided with the death of Stalin) the Soviet Union has seen its opportunities as global and the threats to its own existence as coming from every quarter of the globe. Quite simply, the Soviet leaders felt that the time had come to play a role everywhere in the world as Great Britain had in its heyday and the United States was now

doing. The U.S. resolve to hold the line in Europe made the extension of Soviet influence there a dangerous game and the only areas where the Soviet Union could safely play the Great Power game was in the areas uncommitted to the United States by political and military alliances. By the time the United States had completed its alliance building in 1955, all the industrialized countries in the world (save Sweden and Switzerland) had been included and the Soviet Union had to begin its career as a global power in extending its influence in the poor countries of the world. The Soviet Union felt that the first step in gaining influence in these areas was to push its opponents out—and the means were readily at hand—the movements of independence and national self-assertion in the colonies. An early and instructive case is the Soviet support of the Jewish revolutionaries in Palestine in 1947 and 1948. The Soviet Union had no sympathy with Zionism, which was proscribed in the Soviet Union and could not have expected that the Zionists wanted to create a new communist state in Palestine. The purpose was to hasten the recession of the British presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. Similarly in 1958 when Soekarno became convinced that the C.I.A. had promoted a revolution in Indonesia, he readily accepted the Soviet offer of large scale military assistance. Once the rival is excluded as in Egypt or Indonesia, or the Soviet Union is admitted to competition as in India, the effort to extend influence begins. We shall postpone an evaluation of precisely what that influence has meant and first examine how it has been extended.

SKILLFUL SOVIET POLICY

The Soviet Union has conducted its policy in the underdeveloped areas of the world with a skill and deftness that stands in sharp contrast to the clumsiness and brutality of its policy toward socialist allies. The reason is not too far to seek. The Nassers, the Soekarnos, the Nehrus and the Allendes are not communists and therefore the Soviets expect only that they will be useful in reducing American power and extending Soviet power. Failure does not mean a crisis for the Socialist state system, merely a reverse. Therefore, policy has been conducted with, as international politics goes, a quite reasonable and sensible calculation of possible gains over possible costs. The failures of the Nassers and the Soekarnos do not mean the end of the world and the Soviet Union has been remarkably cold blooded about taking defeats and starting over again.

Another reason for the relative success of the Soviet Union can best be examined by contrasting it with the United States policy in underdeveloped areas. For a long time the United States policy in underdeveloped areas was based on the assumption that if somehow we could stimulate economic progress and development, we would be able to stop the spread of communism. This was an enormous task; it meant that the United States had to try to influence the course of events in many different countries of the world and to make it worse the people in charge of this policy had rather rigid, if not to say doctrinaire, notions about how economic progress and development should proceed combined with the fear that failure to bring economic plenty and democracy to these countries would offer great opportunities for the spread of communism. This meant that the United States could intervene in the economic, political and sometimes military affairs of any country that was not already part of the socialist state system. By contrast, the Soviet Union which was not defending itself against faceless and omnipresent dangers but simply seeking to maximize its influence in promising areas could concentrate its efforts and put relatively large resources in a few areas and satisfy itself with a token presence elsewhere.

A few selective instances may serve to illustrate Soviet flexibility. In Indonesia despite Soekarno's displacement and the destruction of the communist party of Indonesia in 1965 the Soviet Union has continued to maintain a position and to deny the United States a monopoly. If the major Soviet goals were to make Indonesia a communist country there would be little point in making its peace with a government which destroyed the communist party with an almost classic brutality. But since the goal of the Soviet Union in Indonesia is not to leave the field clear for the United States and to promote its relations with governments which view China as a rival, the Soviet Union finds it no difficulty in proceeding along this power politics line.

In the Indian sub-continent the Soviet Union has on the whole been much more successful than the United States. Both powers have to deal with one of the oldest problems in diplomacy: to win the favor of two states claiming the

same territory. Whatever the Pakistanis and the Indians say in public they view the Soviet Union as a country which is mainly interested in maximizing its own power and as a country which can be quite ruthless in that pursuit. The Soviet Union has been able to balance between the two parties much more successfully than the United States. Pakistan had everything to gain when the Soviet Union abandoned the policy of supporting India only. Since the U.S. had treaty commitments to Pakistan and seemed unlikely to substitute for its treaty with Pakistan a treaty with India, the Indians could not threaten to drop the Russians because they had made friends with the Pakistanis.

INDIAN DISAPPOINTMENT WITH U.S.

To oversimplify the matter it is precisely because the Indians have expected the United States to be benevolent and the Soviet Union to be self-seeking that they are deeply disappointed in the United States and accept the Soviet pursuit of its own interests as one of the realities of life.

In the Near East the Soviet Union came in at the invitation of Egypt in 1955. The original goal was to challenge first the British and then the American monopoly of influence in the area. But the Soviet commitment to Egypt has expanded so greatly, that now a Soviet goal is to retain its presence in Egypt. I shall not expand on this question because you have other testimony on that subject. I shall confine myself to saying that despite all the Soviet blunders, and there have been many, the Israelis cannot make peace in this area without the cooperation of the Soviet Union and the United States cannot impose a "just solution"—whatever that might be—on the Egyptians and Israelis. Therefore, if and it is a big if, some kind of peace comes to the area it will bear a Soviet stamp. True the Soviet Union has paid a large price for this accretion of influence but a generation ago it had no influence at all.

I am aware that there is a seeming inconsistency in my presentation thus far. How it might well be asked, does this picture of limited Soviet goals pursued with limited means square with the Soviet support of communism in Cuba, and Vietnam, a support which has been of critical if not essential importance. In both cases, the Soviet Union was reluctant to support a venture, for the reasons I have outlined, which seemed to have little prospects of a success. But in Cuba, when Castro announced his conversion to communism and for reasons difficult for the Soviet Union to fathom, the United States broke off its intervention in April 1961, communism seemed to have a good chance. A live communist infant was not the same as the possibilities of a pregnancy. Enthusiasm for this adopted child has had its ups and downs, but neither has it been abandoned nor does it seem likely to be.

While Khrushchev was in power the Soviet Union was extremely stand-offish in its relations with North Vietnam and offered little except advice. However, at the beginning of 1965, with the large scale bombing of North Vietnam and the introduction of large numbers of American troops, the Soviet Union for the first time had to face the political and psychological losses attendant upon the unopposed intervention of the United States in a country allied to the Soviet Union. Under these pressures, and not to be minimized, the pressure of competition with communist China, the Soviet Union has provided very effective military and economic assistance to North Vietnam whose effects have been felt in South Vietnam. To summarize: the Soviet Union is reluctant to support communist movements before they have succeeded but once they are established it has, in its own view, very little choice in the matter.

SOVIETS FOLLOW BRITISH MODEL

What are the future prospects of Soviet involvement in the affairs of poor countries which are not in any of the alliance systems or which like Chile, in South America, have to all intents and purposes severed their relationship with the United States alliance system. On the whole the Soviet Union has been mechanically trying to replicate the British model. As someone has said rather facetiously, but perceptively, the Soviets want to restore the British lifeline to India. But the situation in the last three decades of the twentieth century is very different from that situation in the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century. In the earlier period, colonies were rightly or wrongly viewed by both the colonial peoples and the imperial powers as important accretions to the strength of the imperial power. But now their sig-

nificance is different. Instead of a string of colonies and protectorates upon which the sun never sets, a great power now collects importunate, and ultimately always dissatisfied clients. Colonies used to provide revenues; now clients make economic demands and cause diplomatic complications. In the early part of the twentieth century, the British navy protected the lifeline to India, the chain of colonies and protectorates stretching from Gibraltar to the Indian Ocean, and the British navy in the Indian Ocean was the symbol of British power and its determination to remain in India indefinitely. But now when a communist India is a nightmare for Soviet leaders, the presence of the Soviet navy in the Indian Ocean is simply a feature of Great Poweritis and of only limited utility in the pursuit of limited Soviet goals in India.

Now the collection of expensive and demanding clients is a sucker's game. To a certain extent in areas where competition has abated, like Sub-Saharan Africa, the Soviet Union and the United States have understood that more clients means more trouble, not more glory. But in areas where emotional and political commitments have been made there seems to be no easy way of shaking off the Great Power burden which I have argued is quite different in quality from the imperial burden. I believe that in the long run the Soviet Union and the United States will sharply limit their economic and political involvement in the affairs of struggling nations which have little to add to the power of the Great Powers. But international politics is not a question of the long run: international politics deals in the present and in the proximate future. And in this period one can only expect continued turmoil and difficulties for the Great Powers.

(The full text of Mr. Laqueur's statement follows:)

Testimony of Walter Laqueur

Soviet dilemmas in the Middle East

It is the object of this presentation to define Soviet expectations and intentions in the Middle East with particular reference to the Arab world and to outline the main problems facing Soviet policy at this time. It is not my intention to give an historical account of Soviet policy in the Middle East; the developments that have led to the present stage are described and analyzed in two books of mine: "The Soviet Union and the Middle East" (1958) and "The Struggle for the Middle East" (1969 and 1971). The interest of the Soviet Union in the Middle East is that of a super power (which, unlike the United States, is not, or at any rate, not yet, a status quo power) in an adjacent area that offers good prospects for extending its political and military influence. Several circumstances have favoured these designs: The area is militarily weak, politically unstable and divided, economically, with a few exceptions, underdeveloped. Unlike Western Europe the Middle East—with the exception of Turkey—is not part of the Western defence system. The risks the Soviet Union is likely to incur in its forward policy in the area are therefore infinitely less than in Europe, or indeed in many other parts of the world. Having said this I ought to add immediately that I do not think direct Soviet military involvement in the area at present is very likely; at any rate, not substantially in excess of what there is already. While the Chinese danger is uppermost in Soviet minds, Moscow has other more urgent preoccupations: To neutralize Western Europe, on the basis of the status quo, to pursue an active role in the Indian subcontinent, to bring about the withdrawal of American forces from Europe and other parts of the world.

Controlled tension a goal

This is not to say that the Middle East no longer enjoys high priority in Soviet strategy, it simply means that the Soviet leaders want at present no more than controlled tension in the area. It seems to be clear that direct Soviet military involvement in the area, quite apart from the risk of a wider conflagration, would defeat some of their designs elsewhere such as the European Security Conference to which they attribute at present greater importance. The Soviet leaders seem to have realized that it is impossible to combine a *detente* even in the limited sense (as they interpret it), with a war involving Soviet forces in the Middle East.

But I ought to add two *caveats* to this seemingly reassuring perspective: Once the Soviet Union will be under less pressure from China, once it has made more progress in Europe, once it has restored "order" as far as the unruly satellites are concerned, it will no doubt pursue a more determined policy in the Middle East involving higher risks. The second *caveat* is this: I have spoken so far about Soviet intentions and policies, about the controlled tension, which seems best to serve its purposes. But the Soviet Union is not in full control in the Middle East, not even after having concluded a pact with Egypt which provides for very close ties indeed between the two countries. The tension may get out of control; one can imagine more than one such scenario in the context. In this case, and if things should go badly for its allies, the Soviet Union may well find itself drawn into a direct military engagement despite the fact that this would be contra indicated as far as other, more important Soviet interests are concerned.

The attractions of the Middle East as far as the Soviet Union is concerned can be easily defined. Geographically proximity is an obvious factor. Ten years ago, or even five, I would not have mentioned oil in this context, for until recently the Soviet Union was self-sufficient in this respect. But Soviet (and Eastern European) consumption is now outstripping production and there is little doubt that toward the end of the present decade Middle Eastern oil will figure as a major factor in Soviet strategy. But more important than economic and even military factors (such as bases in Egypt and elsewhere) are political considerations, even if these may appear at first sight somewhat abstract and intangible. Expansion in a southward direction has been one of the constant factors in Russian foreign policy for more than two hundred years. Furthermore, and more concretely, if the Middle East became an exclusive Soviet sphere of influence this would have far reaching repercussions on the situation in Europe as well as in Africa and Asia. It would constitute, in fact, a radical change in the global balance of power. It is not my assignment here to describe in detail the probable consequences: they are all too obvious.

Soviet policy in the Middle East at present aims, very briefly, at the neutralization of Turkey and Iran and at the installation in the Arab world of regimes on which it can rely for close collaboration on the pattern established under President Nasser. The general assumption behind this policy was that power in the Arab countries is bound to pass gradually into the hand of people even more closely identified with Soviet policies. It was generally expected that there would be ups and downs in this process and occasional setbacks. But about the general trend of development there is (or to be precise: was—until recently) little doubt in Moscow. There is no denying that events in Egypt, Syria, Algeria and other countries in the nineteen sixties seemed to bear out Soviet expectations. There was a progessive radicalisation in domestic affairs in these countries as well as growing identification with Soviet policies: factories and banks were nationalized, important sections of the state apparatus were revamped according to the Soviet model etc. But beyond a certain point the Soviet Union has so far failed to make progress and therefore more sober thoughts have prevailed in Moscow about the rate of political progress not only in the Middle East but in the third world in general.

SOVIET POTENTIAL IN MIDDLE EAST

To amplify what I mean I have to refer in some detail to the circumstances which have favoured, and still favour the Soviet advance in the Middle East and to the factors that impede it. I have already mentioned the intrinsic weakness of the area—political, military, and economic. To this one should add the shortsightedness and political inexperience of some of its leaders. These are no doubt absolutely genuine in their frequent professions of unswerving devotion to national independence. But the result of the policies they have pursued has not been to strengthen their independence; on the contrary, they have become dependent from the Soviet Union to a growing degree. True enough, there have been growing misgivings in the Arab world—not only since the recent events in the Sudan. But to assuage these misgivings it is usually argued that the Soviet Union is a disinterested country which in contrast to the Western imperialists has no desire to interfere in internal Arab affairs. The simple geopolitical facts of political life have not yet been fully accepted in the Arab world: The mistaken idea

still persists that the Soviet Union is not only a benevolent but also a geographically distant country. (The distance between the Egypt and Soviet border—not to mention Iraq and Syria—is in actual fact less than that between Cairo and Khartum or between Cairo and Tripoli). The countries of the Middle East have been sidetracked by their internal quarrels to such an extent, that the question whether an Egyptian (or Syrian or Iraqi) victory over Israel would be worthwhile if it could be achieved only at the price of Egypt's independence is brushed aside as irrelevant. Whatever Arab feelings about Israel this state does not constitute a serious threat to the independence and sovereignty of the Arab countries, for the simple reason that a small country is not a big power and that moreover there is no "Israeli party" in Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad which could seize power from within. There is, on the other hand, a "Russian party" which as recent events have shown is a strong contender for leadership. Yet in most Arab eyes Israel is still the main, not the lesser danger: Somehow, it is argued, they will get rid of the Russians once Israel is defeated and the Arab world will then regain its full independence and freedom of action. It is a striking example of what some Marxist philosophers call "false consciousness" and it helps to understand why Soviet policy has encountered so far an exceedingly favorable psychological climate.

COMPLICATIONS ARISE

But the more deeply the Soviet Union has become involved in the Middle East, the more complicated its position. To a certain extent this was an inevitable process: While the West was "in", and the Soviet Union "out" in the Middle East, Moscow did not have to take sides—just as it could be on friendly terms with both India and Pakistan, to give an example from another part of the world. The West had the monopoly of committing mistakes, whereas the Soviet Union could do no wrong. Progressive involvement in Arab affairs meant that Moscow has had to choose, to join sides in the many existing conflicts. The existence of Communist parties and pro-Russian factions in the Arab world is the main bone of contention but by no means the only one. The Soviet Union cannot at one and the same time support General Numeiry and those who want to overthrow his regime; it can be tried—but the attempt is bound to fail. If the Soviet Union were just a big power the dilemmas facing it would be less acute. But since it is also the head of the world Communist movement, its position has become even more difficult. It cannot opt out entirely from its commitments to its local followers without causing fatal damage to the legitimacy of its claims for leadership—and this at a time when its authority as the leader of the Communist camp is in dispute anyway.

Soviet policy makers have become reconciled to the fact that political power in the Arab world—certainly in the so called "progressive countries"—will remain for a long time to come in the hands of military juntas, rather than political parties supporting Moscow. This, from the Soviet point of view, is not *per se* a major disaster. Since the Communist bloc lost its monolithic character, the Soviet Union can no longer count on the automatic support of other Communist parties, unless it also happens to be in physical domination of the country concerned. Albania is Communist and Finland is not, but there is little doubt that Soviet policy makers vastly prefer the Helsinki over the Tirana government. To give another example: Many Communist parties dissented from the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 whereas the military governments of Egypt, Syria or Algeria supported it without reservation. The Soviet leaders may therefore be forgiven for reaching the conclusion that in a critical situation they can rely more on clients than on purely ideologically motivated supporters. The advantages of having to deal with non-Marxist rulers are obvious: Consideration of "proletarian internationalism" of "socialist humanism" etc. are not likely to enter the picture. The clients can be relied upon to support Soviet policy, because they need Soviet help.

And yet, there is a basic element of uncertainty with regard to the political orientation of these military regimes and the situation is by no means satisfactory from the Soviet point of view. Ten years ago Soviet policy makers were far more optimistic about the intentions and political prospects of the military dictatorships in the third world than at present. The reasoning at the time was briefly this: Military leaders such as Nasser were "radical democrats in uniform." Even though their outlook was as yet beclouded by certain petty bourgeois

prejudices it was assumed that the "objective logic" of events would carry them into much closer collaboration with the Communists and the Soviet Union than they had originally envisaged and intended. For they were not acting in a political vacuum; once the means of production had been nationalized and capitalism was on the way out, the ruling officers, needing a political mass basis, were bound to turn to "scientific socialism"; i.e., to the Communists. For only these could provide the doctrine and the political know-how needed for the mobilization of the masses.

HALF-TRUE NOTIONS

In recent years it has been realized that this appraisal has been overoptimistic. Communism found it difficult at the time to understand fascism because economic factors were not sufficient to explain Hitler's and Mussolini's policy. In a similar way Communists now begin to realize—though they are as yet from a full understanding—that their previous notions about the situation in the Middle East were at best half true. Economic changes do not necessarily have the expected political results, military leaders can turn with equal ease "left" and "right" in rapid succession, to apply terms of classification which should be used as sparingly as possible with reference to Middle Eastern politics. As a result there is now hardly veiled disappointment in Moscow about the agonizingly slow progress made by Communism in parts of the third world, about the "complicated state of affairs", about the fact that army officers may be power-hungry, or "career motivated" even if they constantly use the anti-imperialist political rhetoric which should endear them to the Communist camp. These shortcomings and "inconsistencies" of the junta are more frequently explained with reference to the "petty bourgeois background" of the military rulers. But it is doubtful whether such explanations take one much further: There is nothing "petty bourgeois" about a man who was born in a Bedouin tent and now disposes billions of dollars such as Colonel Khadafi. The real explanation for the apparent "inconsistencies" is much easier: In the struggle for power between rivalling officers' groups ideological considerations play usually a secondary role. Nationalization of industries and banks and agrarian reform by no means lead to socialism or Communism; the ideological climate prevailing in the Arab world is populist, nationalist-socialist, as it is, *mutatis mutandis*, in China and the Soviet Union. The decisive issue in the third world, including the Arab countries, is not whether the state has the monopoly of foreign trade but in whose hands political power has come to rest; who is running the state.

THREE CONTRADICTIONS

In this context Soviet policy in the Middle East has to face three contradictions which it cannot shirk and to which so far it has not been able to find a satisfactory answer. The first has already been hinted at: According to the Soviet blueprint the progressive military rulers were gradually to "democratize political life", i.e., hand over power to the avant-garde, the Communists. But in fact the Colonels and the Majors have not shown the slightest intention to do so. They have been dealing ruthlessly with those challenging their power. According to Soviet expectations the military were to be politicized, i.e., made to share power with civilian leaders; in fact, the opposite has happened: Political life has been militarized, with Syria as a striking example. (The take over of the Neo-Ba'th by the Syrian army command). It could be argued with some justification that since the ruling juntas do not constitute a political homogenous body, it may still be possible for pro-Communist or pro-Russian elements among them to effect a take over and to oust their rivals. This possibility does exist: In view of the weakness of political structures in the Arab world a handful of determined people stand a good chance to make a successful bid for power, provided, of course, they are in control of army units or the political police. And, with a little luck, they may keep it. But a pro-Communist or pro-Russian coup in one country is bound to provoke with almost mathematical certainty suspicion and antagonism in others and to give rise to counterforces: Victory in one country will mean defeat elsewhere. In other words: Unless the pro-Russian forces make steady and even progress in all the key countries of the Arab world, the overall balance as far as the Soviet Union is concerned may be negative.

The Arab-Israeli dispute has become increasingly problematical from the Soviet point of view. Earlier on it undoubtedly facilitated the Soviet advance in the Middle East. It was not the only, nor the single most important factor. The

forces supporting the Soviet Union have made their greatest strides in those parts of the Middle East least affected by the Arab-Israeli dispute such as the Sudan. But in recent years the conflict has become a major obstacle as far as the further progress of Communism is concerned. While the conflict lasts, the overriding aim of defeating the common enemy (Israel) narrowly circumscribes Communist action or tends altogether to prevent it. For the Communists cannot afford to ignore the appeals for national solidarity and for a truce both inside the Arab countries and between them. Soviet observers assume, not perhaps altogether wrongly, that but for the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, power in the Arab capitals may well have passed from the "bourgeois nationalist elements" into the hands of the "radical democrats" if not the Communists. Certainly the Arab world would be in a state of far greater internal turmoil but for the struggle against Israel which acts as a stabilizing factor. Soviet leaders could have instructed their followers according to the basic tenets of Leninist strategy to transform the war against Israel into a "revolutionary war". They have not done so, partly, because the Communists are too weak, given the present balance of power in the Arab world, partly because such a course of action, if successful, would result in a state of anarchy which may well benefit the pro-Chinese rather than the pro-Soviet elements among the radicals in the Arab world.

SOVIST OPTIONS NOTED

These are some of the sources of conflict facing the Soviet Union in its policy vis-a-vis the Arab countries. There is every reason to assume that these contradictions will loom even larger in the years ahead. But what are the options open to Soviet policy? Developments in Algeria over the last few years have been disappointing from the Soviet point of view, Khadafi's regime in Libya and Numeiri's in the Sudan are at present openly anti-Communist and Sadat's rule constitutes a retreat in comparison with Nasser's. Soviet policy makers cannot possibly be very happy about the new Arab federation. For its political significance, if any, will be that of a reactionary "Holy Alliance" preventing revolutionary uprisings in its components parts. It is the Arab version of the Brezhnev doctrine—stood on its head. The fact that it might be applied against Jordan, for instance, does not offer much comfort. Events in the Sudan earlier this year have foreshadowed the shape of things to come. Soviet expectations that military dictatorships *tout court* cannot hold on to power for long because they lack political know-how and a mass basis have not so far been borne out by the course of events. These assumptions may still be correct in the long run; Nasser, too, had his quarrels with the Communists and the Soviet Union but mended his ways towards the end of his rule. But it cannot be taken for granted that the present rulers will emulate Nasser; moreover, there is no certainty at all that the military leaders in their search for political allies will turn to the Communists for help. If the Soviet Union should decide to support the opposition to the military regimes, they will be inviting open conflict, risking their past gains in the area and even a restoration of closer relations between these leaders and the West. For despite the vituperation heaped on the West, it cannot be excluded that the help of the West will be looked for by military dictators facing defeat by the Communists. If, on the other hand, the Soviet Union and its supporters in the Arab countries should prefer a policy of wait-and-see, on the assumption that the political constellation will be more auspicious at some future date (after another lost war against Israel or the continuation of the military stalemate and the ensuing frustration, or some major economic setback, or the growth of popular discontent for yet other reasons) they will be in danger of being outflanked from the left by more extreme factions.

It seems, nevertheless, that Soviet policy is most likely to follow a cautious course of action. Provided that there will be no reconciliation with China or that for other reasons a decisive shift in the global balance will not take place in the near future, it is clearly in the Soviet interest to "freeze" the situation. Sadat's regime may be highly unsatisfactory as a guarantee for the Soviet investment (political, military and economic) in the Middle East but at the moment there may be no alternative. It follows that Soviet policy in the short run is likely to be defensive, to aim at consolidating its gains rather than trying to make further advances. Any gamble would be dangerous in the present constellation, for it could result in further setback which might have undesirable repercussions inside the Soviet Union: It would provide ammunition for a faction inside the Kremlin

which challenges the present leadership. Personal changes in the Soviet leadership are almost certainly bound to take place in the next few years, and since such *revisements* usually take place on the background of a struggle for power, the present leadership will probably opt for the least risky policy in order not to expose itself to attacks by its opponents.

SOVIETS NOT IN FULL CONTROL

Nevertheless, it cannot be stressed too often that since the Soviet Union is not in full control as far as events in the Middle East are concerned, not even the actions of their followers and clients, there is always a very considerable element of uncertainty. It would be foolish for this as well as for other reasons, to assume that the Soviet leadership will automatically pursue a cautious policy simply because this is at the present moment in its best interest. Moreover, "freezing" in the Middle East context means the continuation of "controlled tension"—but there is no guarantee that tension will not go out of control. "Consolidation" does by no means imply that the Soviet Union will be condemned to prolonged inactivity. The treaty of friendship between the Soviet Union and the UAR concluded in May 1971 undoubtedly constitutes a step forward from the Soviet point of view. President Sadat had to sign a document which stated that the UAR set itself the aim of reconstructing Egyptian society along socialist lines, despite the fact that "socialism" now figures in Egyptian pronouncements less frequently (and Islam more often) than in Nasser's day, and that, in any case, socialism as envisaged by Egypt's rulers differs in many essential points from the Soviet idea and practice of socialism. More sweeping and potentially more threatening is paragraph nine of the treaty which states that the high contracting parties will not take part in any groupings of states, *or in actions or measures* directed against the other high contracting party. This provision exposes Egypt, in theory, at any rate, to the application of the Brezhnev doctrine.

Whether the Soviet Union will be able to enforce by military intervention the rights it obtained under the treaty is yet another question, the answer to which depends from the general balance of power and the risks it will be running in taking such action. At present the main aim of Soviet policy in the Middle East remains, to summarize, the consolidation of its gains, and at the same time the creation of a political climate in which the replacement of the present rulers by others more closely identified with Soviet ambitions in the area will be possible with a minimum of friction. The more distant aim is the transformation of the military regimes into political coalitions dominated (or at least guided by the Communists). But this remains for the time being a fairly remote prospect inasmuch as the key countries in the Arab world are concerned. Soviet policy towards Israel will not undergo any basic change, though it is quite possible, and indeed likely that there will be occasional friendly gestures towards Jerusalem in order to impress the Arabs that they must not take Soviet assistance for granted in all circumstances.

Altogether, the Middle East is an area in world politics to which Soviet commentators apply the term "slozhni" (complicated) more and more frequently. Ten years ago they were more confident than now of having all the answers.

Mr. HAMILTON. The joint subcommittee stands adjourned until tomorrow at 2 p.m.

(The joint subcommittee adjourned at 11:55 a.m., to reconvene at 2 p.m. of the following day, Wednesday, October 20, 1971.)

SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE WESTERN RESPONSE

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1971

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEES ON EUROPE
AND THE NEAR EAST,
Washington, D.C.

The joint subcommittee met at 2 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin S. Rosenthal (chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe) presiding.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The subcommittee will be in order.

The joint subcommittee meetings will continue today on the subject of "Soviet involvement in the Middle East and the Western response."

Our first witness will be Prof. Richard Pipes of the department of history of Harvard University who will discuss the subject matter of "Historical Perspectives on the Soviet Middle Eastern Role," followed by Richard T. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, and Jack F. Matlock, Director, Office of Soviet Affairs, Department of State.

I must regrettably report that at the urgent request of the Department of State we have agreed to go into executive session at the conclusion of Professor Pipes' testimony.

Professor, we would be very pleased to hear from you.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD PIPES, PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, RUSSIAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

(The biography of Mr. Pipes appears on p. 187.)

Mr. PIPES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have been asked to summarize in 20 minutes my views on the historical factors which conditioned the post-1945 Russian approach to the Middle East. This is a difficult thing to do not only because of the limitation of time but also and above all because a historian hesitates to establish a direct link between the past, the present, and the future.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, if I could interrupt Dr. Pipes, there is no reason for him not to submit a statement of any length, even book length if he would like to, but the problem is one of time. There would not be any time for exchanges and also for getting other witnesses in today. I feel, too, that there should not be an arbitrary limitation especially for a historian like yourself.

Mr. PIPES. Thank you.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I am requesting permission from the chairman; I don't have the power.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I thoroughly agree with what my colleague from New Jersey has suggested. We would be happy to take any written material at any length. I don't feel you should be too much inhibited by the 20-minute rule even if we go twice that much. You will be making a valid contribution.

Mr. PIPES. Thank you. I will talk as long as I can and then I will be open to questions.

LONG HISTORICAL TIES

One thing that needs stressing, to begin with, and that is not a matter of common knowledge, is that Russia from the earliest time of its history was in contact with the Middle East. By this I mean the Middle Eastern peoples, the Turks and the Mongols who historically have occupied the prairie to the south of the Russian forest zone.

Early Russian history is essentially preoccupied with the conflict between the forest zone and the prairie zone, between Slavs and the Turko-Mongols. When we speak of the Russian involvement in the Middle East we are not talking about relationships that began a century or two ago, but of events that go back a millenium, to the very beginnings of Russian history. This is of some importance because in the historic subconscious of the Russian people there is deeply imbedded a concern with the Orient and, more specifically, with the Muslim Middle East. Their involvement is not to be compared with that of the British or French who entered the Middle East rather late in their national histories.

As a result of the Mongol conquest of 1237–40, Russia became so closely involved in Middle Eastern and Far Eastern affairs that until the second half of the 17th century it may be said to have been a predominantly oriental country. By this I mean that its style of life, its attitudes toward politics, its social structure, its manner of conducting business, all were modeled on examples taken from the Orient—Persia, The Ottoman empire, and China. How deeply this oriental background penetrated Russia may be illustrated by the fact that the Russians to this day are the only Slavic people to use patronymics as part of their proper names (e.g., Ivan Ilich, meaning Ivan, son of Ilich)—a practice prevalent in the Middle East, and taken from there.

CONQUERED TURKEY

Until the middle of the 17th century the Russians tended to be on the defensive in regard to the nations who surrounded them in the east and south. Then, from the middle of the 17th century onward, thanks to political organization and military power which they had acquired from the West, they went over to the offensive and in the next century and a half established their supremacy in the areas north of the Black Sea. They became the dominant power here—conquering and subjugating their one-time Turkic rulers. To this day there are more Turks living in the Soviet Union than in the Turkish Republic. These are descendants of the people who had once surrounded Russia and dominated it and have subsequently been subjugated by the Russians.

From the 1660's onward the Russians tried to form anti-Ottoman coalitions with the other European states. Peter the Great was very

keen on this. His famous European trip was essentially undertaken for the purpose of gaining allies against the Turks. From then on Russians exerted relentless pressure on the Ottoman Empire; sometimes alone, sometimes in combination with the western powers, hoping to achieve a dismemberment of Turkey.

In the course of the 18th century the Russians cleared the Turks out from the northern shores of the Black Sea and began to cast their eyes on Constantinople and the Straits. Catherine the Great wanted to create an empire with Constantinople as its capital and she named her grandson Constantine with the hope that he would be its first emperor. At the same time she began to apply pressure on the Turks in the Balkans. Napoleon who was exceedingly astute realized Russia's oriental interests and not only offered the Russians lands belonging to the Ottoman Empire but also India, hoping in this manner to secure their support against England.

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The Russian pressure on the Ottoman Empire reached its peak under Nicholas I, who ruled from 1825 to 1855. Nicholas was absolutely determined to accomplish in regard to the Ottoman Empire what his grandmother Catherine had achieved in regard to Poland—that is, to dismember it in combination with other powers. He proposed this to the British and he got some support but when he went too far the British withdrew their support, and from the 1830's onward they became the principal bulwark of opposition to Russian expansion in the Middle East. They were the first ones to practice the policy of containment in regard to Russia in the Middle East. They were particularly frightened by the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi of 1833 which the Russians signed with the Ottoman Empire, and by virtue of which they became its virtual protectors. The treaty was effectively undone by the British and from then on the Russians and the British became avowed enemies. This Russo-British conflict reached its climax in the Crimean War. Their defeat in this war did not stop the Russians, and in the 1870's they began to exert renewed pressure on the Ottoman Empire, again hoping to establish a strong foothold in the Balkans. They gained the sympathy of the Slavic population living under Ottoman rule and by inciting them against their Turkish masters helped to subvert it from within.

In the war of 1877–78 the Russians defeated the Ottoman Empire and in the Treaty of San Stefano which followed, managed to carve up the Balkans in such a way that a vast satellite Bulgarian state was established which in effect would have given Russia domination of the Balkans and a very strong position in the Mediterranean. But once again the British moved in, thwarting the Russian ambitions in the Treaty of Berlin which forced the Russians to give up the most important provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano.

RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM

Until the latter part of the 19th century it was very difficult to find in Russian writings ideological justifications for Russian pressure on the Ottoman Empire. No one talked much about the duty of Russians to civilize that part of the world. The ideology of expansionism began

to emerge only at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century when Russian imperialists, people who really believed in empire building, began to argue that Russia's natural sphere of expansion lay not toward China but toward the Middle East because here were Russia's markets.

With the diplomatic revolution which occurred on the eve of World War I when Turkey switched its allegiance from Britain to the Central Powers, the British found themselves for the first time in nearly a century enemies of Turkey and friends of Russia. In the various negotiations which the British conducted with the Russians during World War I, fearing that the Russians may not last very long and might make separate peace, they promised the Russians Constantinople and the Straits as a reward for the victory over the Germans and Turks.

You may recall that the provisional government that came into power in February 1917 demanded fulfillment of the promises which the British and also the French had made to the imperial government. The provincial government insisted on the Allies giving Russia in the event of a successful outcome of the war the straits and Constantinople. This insistance was very unpopular in Russia because the left-wing parties, the Bolsheviks included, were very much opposed to Russia participating in imperialist spoils. (In preparing this testimony I checked in a Soviet textbook on the foreign policy of the Provisional Government and noticed to my surprise that no mention is made of the fact that in 1917 the Bolsheviks adamantly objected to Russia securing the straits and Constantinople.)

When the Bolsheviks came into power in October 1917 they began to broadcast very far-reaching promises to the Moslem peoples of the world. They were fundamentally following in the footsteps of Kaiser Wilhelm II who in his attempt to undermine the British Empire did likewise. They offered to act as their protectors and free them from the yoke of "imperialism." This did not last very long. Toward the end of the 1920's the Soviet Government became preoccupied with internal problems. First there was a struggle for power, then there was collectivization and industrialization, then there were the purges, then there was rearmament and the German danger, and in all this the Middle East dropped pretty much out of sight.

VIEWS OF STALIN

Stalin himself seemed to have had a rather low opinion of the importance of the Middle East. He attached far greater significance to the Balkans, to Eastern Europe, and to the Far East. We know from the Ribbentrop-Molotov negotiations, for example, that when the Germans were urging the Russians to move into the Persian Gulf and India, the Russians came back time and again demanding concessions in the Balkans and not in the Middle East. All through the Stalin era Russian interest in the Middle East tended to be rather subdued. After the war, 1945–46, the Russians made some noises about revising the Montreux convention and facilitating the passage of Russian vessels through the straits but they never pressed this demand very hard. Stalin simply was not interested in this part of the world.

The great reversal came in the mid-1950's with the advent to power of Khrushchev when the Middle East began to loom once again very

large on the horizon. Now here we are already outside of history, properly speaking, because we no longer have access to documents. We can only hypothesize why this renewal happened. I can offer you my own opinion. I believe the people who came into power in the mid-1950's were obsessed with Americans "encirclement" which was how they viewed what we called "containment." They had a strong desire to break out of it and they found an opportunity in the breakdown of American friendship with Egypt which allowed them as it were to leapfrog across the northern tier. Their foothold in the Middle East, in my opinion, was originally inspired by a desire to break out of the containment ring. In time it acquired a very different significance, however.

Originally, the Soviet Union supported Israel; it supplied it with arms, it backed it with votes in the United Nations. Afterwards, once it got itself involved in the Middle Eastern affairs, it had no choice but to support the Arabs because only by so doing could it maintain its precarious foothold there. This policy ultimately lead to tremendous complications committing the Russians much more than they had originally expected. The Soviet Union, I believe, presently is more deeply involved in the Middle East than many of its leaders would like. This subject is, however, outside of history. I will be glad to elaborate on it during the questioning period.

RUSSIAN EXPANSION

I would like to sum up. Russia traditionally expands into any area lying around its borders where it encounters weakness.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. When you use the word "traditionally," you mean simply in the past?

Mr. PIPES. No, I mean going as far back as the 14th century. Russia has always expanded, it is a land-based power which attaches great importance to the acquisition of land and subjects. Why this is so is a very complicated matter but I think it is easier to understand the answer if one puts it negatively: they are not a commercial people. Commerce has never played a large part in Russian life and they have not acquired the habit of negotiating implicit in trade. They tend to seize as much land and as much property as they can. They have always taken land close to their borders which no one defended very strongly. If they found strong defenses, they drew back; if they found a gap, they poured in. They did this against Poland, they did this in the Far East against China, and they did it against the Ottoman Empire. They have done so since 1945 against the British Empire in the Middle East.

Now it may seem that in 1945 the British Empire loomed overly large in the Soviet mind, but if we consider the situation during World War II, when Britain was one of the three world powers it becomes clearer why Stalin overestimated British power. It seemed to him that anything that could be done to get the British out of the Middle East would be good and this is the reason he helped Israel.

The Russians entered the Middle East and found nowhere a presence as strong as they had suspected. Here we have a traditional form of behavior which can be duplicated on Russia's eastern and western borders. From the 1830's to the early 1900's the Russians were stopped by Britain. Then the British presence weakened and historically

speaking the Soviet penetration in the Middle East can be explained by the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire which created an opportunity of Soviet land. The leap which they have accomplished in the mid-1950's has given them unprecedented opportunities for which there is no historical parallel because they are now entrenched—how securely I don't know, but certainly entrenched—in northern Africa, in the eastern Mediterranean, and even in East Africa. This is without precedent in Russian history.

I personally do not believe that Russia either had or has a very powerful national interest in the Middle East. One could have made a very good case for the British having a natural interest in the Middle East because it was the area straddling the link between their metropolis (England) and their most important possessions, notably India. If that lifeline were cut, Britain in effect would have been isolated from much of its empire. Such a point cannot be made in the case of the Soviet Union. I would say the Soviet Union is there because there was no one to defend the area and once there they exploited the opportunity to strengthen its hold. It would be very difficult to find any either economic or strategic reason justifying Russia's presence there.

RESPONSIBILITY OF EUROPE

I say all of this because it leads me to my principal practical conclusion which is that, I believe, it is incumbent not only upon the United States but also upon Western Europe to take a very strong stand to prevent further encroachments of the Soviet Union in this area and indeed to liquidate its present position there. Insofar as history is any guide, when the Russians expand they do not stop until they are stopped, that is, until they run into a superior force. In the Middle East they had in their past been stopped by the Turkic peoples, then the Ottoman Empire, and finally the British Empire. They have not really encountered any such a force during the past quarter of a century and hence their drive there.

I shall stop here and I shall be glad to elucidate any of my statements.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Doctor, it is correct in your view, I take it, to label the Soviet Union as an expansionist power?

Mr. PIPES. Yes, it is. It certainly is.

Mr. HAMILTON. And you don't see anything in recent history that alters that view at all; it indeed confirms it?

Mr. PIPES. By "recent history" you mean post-Stalin history?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.

Mr. PIPES. No. As a matter of fact, I would say that under Stalinism Russia had been less expansionist than it has been under his successors.

Mr. HAMILTON. In the Soviet scale of priorities, where does the Middle East rank as against China, Europe, Africa, Latin America?

Mr. PIPES. Well, Latin America can be written off, it is of no great importance to them. I do not deny the Russians might wish to establish a presence there but it does not concern them deeply. I think Europe is the No. 1 concern.

Mr. HAMILTON. Over China?

Mr. PIPES. The Chinese situation is a very special one, it is a situation arising from a particular conflict between Russia and China. I

have been addressing myself rather to general geopolitical considerations. I would say that geopolitically speaking Europe is their prime concern, but that now because of the conflict with China, China is the No. 1 priority and has been so for some time.

Mr. HAMILTON. What does the word "expansionist," as you use it here, mean? Domination? Influence? Control? How do you define the word "expansionist?"

Mr. PIPES. Expansionism can cover a whole spectrum of possibilities, all of them leading ultimately to absorption. I would say the Soviet Union prefers a friendly neutral government to an unfriendly government. It prefers an independent Communist government to a friendly neutral one, and a Moscow-dominated Communist government to one that is run by independent Communists.

NO MASTER PLAN

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you think then that the Soviet leaders today have in their master plan absorption of the Middle East?

Mr. PIPES. No, I don't think they have any master plan whatsoever.

Mr. HAMILTON. You don't think they have any kind of a master plan?

Mr. PIPES. No, I don't believe so at all.

Mr. HAMILTON. But they are still expansionists and they are going to move where the opportunities arise?

Mr. PIPES. Yes. Where the opportunity presents itself they move in, and that has been traditional Russian foreign policy.

Mr. HAMILTON. We are going to have kind of a vacuum of power in the Persian Gulf at the end of the year. Do you think they will have their eyes on that area?

Mr. PIPES. I think very much so.

Mr. HAMILTON. How would you expect that expansionism to manifest itself?

Mr. PIPES. I think insofar as Persia is concerned, it can become a bone of contention between the Russians and the Chinese. When this happens both parties will be looking for ways to win the favor of the government of Persia. That might well take the form of foreign aid to begin with, followed by perhaps an offer to help build up the armed forces and so on and so forth. I think that is the usual form that it takes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, what, if anything, do you see in Russian Middle East policy today that is different from its historical interests in that area?

Mr. PIPES. No, there really is not anything particularly different. I never could understand what their national reasons were for expanding into the Middle East. That is, some historians attach a lot of importance to access to warm water ports but Russia was never a great maritime power. Its export trade was never of such dimensions as to make it worthwhile to get involved in imperial competition. I think you are dealing with a kind of peasant mentality which believes—and it is fundamentally a kind of land-oriented country—that where there is land you ought to take it.

TURKEY LESS IMPORTANT

Mr. HAMILTON. Does that apply to the Turkish Straits, for example? Do you think they have their eye on that area?

Mr. PIPES. I think it is less important to them now than it used to be because today the Straits are strategically less valuable. They have jumped across the Straits, as it were. They have air bases, missile bases and so on, so I don't think the Straits are quite as important to them as in the past. But they would certainly like to have them, if that were possible.

Mr. HAMILTON. You have been around this question but let me ask you specifically how would you define Soviet goals in the Middle East today?

Mr. PIPES. To begin with let me answer by saying that I am not sure they are clear themselves what their goals are. That is, it is perfectly possible for a country to get involved in a situation and then find that the goal has been met but other problems have arisen from it. I would say probably no one in Russia really knows what the long-range goal is, but right now strategically and politically speaking the most important goal is to keep the Chinese out. If the Chinese should establish a strong foothold in the Middle East, Russia then would confront the Chinese not only in the Far East but also in the Middle East where they are strategically more vulnerable.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you think this goal of keeping the Chinese out is prior to denying the resources of the Middle East to the West?

Mr. PIPES. If by that you mean the oil resources, that is correct, in my estimate. A few years ago I think what they had in mind was outflanking NATO. Now outflanking NATO takes second place and keeping out the Chinese is No. 1. Denying oil resources to the West is third priority. I am not an oil expert but it does not seem to me that this would really be a vital goal for them because they could be denying oil to Europe, not to the United States. They could not really hurt the United States very painfully by denying it Middle Eastern oil.

Mr. HAMILTON. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Well, denying oil to Western Europe would seem to me to have a value to them. If they could tie up Middle Eastern oil, they could paralyze Europe.

OIL FOR EUROPE

Mr. PIPES. If that were their design. Their policy toward Europe has changed, however: presently they want a rather quiet Europe. They do not want to bring Europe down, they do not want to alarm Europe. If they were to seize the oil, they would be in a position to choke Europe's economies. The policy in Europe has lately been one of quiet diplomacy, aimed at reducing tension because they wish to have a secure western border in the event of war with China.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Could you define for us, Professor, how you see the Soviet Union physically moving into that area?

Mr. PIPES. As I see it, for the past several years the Russians have been trying to do to the Chinese what we did to them in the 1950's; that is, to contain China. They have done that by establishing friendly relations with all the countries surrounding China. They have taken India to some extent under their protection. Of course they have tried

to take the whole Middle East under their wings. They have made approaches to Japan. I interpret the proposal that Japanese might be allowed to exploit the economic resources of Siberia as an effort to get the Japanese involved in the Russian struggle with China. Now the Chinese naturally have been very resentful of this containment policy and have been trying to break out of it. They have been doing this in the last couple of years very successfully, first by establishing a kind of protective presence over Pakistan and secondly by establishing bases in Tanzania and East Africa, and most recently and most dramatically by entering into talks with the United States of America.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. They have not been very successful in East Africa, outside the building of the railroad.

Mr. PIPES. This is just the beginning. They have also established friendly relations with Romania. In other words, what they are trying to do, as it were, is to out-maneuver and out-flank the Russians. I grant that, of course, they are way behind the Russians, but if you consider how successful the Russians had been in breaking through our containment strategy in the past 15 years things look much more hopeful for the Chinese than may appear.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. You said early in your testimony that the Russians by tradition would keep pressing until they met some form of resistance. From the point of view of the United States, do you see it as our responsibility to offer that resistance, and how would it be done?

Mr. PIPES. I would answer the first part of the question by saying that I think it would be infinitely better if we tackled this responsibility together with Western Europe. Western Europe has been very lax considering that their interests are more directly affected by the Russian threat in the Middle East strategically as well as economically for the reasons we mentioned before, namely, the dependence of Europe on Middle Eastern oil.

Second, by making it unmistakably clear, that we will not stand by idly in any conflict in the Middle East, should the Russians become involved.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Europe seems to be defaulting in this area. Why do you think that is?

EUROPE PROTECTED BY UNITED STATES

Mr. PIPES. Europe has had a very comfortable situation since the end of World War II. It has been under our wing, and once you get used to living this way it becomes difficult to be on your own again. I have been always a very strong supporter of the containment policy but I now think it was an unforeseen consequence of our very strong presence in Europe that we have untaught the Europeans how to defend themselves. It will take some time to make them aware that they have to stand on their own feet.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Just explaining that question, do you think it is in the American national interest for us to proclaim that the time has come for Western Europe to abandon this custodial relationship that it has with the United States and that it ought to assume more of its own burdens and specifically, that Europe should move into some sense of responsibility in the Middle East?

Mr. PIPES. I do. I think we have been hinting at it for several years now.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. How could we be more specific and precise?

Mr. PIPES. I think the proposal to withdraw some troops from Europe is one possibility; the insistence on Europeans contributing a greater amount of money to their own defense another.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Without European involvement in a positive forthright fashion, is it your view that the United States has no alternative but to pursue the policies it is presently pursuing in the Middle East?

Mr. PIPES. I think so. But in diplomacy there is always a great variety of options open. While pursuing a strong policy ourselves, we can, at the same time, get the Europeans involved. I am not prepared to go into details how this can be accomplished. We might do so by constantly impressing open European leaders that while it is in our interest to keep Europe out of Soviet hands it is even more so in the interest of Europe itself.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. A witness said yesterday that the Soviet goal is a neutralized Turkey for control of its warm water port. Do you see it that way? Do they want, taking it a step further, a client-state relationship there?

Mr. PIPES. Yes, but I think they will be content with a neutralized Turkey.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you think that maybe in the long run what they want in the Middle East and North Africa is the sort of client-State relationships somewhat similar to what we have in South America?

NO SOVIET COMMERCIAL INTERESTS

Mr. PIPES. Our interest in South America is based on commercial relations and this is a very fundamental difference because Russia has few commercial interests abroad. For this reason it can conduct a very flexible foreign policy. If we should be ejected from the Middle East or from South America we would suffer great economic losses. If Russia is ejected from any one country, this is not the case. I don't believe this analogy holds. They are most concerned with naval bases, air bases and possibly the stationing of troops, all of which would give them leverage against us as well as against the Chinese.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Is it your view it is in the interest of the United States to be very forthright in enunciating a policy to Europe that they ought to free themselves from the thought that we can maintain their security indefinitely for them and that they should maintain some of this burden themselves?

Mr. PIPES. I think this should be stressed very sharply by the United States.

Mr. HAMILTON. Doctor, before you conclude, and your testimony has been very fascinating, I would like to give you an opportunity to comment on American Middle East policy today. You have spoken with approval of our strong support of Israel and then you made a comment just a moment ago which caused some doubt in my mind. Could you express yourself on how you view us on the Middle East today?

Mr. PIPES. I think our policy reveals a certain ambivalence. That is, we do strongly support Israel for a variety of reasons that I do not need to go into, but at the same time we would very much like the Russians out of the Middle East.

The State Department seems to think that the best way to achieve the latter aim is by conducting a balanced policy which would persuade the Arab powers that they can get more out of us than out of the Russians. This, in turn, necessitates a somewhat anti-Israel policy.

I rather doubt whether this policy will work. I mean I do not quite approve of Mr. Rogers' policy in this respect. It seems to me that ultimately the present crisis in the Middle East will be solved if and when the Arabs—and of course that means the Egyptians above all—come to the conclusion that there is no other way out except to enter into direct negotiations with Israel. Once they arrive at that conclusion, then the Russians will become superfluous to them—since they are using Russia as leverage against Israel and the United States. There is great personal friction between the Egyptians and the Russians, they do not care much for one another, and I suspect the Egyptians would be rather glad to be rid of their Soviet military guests.

Mr. HAMILTON. So you would alter our policy in the Middle East to be even more evenhanded?

Mr. PIPES. I do not deny the Arabs may have a case against Israel. But where the Arabs have claims, these ought to be settled in negotiation. Our policy ought to be to demand direct negotiations between the parties involved and nothing else. I do not mean to imply at all that we should support Israel 100 percent. The thing that is so attractive in the Israeli position, however, is the insistence on direct negotiations, and that makes perfect sense regardless whether one is a Zionist or not. Historically speaking, international conflicts have always been settled between the parties concerned. Once you get the big powers negotiating—that is, a deal between the Soviet Union and the United States over the bodies of Egypt and Israel—then you are back at 19th century imperialism. It is only in this respect and to this extent that I would recommend one hundred percent American backing of the Israeli position. We should not commit the United States to any particular resolution of the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Mr. HAMILTON. Our people will say to you that it won't work because none of the Arab governments can do that and survive.

PARALLEL WITH CHINA

Mr. PIPES. I do not find this explanation convincing. The same thing was said about our China policy since 1949. It was said that no U.S. Government could recognize Communist China and survive. But we have come to accept the reality of Communist China. They will have to recognize the reality of Israel as well. When that happens, they will sit down and negotiate just as we are doing with the Chinese Communists.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. In addition to what you suggest, the reluctance of Western Europe to get involved in the Middle East, do you think that one of their other considerations is that Israel has 3 million people and the Arabs 90 or 100 million or more people and that makes the Arabs more attractive friends in the long run? Second, do you think that hesitation is also motivated by some strong historical antisemitism that still derives strength from Western Europe?

Mr. PIPES. To answer your first hypothesis, that 90 million or 100 million Arabs—it is difficult to determine how many there are because there really is no Arab "nation"—are important and potentially better

friends to the Soviet than 2 million or 3 million Israelis. I think this is so but I also believe they have had reasons to change their minds on this. There were some articles recently in the New York Times by Victor Louis, who works for the Soviet government and speaks with authority. Here he dropped hints both to the Israelis and to the Arabs that the Soviet Union has not closed doors to negotiations with Israel. In fact, he concluded his articles by saying that Russia traditionally has had closer links with Israel than the United States does. These are hints which suggest that they are very interested in reopening relations with Israel.

As far as antisemitism is concerned, I think it reinforces anti-Zionism, but it is not the cause of it. Stalin was an antisemite but this did not prevent him from backing Israel when it was convenient for him to do so. Once, however, an anti-Zionist campaign was launched, antisemitism came into play.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you very much. We are very grateful to you.

Again let me say I think it was a very important statement and we are very grateful for a person of your stature to take time out to participate in what we hope to be a very important series of educational hearings.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. PIPES. Thank you.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Reluctantly and regrettably I must say that the remainder of today's hearings will be in executive session.

(Whereupon, at 2:56 p.m., the joint subcommittee proceded in executive session.)

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Let me say briefly for the record that we reluctantly agreed to hold this in executive session and that it was done only because of the urgent plea of Mr. Abshire and Mr. Sisco, relayed through Mr. Abshire. This matter should be discussed in public and you could have had an opportunity to deny answering any question you felt was highly sensitive at the moment. My understanding with Mr. Abshire is that your testimony will be printed in the official record for publication and distribution subject to security deletions, and I want you to know that we will be very firm in insisting that great restraint be shown in that area.

CLOSED HEARINGS A DISSERVICE

These closed sessions puts us in a very difficult position and one that we think does great disservice to the purpose and import of these hearings. In the future I don't expect that we shall accede to this request unless it is in writing long in advance of the hearing, and even then in my judgment none of us should make any effort to have an executive session unless it is a matter of great urgent national security. In this case I don't believe it is, but if Mr. Sisco believes it is, then we shall proceed in accordance with his request.

So we will be prepared to hear your statement.

Mr. HAMILTON. May I just add that I agree to everything that Congressman Rosenthal has said. I will tell you how this thing strikes me. The committee rules say that you are to have a statement before us 48 hours prior to your appearance. Twenty-four hours prior to

your appearance we had not received any and we began to initiate phone calls to the State Department. My impression is that you did not really begin to consider a request for executive session until after our inquiries were made and that Mr. Sisco, if that is the level at which the decision was made to request an executive session, didn't even get involved in this thing until last night. That is the only impression I can draw from it.

If the State Department was going to insist on executive sessions, then it seems to me it should have been done a week ago or more. But, to receive a call as I did last night from Colgate Prentice at, I think, about 6 o'clock and Mr. Rosenthal somewhat after that, requesting at that point that we have an executive session, puts the chairman and myself in the position of having announced a public hearing and then canceling it and it is not a position in which I particularly like to be put. So I must say that I try to have an appreciation of your problems there but I really don't see how you could have handled this in a worse fashion.

Mr. DAVIES. I understand. I do apologize for the position in which you gentlemen have been put.

I would like to introduce Jack F. Matlock who is the Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs in the Bureau of European Affairs who has come up with me this afternoon.

I had understood that copies of the statement had been brought up this morning, I don't know whether that is true or not.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. That makes no difference, the rules say 48 hours.

Mr. DAVIES. I understand, Mr. Chairman.

I will proceed with my statement then.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD T. DAVIES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

(The biography of Richard T. Davies appears in the appendix on p. 184.)

Mr. DAVIES. Soviet policy in the Middle East has been generally reactive and opportunistic. Methods and goals have shifted over the years. For example, the U.S.S.R. was among the first states to recognize Israel in 1948. At that time, the Soviet aim was that of helping to expel British "imperialism" from the area. When the U.S.S.R. first provided arms to Egypt through Czechoslovakia in 1955, those arms were intended as much to undermine the Baghdad Pact as to strengthen the Arabs against Israel. It is also noteworthy that Soviet naval policy at the time was to deemphasize surface vessels in favor of submarines, and the Soviets did not begin deploying surface ships into the Mediterranean until the midsixties.

RUSSIA AVOIDS GREAT RISKS

Soviet aims are relatively self-evident: Moscow wants to enhance its own position, particularly against the United States and NATO, in an area close to its borders, which it views as having strategic significance. It is pursuing a political strategy in the area, bulwarked by increased military strength. Many factors necessarily impinge on Soviet aims, such as the military balance in the world and in the area, the vulnerability of the states of the region to outside penetration, the

strength and loyalty of Moscow's allies, and the opportunities for exploitation. The Soviet Union has traditionally found it prudent to avoid excessive risks in the area. The Arab-Israel conflict has undoubtedly greatly helped the U.S.S.R. to achieve its current position.

Soviet military assistance, particularly to Egypt, has been the main source of Soviet leverage. [Security deletion.] The Soviet resupply effort since the June 1967 war has permitted Egypt to build up its forces above the prewar level. We believe the Soviets have held back from meeting all of Egypt's requests, particularly with respect to certain offensive equipment. In 1970, following Israeli deep-penetration raids in the Cairo area, Moscow improved Egypt's air-defense system by introducing new weapons and Soviet personnel to operate them. Throughout this entire period, the United States has been the principal supplier of Israel and in maintaining the balance in the area.

As a result of its supply relationship, the U.S.S.R. has been able to make extensive use of Egyptian airfields and port facilities, partly in support of its own operations in the region. Thus far, the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty signed on May 27 of this year has not been followed by an upsurge in Soviet aid to Egypt. Despite Soviet aid, we believe, though we are not certain, that the U.S.S.R. has substantially less control over Egyptian policies than might have been anticipated. The May purges of Egyptian leftists, and the hostile Arab reaction to the attempted Communist coup in the Sudan, show that even massive quantities of arms are not enough to insure Arab subordination to Soviet policy.

It must also be stressed that the quantity of Soviet military hardware in the Egyptian arsenal is not an accurate index of Egyptian military capabilities.

OTHER SOVIET AID

Soviet military aid to other radical Arab states has been on a smaller scale than to Egypt, [security deletion]. The Soviets enjoy only very limited access to military facilities in these countries as compared with Egypt, and Soviet personnel there are not assigned operational roles. Furthermore, Syria and Iraq have serious operational and organizational problems which detract from their military capabilities. [Security deletion.]

Our assessment of the Arab-Israeli balance is that Israel remains superior on the ground in overall capability. While no longer able to attack Egypt from the air at will, Israel nevertheless retains defensive superiority in the air. The balance is being monitored carefully. [Security deletion.] The Secretary of State recently announced a new review of this balance in the light of the Soviet-Egyptian communique of October 13, 1971.

The Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean has grown steadily since the first Soviet naval combatants appeared in the area in 1964. Today, the Mediterranean squadron is a balanced force consisting of modern surface combatants, torpedo- and missile-equipped diesel and nuclear-powered submarines, auxiliaries, and patrol and reconnaissance aircraft. It usually consists of some 45 to 50 ships of which only about half are surface combatants and submarines, although, during exercises and periods of rotation, the squadron has numbered as many as 65 to 70 ships.

Since 1968, Soviet reconnaissance aircraft based in Egypt have provided the squadron with tactical intelligence on NATO 6th Fleet movements, while Soviet anti-submarine-warfare aircraft have given the squadron a modest airborne anti-submarine-warfare capability. Although NATO Forces continue to enjoy naval and air superiority in the Mediterranean, the Soviet squadron's size and structure enable it to carry out its missions of countering NATO Forces; collecting intelligence on U.S. and NATO Forces, tactics, and capabilities; showing the flag; and, by its presence, influencing, whenever possible, the course of political events in the area.

Thus, the principal strictly military threats created by the U.S.S.R. against U.S. security interests involve (1) The danger to Israel of Soviet arms supplies to the Arabs, and (2) the impact of the Soviet Mediterranean squadron and other Soviet forces in the area on the 6th Fleet and NATO.

As we have said, the Arab-Israeli balance remains favorable to Israel, both because of qualitative advantages and because of the U.S. policy of preventing the development of a serious imbalance. As for the Soviet Mediterranean squadron, it is still deficient in air cover, despite the basing of some Soviet aircraft in Egypt. It still does not have a very powerful amphibious capability, although it does have a modest ASW capability. The squadron is, of course, of political significance in showing the Soviet flag.

It would be a mistake, however, to view the Soviet threat purely in military terms. The Soviets have gained their position in the area mainly because of their exploitation of the Arab-Israeli conflict and, in particular, of their willingness to provide military aid. Although we must maintain our own commitments in the area, we should not expect the Soviets to be dislodged through an arms race. We are up against a Soviet political strategy enhanced by growing military power. The best way to meet this Soviet threat is by achieving a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. The stability that would result from such an agreement would serve our interests; instability serves Soviet interests in the area. Such a settlement would lessen Arab dependence on Soviet arms and permit the Arabs to diversify their sources of outside support. In our judgment, if and when the Arabs and Israelis arrive at a political settlement, present Soviet troublemaking capability will be reduced.

That completes my statement, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Matlock, did you want to add some views or thoughts?

Mr. MATLOCK. I have no statement prepared and I will be happy to answer any questions.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Would either one of you want to comment in any fashion at all on the testimony of the previous witness, Professor Pipes?

Mr. DAVIES. Well——

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I mean on the substance of it.

Mr. DAVIES. I found a great many things I could agree with. Mr. Pipes is an eminent authority on the area and our views are close on many aspects of the matters he touched on.

SOVIET EXPANSION

To go back to one of the fundamental things Dr. Pipes said with regard to Soviet aggressiveness, I put less emphasis upon what he appeared to depict of the innate aggressive quality, the concept that wherever there is land the Soviets feel an urge to occupy it or to get control of it. It seemed to me it was a generalization that went rather beyond what the historical facts might bear out in some cases.

I thought, too, that in his treatment of the impetus which lead the Soviets to want to leap over Turkey and Iran he didn't mention a couple of things or rather he mentioned one but did not dwell on it, and that is the Soviet demand at the end of the war for revision of the Montreux Convention. There was also a demand from the Soviets for what they depicted as the return of Kars and Ardahan in eastern Turkey to the Soviet Union, pieces of territory that were demanded from Turkey, and he did not mention the occupation of Azerbaijan.

I cite these things because I think they are important in explaining some of the motivations of the neighboring states at the time in entering into defensive alliances against the Soviet Union.

I think some of the comments he made on the rather recent period obviously we would have some quarrel with. I felt Dr. Pipes in his historical survey was on very good ground by and large, but when he got into contemporary events I don't think that I would agree with most of what he said.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. If he was on such good historical grounds, it seems to me I guess he was. The point I think he made was that Russians by tradition, long before the Soviets, were an expansionist power and that merely is an extension of the expansionist power.

You say on page 6 of your statement, "We are up against a Soviet political strategy enhanced by growing military power." Then you say, "The best way to meet this Soviet threat is by achieving a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute."

Now the implication I draw from your statement is that if the Arab-Israeli dispute were resolved that the Soviet influence or expansionist aims in the Middle East could diminish.

Mr. DAVIES. No.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The suggestion is that the Soviets' natural tendency to expansionism would continue notwithstanding events in the Middle East. Do I read you wrong?

SOVIET OPPORTUNISM

Mr. DAVIES. No; I would agree that Soviet aims would remain. The question is one of opportunities. It seems to me that Dr. Pipes did bring out quite clearly a point on which I agree with him strongly, that it is primarily a matter of opportunities—where they see the opening, where they see a target which appears to be susceptible of control, they are going to move. Now that, I believe, is precisely the point that we are trying to make here. The opportunity has been opened in recent times by the existence of this dispute—by the fact that the Arab States have been looking for aid in what they regard as their national natural struggle. The fact that the Soviets were there and interested in the area represented the opportunity, which the Soviets have grasped. It seems to me our job is——

Mr. ROSENTHAL. If the Arab-Israeli dispute is concluded, does the Department feel that that would terminate the Soviet expansionist aims?

Mr. DAVIES. No. In fact, Mr. Chairman, I would think this would be irrelevant if the Arab-Israeli dispute were concluded. We have seen previous instances of Soviet expansion which, as Dr. Pipes noted, had ended when the Soviets ran up against what they regarded to be a superior force. I think I would like to emphasize in that connection that the superior force does not have to be a military force. If you take the case of Azerbaijan, the force was primarily, it seemed to me at the time, psychological. They were attempting to take over this part of Iran.

When it became clear to them that there was going to be a real clamor in the world, and there was, they changed their view pretty quickly and pulled back. Now that does not mean that they don't continue to have stuck away somewhere in the back corners of their minds the idea that some day it will be a good idea to reunify, as they say, Iranian Azerbaijan with Soviet Azerbaijan. The aim may remain. They judge at the time that the constellation of forces—not military alone, because in fact military force was the least of the reasons they withdrew, was such that they could not maintain their position, and pulled back.

SHORT-TERM SOVIET AIMS

So I don't think we should be concerned here with trying to change long-term Soviet geopolitical aims. After all, these are perceptions that they have of what they require or would like to have at a given point. That I think is the part of Dr. Pipes' presentation which I find most difficult.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Yesterday's witnesses said essentially the same thing, the Soviets had—I think someone used the word Victorian attitude, that they now assumed the role of a major power. And one of the burdens of a major power is to have a large empire, failing to recognize that this has become too costly for the top of the 20th century economies to support but nonetheless they are going to pursue their own kind of expansionism. So far all the witnesses suggested that. I just wondered if it is your view and the view of the Department that the conclusion of the Arab-Israeli dispute would in any way soften that expansionist attitude?

Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, you know, I don't think any department of the U.S. Government has a firmly formulated view on the point of Soviet long term aims. There are all kinds of views within the Government as there are outside the Government on this question. We have, as you are aware, enough of a problem developing policies of immediate relatively short term——

Mr. ROSENTHAL. You have to understand long term objectives.

Mr. DAVIES. You certainly do. You have to bear in mind that there is this expansionist element, however explained, however motivated, in the Soviet outlook on the outside world. I would explain it somewhat differently from Dr. Pipes, but what we are talking about in the case of the Arab-Israeli dispute is attempting to remove an opportunity. This does not mean that the Soviets would then give up their aims in the Middle East, they would look for other channels through which to fulfill them.

I think one difficulty with the point of view Dr. Pipes is presenting in the last of his answers to questions, right at the end, was that he seemed to be positing the necessity for a zero-sum game in some gain here. Well, I don't think that is a winning proposition. I mean what we should be concerned with is not seeking a way to find more direct means of confronting the Soviets but of depriving them of the means of confronting ourselves and others, and I think that can be done politically.

Jack, do you have comments?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Let me just have one other thought. You said you disagree with him on some areas of current matters that we have discussed.

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you disagree with the proposition he made that the real useful way to conclude the Arab-Israeli dispute was between direct negotiations of the parties? Is that one of the things you disagree on?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, I disagree on that, and on this thing I would agree in the terms of a final solution, a definitive solution of this problem. There has to be a direct negotiation, but it did seem to me that Dr. Pipes was not looking toward the shorter term, that he was positing this in terms which are quite natural to the historian but ones which diplomats or people who are dealing with these matters on a current basis don't find congenial.

That has to be done before you are going to get a lasting, solid peace in the Middle East and that we take fully into account and realize. What we are talking about at the moment though is finding ways and means to keep war from breaking out there, to reduce the possibility of a renewal of the fighting. I would suggest that that is our goal which is more limited than the one he was positing when he said that.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What about the view that he expressed that Western Europe should become more seriously involved about Soviet penetrations; that it is in their interest to resist that when the opportunity presents itself and that we ought to announce or indicate that it is a cornerstone of our policy that they should assume an interest in the Middle East which they seem to be retreating from?

NIXON DOCTRINE

Mr. DAVIES. I would agree with that view. I think the goal of getting the Western Europeans to do more—they are already doing a great deal—but to do more both in Europe and in the nearby areas which are bound to be of considerable interest to them from a number of points of view is part of the President's policy of letting the rest of the world know that we cannot go on bearing so large a share of the burden as we have in the past. I believe this is inherent in the Nixon doctrine.

I would say though that it does not seem to me it would be terribly useful at this point to come out with a resounding statement to this effect. I think the way we have to work towards that goal is through representations to the Europeans and effort consistently over a period

of time to convince them that they have got to get in here and bear a somewhat larger share of the burden. I am afraid that demonstrative statements of this sort, unless they had a practical effect and were given practical implementation, would not help a great deal.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Matlock, did you want to say something?

STATEMENT OF JACK F. MATLOCK, JR., DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SOVIET UNION AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(The biography of Jack F. Matlock, Jr., appears on p. 187.)

Mr. MATLOCK. I just wanted to add another example on what in my mind illustrates the difference between ultimate aims and capabilities. I think we had a very good example in Soviet policy just before, during and immediately after the Second World War regarding Finland. It was very clearly the Soviet aim to absorb Finland into the Soviet Union like the Baltic States. Like the Balkan States, Finland had been part of the Russian Empire and Stalin went so far as to set up a Karelo Finnish Republic right next to Finland. He had as a member of the Politburo an ethnic Finn, Kuusinen. It was very clear that the aim of his policy was the absorption of Finland.

THE FINNISH EXAMPLE

You know, of course, their experience with the Winter War and with the Finns during the war, and I think that over a period of years it soon became evident to the Soviet Government that whatever their desires might have been in that area it was not worth the cost. Here I think again, strictly speaking in a purely military sense, if they had really decided in 1945 that regardless of other considerations they would have pushed their military forces into Finland, it is difficult to say really that the West would have resisted by force, both the political costs and other costs would have been extremely high.

Now I would say that today who knows what is in the back of the minds of some Soviet leaders? Maybe they do posit the absorption of Finland as an ultimate goal—maybe they no longer do, but the essential thing is that the political situation in Finland does not give them the opportunity at least at this stage to achieve complete domination of Finland. I think our feeling is they are relatively comfortable with the situation they have. I think that really has a bearing on what we are saying about the Arab-Israeli situation because regardless of what their intent might be, of what their ultimate goals might be, what has really brought them in has not been these ultimate goals or this intent so much as the specific situation which has led the Arabs to turn to them. If this situation were ameliorated so that the Arabs did not feel that they had to turn to the Russians, then there would be much less opportunity, I think, for the Soviet exercise of influence and power in the area would be reduced to a commensurate degree.

Mr. DAVIES. That is a good point. Many other examples could be cited in support of the contention that you know that we are not dealing with a great land power which is inexorably pushed outwards and cannot retract. They have retreated. They retreated not only in

terms of their aims in Finland but they retreated from Austria. There were many people in the West who said they will never give up their zone of occupation in Austria. They did. They retreated from China. This of course came at a moment of great weakness when they saw the constellation of forces in the world very badly against them. Actually, I think they were not so bad against the Soviets as they believed they were.

So I think in looking at the Middle East we ought to apply these lessons as well as the overarching view of political conclusions when it comes to long-range aims.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. If Soviet interests in the Middle East are best served by instability as you mentioned in your statement, the Soviets will not be any help to us on interim settlement efforts and beyond that it would not seem to bode well for a big force. You are really saying to us here that the Soviets don't want a settlement in the Middle East?

AN INTERIM SOLUTION

Mr. DAVIES. Our reading is that they have not actively hindered us. Their position now seems to be: OK, go ahead and see if you can work out this interim settlement. No doubt in taking that position they have got mixed motives. First of all, we can't be sure what their assessment is of the chances of our success. Second, if we should not succeed, they would be counting on benefiting by our failure. However, there is a fundamental congruence of interest here despite the vast divergence of aims and immediate goals, and that is that, like us, they would prefer not to see the fighting break out again. Our judgment at this moment is they don't think that would be in their interest.

Now what the situation would be if, as, and when they should conclude that the Arab states were sufficiently strong to overcome the Israelis militarily is another question.

Mr. HAMILTON. They don't want the fighting to break out between Israel and Egypt?

Mr. DAVIES. That is correct.

Mr. HAMILTON. How do you characterize Soviet military assistance to Egypt? Would you say it is defensive in nature or are they supplying offensive weaponry, or both?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, in effect both, but the mix seems to be qualified on the side of not giving the Egyptians everything they want and particularly in the sphere of offensive weapons: that is, if one can imagine the kinds of things the Egyptians would want if, for example, they were planning a massive cross-canal operation. Now some of these items have shown up in Egypt but not in quantities which would lead us to believe that the Soviets have agreed with the Egyptians that this should be the next stage.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is there any debate going on in the Soviet Union about the policy?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, now, you have asked a question which starts Kremlinologists musing. I personally believe there is a debate going on, I believe there is a debate going on all the time on important elements of Soviet foreign policy of this magnitude. I think there

are people there, there are what you might call parallels with the "little Englanders" in England of the late 19th century. There are "little Russians" and "great Russians."

DIFFERING SOVIET VIEWS

I am not using that term in any ethnic sense, as it usually is. I think there are people who say we have got enough to worry about with what we have right around our borders. We are not threatened in any material way from the south; that is, by Turkey and Iran. Yes, it would be good if we had more influence there and we were quite sure that they would never ally themselves with anybody else against us.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now can we identify specific Soviet leaders, for example, that advocate that line?

Mr. DAVIES. No. That is why I say you don't evoke concrete answers. We cannot identify specific people who would be taking a questioning attitude. We can make guesses based upon the positions some of the leadership have taken on other questions. For example, I think most people who study this subject carefully are inclined to think that those Soviet leaders who have a particular interest on the economic side—that is, building up Soviet industry and developing Soviet technology in catching up with the West, as they have always said they wanted to—will probably be a little less inclined to support what they may feel is adventurous foreign policy. We don't have any proof of this.

The leadership acts together, the Politburo makes its decisions either by reaching a consensus with no important figure strongly dissenting or on occasion by a majority vote and we don't get an insight into what goes on in this tiny group of 13 or 14 men. They make these decisions and they are successful in avoiding leaks to the press.

Mr. HAMILTON. Is it your view in the Department that direct talks between Egypt and Israel are impossible in the immediate future? And if so, why is it your view?

Mr. DAVIES. Sir, you are really getting out of my area there, the European area. I think I really should say that you ought to ask Joe Sisco and people who are responsible for Near Eastern affairs.

Mr. HAMILTON. We will hold the question for another time.

Is there anything you can report to us as a result of the United Nations discussions with the Secretary that bears on this question of Soviet interest in the Middle East?

Mr. DAVIES. No; there is not. I am not aware of anything that has come out of those that would change the situation as it was viewed before the United Nations met.

OPENING SUEZ CANAL

Mr. HAMILTON. How strongly do we think the Soviets want to open up the Suez Canal?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, I think they would like to see the Suez Canal opened. Now we were talking earlier about——

Mr. HAMILTON. Are they putting a lot of pressure on Egypt to get it open?

Mr. DAVIES. No; I don't think they are. I think their position now as best we can determine it is one in effect of letting the Egyptians make the running.

Mr. HAMILTON. Make the what?

Mr. DAVIES. Make the running on this score. That is, the Egyptians have been involved with us during this past period in an effort to find an interim settlement. I think the Soviet attitude is one of saying, "Well, you people have to make up your own minds; how do you want to play this?"

Now I think it is also quite probable that they are not doing anything in particular to push the Egyptians in this direction. I think here probably their major concern is that the United States should not end up publicly appearing as the author of the interim settlement.

Mr. HAMILTON. What kind of an attitude are European allies expressing with regard to our interim peace efforts?

Mr. DAVIES. In general I think it is one of support. They would like to see us succeed, they would like to see a settlement reached in the area.

Mr. HAMILTON. Don't they have very great misgivings about the chances of success of an interim settlement?

Mr. DAVIES. Some of them do; yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. In other words, some of them say to us it is not going to work?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes; some of them are.

Mr. HAMILTON. Who?

EUROPE WAITING FOR UNITED STATES

Mr. DAVIES. Well, I don't think any of the governments involved have come forward with this kind of judgment. Now we have heard from some of our colleagues that they do have strong doubts, they are not at all sure it will work. But I think the attitude of our European allies is one of wishing us well and hoping that we can come up with a settlement.

Mr. HAMILTON. One of our witnesses yesterday said that the Soviets are beginning to develop an interest in Middle East oil and that consumption is or will soon be outstripping domestic production.

Mr. DAVIES. Soviet consumption?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, Soviet consumption.

Do we see this interest?

Mr. DAVIES. No, we have not.

Jack.

Mr. MATLOCK. No; as a matter of fact, I think our feeling on this point is that probably Soviet production if we look ahead say to 1975, 1980, is very likely going to keep pace with Soviet consumption. Now they may have some unfulfilled requirements if they take on export responsibilities or export commitments. You know, right now they export I think about 800,000 barrels a day to Eastern Europe and about the same amount to other countries in Western Europe and to some extent to Japan. So they have fairly substantial export commitments.

I think the problem is not so much are they running out of oil for their own use or will they run out of oil. It may well be that they need a certain amount if they need to maintain their export position. I think here that the problem is unlikely to be of such a magnitude that this would be a significant motivating force—I mean their own need for the oil.

Mr. HAMILTON. Let me ask you the same question I asked Dr. Pipes. Where does the Soviet leadership put the Middle East in their scale of priorities today?

Mr. DAVIES. I think Dr. Pipes had a good answer. The first priority is at the moment China. Very closely linked with that is the problem of Europe, including Eastern Europe which continues to be a problem for them 26 years after the war. They are concerned to reach settlements and create an atmosphere of detente in Europe, I think primarily because of their great worry over China. It seems to me that the Middle East comes after this complex of problems. If you want to take the three areas and rank them in order, I would say the Middle East comes third.

Mr. HAMILTON. Have we seen any change since the Soviet-Egyptian treaty in the flow of arms to Egypt?

Mr. DAVIES. There has not been any great upsurge in the delivery of arms, no, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. In this statement they made just the other day——

Mr. DAVIES. The communique?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes. They indicated more arms would be flowing, didn't they?

Mr. DAVIES. Well, yes, they did. The communique from the Sadat visit says that the Soviets will continue to support the Egyptians through the supply of arms.

Mr. HAMILTON. Was there a connotation of increased supply?

NO INCREASE IN ARMS

Mr. DAVIES. I don't think the connotation was one of increased supply. I think there we are going to wait and see what happens. The Egyptian war minister did stay in Moscow following the departure of President Sadat presumably to negotiate on this and allied questions.

Mr. HAMILTON. Are you satisfied that our surveillance techniques here are very good with regard to monitoring the supply of arms?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir; I think they are.

Mr. HAMILTON. We have high confidence in our ability to detect what is going into this?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. And the nature of the problems?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Just one last question, Mr. Davies.

How do you see the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean—as defensive, offensive, mixed? How do you see it as a threat to Europe, NATO, the Middle East involved and so forth? I think we have had mixed opinions on that.

Mr. DAVIES. Mr. Chairman, at the present time I would not describe it as an outstandingly offensive force. It serves as an important Soviet military presence in the area. We have not concluded that it is designed as it now stands to be used in what you might call a first-strike capacity and sweep the Mediterranean. It does provide a certain security for Soviet operations in the eastern Mediterranean. Obviously one of its principal tasks at the present time is to monitor what we are doing and attempt to develop a body of doctrine on how it would meet the problem of naval operations in the Mediterranean in time of war, but it does not seem to us to be designed to be an overpowering threat.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you very much. We appreciate your appearance.

The subcommittees stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the joint subcommittee adjourned.)

[illegible]

Mr. [illegible] from you the loss of arms to Egypt?

Mr. [illegible]

Mr. Harriman. [illegible]

Mr. [illegible]

Mr. Harriman. [illegible]

Mr. [illegible] through the supply of arms.

Mr. Harriman. [illegible]

[illegible]

Mr. [illegible]

Mr. Harriman. [illegible]

[illegible]

SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE WESTERN RESPONSE

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1971

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEES ON EUROPE AND
THE NEAR EAST,
Washington, D.C.

The joint subcommittee met at 2 p.m. in room 2175, Rayburn House Office Building, the Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (chairman of the Subcommittee on the Near East) presiding.

Mr. HAMILTON. This joint meeting of the Subcommittee on Europe and the Subcommittee on the Near East will come to order.

Today's hearing will examine internal factors in the Soviet Union affecting the formulation of Soviet foreign policy toward areas like the Middle East. While we are primarily interested in looking at those bureaucracies in the Soviet Union with a stake in Soviet policy and involvement in the Middle East, we would also like to discuss what kinds of debate go on in the Soviet Union on foreign policy issues involving the Middle East.

We are happy to have with us today two scholars with expertise on Soviet foreign policy. Dr. Vernon Aspaturian is a professor of political science at Pennsylvania State University and Dr. Roman Kolkowicz is a professor of political science at the University of California at Los Angeles.

Dr. Aspaturian, I believe you testified before the Subcommittee on Europe in 1964. We welcome you back and you may proceed to read or summarize your statement, as you choose. For the benefit of both of you, your statements will be entered into the record and made a part of the record.

You may proceed, Dr. Aspaturian.

STATEMENT OF VERNON V. ASPATURIAN, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY

(The biography of Mr. Aspaturian appears on p. 183.)

Mr. ASPATURIAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Hamilton.

What I propose to do is to discuss in somewhat brief fashion internal forces in Soviet policy as they affect the eastern Mediterranean, more importantly how Soviet policy in the eastern Mediterranean has affected internal and domestic forces and institutions. I want to concentrate essentially on two general categories of institutions and forces that are affected and have affected policy. The first general category

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consists of the nationalities and certain religious groups and the second consists of public bodies, institutions and various other social groupings.

RUSSIAN INTEREST IN EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Russia's interest in the eastern Mediterranean has been long durable and persistent. In spite of unrelenting attempts to establish a presence in the area over the past century in concert, association or intrigue with a wide assortment of other powers, until comparatively recent times all of these attempts have resulted in signal failure for one reason or another.

Neither the alliance with the Entente in World War I, nor the ill-fated association with Hitler in 1939–41, nor the joint Allied victory in World War II could bring about the realization of a more than 100-year ambition to become a Mediterranean power. All of Russia's partners, of whatever political hue, ideological coloring or vintage, seemed equally implacable in blocking Russia's entry into this vital waterway which has always been of strategic importance to Europe, Asia, and Africa, and now plays a crucial role in the overall global balance of strategic power.

I need not go into detail concerning the various strategems employed by Moscow to reach into the Mediterranean, since this has been amply covered by other witnesses, but rather I wish to restrict my remarks almost exclusively to the internal forces and pressures which have impelled the Soviet Union to expend the immense effort, resources, and risks to achieve status as a Mediterranean power, and also to the impact that these policies have in turn had upon the interplay and interaction of domestic forces inside the Soviet Union. In my remarks, I shall make only passing references to the goals and objectives—both short term and long range—of Soviet policy in this region, attempting wherever possible to link them with domestic sources of impetus and feedback effects upon Soviet domestic institutions, forces, and entities.

Initially, Soviet objectives in the eastern Mediterranean and its surrounding areas were primarily ideological in character, stemming largely from Moscow's self-assumed mission of encouraging and supporting revolutionary movements and groups of various hues as they struggled to free themselves from European economic and political control and influence. Fledgling Communist parties, radical nationalist movements and reformist, anticolonial regimes, including monarchies, were supported in various ways in Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and elsewhere soon after the revolution in an endeavor to simultaneously erect a political buffer zone against outside intervention and to provide a foundation for further ideological penetration and expansion.

TRADITIONAL SOVIET GOAL

While Soviet policy during this period was largely bereft of explicit strategic, commercial, and political goals in the traditional sense, as the Soviet regime stabilized itself and grew in power, the activities of the Comintern and its various external components in these countries became de facto instruments of traditional Russian purposes in the area, although within the context of world communism and de-

liverance from colonialism and capitalism rather than tsarist expansion or Christian humanitarianism.

The establishment of Soviet power in the Transcaucasus and its formal incorporation into the U.S.S.R. once again made Russia a Near Eastern, if not an eastern Mediterranean power, and the traditional imperatives of security interests in the region once again assumed their cardinal importance. Commercial and economic interests in the region were also soon resurrected, and ideological interests were thus simply grafted upon those already ordained by geography and history.

Thus from 1924 to 1939, Soviet interest in the eastern Mediterranean was largely passive in character. It had no active or affirmative policy, since its limited capabilities impelled it to focus upon the more crucial areas of Central Europe and the Far East. An active eastern Mediterranean policy was simply a luxury which the Soviet Union could not afford, since the British and French presence in the region seemed firmly entrenched and fixed. The opportunities for penetration and influence were sparse and the possible benefits of such a policy equally meager.

WORLD WAR II

The Nazi-Soviet Pact and the first phase of World War II, however, created unexpected opportunities and possible windfalls. The collapse of France and the military isolation of a beleaguered Britain appeared to presage an imminent collapse of the Anglo-French sphere of influence in the eastern Mediterranean, threatening to create an enormous vacuum which Stalin felt should be shared by Hitler.

Less than a year before the German attack upon Russia, a bizarre conference took place between Molotov and Hitler in Berlin, in which the German dictator offered to define the forthcoming Soviet sphere of influence in the region by expansively suggesting that Moscow focus its attention "in the general direction of the Indian Ocean," a vision too grandiose and remote to have any relevance for Moscow's real concerns which at the time were in the Balkans and Turkey.

TURKEY AND IRAN

I might say that the Soviet Union felt this was a rather remote and rather utopian type of offer and instead countered with a formal counterproposal that indicated Moscow was more interested in establishing a military and naval base in the Turkish Straits and more interested in establishing a more limited but incredible sphere of influence "south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf." The Germans apparently rejected this proposal because they never responded to it.

The Nazi-Soviet negotiations thus revealed that the traditional interests of Russia in Iran, Turkey, and the straits had lain dormant but were not dead and at least strongly suggested that Soviet ambitions in this region could easily be aroused if the opportunity presented itself, but equally suggested that Moscow was in no position to elevate it to a primary or high-priority interest.

The Allied victory in World War II, the collapse of German and Italian power in the Balkans and the weakening of the British position, however, served to sustain the opportunities at a level sufficient

to impel Stalin to at least make a serious effort to extend Soviet influence not only in Iran, Turkey, and the straits, but also to Greece, north Africa and even east Africa. Different strategems were employed in each case, defined largely by the conditions, circumstances, available instruments and credible justifications. In Iran, Soviet military pressure, exerted mainly through Moscow's refusal to withdraw its forces from northern Iran, combined with the establishment of a puppet autonomous regime in Persian Azerbaidzhan, and the manipulation of the leftist Tudeh Party, were used in an effort to extract economic and possibly territorial concessions from Teheran. In Turkey, where neither a viable Communist Party or leftist movement existed, Stalin employed Georgian and Armenian irredentism to annex territory from Turkey in the east and relied upon the support of grateful Allies to coerce Turkey, which had wavered and vascillated during the war, into permitting the Soviets to establish military and naval bases on the straits. The traditional Russian obsession with security and free exit from the Black Sea were offered as principal justifications. In Greece, a civil war instigated by local Communist militants, although apparently neither initiated nor enthusistically sanctioned by Stalin, was reluctantly coopted by Moscow. Ironically, it was the local Communist attempt to move Greece into the Soviet orbit that was the principal factor which mobilized and congealed Western sentiment against the otherwise reasonable claims which Moscow made against Turkey, although the Soviet debacle in Iran also played its role. As part of an apparent concerted design to establish herself as a Mediterranean power, the Soviet Union also unexpectedly made bids of varying degrees of effort to become the trust power in three former Italian colonies: The Dodecanese Islands off the Anatolian coast, the Cyrenaican part of Libya, and in Eritrea on the African Horn. All three bids were rebuffed in spite of Molotov's eloquent appeals that the Soviet contribution to the Allied victory, her well-known opposition to colonialism and her long experience with nationality problems, made Moscow eminently qualified to become a trust power. In addition, Moscow demanded one-third of the Italian Navy as war booty, presumably to use it as the basis of a Mediterranean fleet.

A SOVIET FAILURE

All of the postwar Soviet attempts to establish herself in the eastern Mediterranean region failed. Had the Soviet Union succeeded across the board, there is little question but that Moscow would have become a Mediterranean power of some magnitude, given the fact that the British were already expressing their inability to fully preserve their former presence and were calling upon the United States to fill the vacuum. The eventual upshot was the emergence of the United States as a Mediterranean power and the incorporation of Greece and Turkey into the Western alliance system as American protectorates. Stalin prudently retreated to the Black Sea and, after his death, his successors made amends to Turkey and officially withdrew its earlier demands for both bases and territory.

I present this as a way of backdrop because I think it is important to link together these various aspects of Soviet interests in the area in order to show how it relates to the main focus of my statement.

We can say with respect to the Soviet demands upon Turkey in 1946 and 1947, down to about that time, the role of internal forces, institutions, and groupings in the shaping of Soviet policy in the eastern Mediterranean, as well as the impact of such policy upon the domestic situation, was rather limited and restricted. As you know, private interest groups do not exist in the Soviet system and hence there were none that could conceivably develop a vested interest in the region; nor, with the exception of the armed forces, were there any public institutions sufficiently independent or functionally differentiated to develop discretely distinguishable, even though nonconflicting, interests in the area.

The armed forces, particularly the navy, were anxious to secure free exit from the Black Sea and the addition of new territory south of the Caucasus would undoubtedly improve the Soviet defense perimeter in that vital region but, aside from this, there was little opportunity or even perception of separate interests by Soviet public bodies and institutions. Furthermore, the Soviet decisionmaking process was so centralized during this period that Soviet public bodies and institutions were largely instrumentalities of the decisionmakers rather than active participants in the decisionmaking process.

RUSSIAN POLICYMAKING

Whatever benefits accrued to various internal public bodies, institutions or groupings were largely fortuitous windfalls and not the product of conscious pressure, leverage or even design. Thus, had Stalin's postwar demands in the area materialized, the armed forces, particularly the navy, would have been substantially benefited whether it actively participated in formulating the policy or not.

Policies in the region, as elsewhere, were largely conceived and developed by the leadership, based upon its values, goals and definition of interests and similarly executed in accordance with its judgment and assessment of the situation. These interests were broad and diffuse in character and did not correspond in a discrete sense with the specific interests of given internal entities. Rather, the overall purpose was to strengthen the Soviet Union, expand her power and influence to assure in the first place the security and survival of the Soviet State, and to prepare in the second place a foundation for expanding the area of Soviet influence via conventional means or the spread of communism.

Moscow sought bases on the Turkish Straits and territory in eastern Turkey largely for strategic and defensive purposes, although eventually they could be used as a basis for further expansion. In Iran, Moscow sought not only oil concessions on favorable terms but wished to weaken the Iranian state and draw it into the Soviet political orbit. In Greece, ideological aims were imposed, but accepted, upon Moscow by local Communist militants. And Soviet demands for trust territories in Africa could be described essentially as a desire for enhanced international prestige and acceptance, although such trust territories would enable Moscow to establish a foothold in Africa as a prelude to undermining British and French power in the continent.

Stalin prudently refrained from making demands that would explicitly encroach upon established French and British interests and thus the Arab states were considered off-limits for the moment.

Aside from purely public bodies and institutions, other internal forces that were to become more intricately involved in the eastern Mediterranean policy of the Soviet Union were social and national groupings and, in particular, certain religious groups and nationalities. Soviet Jews and Muslims, Georgians and Armenians, and even the Russian Orthodox Church, had important links with the region, as well as discretely defined and perceived interests which could vitally affect Soviet policy and, in turn, be affected by it. Unlike Soviet public bodies and institutions at the time, these were domestic groupings of long historical duration, with almost predetermined interests in the area but, because of the Soviet political system, were effectively precluded from acting as independent or autonomous centers of influence and pressure upon the Soviet decisionmakers generally.

Stalin was quite aware of these interests and, while keeping their propensity for initiating action or exercising independent articulation of their view suppressed, he shrewdly manipulated their external connections and links for entirely other purposes. Capitalizing on the fact that the special interests of these groups were both well-known and enjoyed a credible legitimacy in the outside world, he employed them as instruments of Soviet policy without at the same time allowing them to become active participants in its formulation.

Thus, the Russian Orthodox Church with its interests in Jerusalem and its spiritual links with Greek Orthodox communities in Greece and the Arab world, the Jews with their interest in Palestine and later Israel, the Armenians with their special ties to Armenian communities in the eastern Mediterranean countries and irredentist claim to their historical homeland in eastern Turkey, the Georgians with similar though less extensive territorial claims to Turkish territory, the Azerbaidzhanis and their association with neighboring kinsmen in north Iran, and the Soviet Muslims with their spiritual links with other Muslims in the Mediterranean region, were all utilized as pawns of Soviet policy in one connection or another.

ARMENIANS AND MUSLIMS

The Armenians inside and outside the Soviet Union were energized and activated to give legitimacy to Soviet demands against Turkey, since this was a cause to which all Armenians of various political hues could rally; the new State of Israel was quickly recognized and military assistance funneled through Czechoslovakia, which was welcomed warmly by Soviet Jewry and aroused substantial support for Soviet goals among sectors of Jewish communities abroad. Although the potential was great, Stalin was not as skillful in utilizing Soviet Muslims as instruments of Soviet policy partly because of the circumstances of individual cases and partly because of Stalin's own personal predisposition toward Muslim nationalities which he viewed with a scorn just short of contempt.

Furthermore, Stalin was pursuing policies detrimental to Muslim states and communities in the region; he was supporting Armenians and Georgians against Turks and supporting Jews against Arabs. Under the circumstances, it was perhaps more prudent not to need-

lessly arouse Muslim consciousness and remind Soviet Muslims of their external links. Even the Soviet activity in Persian Azerbaidzhan was carefully disassociated from Soviet Azerbaidzhani irredentism, unlike Soviet claims against Turkey which consciously enflamed Georgian and Armenian nationalism in an active manner.

Although Stalin skillfully orchestrated and controlled the active involvement of Soviet religious and national groups in support of Soviet policy, he was equally adept at circumscribing their initiatives and contnued to actively repress their latent predisposition to act spontaneously in behalf of Soviet interests which happened to coincide with their own more specific interests. Stalin knew that officially inspired and directed involvement of these groups in support of Soviet policy could easily develop its own individual momentum and become disfunctional and even dangerous to Soviet policy if events and circumstances dictated a reversal or abandonment of policies supported by these groups.

SOVIET JEWRY

Soviet Jewish support for Israel might continue even if Soviet policy became hostile to Israel and Armenian irredentist demands against Turkey might persist even if Moscow reversed its attitude and sought rapprochement with Ankara. Stalin recognized these hazards and dangers and he developed contingency plans to deal with them, relying principally upon instruments of terror to keep these sentiments in check.

Nonetheless, the official blessing bestowed upon the activity of selected national and religious groups in support of specific aspects of Soviet policy imparted to it a measure of legitimacy, even within the Soviet context, which could not be easily or completely extinguished. By recognizing the right of Soviet Jews and Armenians to support Soviet policy in the name of promoting and defending Jewish and Armenian national interests, Stalin inadvertently legitimized both Jewish and Armenian nationalism as an absolute right.

At this stage, the revival of Jewish self-identity and consciousness posed a greater hazard to Stalin's policies than did Armenian nationalism, since the Jewish State which became the focus of Soviet Jewish support was not under Soviet control or influence and seemed unlikely to be in the foreseeable future.

Furthermore, the more active involvement of the more numerous and influential Jewish community in the United States on behalf of Israel and its greater importance to Israel itself, impelled the suspicious Stalin to perceive the possibility that Soviet Jewry, because of its concern with Israel, might be converted into an instrument of Israeli and even U.S. interests, and he took immediate measures to frustrate and eradicate this possibility. Whether Soviet policy toward Israel assumed an ever more hostile turn during the late Stalin period because of this fear of a potential fifth column or whether it stemmed from a conscious decision to abandon Israel as a possible Soviet client-state in the eastern Mediterranean in favor of other prospects remains difficult to discern.

Irrespective of why Soviet policy toward Israel underwent an abrupt change, the consequences for Soviet Jewry of this initial exercise in becoming actively implicated in Soviet Near Eastern policy

was a near disaster. The episode also contributed mightily to the recrudescence of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union which ultimately developed its own rationale independent and separate from Soviet policy toward Israel, and yet influenced it as well as conditioned the attitude of Soviet Jews to the Soviet State itself.

It should be noted that the Soviet attitude toward the Arab states and their claims against Israel was not a factor in Soviet behavior at this time. The alienation of Moscow from Israel and the alienation of Soviet Jews from the Soviet regime became essentially a domestic problem, whose dynamics assumed an independence from Soviet policy in the eastern Mediterranean although it grew out of that policy. When Moscow in 1955 developed an active pro-Arab policy, this simply aggravated the alienation which has since grown to enormous proportions and threatens to become one of the most serious domestic problems of Soviet society. Conceivably, Jewish alienation could spread and infect other nationalities whose latent resentments and frustrations against the Soviet regime might easily be forced to surface.

EFFECTS OF MIDDLE EAST POLICY ON SOVIET MINORITIES

The increasing Soviet involvement in Arab affairs and support for Arab claims against Israel has resulted in the activation of the Soviet Muslim nationalities, even to the extent of using Muslim political and cultural dignitaries as Soviet diplomats to Arab countries. Since none of the Soviet Muslim nationalities are Arabs, this means that not national but religious and cultural affiliation is being employed and activated. Here again, as long as Soviet policy is pro-Arab, it does not run counter to normal Soviet Muslim sentiments, but should it for some unforeseen reason become anti-Arab and hence indirectly anti-Muslim, some alienation of Soviet Muslims can be expected due to this particular aspect of Soviet policy.

Changes in Soviet policy toward Turkey also resulted in a similar cycle of mobilization and alienation of Armenian support for Soviet causes in the area. As long as Soviet claims against Turkey, ostensibly on behalf of the Armenians, were not abandoned even though not vigorously prosecuted, there was little reaction from the Soviet Armenians other than varying degrees of gratitude and support. After Stalin's death, however, when his successors formally apologized to Turkey and forced the Georgians and Armenians to officially abandon their irredentist claims, Armenian disenchantment gave way first to disillusionment and eventually to potential alienation as the Soviet regime actively pursued a rapprochement with Turkey.

As part of this effort, the Soviet regime, in response to Turkish representations, has sought to muffle those aspects of Armenian nationalism that appear offensive to the Turks. Thus, in 1965 and 1966, when the Armenian Republic commemorated the 50th anniversary of the Turkish massacres, Moscow intervened to downplay the event. The consequence was anger and revulsion, which erupted in demonstrations and riots in Yerevan as Armenian speakers attacked the Turks and demanded that the Soviet authorities do more to satisfy their claims against Turkey. These anti-Turkish sentiments were publicly expressed by outstanding Armenian intellectuals, writers and scientists of un-

impeachable loyalty to the Soviet State and fidelity to the Communist Party. As a result, Moscow intervened and removed the leadership from both the Armenian Communist Party and Government because of their inability to control these exuberant manifestations of nationalism, but these resentments and anger continue to persist.

It should also be pointed out in this connection, however, that the new Soviet approach to Turkey has found a warm reception in Soviet Azerbaidzhan and among the various Turkic nationalities of central Asia, all of whom have strong cultural, linguistic and religious ties with the Ottoman Turks. Thus, if Moscow should once again adopt a policy hostile to Turkey in response to Armenian pressures or for some other reason, she runs the risk of alienating the Soviet Turkic nationalities who, in the meantime, have been mobilized to support and facilitate Soviet repprochement with Ankara.

PRESSURES OF SOVIET NATIONALITIES

Let me point out what I think should be drawn out as Soviet nationalities exert pressures on the Soviet Government in its Near Eastern policy. What is important in this connection by way of summary is this:

1. National and religious groups in the Soviet Union have become converted from passive objects of manipulation by Soviet leaders into increasingly active pressure groups seeking to force Moscow to adopt policies in the Near East that are congenial or at least not hostile toward states and groups that have close connections with them. In almost all cases, this poses a serious dilemma for the Soviet authorities since domestic Soviet national and religious groups pressure the Soviet regime on behalf of contradictory policies. Responding to Jewish demands in support of Israel would alienate Muslim nationalities, whereas responding to the pressures of Muslim nationalities to support the Arabs against Israel and to seek rapprochement with Turkey will continue to alienate Soviet Jews and Armenians.

2. The Soviet regime is involved currently in a serious conflict with substantial numbers of Soviet citizens because its policies in the eastern Mediterranean have aggravated anti-Semitic tendencies at home. To a lesser degree, Moscow is in danger of alienating a significant number of Armenians because of its refusal to actively press Armenian national claims against Turkey. The Armenians pose less of a problem than the Jews because they are more vulnerable as a national entity—virtually the entire Armenian nation resides on Soviet territory—and thus they enjoy no option aside from displaying their resentments, anger, and frustrations in symbolic and passive form.

In the case of the Jews, the Soviet Jews constitute only a small fraction of the total world Jewish community, and the Jewish State exists outside Soviet control. Jewish alienation thus can assume the form of increasing demands for emigration to Israel and this agitation will find considerable support in Israel, the United States and in other countries. Bowing to these demands in turn could complicate the regime's relations with other national and religious groups which might demand similar rights to emigrate, particularly those national groups whose national states lie outside the Soviet Union. Furthermore, allowing Soviet Jews to leave for Israel would bring cries of

outrage from Arab states, since this would have the effect of not only strengthening Israel but reenforcing the legitimacy of Jewish claims to Palestine.

3. Soviet policy in the eastern Mediterranean is now inextricably enmeshed in Soviet nationality problems at home and effects Soviet relations not only with individual Soviet nationalities but influences the relationship of Soviet nationalities with one another as each attempts to push the Soviet regime into a direction that conflicts with the interests of the other nationalities.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I wonder if I can interrupt.

Mr. ASPATURIAN. Yes.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. One view is that the Soviets sort of cheered these minority groups on and, unwittingly, they have now developed into a sort of a Frankenstein monster. These strong views, having been activated by governmental policy and by their own individual momentum, is carried forward by the ethnic or religious or other nationalities.

Mr. ASPATURIAN. Yes.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. It seems to me like a dilemma.

Mr. ASPATURIAN. Yes; it threatens to spill over and create similar problems for other nationalities that currently are not even affected directly in Soviet policy.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. This is something we have not done here in the United States. We have not tried as a governmental policy to cheer such groups on.

A DOMESTIC INFLUENCE

Mr. ASPATURIAN. I think we have. We have not tried because we don't have to do that; the groups can cheer themselves on. One of the reasons why we have not been really involved in this in the same way is that we don't have the same array of forces, although I would suspect that if we had, say, 5 million Arabs in this country, American policy in the Middle East might be a little different, and so would the domestic situation.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Getting back to the deeper domestic problems; we have never tried to cheer groups on to support policy or to change policy which is what is happening here.

Mr. ASPATURIAN. Well, I think that, given our political system, we did that indirectly during the period of the cold war, when, I think, an attempt was made to mobilize ethnic Americans from Eastern Europe on behalf of American policy, not in the same way but I think that it was done to a certain degree.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. It is very risky.

Mr. ASPATURIAN. Yes; it is very risky because policies can change, and once you arouse certain groups to support a particular policy on grounds of a special interest that they might have this legitimatizes their interest and keeps sustaining it even though the government may deviate and revise its own estimate of what its interests should be.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I think the Nixon administration sees that now in a reversal in the China policy.

Mr. ASPATURIAN. Yes; I think to a certain degree that is true. Yes. Do you want me to go on?

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Yes, please.

Mr. ASPATURIAN. Even Soviet claims to Turkey under Stalin triggered Armenian-Georgian quarrels since the two republics had overlapping territorial claims against Turkey. As a single state attempting to simultaneously represent the national interests of more than a score of different nationalities, the Soviet leaders are discovering that Soviet foreign policy goals, particularly in the eastern Mediterranean, have unwittingly exposed the basic incompatibilities of Soviet national policy as it simultaneously attempts to discharge its obligations to various nationalities in the field of foreign policy and discovers, for example, that its foreign policy on behalf of the Armenians conflicts with its foreign policy on behalf of the Soviet Turkic nationalities.

4. The uneven impact of Soviet policy in the eastern Mediterranean on various Soviet national and religious groups also involves uneven costs and risks for the Soviet regime. The Muslim and Turkic nationalities, while relatively numerous in both total numbers as well as individual nations are not, however, among the more intensively developed and skilled in the Soviet Union. They do, however, occupy large tracts of strategically located territory on the borders of the U.S.S.R. and increasingly they are becoming an important factor in the Soviet conflict with China. Thus the alienation of substantial numbers of Soviet Muslim and Turkic citizens would pose a serious problem for Moscow, although the general level of consciousness among these groups is relatively low and the dangers are not proportionate to their numerical size.

JEWS AND ARMENIANS

On the other hand, the Jews and Armenians are relatively small in total numbers, but they are two of the most intensively developed and skilled sectors of the Soviet population, particularly the more than 2 million Soviet Jews who constitute an invaluable, almost indispensable, I would say, human reservoir of scientific, intellectual and artistic talent. This is also true, but to a lesser degree, of the Armenians who, in addition to supplying the Soviet Union with outstanding scientists, intellectuals and creative artists, also furnish substantial numbers of highly trained and skilled organizational, managerial, military and administrative personnel, operating in sectors from which Jews are excluded for political and other reasons. In short, both national groups while small are creative minorities dispersed throughout the Soviet Union, performing valuable and important functions. Their alienation, for any reason, could result in a substantial reduction in their efficiency and performance, and correspondingly that of the Soviet system as a whole.

I might point out here that although I am discussing the two nationalities in a single context, Jewish and Armenian interests in the eastern Mediterranean are neither in harmony or in conflict; Armenians have claims against Turkey and have no quarrel with the Arabs or Jews; Jews have claims against the Arabs but no quarrel with either Turks or Armenians. Thus, the discussion of the cost of their alienation to the Soviet Union should not be interpreted as meaning that their pressures upon Moscow are in the same direction or in cooperation with one another. They move simply in different but not opposing directions.

RISKS AND COSTS OF SOVIET MIDDLE EAST POLICY

Finally let me say in this connection that ultimately the greatest costs and risks which the Soviet Union may bear as a result of its eastern Mediterranean policy may well be the feedback effects of its changing policies upon the nationality equilibrium at home.

I will go now to the Soviet public institutions and entities in Soviet Middle Eastern policy: The armed forces, economic sectors and social groups.

The continuing and deepening involvement of the Soviet Union in the Middle East since 1955 has resulted in interlacing specific domestic interests with policy in the area that goes beyond the nationality issue. The Communist Party apparatus, various sectors of the economy, the armed forces, sociofunctional groups, and even factions within the state bureacuracy have all, to some degree, developed a vested stake in Soviet policy in the eastern Mediterranean. While it is exceedingly difficult to casually relate the interests of specific groups with certain aspects of policy, it would appear that, as in the case of religious and national groups, the influence upon the shaping of policy and the reciprocal impact of policy upon interests is both uneven and fluctuating in character.

Individual Soviet leaders and factional groupings within the leadership have also developed a vested stake in the Soviet Middle Eastern enterprise that would seem to affect their political fortunes favorably or adversely. The minor shake-up in the Soviet Central Committee after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, coming immediately after indications in the Soviet press of a bitter controversy over the implications of the Arab defeat for the U.S.S.R., suggests this very strongly. Individuals closely associated with Alexander Shelepin, in particular, appear to have suffered a loss in influence within the leadership.

The precise contours of those factional lines, together with their positions, cannot be fixed but it appears certain that the 1967 war affected some individuals and groupings adversely while benefiting others. Similarly, controversy over whether to maintain, diminish or deepen the Soviet commitment to the Arab cause leaves an uneven impact upon various public institutions, factions, social groupings and sectors of the economy.

Furthermore, the general Soviet citizenry is also vitally affected by the costs of a particular policy in the eastern Mediterranean in relation to other priorities. The Soviet Union, over the past decade and a half, has poured enormous resources into the Middle East, and thus possesses an enormous economic, military and political investment in the region which it must protect and preserve and the existence of this investment has been shaped by the interests of various internal forces just as it in turn continues to affect the fortunes of these domestic groups.

SOVIET ARMED FORCES

First and foremost, Soviet policy in the Middle East has contributed immensely to the importance of the armed forces in the Soviet system, although the armed forces may not have actively advocated such a policy in the first place. In the past 15 years, however, the Soviet military seems to have developed a vested stake in the policy that

goes over and beyond simply the abstract interests of the Soviet State. The Arab defeat in 1967 was in some ways a defeat for the Soviet military since it was charged with equipping and training the Egyptian forces. Its prestige thus suffered indirectly, which suggests that it is determined that this shall not happen again. Since 1967, Soviet troops, technicians, advanced military equipment and perhaps even marginal involvement in military operations have increasingly made their presence felt on Egyptian soil.

All branches of the Soviet military appear to be actively involved, but it is the Soviet Navy, in particular, that has demonstrated the greatest relative growth as a consequence of Soviet ambitions in the Mediterranean. The expanding commitment to the Arab states has been accompanied by steady growth of Soviet Naval Forces, which increasingly assume a key tactical role in asserting the Soviet presence in the region. Establishing a sphere of influence in the Mediterranean, in effect, releases the Soviet Navy from its landlocked environment, enabling it to grow to meet and exploit the expanding opportunities that lie waiting in the Atlantic, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

Since Soviet policy in the eastern Mediterranean has justified the rapid growth of the Soviet Navy, we can assume that the Soviet Naval Forces have developed an enduring interest in preserving and expanding Soviet power in this region. A failure of Soviet policy in the area could have disastrous consequences for the Soviet Naval Forces; it might be deprived of its quasi-bases in north Africa and be forced back into the Black Sea, with a resultant contraction and diminished role to play in Soviet life.

SOVIET INDUSTRY

The military investment in Egypt has also affected the Soviet economy, particularly the defense industries and heavy industries. Egypt and other Third World countries have become a dumping ground for obsolete and surplus Soviet weapons, Egypt's demonstrated military ineptness virtually guarantees a perpetual market for surplus and obsolete weapons. It becomes a market for spare parts and altogether Soviet policy in this region serves to keep Soviet defense industries humming and busily developing and producing new weapons which can be tested and tried out in Egypt.

On the other hand, light industry, agriculture, the consumer goods industries and the service industries may view Soviet policy in this area with disfavor, since commitments to the Arab countries serves to drain away scarce resources and preserves economic priorities that these sectors of the economy find distasteful, since it arrests or decelerates their growth in spite of growing demand at home for their goods and services.

PARTY APPARATUS

A third group whose interests are ambiguously affected by Soviet military policy is the party apparatus. Normally, this institution finds itself in close informal alliance with the military and heavy industry, but this is by no means clear with respect to the Arab states. Since none of the Arab states are Communist in character and all have legally outlawed their Communist parties, the purists in the party

apparatus are understandably apprehensive with Moscow's extensive and expensive flirtation with regimes that are internally unstable, politically unreliable, ideologically suspect, and basically anti-Communist. Local Communists are often persecuted, harassed, jailed, and executed by regimes which are actively supported by Moscow. This serves to demoralize local Communists, frustrates the development of Communist parties, arrests agitation for Marxist-Leninist type revolutions and in general serves to ally Moscow with anti-Communist regimes.

Furthermore, some veteran Soviet party officials are concerned that these basically bourgeois regimes are exploiting Soviet power for their own purposes and would be ready to abandon the Soviet association if more desirable options were to make their appearance. There are suggestions that some senior party officials in Russia regard the regimes in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and Sudan as more Fascist than Socialist in character. Thus, these officials may view with alarm the fact that the Soviet Union in some ways has become the prisoner of weak, ideologically erratic, and politically unreliable client-states that can inadvertently maneuver the Soviet Union into confrontations with the United States, forcing the Soviet State to lay its prestige on the line by either escalating risks on behalf of dubious goals or withdrawing in prudent humiliation.

It is noteworthy that senior Soviet party ideologists like Mikhail Suslov have yet to express consistent enthusiasm for these regimes or the Soviet association with them. Unlike the organizational party types like Brezhnev, it appears that the ideological types are not particularly enthusiastic about the specific manner in which the Soviet Union is attempting to cultivate a sphere of influence in the Mediterranean.

Furthermore, Soviet support for regimes that outlaw local Communists serve as a signal to other Communist parties that they, too, can expect to be sacrificed to promote Soviet global power interests as distinct from its ideological interests. This creates a possible opening for the Chinese who may come to the rescue of local Communist parties abandoned by the dictates of Soviet expediency.

Thank you.

(The full text of Mr. Aspaturian's statement appears on p. 82.)

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much.

You may proceed, Mr. Kolkowicz.

STATEMENT OF ROMAN KOLKOWICZ, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES

(The biography of Mr. Kolkowicz appears on p. 185.)

Mr. KOLKOWICZ. Thank you very much.

I appreciate very much being able to discuss today the role of the military factor in Soviet foreign policy and, more specifically, the Soviet military goals in the Middle East and the role of the military as a pressure group in the Soviet Union.

SOVIET MILITARY MORE IMPORTANT AFTER STALIN

The Soviet military has traditionally played a minor role in the shaping of Soviet foreign policy objectives and interests. Stalin controlled, coerced, and terrorized the officers corps whenever he found it

expedient, and the military's views on foreign policy carried little weight in the Politburo, except perhaps during World War II. The death of the dictator in 1953, however, freed the military establishment from its subordinate position, and they have since expanded their influence and political power impressively. It would not be an overstatement to suggest that the Soviet military establishment has become the most powerful institution in the Soviet Union next to the party.

There are many reasons for the military's ascendance into their current position of influence. First, the single, dictatorial rule of Stalin was replaced by a collective leadership, which by its very nature reduces the absolute power and control from the center, and is a kind of coalition rule, with the attending necessity to constantly balance powerful and at times conflicting interests at play; two, the Soviet Union has become a global superpower whose interests and commitments around the globe have grown substantially and depend to a large extent on a viable and effective military establishment; three, the enormous complexity of modern warfare and nuclear technology increased the indispensability of military expertise in policymaking; four, the role of terror machine, which in the past kept the military controlled and coerced, had now become reduced, thus making the military a more self-assured and powerful institution.

Each of these factors, and many others, have strengthened the military's corporate autonomy and its influence on Soviet politics and made the party leaders more dependent on the marshals, generals, and admirals. These factors have also reduced the party's controls within the military and thus enabled the latter to press their demands with greater immunity and impunity.

KHRUSHCHEV AND THE MILITARY

The current leaders in the Kremlin have undoubtedly also learned an important political lesson from the experiences of their predecessors, Malenkov and Khrushchev. They presumably learned that to oppose the military's basic interests in the long run eventually invites political disaster. Chairman Malenkov, whose foreign and defense policies alienated the military during 1953–55, was easily ousted from power with the military's support. The price the military extracted from his successor, Khrushchev, was impressive, involving higher military budgetary allocations, massive promotions and the reduction of party controls over the armed forces. Chairman Khrushchev who came to power with the military's support eventually opposed a number of important military objectives and was ousted from power in 1964 with the support of the military, who presumably expected a better deal from the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime.

The Soviet military represent today a state within a state, an enormous organization absorbing a large portion of Soviet economic resources, given preferential treatment by the party and playing an important role in the shaping of Soviet defense and foreign policies. We must ask, therefore, what does the military want? Or, to put it in another way, what are some of the military's interests, objectives, and values that are relevant to Soviet foreign policy presently?

The military's basic objectives and perennial demands are no secret: high priority levels for the defense sector of the economy; high levels of budgetary allocations for the several branches of the armed

forces; greater autonomy for the high command in the planning and execution of military policy—in other words, greater authority and independence from the party. The military prefers an international environment which is less than stable and which can be described in terms of high levels of "threat expectation," in part as a rationalization for the maintenance of high defense budgets and priorities for the defense industrial sector.

A CONSERVATIVE MILITARY VIEW

With reference to broad foreign policy objectives, the military's attitudes may be described as militant, conservative, and rather inflexible. For example, the Soviet Government's support of a detente policy has met with resistance and hostility from many sectors of the military; past attempts by party leaders to reduce the burdensome size and cost of the conventional forces in the Red Army have met with concerted opposition from the military, and they were eventually rescinded; occasions of political and military accommodations with the West, as for example in the Cuban missile crisis, were met with hostility from the military.

There is no need to expand this list in order to arrive at the conclusion that the marshals, generals, and admirals prefer to deal with Soviet external problems from a position of power, seeing the security of the country and the pursuit of policy opportunities abroad as being determined largely by the might of the Red Army. While Stalin and Khrushchev resisted military pressures more effectively, presumably being more strongly entrenched in power, the current leadership is, for a variety of reasons, less willing or able to oppose the military.

One point needs to be made clear: in describing military-party disagreements I do not mean to imply that the military is necessarily more militant and adventurous than the party leaders; nor is it fair to say that the military always speaks with a single, united voice. The military community is frequently divided, interservice rivalry is a known fact, and the party is constantly seeking to further these diversions within the military in order to prevent collusion and to achieve better control. Moreover, the military high command is at times more conservative and less adventurous than party leadership in pressing for foreign and military adventures abroad.

However, when it comes to the military's basic objectives described above, the officer corps tends to act in a united way, and when it comes to projecting military power abroad the military wants to be assured that the time, place, and capabilities are right. In the contemporary period, and with reference to the area under consideration today, the Middle East, the military seems to feel that the time, the place, and the capabilities are indeed right. Let us now, therefore, turn to Soviet military goals in the Middle East.

I believe that in order to better understand Soviet political and military objectives in the Middle East we should place these in the broader context of their political and military purposes and policies around the globe. The reason for this is, I believe, that their Middle Eastern policy is closely related to others, and that future Soviet behavior in the Middle Eastern region will be strongly influenced by what happens elsewhere.

It is a generally accepted fact that Soviet military and political leaders rely, above all, on their military capabilities to defend their

country, to control their satellites and to expand their influence around the globe. Ideology, Communist doctrine, revolutionary propaganda, and economic aid all play their assigned roles in Soviet political calculations. But in the final analysis, to the suspicious Soviet mind, only the might of arms is what preserves their gains and turns opportunities into further gains. Now for about two decades since World War II, the Soviets labored under a disadvantage: they were strategically inferior to the United States. Soviet leaders tried various means to get around this handicap, but it was not until the past few years that they finally obtained this desperately sought objective—obtaining strategic equality with the West.

CHANGES IN SOVIET STRATEGIC POLICY

I believe that this development has led to several important changes in Soviet strategic thinking and foreign policy.

For two decades since World War II, Soviet foreign and military policy was essentially Western oriented, it focused on an intense confrontation of NATO and the United States. Soviet military capabilities, postures, and strategies were aimed primarily against the West. In recent years we have seen a shift in that policy emphasis and orientation. We may call this new policy line, this new Soviet grand design, a policy of hold and explore. Specifically, hold the Western flank stable, normalize and stabilize relations with the West from the newly gained position of strategic equality, in order to gain greater freedom to deal with the challenge from Communist China in the East, and to explore promising opportunities south of Russia, in the Mediterranean, in the Middle East, and in the areas of the Indian Ocean.

Such a policy shift seems realistic and promising to Soviet political and military leaders. They tend to see a continuation of the old, anti-Western confrontation policy as one of high cost, high risk and low payoff, while the pursuit of the new policy direction as one of relatively low cost, low risk, and potential high payoff. Several recent Soviet policy initiatives seem to support these assumptions: Soviet interest in strategic arms control talks; Soviet interests in European security arrangements with the West—all seem directed at a stabilization and normalization of relations with the West from a position of strategic and political strength and equality.

IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET MILITARY EXPANSION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Moreover, Soviet concerns with China have become more acute, and they have undertaken corresponding military and political measures to that end. And finally, Soviet interests in and commitments to the Middle East have increased and are likely to increase. The Soviet military expansion into the Middle East is therefore intimately related to several developments and expectations:

One, the U.S. preoccupation with the conflict in Southeast Asia which necessarily reduced our attention, interests, and the likelihood of significant commitment to the Middle Eastern region.

Two, the sharp rise in the levels of Soviet strategic and conventional capabilities offered the Soviets a greater sense of security vis-a-vis the West and emboldened them to probe the degree of Western resolve in the Middle East.

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Three, the Middle Eastern region represents to the Soviet mind a highly promising area for political and military exploitation: it contains a number of intensely anti-Western countries, with unstable leadership, seeking outside support and open to Communist penetration.

Four, the pressure of the Soviet military upon the party leaders to expand Soviet military presence in the region for both military and political purposes has likely reduced whatever reservations there might have been in the Kremlin.

CONCLUSIONS

We may suggest, therefore, that the increased Soviet military power is looking for a purpose. To the Soviet military and political leaders the Middle East is in many ways an ideal place and purpose. It opens strategic areas in support of Soviet global military operations; it is an area of ill-defined Western political interests, and thus prone to probing and penetration; it offers the Soviet military an opportunity to expand its influence abroad, to test certain doctrines and weapons; it enhances the rationale for high levels of defense allocations at home. An increased Soviet military presence in that region threatens the southern flanks of NATO and the actual and symbolic Western presence. The region, moreover, is logistically accessible to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet military leaders have never, in the half century history of their country, commanded a more formidable armed force; never enjoyed such a strong political position at home; never been that powerful vis-a-vis the West. Moreover, from the Soviet point of view, their traditional adversaries, the United States and the NATO countries, have never been in such a disarray, largely because of Vietnam, domestic preoccupations, and because of a disinclination to undertake new global commitments.

I would conclude, therefore, that this is a rather dangerous situation in which the Soviet military leaders may seek to force the hand of their rather unimaginative and less-than-decisive collective political leadership.

The future course of Soviet policy in the Middle East will therefore depend to a large extent on the firmness and resolve of the only power capable of deterring further Soviet penetration of the Middle Eastern region, and the only power capable of compelling them to reconsider future course of action. In the absence of such a resolve I suggest the Soviet military and political leaders will feel less constrained to expend their military presence there and thus set the stage for a potential conflagration of disastrous proportions.

(The full text of Mr. Kolkowicz' statement appears on p. 90.)

U.S. RESPONSE

Mr. HAMILTON. Gentlemen, we thank both of you for your fine statements. You have added perspectives to our committee hearings that we have not had before and we appreciate your fine statements.

Dr. Kolkowicz, you conclude in the sentence that you just read that:

> The future course of Soviet policy in the Middle East will therefore depend to a large extent on the firmness and resolve of the only power capable of deterring further Soviet penetration of the Middle Eastern region.

That is the United States, I presume.

Mr. KOLKOWICZ. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. What kind of steps do you think the United States ought to take that we are not now taking to achieve that?

Mr. KOLKOWICZ. Well, I suggest that first we want to take a look at the possibilities for influencing Soviet behavior. Soviet foreign commitments of recent years have become expanded. While they are militarily much stronger, they are also potentially more vulnerable.

Soviet political, military and economical commitments have expanded in East Europe, the Far East and in the Middle East. There are certain domestic pressures within the Soviet Union, pressures from certain elites which are not quite sure of the outcomes of an endless involvement in the quicksand of the Middle East.

What I am suggesting is that there are certain avenues possibly open to us in which we may, without getting directly involved, deter or influence further Soviet involvement. First, we must come to terms at home with a rather unhappy fact. The Middle East is not a remote area of limited American interest. This is potentially, and not necessarily remotely, a likely area of a more massive Soviet involvement and we should, I believe, become educated to this possibility.

Second, I suggest we could possibly make it more expensive for the Soviets at, for example, the SALT negotiations and force them to consider certain costs and risks involved in terms of their own priorities. If we assume that Soviet interests in SALT are genuine, we may seek to persuade them to reconsider these particular costs or risks involved.

Third, we obviously want to make sure that the State of Israel, the only source of resistance to Soviet penetration, receives our substantial support in terms of supportive declaratory policy and in terms of not eroding at least minimal positions, minimal requirements for its security.

What I am suggesting is not a very elegant solution simply because the problem is too complicated. What I am suggesting is that there are a variety of ways to persuade the Soviets to reconsider the costs and the risks involved in their gradual and expanding penetration of the Middle East.

SOVIET PENETRATION OF THE MIDDLE EAST

Mr. HAMILTON. When you talk about penetration, what does the word "penetration" mean to you? Are you thinking in terms of domination? Is this what the Soviets are seeking in the area, absolute control of certain states? Do you think the intent in Moscow today is to control countries of the Middle East as they have controlled Eastern European countries?

Mr. KOLKOWICZ. Well, I believe we might possibly want to examine this problem on two or three levels. I don't think that the Soviets are strongly interested in getting more real estate in the Middle East. I think the Soviets are predominantly interested—and this is a commonplace observation, but I think it is relevant—in the reduction of Western presence in that region, both symbolic or actual Western presence in the Middle East.

Second, the Soviets feel that they have a lot of time. They can afford to undertake what might be called a capillary penetration into several countries in the Middle East in which they have substantial influence

right now; that is, to establish a stronger political base in some of the institutions, particularly in the more radical countries there, and in some of the more receptive institutions like the military establishments.

Third, that particular region has always been a Russian political and military objective; they have wanted it for over a hundred years. Right now, they are strong and the traditional Western presence relatively weak, they believe that they can possibly obtain that objective in a less costly way.

So to come around full circle, what the Soviets seem to want is not the establishment of the Soviet flag there or to establish satellites there, but to establish a dominant Soviet political, ideological, economical, and military presence in the region.

SOVIET NATIONALITIES

Mr. HAMILTON. Dr. Aspaturian, I was interested in your statement on page 14 that "Soviet policy in the Eastern Mediterranean is now inextricably enmeshed in Soviet nationality problems in the Soviet Union." This is, as far as I know, to this joint subcommittee, a new perspective.

How important in terms of Middle East policy do you think that is? Is this the kind of thing that the Soviet policymakers have to weigh very heavily in determining their Middle East policy?

Mr. ASPATURIAN. Well, let me attack it both in terms of the immediate aspect and the potential aspect. I think the Soviet nationality situation is potentially one of the most explosive domestic situations in the Soviet Union today. It is not blatantly obvious but there is a great deal of simmering below the surface.

There is a great deal of discontent among various nationalities. The discontent is uneven. Some nationalities, of course, are not as discontented. What I have perceived recently, is that some nationalities that at one time have been relatively content have been moved into a condition of ferment by a number of policies and the Near Eastern policy is only a part of it. So I think we have to look at the Soviet nationality question as a separate item which Soviet policy in the eastern Mediterranean affects.

I think with respect to the Jews, Soviet policy is critical. I think that they have a real problem with Soviet Jews.

SOVIET JEWRY

Mr. HAMILTON. How many Jews are there in the Soviet Union?

Mr. ASPATURIAN. According to the last census, about 2,130,000 which registered a drop of about 150,000 from the previous census when everybody expected it to go up by at least a half a million. So for some of us who have closely examined the statistics this suggests that many Jews are giving Russian as their nationality, either because they don't want any trouble or the authorities are indiscriminately counting Jews as Russians to support and justify their charge that the Jewish problem is well on the road to solution via assimilation.

But it is not the large number that is important, it is the fact that the Jews are one of the most creative people in the Soviet Union. Virtually all of their nuclear physicists, those involved in building atomic weapons, have been Jews. Most of them remain nameless, but of those that

we know of a large proportion are Jewish. Outstanding scientists and mathematicians in other areas are Jewish. A substantial sector of the medical establishment is Jewish. Although there are only two million Jews in the Soviet Union, most of them are performing vital and important tasks and if there was a——

Mr. HAMILTON. What I am trying to get at is the impact these nationalities have upon Soviet policy, how much weight the leadership of the Soviet Union has to give to the presence of these nationalities. Now you are making the point that the Jews are very influential for their size, but the Soviet policy in the Middle East obviously runs counter to the wishes of its Jewish population.

Mr. ASPATURIAN. Well, it does at the present time but it all depends on what the costs will be in the future with respect to pursuing this kind of policy. One would have to ask, supposing Soviet policy was committed in such a way as to associate itself with the Arab commitment to destroy Israel or at least diminish it considerably. I think this would have an explosive impact on the Soviet Jews.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you think this is one reason the Soviets are making some small overtures toward Israel today?

Mr. ASPATURIAN. Yes, I think so. I think that this is one of the reasons. I think that Victor Louis' two articles in the New York Times suggests that there is an alternative in Soviet policy that might come into play under certain conditions.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Rosenthal.

U.S. INTERESTS: VIETNAM AND MIDDLE EAST

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Dr. Kolkowicz, you talked about military interest in the Soviet Union and touched slightly on military interests of the United States. Would you want to comment on what the national security interest of the United States is in Southeast Asia compared to the Middle East?

Mr. KOLKOWICZ. If I may be allowed, I would rather not go into that simply because it is a very complicated problem. If I may slightly shift the focus of that question, I would possibly answer it as follows: that hopefully the Soviets have learned something from our involvement in Southeast Asia and that is that it is very easy for a major power to get involved and committed in a remote area and so very hard to uncommit or disengage.

Second, I hope they would have learned that in our contemporary era massive military power does not always bring commensurate political gains.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. One of the positive residual effects, if one can define it in that way, of the Vietnam engagement is a lesson to all military establishments that sometimes political objectives cannot be achieved by military means.

Mr. KOLKOWICZ. That is true.

This question relates to certain important changes in Soviet thinking about war. Stalin always thought of war in terms of continental warfare; that is, he never sought a policy which would send large, organized Soviet military units far away from Soviet borders. In other words, he was wedded to the so-called continental, theater operation doctrine. Khrushchev rejected that doctrine. Khrushchev announced

a strategic doctrine which very strongly decreased the emphasis on theater warfare and put sizable resources as well as strategic emphasis into strategic warfare.

What is happening today since Khrushchev's departure, is a merger of both strategic policies. They think now both in terms of global warfare as well as in terms of theater warfare. Moreover, they have the capabilities for both. So what we face today in the Soviet Union is in many ways a radical change in their attitude to warfare. This has persuaded them to consider theater warfare, limited warfare, and naval warfare as something operationally plausible and in terms of capabilities feasible.

SOVIET UNION AS A SUPERPOWER

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Some of your colleagues suggested yesterday that one of the reasons that has developed is that the Soviet now sees control as a perquisite superpower. In a sense they had the old-fashioned concept that to be a genuine superpower one has to have commitments and responsibilities all over the world, that they have not really learned the lesson from us that the burdens of commitments is sometimes enormously high and quite deleterious to domestic aims.

Mr. KOLKOWICZ. Yes. Well, I don't know the proper definition for a superpower, but I would suggest that the Soviets have traditionally probed for openings, probed for opportunity targets. For 50 years this has been their policy, and they have now grown to be an enormous nuclear military power. They have expanded their influence, broken out of containment, and their flag is visible around the world; so in this sense they are a superpower.

I would also suggest that what is happening is that as the Soviet empire and commitments are growing, they may have trouble digesting their acquisitions, and balancing their domestic, bloc-wide and international priorities. As a result the Soviets want a policy of controlled initiatives; that is, to operate in one theater at a time. I think we can deny them that particular preferred policy initiative.

What I am suggesting is that one of the Communist fears has been to face two confrontations, two fronts at the same time. This is something that must be giving nightmares to the people in the Kremlin. I believe that current Soviet policy is aimed at stabilizing one theater of confrontation in order to deal more adequately with the others, that is, with China and with their expansionistic policy south of Russia.

PRESENT SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND MILITARY

Mr. ROSENTHAL. There is a statement on page 7 of your statement that is new as far as I am concerned. You said: "I submit that this is a rather dangerous situation in which the Soviet military leaders may seek to force the hand of their rather unimaginative and less-than-decisive collective political leadership."

I had always thought that political leadership; that is, the party, was quite decisive and frequently imaginative, I believe, at least in terms of their goals. As you suggest now the military has the upper hand.

Mr. KOLKOWICZ. No.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you suggest the military has the upper hand in making policy?

Mr. KOLKOWICZ. No, I do not suggest that the military has the upper hand in terms of making foreign policy. The military is quite content much of the time to follow the party's leadership. When the military disagreed in the past with the party, it was because their own institutional interests were involved such as a cut in budget, such as the conciliatory policy vis-a-vis the West and things of this sort.

What I am suggesting is that they have a collective leadership. Many people in the West have described that leadership as less than imaginative, as indecisive, pointing at their past policy initiatives. Since the military is strong and the leadership seems not to be decisive, I would suggest that in the event of a crisis situation this is a formula for possible over-reacting to or for underassessing the adversary.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Is it different in the Soviet Union from other countries, where a forceful and aggressive military might prevail over a dissipated political leadership?

Mr. KOLKOWICZ. Well, possibly not. I would only refer to comparisons within the Soviet Union itself on this. Under Stalin they never had any opportunity for asserting their views or preferences. They tried under Khrushchev but were not very successful. The military has in the meantime grown into an enormous institution, and I believe that the collective political leadership is going to be very careful in not alienating or not opposing some basic military objectives and values.

MILITARY AND IDEOLOGY

Mr. ROSENTHAL. You suggest also on pages 4 and 5 of your statement that the Soviets place more emphasis on military strength and less on ideology.

Mr. KOLKOWICZ. Yes.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. And this seems to vary from the conventional wisdom which accepts a high danger from Soviet ideology and subversion and less from direct Soviet arms involvement. In other words, all these years we were brought up on the theory that the thing we had to fear as much as their military strength was subversion and ideology, that the spread of ideology was the big motivating factor.

Mr. KOLKOWICZ. I would suggest the following: that ideology in the Soviet Union has progressively eroded as a vital dynamic element in both foreign policy and domestic policy. While China remains a source of ideological dynamism, vitality, et cetera, the Soviet Union is seen by many of the Third World countries as an advanced industrial, stable, status quo kind of power.

While the Soviets turn out an enormous volume of ideological propaganda themselves, I don't believe that they see its utility as being very high. In the final analysis, the Soviets continue to rely on the might of arms, on their political influence, and economic capabilities for the protection of their country and in the pursuit of political opportunities.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you see that the nationalism factor being put into their decisions is more important than the ideological factor? Is nationalism now prevailing all through the country?

Mr. KOLKOWICZ. If you mean Russian national interests as opposed to international Communist objectives, I would say, yes, Russian national interests, no matter how defined, are, in the final analysis, the basic guidelines for Soviet policy.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. You detect a division between the Soviet military and the civilian leadership or within the military itself on the SALT talks, mutual reduction of forces, disarmament and things like that?

Mr. KOLKOWICZ. Yes; there is evidence of disagreement. How significant it is in terms of policymaking I cannot say. Public statements by military people indicate that they find SALT fruitless and potentially detrimental to Soviet interests.

SOVIET NATIONALITIES

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Dr. Aspaturian, how do the various nationalities within the Soviet Union affect government policies and how effective are the various influences?

Mr. ASPATURIAN. Yes, I didn't want to clutter it up with charts and statistics. It depends on the size of the nationality, its strategic location and of course the value of the nationality to the Soviet Union as a whole. Under Stalin, very few nationalities except the Georgian nationality exercised very much of an input except for the Russian nationality and it had essentially become a great Russian state presiding over the other nationalities. With the event of Khrushchev, however, the Ukrainians became very influential and many of the important positions were filled with Ukrainians.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What is the mechanism for them exercising their influence?

Mr. ASPATURIAN. There are two ways. First, there is the personal influence of individual leaders of various nationalities who are catapulted into important positions. Second, the perceptions of the leadership are conditioned by the awareness that a certain threshold of alienation cannot be gone beyond, and in the case of the Ukrainians the possibility that 45 million Ukrainians might be alienated and, being located in a very strategic and important area of the Soviet Union, becomes an important factor in their influence on policy. Another important factor was the fact that Khrushchev in his bid for power used whatever basis of organizational and regional support he could find and a good deal of his regional and local support was located in the Ukraine.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What is important, I think, is for us to understand as politicians—in other words, we have a general election—a man running for national political office might appeal to one area of the country by offering programs or an ideology that they are interested in. How does that differ in the Soviet Union where they don't have contested elections?

HOW MINORITIES SPEAK

Mr. ASPATURIAN. In the Soviet system they do have formal representation of this character but it is not that important. Thus, each nationality has its own republic organized like a sovereign state. They all have proportionate representation in the Supreme Soviet, for example, but I think that this is not what is a crucial thing.

After a time it tends to become a legal funnel for exercising influence that derives from other sources. What happens is that leaders who are of a particular ethnic origin and who become important in the central government, at first unconsciously, later more consciously, become spokesmen for their nationalities, spokesmen for their localities as

well as spokesmen for the central government in much the same way that an American politician might become a dual spokesman, because during the period of collective leadership, as Professor Kolkowicz has pointed out, individual leaders in contending with one another look for various kinds of support, and one of the ways in which they look for support is to find powerful or influential nationalities that they can use as a base. It is not formalized in the same way as it is here but nevertheless it becomes an important factor.

Third, the fact that the Soviet Union has mobilized and used nationalities for its own purposes on certain occasions has served to legitimize and to inculcate these people with the idea and the habit of agitating for their own specific interests even when it does not coincide with those of the Soviet Union.

If you are asking whether a Ukrainian lobby or a Georgian lobby or an Armenian lobby exists that can go in and lobby with the central committee or the government, no, it does not happen that way. There is not even a military lobby in that sense, either. It is much more informal and much more subtle the way these influences are felt, but nevertheless they are felt there.

To give one example of a nationality, we have not talked about, the Uzbek nationality in Central Asia which, for example, has become more and more important in Soviet policy and influential in Soviet calculations. I might say that the influence of the nationalities at this stage is more in the sense that Soviet leaders must take their interest into calculation rather than bowing to specific demands. They know that there are certain interests and if they don't want to alienate them or if they wish to ameliorate them, they must cater to them in some degree.

In the case of the Uzbek nationality, since the Soviets were making a bid for influence in the Third World they wanted to use the Uzbek as an example to show how an underdeveloped nationality could develop in the Soviet scheme.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. You say Soviet policy or emphasis changes sharply as the leadership changes; that is, Stalin/Khrushchev. In our country by comparison within reasonable limitations we seem to have a continuous, or even rigid foreign policy. Is that a fair statement?

Mr. ASPATURIAN. No; I don't think so. I think you really have the most significant break in the foreign policy since the death of Stalin. I think since Stalin's death Soviet foreign policy has been cut from a single cloth; different patterns, yes, but the same cloth; that is, the global aspect in contrast to the more limited continential aspect of Soviet policy goals under Stalin. I think this is still essentially the same foreign policy. There are different emphases, there are different allocations and so forth and so on, but I think from about 1954 you have had essentially the same kind of foreign policy in the Soviet Union—a policy based upon global involvement.

SOVIET JEWERY'S ALIENATION

Mr. ROSENTHAL. You mentioned earlier the change in Soviet policy since 1955 toward Israel in the role of Soviet Jewry and their attitude to that policy. How serious is the present alienation of the Soviet Jews from their Government as a domestic problem within the Soviet Union?

Mr. ASPATURIAN. I think it is extremely serious. In fact, Kosygin today dealt with the Jewish question. One of the things he mentioned was that they were not permitting young Jews to leave the Soviet Union for two reasons: One, because they have a tremendous financial investment in their education. You have to bear in mind that one out of every five Soviet Jews is a college graduate. Now that is at a level much higher than that of even the second highest nationality and this is very important from the Soviet standpoint.

The second is the qualitative character of Jewish skills. Not only are they college graduates but the quality of their training and the quality of their talent is much higher and much more crucial.

Third, I think Kosygin mentioned that they didn't want to provide Israel with military recruits.

So this indicates here how the nationality problem has become involved. They cannot send young people to Israel because first it costs money and second the Arabs will view this as a way in which the Israeli Army is recruiting new able and skilled people.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Do you think they are clandestinely permitting some Jews to get to Israel, hoping it will not receive any notoriety in the world press?

Mr. ASPATURIAN. Four thousand Jews have been permitted to leave already this year, but this is just a small trickle compared to the number that probably would want to leave if they had the opportunity.

Kosygin also maintained that there were a large number of Jews returning to the Soviet Union because of disenchantment with Israeli. We don't know what the figures are on that, however.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HAMILTON. Gentlemen, we have a vote pending here. I had some additional questions but by the time we get over to vote and return again it would be quite a delay so I think we will just express our appreciation to you for your statements and your response to the questions.

Mr. KOLKOWICZ. Thank you very much.

(The full text of Dr. Aspaturian's statement follows:)

INTERNAL FORCES AND SOVIET POLICY IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

I. INTRODUCTION

Russian interest in the Eastern Mediterranean has been long, durable and persistent. In spite of unrelenting attempts to establish a presence in the area over the past century, in concert, association or intrigue with a wide assortment of other powers, until comparatively recent times all of these attempts have resulted in signal failure for one reason or another. Neither the alliance with the Entente in World War I, nor the ill-faded association with Hitler in 1939–41, nor the joint Allied victory in World War II could bring about the realization of a more than 100-year ambition to become a Mediterranean power. All of Russia's partners, of whatever political hue, ideological coloring or vintage, seemed equally implacable in blocking Russia's entry into this vital waterway which has always been of strategic importance to Europe, Asia and Africa, and now plays a crucial role in the overall global balance of strategic power. I need not go into detail concerning the various strategems employed by Moscow to reach into the Mediterranean, since this has been amply covered by other witnesses, but rather I wish to restrict my remarks almost exclusively to the internal forces and pressures which have impelled the Soviet Union to expend the immense effort, resources and risks to achieve status as a Mediterranean power, and also to the impact that these policies have in turn had upon the interplay and interaction of domestic forces inside the Soviet Union. In my remarks, I shall make only passing references to the goals and objectives—both short-term and long-range—of Soviet pol-

icy in this region, attempting wherever possible to link them with domestic sources of impetus, and feedback effects upon Soviet domestic institutions, forces and entities.

Initially, Soviet objectives in the Eastern Mediterranean and its surrounding areas were primarily ideological in character, stemming largely from Moscow's self-assumed mission of encouraging and supporting revolutionary movements and groups of various hues as they struggled to free themselves from European economic and political control and influence. Fledgling Communist parties, radical nationalist movements, and reformist, anti-colonial regimes, including monarchies, were supported in various ways in Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and elsewhere soon after the Revolution in an endeavor to simultaneously erect a political buffer zone against outside intervention and to provide a foundation for further ideological penetration and expansion. While Soviet policy during this period was largely bereft of explicit strategic, commercial and political goals in the traditional sense, as the Soviet regime stabilized itself and grew in strength, the activities of the Comintern and its various external components in these countries became *de facto* instruments of traditional Russian purposes in the area, although within the context of World Communism and deliverance from colonialism and capitalism rather than Tsarist expansion or Christian humanitarianism. The establishment of Soviet power in the Transcaucasus and its formal incorporation into the U.S.S.R. once again made Russia a Near Eastern, if not an Eastern Mediterranean power, and the traditional imperatives of security interests in the region once again assumed their cardinal importance. Commercial and economic interests in the region were also soon resurrected, and ideological interests were thus simply grafted upon those already ordained by geography and history.

A PASSIVE POLICY, 1924–39

From 1924 to 1939, Soviet interest in the Eastern Mediterranean was largely passive in character. It had no active or affirmative policy, since its limited capabilities impelled it to focus upon the more crucial areas of Central Europe and the Far East. An active Eastern Mediterranean policy was simply a luxury which the Soviet Union could not afford, since the British and French presence in the region seemed firmly entrenched and fixed. The opportunities for penetration and influence were sparse and the possible benefits of such a policy equally meager.

The Nazi-Soviet Pact and the first phase of World War II, however, created unexpected opportunities and possible windfalls. The collapse of France and the military isolation of a beleaguered Britain appeared to presage an imminent collapse of the Anglo-French sphere of influence in the Eastern Mediterranean, threatening to create an enormous vacuum which Stalin felt should be shared by Hitler. Less than a year before the German attack upon Russia, a bizarre conference took place between Molotov and Hitler in Berlin, in which the German dictator offered to define the forthcoming Soviet sphere of influence in the region by expansively suggesting that Moscow focus its attention "in the general direction of the Indian Ocean," a vision too grandiose and remote to have any relevance for Moscow's real concerns which at the time were in the Balkans and Turkey. The Soviet response to this offer contained, among other *desiderata*, a demand for a Soviet military and naval base on the Turkish Straits, while the horizon which Hitler offered Molotov was lowered to more accessible regions. "The center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union" were defined as "south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf," in the formal Soviet reply to Hitler's more generous but less realistic offer. Berlin apparently rejected the Soviet counter-proposal by never replying to them.

The Nazi-Soviet negotiations thus revealed that the traditional interests of Russia in Iran, Turkey and the Straits had lain dormant but were not dead and at least strongly suggested that Soviet ambitions in this region could easily be aroused if the opportunity presented itself, but equally suggested that Moscow was in no position to elevate it to a primary or high-priority interest.

The Allied victory in World War II, the collapse of German and Italian power in the Balkans and the weakening of the British position, however, served to sustain the opportunities at a level sufficient to impel Stalin to at least make a serious effort to extend Soviet influence not only in Iran, Turkey, and the Straits, but also to Greece, North Africa and even East Africa. Different strategems were employed in each case, defined largely by the conditions, circumstances, available instruments and credible justifications. In Iran, Soviet military pressure.

exerted mainly through Moscow's refusal to withdraw its forces from Northern Iran, combined with the establishment of a puppet autonomous regime in Persian Azerbaidzhan, and the manipulation of the Leftist Tudeh Party, were used in an effort to extract economic and possibly territorial concessions from Teheran. In Turkey, where neither a viable Communist Party or Leftist movement existed, Stalin employed Georgian and Armenian irredentism to annex territory from Turkey in the East and relied upon the support of grateful Allies to coerce Turkey, which had wavered and vascillated during the war, into permitting the Soviets to establish military and naval bases on the Straits. The traditional Russian obsession with security and free exit from the Black Sea were offered as principal justifications. In Greece, a civil war instigated by local communist militants, although apparently neither initiated nor enthusiastically sanctioned by Stalin, was reluctantly co-opted by Moscow.

Ironically, it was the local communist attempt to move Greece into the Soviet orbit that was the principal factor which mobilized and congealed Western sentiment against the otherwise reasonable claims which Moscow made against Turkey, although the Soviet debacle in Iran also played its role. As part of an apparent concerted design to establish herself as a Mediterranean power, the Soviet Union also unexpectedly made bids of varying degrees of effort to become the Trust power in three former Italian colonies: The Dodecanese Islands off the Anatolian coast, the Cyrenaican part of Libya, and in Eritrea on the African horn. All three bids were rebuffed in spite of Molotov's eloquent appeals that the Soviet contribution to the Allied victory, her well-known opposition to colonialism and her long experience with nationality problems made Moscow eminently qualified to become a Trust power. In addition, Moscow demanded one-third of the Italian navy as war booty, presumably to use it as the basic of a Mediterranean fleet.

All of the postwar Soviet attempts to establish herself in the Eastern Mediterranean region failed. Had the Soviet Union succeeded across the board, there is little question but that Moscow would have become a Mediterranean power of some magnitude, given the fact that the British were already expressing their inabiliy to fully preserve their former presence and were calling upon the United States to fill the vacuum. The eventual upshot was the emergence of the U.S. as a Mediterranean power and the incorporation of Greece and Turkey into the Western alliance system as American protectorates. Stalin prudently retreated to the Black Sea and, after his death, his successors made amends to Turkey and officially withdrew its earlier demands for both bases and territory.

Down to about 1947 the role of internal forces, institutions and groupings in the shaping of Soviet policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as the impact of such policy upon the domestic situation was rather limited and restricted. Private interest groups in the Soviet system that could conceivably develop a vested interest in the region do not exist; nor, with the exception of the Armed Forces, were there any public institutions sufficiently independent of functionally differentiated to develop discretely distinguishable, even through non-conflicting, interests in the area. The Armed Forces, particularly the Navy, was anxious to secure free exit from the Black Sea and the addition of new territory south of the Caucasus would undoubtedly improve the Soviet defense perimeter in that vital region but, aside from this, there was little opportunity or even perception of separate interests by Soviet public bodies and institutions. Furthermore, the Soviet decision-making process was so centralized during this period that Soviet public bodies and institutions were largely instrumentalities of the decision-makers rather than active participants in the decision-making process. Whatever benefits accrued to various internal public bodies, institutions or groupings were largely fortuitous windfalls and not the product of conscious pressure, leverage or even design. Thus, had Stalin's postwar demands in the area materialized, the Armed Forces, particularly the Navy, would have been substantially benefited whether it actively participated in formulating the policy or not.

Policies in the region, as elsewhere, were largely conceived and developed within the leadership, based upon its values, goals and definition of interests and similarly executed in accordance with its judgment and assessment of the situation.

These interests were broad and diffuse in character and did not correspond in a discrete sense with the specific interests of given internal entities. Rather, the overall purpose was to strengthen the Soviet Union, expand her power and influence to assure in the first place the security and survival of the Soviet State, and to prepare in the second place a foundation for expanding the area of Soviet

influence via conventional means or the spread of Communism. Moscow sought bases on the Turkish Straits and territory in Eastern Turkey largely for strategic and defensive purposes, although eventually they could be used as a basis for further expansion. In Iran, Moscow sought not only oil concessions on favorable terms but wished to weaken the Iranian state and draw it into the Soviet political orbit. In Greece, ideological aims were imposed, but accepted, upon Moscow by local Communist militants. And Soviet demands for Trust territories in Africa could be described essentially as a desire for enhanced international prestige and acceptance, although such Trust territories would enable Moscow to establish a foothold in Africa as a prelude to undermining British and French power in the continent.

Stalin prudently refrained from making demands that would explicitly encroach upon established French and British interests and thus the Arab States were considered off-limits for the moment.

II. Soviet Nationalities and Soviet Policy in the Middle East

Aside from purely public bodies and institutions, other internal forces that were to become more intricately involved in the Eastern Mediterranean policy of the Soviet Union were social and national groupings and, in particular, certain religious groups and nationalities. Soviet Jews and Moslems, Georgians and Armenians, and even the Russian Orthodox Church, had important links with the region, as well as discretely defined and perceived interests which could vitally affect Soviet policy and, in turn, be affected by it.

Unlike Soviet public bodies and institutions at the time, these were domestic groupings of long historical duration, with almost predetermined and prefabricated interests in the area but, because of the Soviet political system, were effectively precluded from acting as independent or autonomous centers of influence and pressure upon Stalin and Soviet decision-makers generally. Stalin was quite aware of these interests and, while keeping their propensity for initiating action or exercising independent articulation of their view suppressed, he shrewdly manipulated their external connections and links for entirely other purposes. Capitalizing on the fact that the special interests of these groups were both well-known and enjoyed a credible legitimacy in the outside world, he employed them as instruments of Soviet policy without allowing them to become active participants in its formulation.

Thus, the Russian Orthodox Church with its interests in Jerusalem and its spiritual links with Greek Orthodox communities in Greece and the Arab world, the Jews with their interest in Palestine and later Israel, the Armenians with their special ties to Armenian communities in the Eastern Mediterranean countries and irredentist claim to their historical homeland in Eastern Turkey, the Georgians with similar though less extensive territorial claims to Turkish territory, the Azerbaidzhanis and their association with neighboring kinsmen in North Iran, and the Soviet Moslems with their spiritual links with other Moslems in the Mediterranean region, were all utilized as pawns of Soviet policy in one connection or another. The Armenians inside and outside the Soviet Union were energized and activated to give legitimacy to Soviet demands against Turkey, since this was a cause to which all Armenians of various political hues could rally; the new State of Israel was quickly recognized and military assistance funnelled through Czechoslovakia, which was welcomed warmly by Soviet Jewry and aroused substantial support for Soviet goals among sectors of Jewish communities abroad.

Although the potential was great, Stalin was not as skillful in utilizing Soviet Moslems as instruments of Soviet policy partly because of the circumstances of individual cases and partly because of Stalin's own personal predisposition toward Moslem nationalities which he viewed with a scorn just short of contempt. Furthermore, Stalin was pursuing policies detrimental to Moslem states and communities in the region: supporting Armenians and Georgians against Turks and supporting Jews against Arabs. Under the circumstances, it was perhaps more prudent not to needlessly arouse Moslem consciousness and remind Soviet Moslems of their external links. Even the Soviet activity in Persian Azerbaidzhan was carefully disassociated from Soviet Azerbaidzhani irredentism, unlike Soviet claims against Turkey which consciously enflamed Georgian and Armenian rationalism in an active manner.

APPROACH OF STALIN

Although Stalin skillfully orchestrated and controlled the active involvement of Soviet religious and national groups in support of Soviet policy, he was equally adept at circumscribing their initiatives and continued to actively repress their latent predisposition to act spontaneously in behalf of Soviet interests which happened to coincide with their own more specific interests. Stalin knew that officially inspired and directed involvement of these groups in support of Soviet interests could easily develop its own individual momentum and become disfunctional and even dangerous to Soviet policy if events and circumstances dictated a reversal or abandonment of policies supported by these groups. Soviet Jewish support for Israel might continue even if Soviet policy became hostile to Israel and Armenian irredentist demands against Turkey might persist even if Moscow reversed its attitude and sought rapprochement with Ankara. Stalin recognized these hazards and dangers and he developed contingency plans to deal with them, relying principally upon instruments of terror to keep these sentiments in check.

Nonetheless, the official blessing bestowed upon the activity of selected national and religious groups in support of specific aspects of Soviet policy imparted to it a measure of legitimacy, even within the Soviet context, which could not be easily or completely extinguished. By recognizing the right of Soviet Jews and Armenians to support Soviet policy in the name of promoting and defending Jewish and Armenian national interests, Stalin inadvertently legitimized Jewish and Armenian nationalism as an absolute right. At this stage, the revival of Jewish self-identity and consciousness posed a greater hazard to Stalin's policies that did Armenian nationalism, since the Jewish state which became the focus of Soviet Jewish support was not under Soviet control or influence and seemed unlikely to be in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the more active involvement of the more numerous and influential Jewish Community in the United States on behalf of Israel and its greater importance to Israel itself, impelled the suspicious Stalin to perceive the possibility that Soviet Jewry, because of its concern with Israel, might be converted into an instrument of Israeli and even U.S. interests, and he took immediate measures to frustrate and eradicate this possibility. Whether Soviet policy towards Israel assumed an ever more hostile turn during the Stalin period because of this fear of a potential fifth column or whether if stemmed from a conscious decision to abandon Israel as a possible Soviet client-state in the Eastern Mediterranean in favor of other prospects remains difficult to discern. Irrespective of why Soviet policy towards Israel underwent an abrupt change, the consequences for Soviet Jewry of this initial exercise in becoming actively implicated in Soviet Near Eastern policy was a near calamity which was avoided only by the fortuitous death of Stalin in 1953. The episode also contributed mightily to the recrudescence of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union which ultimately developed its own rationale independent and separate from Soviet policy towards Israel, and yet influenced it as well as conditioned the attitude of Soviet Jews to the Soviet State itself.

It should be noted that the Soviet attitude towards the Arab states and their claims against Israel was not a factor in Soviet behavior at this time. The alienation of Moscow from Israel and the alienation of Soviet Jews from the Soviet regime became essentially a domestic problem, whose dynamics assumed an independence from Soviet policy in the Eastern Mediterranean out of which it grew. When Moscow in 1955 developed an active pro-Arab policy, this simply aggravated the alienation which has since grown to enormous proportions and threatens to become one of the most serious domestic problems of Soviet society. Conceivably, Jewish alienation could spread and infect other nationalities whose latent resentments and frustrations against the Soviet regime might easily be forced to surface.

THE MOSLEM NATIONAL TIES

The increasing Soviet involvement in Arab affairs and support for Arab claims against Israel has resulted in the activation of the Soviet Moslem nationalities, even to the extent of using Moslem political and cultural dignitaries as Soviet diplomats to Arab countries. Since none of the Soviet Moslem nationalities are Arabs, this means that not national but religious and cultural affiliation is being employed and activated. Here again, as long as Soviet policy is pro-Arab, it does not run counter to normal Soviet Moslem sentiments, but should it for some unforeseen reason become anti-Arab and hence indirectly anti-Moslem, some alienation of Soviet Moslems can be expected due to this particular aspect of Soviet policy.

Changes in Soviet policy towards Turkey also resulted in a similar cycle of mobilization and alienation of Armenian support for Soviet causes in the area. As long as Soviet claims against Turkey, ostensibly on behlf of the Armenians, were not abandoned even though not vigorously prosecuted, there was little reaction from the Soviet Armenians other than varying degrees of gratitude and support. After Stalin's death, however, when his successors formally apologized to Turkey and forced the Georgians and Armenians to officially abandon their irredentist claims, Armenian disenchantment gave way first to disillusionment and eventually to potential alienation as the Soviet regime actively sought to detach Turkey from NATO and its alliance with the United States. As part of this effort, the Soviet regime, in response to Turkish representations, has sought to muffle those aspects of Armenian nationalism that appear offensive to the Turks. Thus, in 1965 and 1966, when the Armenian Republic commemorated the 50th anniversary of the Turkish massacres, Moscow intervened to downplay the event. The consequence was anger and revulsion, which erupted in demonstrations and riots in Yerevan as Armenian speakers attacked the Turks and demanded that the Soviet authorities do more to satisfy their claims against Turkey. These anti-Turkish sentiments were publicly expressed by outstanding Armenian intellectuals, writers and scientists of unimpeachable loyalty to the Soviet State and fidelity to the Communist Party. As a result, changes were dictated from Moscow in the leadership of both the Armenian Communist Party and Government because of their inability to control these exuberant manifestations of nationalism, but these resentments and anger continue to persist.

It should also be pointed out, however, that the new Soviet approach to Turkey has found a warm reception in Soviet Azerbaidzhan and among the various Turkic nationalities in Central Asia, all of whom have strong cultural, linguistic and religious ties with the Ottoman Turks. Thus, if Moscow should once again adopt a policy hostile to Turkey in response to Armenian pressures or for some other reason, she runs the risk of alienating the Soviet Turkic nationalities who, in the meantime, have been mobilized to support and facilitate Soviet rapprochement with Ankara and Soviet policy in the Arab East.

What is important in this connection by way of summary is:

(1) National and religious groups in the Soviet Union have become converted from passive objects of manipulation by Soviet leaders into increasingly active pressure groups seeking to force Moscow to adopt policies in the Near East that are congenial or at least not hostile towards states and groups that have close connections with them. In almost all cases, this poses a serious dilemma for the Soviet authorities since domestic Soviet national and religious groups pressure the Soviet regime on behalf of contradictory policies. Responding to Jewish demands in support of Israel would alienate Moslem nationalities, whereas responding to the pressures of Moslem nationalities to support the Arabs against Israel and to seek reapprochement with Turkey will continue to alienate Soviet Jews and Armenians.

(2) The Soviet regime is involved currently in a serious conflict with substantial numbers of Soviet citizens because of its policies in the Eastern Mediterranean which have furthermore aggravated anti-Semitic tendencies at home. To a lesser degree, Moscow is in danger of alienating a significant number of Armenians because of its refusal to actively press Armenian national claims against Turkey.

ARMENIANS MORE VULNERABLE

The Armenians pose less of a problem than the Jews because they are more vulnerable as a national entity—virtually the entire Armenian nation resides on Soviet territory—and thus they enjoy no option aside from displaying their resentments, anger and frustrations in symbolic and passive form. In the case of the Jews, the Soviet Jews constitute only a small fraction of the total world Jewish community, and the Jewish State exists outside Soviet control. Jewish alienation thus can assume the form of increasing demands for emigration to Israel and this agitation will find considerable support in Israel, the United States and in other countries. Bowing to these demands in turn could complicate the regime's relations with other national and religious groups which might demand similar rights to emigrate, particularly those national groups whose national states lie outside the Soviet Union. Furthermore, allowing Soviet Jews to leave for Israel would bring cries of outrage from Arab States, since this would have the effect of not only strengthening Israel but re-enforcing the legitimacy of Jewish claims to Palestine.

(3) Soviet policy in the Eastern Mediterranean is now inextricably enmeshed in Soviet nationality problems at home and affects Soviet relations not only with individual Soviet nationalities but influences the relationship of Soviet nationalities with one another as each attempts to push the Soviet regime into a direction that conflicts with the interests of the other. Even Soviet claims to Turkey under Stalin triggered Armenian-Georgian quarrels since the two republics had overlapping territorial claims against Turkey. As a single state attempting to simultaneously represent the national interests of more than a score of different nationalities, the Soviet leaders are discovering that Soviet foreign policy goals, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean, have unwittingly exposed the basic incompatibilities of Soviet nationality policy as it simultaneously attempts to discharge its obligations to various nationalities in the field of foreign policy and discovers, for example, that its foreign policy on behalf of the Armenians conflicts with its foreign policy on behalf of the Soviet Turkic nationalities.

(4) The uneven impact of Soviet policy in the Eastern Mediterranean on various Soviet national and religious groups also involves uneven costs and risks for the Soviet regime. The Moslem and Turkic nationalities, while relatively numerous in both total numbers as well as individual nations are not, however, among the more intensively developed and skilled in the Soviet Union. They do, however, occupy large tracts of strategically located territory on the borders of the U.S.S.R. and increasingly they are becoming an important factor in the Soviet conflict with China. The alienation of substantial numbers of Soviet Moslem and Turkic citizens would thus pose a serious problem for Moscow, although the general level of consciousness among these groups is relatively low and thus the dangers are not proportionate to their numerical size. On the other hand, the Jews and Armenians are relatively small in total numbers, but they are two of the most intensively developed and skilled sectors of the Soviet population, particularly the more than two million Jews who constitute an invaluable, almost indispensable, human reservoir of scientific, intellectual and artistic talent. This is also true, but to a lesser degree, of the Armenians who, in addition to supplying the Soviet Union with outstanding scientists, intellectuals and creative artists, also furnish substantial numbers of highly trained and skilled organizational, managerial, military and administrative individuals, operating in sectors from which Jews are excluded for political and other reasons. In short, both national groups are creative minorities dispersed throughout the Soviet Union, performing valuable and important functions. Their alienation, for any reason, could result in a substantial reduction in their efficiency and performance, and correspondingly that of the Soviet system as a whole. Jewish and Armenian interests in the Eastern Mediterranean are neither in harmony or in conflict: Armenians have claims against Turkey and have no quarrel with the Arabs or Jews; Jews have claims against the Arabs and quarrels with neither Turks nor Armenians.

Thus, the discussion of the cost of their alienation to the Soviet Union should not be interpreted as meaning that their pressures upon Moscow are in the same direction. They move simply in different but not opposing directions.

(5) Ultimately the greatest costs and risks which the Soviet Union may bear as a result of its Eastern Mediterranean policy may well be the feedback effects of its changing policies upon the nationality equilibrium at home.

III. Soviet Public Institutions and Entites in Soviet Middle Eastern Policy: the Armed Forces, Economic Sectors, and Social Groups

The continuing and deepening involvement of the Soviet Union in the Middle East since 1955 has resulted in interlacing specific domestic interests with policy in the area that goes beyond the nationality issue. The Communist Party apparatus, various sectors of the economy, the Armed Forces, socio-functional groups, and even factions within the State bureaucracy have all, to some degree, developed a vested stake in Soviet policy in the Eastern Mediterranean. While it is exceedingly difficult to casually relate the interests of specific groups with certain aspects of policy, it would appear that, as in the case of religious and national groups, the influence upon the shaping of policy and the reciprocal impact of policy upon interests is both uneven and fluctuating in character. Individual Soviet leaders and factional groupings within the leadership have also developed a vested stake in the Soviet Middle Eastern enterprise that would seem to affect their political fortunes favorably or adversely. The minor shake-up in the Soviet Central Committee after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, coming immediately upon indications in the Soviet press of a bitter controversy over the implications of the Arab defeat for the U.S.S.R., suggests this very strongly.

Individuals closely associated with Alexander Shelepin, in particular, appear to have suffered a loss in influence within the leadership. The precise contours of these factional lines, together with their positions, cannot be fixed, but it appears certain that the 1967 war affected some individuals and groupings adversely while benefiting others. Similarly, controversy over whether to maintain, diminish or deepen the Soviet commitment to the Arab cause leaves an uneven impact upon various public institutions, factions, social groupings and sectors of the economy. Furthermore, the general Soviet citizenry is also vitally affected by the costs of a particular policy in the Eastern Mediterranean in relation to other priorities. The Soviet Union, over the past decade and a half, has poured enormous resources into the Middle East, and thus possesses an enormous economic, military, and political investment in the region which it must protect and preserve and the existence of this investment has been shaped by the interests of various internal forces just as it in turn continues to affect the fortunes of these domestic groups.

First and foremost, Soviet policy in the Middle East has contributed immensely to the importance of the Armed Forces in the Soviet system, although the Armed Forces may not have actively advocated such a policy in the first place. In the past 15 years, however, the Soviet military seems to have developed a vested stake in the policy that goes over and beyond simply the abstract interests of the Soviet State. The Arab defeat in 1967 was in some ways a defeat for the Soviet military since it was charged with equipping and training the Egyptian forces. Its prestige thus suffered indirectly, which suggests that it is determined that this shall not happen again. Since 1967, Soviet troops, technicians, advanced military equipment and perhaps even marginal involvement in military operations have increasingly made their presence felt on Egyptian soil.

All branches of the Soviet military appear to be actively involved, but it is the Soviet Navy, in particular, that has demonstrated the greatest relative growth as a consequence of Soviet ambitions in the Mediterranean. The expanding commitment to the Arab States has been accompanied by steady growth of Soviet naval forces, which increasingly assume a key tactical role in asserting the Soviet presence in the region. Establishing a sphere of influence in the Mediterranean, in effect, releases the Soviet Navy from its landlocked environment, enabling it to grow to meet and exploit the expanding opportunities that lie waiting in the Atlantic, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Since Soviet policy in the Eastern Mediterranean has justified the rapid growth of the Soviet Navy, we can assume that the Soviet naval forces have developed an enduring interest in preserving and expanding Soviet power in this region. A failure of Soviet policy in the area could have disasterous consequences for the Soviet naval forces it might be deprived of its quasi-bases in North Africa and be forced back into the Black Sea, with a resultant contraction and diminished role to play in Soviet life.

EGYPT A DUMPING GROUND

The military investment in Egypt has also affected the Soviet economy, particularly the defense industries and heavy industries. Egypt and other Third World countries have become a dumping ground for obsolete and surplus Soviet weapons. Egypt's demonstrated military ineptness virtually guarantees a perpetual market for surplus and obsolete weapons. It becomes a market for spare parts and altogether Soviet policy in this region serves to keep Soviet defense industries humming and busily developing and producing new weapons, which can be tested and tried out in Egypt.

On the other hand, light industry, agriculture, the consumer goods industries and the service industries may view Soviet policy in this area with disfavor, since commitments to the Arab countries serves to drain away scarce resources and preserves economic priorities that these sectors of the economy find distasteful, since it arrests or decelerates there growth in spite of growing demand at home for their goods and services.

A third group whose interests are ambiguously affected by Soviet military policy is the Party Apparatus. Normally, this institution finds itself in close informal alliance with the military and heavy industry, but this is by no means clear with respect to the Arab States. Since none of the Arab States are communist in character and all have legally outlawed their Communist Parties, the purists in the Party Apparatus are understandably apprehensive with Moscow's extensive and expensive flirtation with regimes that are internally unstable, politically unreliable, ideologically suspect, and basically anti-communist. Local communists are often persecuted, harrassed, jailed and executed by regimes which are actively supported by Moscow. This serves to demoralize local com-

munists, frustrates the development of communist parties, arrests agitation for Marxist-Leninist type revolutions and in general serves to ally Moscow with anti-communist regimes.

Furthermore, some veteran Soviet Party officials are concerned that these basically bourgeois regimes are exploiting Soviet power for their own purposes and would be ready to abandon the Soviet association if more desirable options were to make their appearance. There are suggestions that some senior Party officials in Russia regard the regimes in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria and Sudan as more fascist than socialist in character. Thus, these officials may view with alarm the fact that the Soviet Union in some ways has become the prisoner of weak, ideologically erratic, and politically unreliable client-states that can inadvertently maneuver the Soviet Union into confrontations with the United States, forcing the Soviet State to lay its prestige on the line by either escalating risks on behalf of dubious goals or withdrawing in prudent humiliation.

It is noteworthy that senior Soviet Party ideologists like Mikhail Suslov have yet to express consistent enthusiasm for these regimes or the Soviet association with them. Unlike the organizational party types like Brezhnev, it appears that the ideological types are not particularly enthusiastic about the specific manner in which the Soviet Union is attempting to cultivate a sphere of influence in the Mediterranean.

Furthermore, Soviet support for regimes that outlaw local communists serve as a signal to other communist parties that they, too, can expect to be sacrificed to promote Soviet global power interests as distinct from its ideological interests. This creates a possible opening for the Chinese who may come to the rescue of local Communist Parties abandoned by the dictates of Soviet expediency.

(The full text of Dr. Kolkowicz's statement follows:)

STATEMENT BY PROF. ROMAN KOLKOWICZ

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The subcommittee's concern today is with the role of the military factor in Soviet foreign policy, and more specifically, with the Soviet military goals in the Middle East and the role of the military as a pressure group in the Soviet Union.

The Soviet military has traditionally played a minor role in the shaping of Soviet foreign policy objectives and interests. Stalin controlled, coerced and terrorized the officers corps whenever he found it expedient, and the military's views on foreign policy carried little weight in the Politburo, except perhaps during World War II. The death of dictator in 1953, however, freed the military establishment from its subordinate position, and they have since expanded their influence and political power impressively. It would not be an overstatement to suggest that the Soviet military establishment has become the most powerful institution in the Soviet Union next to the Party.

There are many reasons for the military's ascendance into their current position of influence. First, the single, dictatorial rule of Stalin was replaced by a collective leadership, which by its very nature reduces the absolute power and control from the center, and is a kind of coalition rule, with the attending necessity to constantly balance powerful and at times conflicting interests at play; two, the Soviet Union has become a global superpower, whose interests and commitments around the globe have grown substantially, and depend to a large extent on a viable and effective military establishment; three, the enormous complexity of modern warfare and nuclear technology increased the indispensability of military expertise in policymaking; four, the role of terror machine, which in the past kept the military controlled and coerced, had now become reduced, thus making the military more self-assured and powerful.

Each of these factors, and many others, have strengthened the military's corporate autonomy and its influence on Soviet politics, and made the Party leaders more dependent on the marshals, generals and admirals. These factors have also reduced the Party's controls within the military, and thus enabled the latter to press their demands with greater immunity and impunity.

The current leaders in the Kremlin have undoubtedly also learned an important political lesson from the experiences of their predecessors, Malenkov and Khrushchev. They presumably learned that to oppose the military's basic interests in the long run, eventually invites political disaster. Chairman Malenkov, whose foreign and defense policies alienated the military during 1953–55, was easily ousted from power with the military's support. The price the military exacted from his successor, Khrushchev, was impressive, involving higher mili-

tary budgetary allocations, massive promotions, and the reduction of Party controls over the armed forces. Chairman Khrushchev who came to power with the military's support, eventually opposed a number of important military objectives, and was ousted from power in 1964 with the support of the military, who presumably expected a better deal from the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime.

STATE WITHIN A STATE

The Soviet military represent today a state within a state, an enormous organization absorbing a large portion of Soviet economic resources, given preferential treatment by the Party and playing an important role in the shaping of Soviet defense and foreign policies. We must ask, therefore; What does the military want? Or, to put it in another way, what are some of the military's interests, objectives and values that are relevant to Soviet foreign policy?

The military's basic objectives and perennial demands are no secret: high priority levels for the defense sector of the economy; high levels of budgetary allocations for the several branches of the armed forces; greater autonomy for the High Command, in the planning and execution of military policy, in other words, greater authority and independence from the Party. The military prefers an international environment which is less than stable and which can be described in terms of high levels of "threat expectation", in part as a rationalization for the maintenance of high defense budgets and priorities for the defense industrial sector.

With reference to broad foreign policy objectives, the military's attitudes may be described as militant, conservative and rather inflexible. For example, the Soviet government's support of a detente policy, has met with resistance and hostility from many sectors of the military; past attempts by Party leaders to reduce the burdensome size and cost of the conventional forces in the Red Army have met with concerted opposition from the military, and they were eventually rescinded; occasions of political and military accommodations with the West, as for example in the Cuban missile crisis, were met with hostility. There is no need to expand this list in order to arrive at the conclusion, that the marshals, generals and admirals prefer to deal with Soviet external problems from a position of power, seeing the security of the country, and the pursuit of policy opportunities abroad as being determined solely by the might of the Red Army. While Stalin and Khrushchev resisted military pressures more effectively, being more strongly entrenched in power, the current leadership is, for a variety of reasons, less willing or able to oppose the military.

One point needs to be made clear: in describing military-party disagreements I do not mean to imply that the military is necessarily more militant and adventurous than the Party leaders; nor is it fair to say that the military always speaks with a single, united voice. The military community is frequently divided, inter-service rivalry is a known fact, and the Party is constantly seeking to further these divisions within the military in order to prevent collusion and to achieve better control. Moreover, the military High Command is at times more conservative and less adventurous than party leadership in pressing for foreign and military adventures abroad. However, when it comes to the military's basic objectives described above, the officer corps tends to act in a united way, and when it comes to projecting military power abroad, the military wants to be assured that the time, place and capabilities are right. In the contemporary period, and with reference to the area under consideration today, the Middle East, the military seems to feel that the time, the place and the capabilities are indeed right. Let us now, therefore, turn to Soviet military goals in the Middle East.

GLOBAL PURPOSES

I believe that in order to better understand Soviet political and military objectives in the Middle East, we should place these in the broader context of their political and military purposes and policies around the globe. The reason for this is, that their Middle Eastern policy is closely related to others, and that future Soviet behavior in the Middle Eastern region will be strongly influenced by what happens elsewhere.

It is a generally accepted fact that Soviet military and political leaders rely, above all, on their military capabilities to defend their country to control their satellites and to expand their influence around the globe. Ideology, communist doctrine, revolutionary propaganda and economic aid all play their assigned

roles in Soviet political calculations. But in the final analysis, to the suspicious Soviet mind, only the might of arms is what preserves their gains and turns opportunities into further gains. Now, for about two decades since World War II, the Soviets labored under a disadvantage: they were strategically inferior to the United States. Soviet leaders tried various means to get around this handicap. But it was not until the past few years that they finally obtained this desperately sought objective—obtaining strategic equality with the West.

I believe that this development has led to several important changes in Soviet strategic thinking and foreign policy.

For two decades since World War II, Soviet foreign and military policy was essentially Western oriented, it focused on an intense confrontation of NATO and the United States. Soviet military capabilities, postures and strategies were aimed against the West. In recent years we have seen a shift in that policy emphasis and orientation. We may call this new policy line, this new Soviet Grand Design, a policy of Hold-and-Explore. Specifically, *hold* the Western flank stable, normalize and stabilize relations with the West from the newly gained position of strategic equality, in order to gain greater freedom to deal with the challenge from Communist China in the East, and to *explore* promising opportunities South of Russia, in the Mediterranean, in the Middle East and in the areas of the Indian Ocean. Such a policy shift seems realitistic and promising to Soviet political and military leaders. They tend to see a continuation of the old, anti-Western confrontation policy as one of high-cost, high-risk and low-payoff, while the pursuit of the new policy direction as one of relatively low-cost, low-risk and potential high payoff.

SOME SOVIET ASSUMPTIONS

Several recent Soviet policy initiatives seem to support these assumptions: Soviet interest in strategic arms control talks; Soviet interests in European security arrangements with the West—all seem directed at a stabilization and normalization of relations with the West from a position of strategic and political strength and equality. Moreover, Soviet concerns with China have become more acute, and they have undertaken corresponding military and political measures to that end. And finally, Soviet interests in, and commitments to the Middle East have increased and are likely to increase. The Soviet military expansion into the Middle East is therefore intimately related to several developments and expectations: One, the U.S. preoccupation with the conflict in South East Asia, which necessarily reduced our attention, interests and the likelihood of significant commitment to the Middle Eastern region.

Two, the sharp rise in the levels of Soviet strategic and conventional capabilities offered the Soviets a greater sense of security vis-a-vis the West, and emboldened them to probe the degree of Western resolve in the Middle East.

Three, the Middle Eastern region represents to the Soviet mind a highly promising area for political and military exploitation: it contains a number of intensely anti-Western countries, with unstable leadership, seeking outside support and open to communist penetration.

Four, the pressure of the Soviet military upon the Party leaders to expand Soviet military presence in the region for military and political purposes, has likely reduced whatever reservations there might have been in the Kremlin.

We may suggest therefore, that the increased Soviet military power is looking for a purpose. To the Soviet and political leaders the Middle East is in many ways an ideal place and purpose. It opens strategic areas in support of Soviet global military operations; it is an area of ill-defined Western political interests, and thus prone to probing and penetration; it offers the Soviet military an opportunity to expand its influence abroad, to test certain doctrines and weapons; it enhances the rationale for high levels of defense allocations at home. An increased Soviet military presence in that region threatens the southern flanks of NATO and the actual and symbolic western presence. The region is logistically accessible to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet military leaders have never, in the half century history of their country, commanded a more formidable armed force; never enjoyed such a strong political position at home; never been that powerful vis-a-vis the West. Moreover, from the Soviet point of view, their traditional adversaries, the U.S. and NATO, have never been in such a disarray, largely because of Vietnam, domestic preoccupations and because of a disinclination to undertake new global commitments.

I submit that this is a rather dangerous situation in which the Soviet military leaders may seek to force the hand of their rather unimaginative and less-than-decisive collective political leadership. The future course of Soviet policy in the Middle East will therefore depend to a large extent on the firmness and resolve of the only power capable of deterring further Soviet penetration of the Middle Eastern region, and the only power capable of compelling them to reconsider future course of action. In the absence of such a resolve, the Soviet military and political leaders will feel less constrained to expand their military presence there, and thus set the stage for a potential conflagration of disastrous proportions.

Mr. HAMILTON. The subcommittee stands adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the joint subcommittee adjourned.)

SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE WESTERN RESPONSE

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1971

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEES ON EUROPE AND
THE NEAR EAST,
Washington, D.C.

The joint subcommittees met at 10 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Benjamin S. Rosenthal presiding.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The subcommittees will be in order. The Subcommittee on Europe and the Subcommittee on the Middle East continue these hearings on the Soviet role in the Middle East and the Western response. Today's session starts the consideration of the European role in that response.

We are pleased to have two distinguished members of the academic community with vast experience and understanding in this area join us this morning.

Dr. Brown, we will hear you first. You may read your prepared statement, or include it in the record, as you wish, and extract pertinent parts of it.

STATEMENT OF PROF. L. CARL BROWN, MIDDLE EAST HISTORIAN, PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

(The biography of Mr. Brown appears on p. 183.)

Mr. BROWN. All right, with your permission, I would like to summarize roughly half of the prepared statement and then read the final pages.

I was asked by your two subcommittees to address myself to, among other things, the colonial legacy and what impact that has on the present-day political realities, and I might just summarize by saying in the first part of the paper I suggest that the colonial legacy is not a major factor in determining the outlook and range of political choices in the states of the Middle East. This is because the colonial legacy was too brief, it was too disjunctive as an experience, and, hence, because of the brevity in time and the disjunctive nature of the more or less formal Western colonial rule in the Middle East, it left behind no master plan.

FRENCH NORTH AFRICA

A different pattern can be seen as having emerged out of the colonial legacy in formerly French North Africa, simply because of different inputs. That is to say, the French colonial experience in North Africa tended to be more uniform and more intense.

Nevertheless, addressing myself to the problem, or to the question of what was the colonial legacy, I do come up with the finding that although this whole past is of great interest to the student of government, to the student of modernization, those of us obliged to consider present-day political options would be advised to look for other aspects, such as the economic complementary of Western Europe and the Middle East, on such items as oil, workers (the great number of workers especially from Turkey and the countries of North Africa employed in Europe), agricultural commodities, industrial goods, and so forth.

I would suggest even the common political interests, now dormant, suggest feasible future alternatives. The common political interests of Europe and the Near East using each other as a foil against outside domination is one such item to keep in mind.

In the latter part of my paper, I turn to the following considerations, which I will read.

The end of the period of Western hegemony in the Middle East and North Africa does not, however, spell the end of a period of Europe's close involvement with that region. On the contrary Western and Southern Europe is ineluctably linked to the Middle East and North Africa. The economic complementary of Western Europe and the Middle East/North Africa (oil, workers, and agricultural surplus in exchange for manufactures in addition to equipment and technical services required for the area's own industrialization) fits too neatly to be completely disrupted by different political consideration arising either from within the area or without, for example, the Soviet Union or China.

MEDITERRANEAN UNITY POSSIBLE

Also, the Arab States, Turkey and Israel share the Mediterranean with much of Europe. Given present tensions such as that pitting Arabs against Israel and Greece against Turkey (over Cyprus) the idea that the littoral States might rally to the cry of the Mediterranean for the Mediterraneans may seem farfetched. Nevertheless, its potential emotional pull as well as its economic, political, and strategic practicality should not be overlooked.

This line of approach suggests that the conventional Man-from-Mars coming to consider present-day politics and diplomacy in the Mediterranean might well be surprised to hear that it is usually viewed in terms of regional disputes spilling over internationally into a potentially very dangerous Great Power confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union—neither of which borders the Mediterranean. Is there some possible confusion of roles here? Have the principals involved deluded themselves concerning the real issues, either by embracing old slogans and myths or by misreading existing strategic realities?

For example, the potential strategic threat of Soviet moves in the Mediterranean is simply (and not too inaccurately) described as that of outflanking Western Europe, but in that case why is not the region directly threatened more directly involved in working out an effective response. There is considerable evidence that the French Government is concerned, but nevertheless even France seems willing to let the United States take the leading role.

And why not? For as long as the United States preempts the position of leadership against Soviet incursions in the Mediterranean the Western European powers directly involved can enjoy whatever protection the United States policy provides if and for as long as it is successful while maintaining relative freedom of maneuver to consider other options when the opportunity or the need arises. In the eastern Mediterranean, the United States is, therefore, paying the price of preemptive leadership.

ASSUMED EUROPEAN WEAKNESS

Ever since the Eisenhower doctrine (or, in a broader sense, ever since the Truman doctrine) the United States has been acting on the assumption that the Western European hand is too weak in the Eastern Mediterranean to achieve the minimal goals shared by both. At an earlier period this was not a completely whimsical estimate, but power relations have changed since the immediate post-World War II period. Even the idea that Britain and France were so discredited after their abortive Suez campaign as to be unable to play any significant role in the Eastern Mediterranean has lost whatever validity it might have had. In such matters the states of the area (just like other states) have very short memories. The notion—still to be read in a standard text on the Middle East in international affairs—that the United States has some special operating advantage in the Middle East because of its anticolonial past is unadulterated nonsense, and has been for over 15 years.

Just as Britain and France (and for that matter, Italy and Spain) are under no special liability for having colonized parts of the Middle East and North Africa in an earlier period, the United States reaps no benefit for having avoided the scramble for colonies, at least in this part of the world.

Of course, it is easier to point out the penalty of preemptive leadership than to find an effective way of working back to a diplomatic position more consistent with the immediacy and intensity of the interests at stake. The clear—and legitimate—U.S. interest in preventing Soviet domination of the Mediterranean is in no way lessened because of an identical interest on the part of Western and Southern Europe.

It must also be admitted that United States spokesmen (public and private) often confuse U.S. ties with and informal commitments to Israel with the aim of preventing the spread of Soviet influence in the Mediterranean. In certain ways, the policy interests in preserving a strong and secure Israel and in avoiding Soviet domination of the Mediterranean can be reconciled. Indeed, an approach that merges these two interests would represent the best feasible strategy for the United States in the area. Nevertheless, it serves no interest to willfully—or unwittingly—confuse the two; for one part of the problem in getting Western Europe more directly involved in defense of a common Mediterranean interest is to work out a commonly-accepted approach to the Arab-Israeli issue.

The above approach suggests bringing Europe more directly into the resolution of Eastern and Southern Mediterranean affairs not—let it be repeated—because of any special role earned by Europe during the period of colonial rule but only because of a complementarity of geographical, political and economic interests.

EUROPE MODEST, REALISTIC

Nor are any of the European powers showing at this time any nostalgic yearnings for the old empire. The eminently patient and correct attitude of the Italian Government to the expulsion of Italian subjects from Libya seems to suggest a more modest and realistic approach.

Or, to end on a more pessimistic and cynical note, it—this reaction of Europe as we see it today—may be only part of a dismally long pattern of stagnant balance characterizing the now two-centuries old problem of struggle over the eastern Mediterranean that earlier diplomats labeled the "Eastern Question." During this entire period the Middle East has never been dominated, never unified, only tantalized and tormented. There has been just enough outside pressure to keep political forces in the area off balance, not enough to provoke clearly delineated, strongly-rooted, indigenous forces in response to the challenge.

And the bitter fruit is that Middle Eastern leaders still tend to conduct their politics the way it was done during—and even before—the "Western interlude" of colonial rule, that is, with an eye over one's shoulder to see what the outside powers are up to.

And the outside powers still jockey for position in this absurd race that never ends and thus never pays a purse to the victor.

So today, as yesterday, we see little wars, constant tensions, the hypocritical clucking of Great Powers, within the region the deepening cynicism that comes from being constantly tantalized and in the outside world a poor replay of the times of Lord Palmerston and M. Thiers, of Muhammad Ali and the Ottoman sultans, leading perhaps to another Crimean War which we can only hope will be no worse than the first.

So to sum up, Mr. Chairman, I was attempting in this statement first to assay the colonial legacy in terms of present-day realities, and I came up with the simplistic, but I believe basically accurate judgment that this is not the major clusters of factors to look for. Rather, certain present-day economic and political realities are a much more significant guide to what is going on. I then turned in the latter part of the statement to a background appraisal of what I see as some of the inconsistencies or difficulties in the American position in the eastern Mediterranean especially. Finally, I suggested in the last few moments of my prepared statement that the legacy of the last century or so, as seen from within the area, has created a sort of conditioned response to the reality of having been tantalized rather than completely crushed, and their response is now deep rooted.

A STAGNANT BALANCE

Even some of us who have long worked in the area tend to overlook how this patterned response tends to produce a stagnant balance, very little progress, very little solution of internal, regional diplomatic issues, et cetera.

Thank you.

(The full text of Mr. Brown's statement appears on p. 118.)

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Dr. Landes? I know you have a prepared statement. You may insert it in the record, or proceed in whatever manner you think most useful to the committee.

STATEMENT OF PROF. DAVID S. LANDES, ECONOMIC HISTORIAN OF EUROPE, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

(The biography of Mr. Landes appears on p. 186.)

Mr. LANDES. I will read from my statement making perhaps some ad lib changes as I go along, with your permission. I confess that it isn't easy to conceive of a statement of this sort on short order, so to speak, and I would be happier, as perhaps Professor Brown would be, to discuss these matters in response to questions from the committee.

ECONOMIC INTERESTS

I think any effort to understand the interest of the major West European countries (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) in the Middle East simply in terms of economic relations is unpersuasive. The data make it clear that the primary commercial tie of Europe to the region takes the form of oil imports—a subject that I understand will be treated by someone else. Even these, which constitute a substantial fraction of the value of imports from the region, are but a small fraction of these countries' total imports of all commodities.

At the same time European exports to these countries run even lower than imports both in absolute terms and in share of aggregate trade. Germany and Switzerland are exceptions; but the others essentially sell less to these countries than they buy from them, and I think that this disparity is implicit in the huge oil surplus that the Middle East exports to Europe. To be sure, much of this outflow returns to Europe directly or indirectly via trade with non-European countries on direct transfer to European accounts.

Nevertheless, the tendency to view this area as some kind of magnificent potential market for Europe is one that few Europeans would agree with. This is not to say that European nations are not interested in developing their trade with the countries of the Middle East, just as they are interested in expanding trade in other parts of the world. Trade considerations do influence policy, especially insofar as diplomacy can create a favorable reception for European products. The major European nations are very candid about this; and the French, for example, have pointed to a number of successful transactions, beginning in 1967, as evidence of the success of their foreign policy vis-a-vis the Arab States. If one examines the trade data, they show that French exports to the region have almost doubled in current dollar value since 1967—almost threefold if you omit the north African Arab countries. I repeat, however, that the overall amount is rather small compared to aggregate trade, and I have attached to my statement a table of the trade of the principal West European countries with the region as compared with their overall trade.

THE "HAVES" OF THE OIL WORLD

As for foreign aid to the area, one has to distinguish between the haves and have-nots. The haves are those countries that export oil. They have, as noted above, a surplus on commodity account and can buy such material and technical assistance as they need. They receive little by way of gifts from Europe; the Europeans understand perfectly well that there is little point in giving money to people who already have it. But the European countries do vie to serve them, insofar

as such services can be translated into favorable diplomatic relations and profitable contracts for the industry of the country concerned.

To be sure, the more populous oil-producing countries—I think there are three of these that are worth taking account of here—Iraq, Iran, and Algeria—have problems and needs that exceed what they can solve with oil royalties. All three have received foreign assistance, but only the last is particularly linked to Western Europe. Iraq, of course, is mostly closely linked with the Soviet bloc economically, and to a lesser extent with Western Europe, with British petroleum. The Iranians have their close contacts with American business.

Algeria, however, has continued to maintain close economic ties with France since independence, and in spite of recent differences, this common-law marriage continues. On the other hand, the French commitment of resources to Algeria, much of which has taken the form of human technical assistance (teaching personnel especially) has diminished considerably over the years. This reflects partly the growing reliance of Algeria on East bloc countries for aid, partly a waning of French enthusiasm and a certain amount of disenchantment. (France, I might say in passing, continues to be the country that expends the highest proportion of its income in foreign aid, in the entire world, although the proportion is small, around 1 percent, and most of its assistance goes as before, to Africa; but more and more of it, to the countries south of the Sahara.)

"HAVE-NOTS" NEED AID

The have-not countries of the Middle East, that is, those which do not have oil to export, can all use assistance. The ones that need it the most, however, Egypt and Syria, look for help to the Communist countries rather than to Western Europe. This pattern is not likely to change in the near future, and European countries would deem the provision of assistance to them a poor political and business risk. I say this even though Mr. Douglas-Home is reported to have offered Egypt some 1 million pounds in aid on the occasion of his recent visit. The sum of 1 million pounds is very small in relation to the quantity of aid that Egypt has received from the Soviet Union.

These countries, Egypt and Syria, are already heavily indebted to the Soviet bloc and have mortgaged their future for years to come.

Israel is a special case. It is richer, in terms of income per head, than the other Middle Eastern countries—with the exception of small states like Kuwait, with enormous oil royalties to be distributed among a small population. Even so, Israel's large outlays for armaments, its ambitious development projects, and its heavy social commitments have made it dependent on outside assistance to a significant degree—either in the form of loans or gifts. Almost none of this comes now from Europe. German reparations, once very important to Israeli survival, have long since tapered off and would constitute in any case a much smaller fraction of income than they did in the 1950's. French assistance, once particularly active in the military sphere, has dwindled almost to nothing since the June war.

If anything, the French contribution is negative: The French Government is holding under embargo airplanes for which the Israelis have already paid hard cash. Great Britain, in spite of its old political

tie to the area, has never provided assistance to Israel; its main efforts were directed originally to sustaining the State of Jordan, but Britain has since given over much of this role to the United States.

So far I have been looking at the problem from the point of view of the Middle Eastern countries. From the European side, there is no question that Middle East policies are primarily a function of politics rather than business. The two countries most interested in the area, by history and vocation, are Great Britain and France. The former long had a major stake in the area by virtue of its link to India. The second was motivated by national ambition and pretensions that went back, interestingly enough, in some instances, to the crusades. The interwar mandates reflected this interest; in effect, Britain and France shared the Middle East between them. The war and the Arab independence movement changed all that, while the instrusion of the United States and Russia into the region inevitably conduced to a subordination of the former primary powers. Even so, neither France nor Britain has ever given up the hope of playing an active role in the politics of the Middle East. Each recognizes that this role cannot be what it was, and if anything, each now puts itself forward in the name of its weakness rather than of its strength; that is, it puts itself forward as a better potential friend for the countries of the region than either of the superpowers ever can be, precisely because they are superpowers.

CONSISTENT BRITISH ROLE

Inevitably, both the French and the British have become involved in the primary political issue of the region—the Arab-Israeli conflict. Through the years, each has had a fluctuating relationship with Israel, though the British have been on the whole more consistent. The British were opposed to partition in 1947, and have remained opposed to most Israeli policy since.

The only real exception to this record is the interlude of the Sinai campaign, when Britain was drawn by France into an alliance with Israel that had as one objective the recapture of the Suez Canal from Egypt. Since that fiasco, the British have returned to their traditional policy of courting influence with the Arabs whenever possible. To be sure, the stakes are far less important. India is gone, and the route to India is no longer the sacred cow of British imperialism. Still, the British have old, established ties in the area, particularly with the Trucial sheikdoms of the Persian (Arabian) Gulf; and the British foreign service is still staffed by men who made their careers in the region and brought home with them a strong affection for the Arabs and an identification with Arab interests.

There is nothing unusual about this. It goes without saying that this is precisely the pattern that tends to develop in any diplomatic relationship: The ambassador is less the representative of the country that sends him than a spokesman and intermediary to his own people for the country to which he is accredited. The British in this respect are no different from the French or the Americans.

The French record has been very different. Partly because of France's own conflict with the rebels in Algeria, who were receiving assistance at the time from other Arab countries, France linked herself to Israel in the midfifties and continued to support Israel, materially and diplomatically, right into the middle of the next decade. This connection, which found expression in strong personal ties and

sundry statements of loyalty and affection, was, however, like all other such connections, fundamentally a function of national interest. Once the Algerian question was settled, France buried her grievances against the Arabs and sought to renew connections that had lain fallow over the preceding decade. While assistance to Israel continued, efforts were made to balance this by support to Arab countries. The showdown came in 1967, when France made it clear that it would throw its support to Egypt in the crisis over the closing of the Strait of Tiran. The Israelis, who ordinarily think of themselves as hardheaded, were shocked. They were to be even more disappointed in the years that followed, as France subsequently shifted her friendship completely to the side of the Arabs, undertook an overtly one-sided policy of military assistance, and embargoed further shipments of arms to Israel. To be sure, this change of posture was disguised for a while under a rhetoric of evenhandedness. The French, for example, insisted at first that they would send arms to neither side; then, however, distinguished between those Arab countries in the field of conflict, and those, like Libya, that lay outside.

FRENCH ROLE CHANGED

Given the connections among the Arab states, connections that have been reinforced since, this deception fooled no one. If anything, it has been a source of embarrassment to the French Government, which has been criticized on this score by French opinion, at least some French opinion, as well as reproached by old Israeli friends. The answer, as given by Foreign Minister Schumann recently is that France looks forward to renewed normal relations with Israel, and to win friendship with Israel, though only on certain conditions, among them a commitment by Israel not to challenge French discrimination along these lines. In short, "we will be your friend if you don't complain how we treat you."

French policy is also influenced by European diplomatic interests. For some time now, France has sought to depolarize the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States and to regain for itself a position of influence in the international arena. Hence the frequent French references and summonses to four-power conferences concerning the Middle East, which go back to the crisis preceding the June war.

As part of this campaign, the French have been concerned to make their initiative acceptable to the Soviet Union by assuming a roughly parallel position; at the same time, they have tended to play down whenever possible the significance of Soviet intervention in the region. Here I might diverge slightly from Professor Brown's presentation. The French say that they look upon the Mediterranean as, in fact, a frontier area of the Soviet Union. At least this is what Courve de Murville said to a group recently when I was present, that it was by no means unexpected or unreasonable to find Soviet naval vessels and a Soviet buildup in the Mediterranean; that the Mediterranean lies, after all, in close proximity to the southern border of the Soviet Union.

I would emphasize, as Professor Brown has, that the French have felt free to indulge in this flirtation with the Soviet Union precisely because of their confidence of continued American concern and the presence of American naval forces in the area.

Germany is a special case. She has to live with the Soviet Union, especially in matters concerning a divided Germany, and yet she is very much dependent in all this on the United States. Her position is dictated primarily by her concern for the reactions of the superpowers insofar as these are in a position to influence the fate of the two Germanys. The German posture is much less affected by intra-European pressure. I say this in spite of the recent affected adherence to the declaration of the Six regarding a Middle East settlement.

ACTIVE GERMAN TRADE

Because of the absence of a characteristic historical involvement, which to some extent defines the objectives of Britain and France, the German interest in the Middle East is more removed than theirs and less dictated by previous experience. Commercial considerations are that much more important; Germany's trade with the area has grown steadily and now exceeds that of either of the other two major West European nations.

Germany presently has no formal diplomatic relations with the major Arab States. She has been moving, however, to restore these—if only because no great power is comfortable with that kind of hole in its network of diplomatic connections. The Arabs in turn would like to compel Germany, as the price of resumption, to adhere to their interpretation of U.N. Resolution 242 and line up in effect with France, Britain, and the Soviet Union.

In view of the concurrent pressures from France, Britain, the Soviet Union, and perhaps also from the American State Department, the Germans may well move in this direction. The effect would be an almost complete diplomatic isolation of Israel, the prospect of which the Israelis react to with a mixture of dread, philosophical acceptance, and moral outrage. It is not clear to me that this confirmation of Israel's resentment and conviction that its fate is being decided by extraregional power interests, is any more conducive to peace in the area than the parallel Arab resentment and conviction that their fate is at the mercy of extraregional imperialist interests.

Thank you.

(The full text of Mr. Landes' statement appears on p. 122.)

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you very much, Professor.

Dr. Brown, several witnesses have testified before the committee on a matter you didn't talk on, but I wanted to get your view. A number of other witnesses testified that they saw the ultimate solution for peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflict coming through direct negotiations between the parties. All the jockeying and intermediate positions would not be useful, they said, to a final resolution down the road to peace. I would like to have your view on that subject.

Mr. BROWN. I don't feel the question of whether there be direct negotiations is nearly so crucial as the matter of keeping some flicker of flame going in the movement toward a settlement, and in some ways it seems to me rather characteristic of the diplomatic climate in this area that so much time seems to be spent on such questions.

I won't bother to review that background. You know all too well that the sides directly concerned, the Arabs and Israel, have both gotten themselves caught in a position that neither is readily able to step down from. To that extent, the question of whether there should be direct or indirect negotiations has some immediate importance in keeping things

moving, but I feel very strongly in terms of a long-range settlement that all sides can live with; this question is very definitely low priority. I would certainly hope that all sides keep a rather open-ended flexibility.

A MEDITERRANEAN PACT

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Dr. Brown, you discussed on page 7 the lack of political coherence among the countries bordering on the Mediterranean. Do you think there is any chance that there could be a government, a grouping, a Mediterranean Pact, as it were; and if such a thing could develop, would it provide stability and some kind of long-term tranquility in that area?

Mr. BROWN. Let me try to answer this in several ways. First, I think the statement that Mr. Landes gave, which in part put more emphasis on the European view of the Middle East, is indeed consistent with my own. I would agree that to the Europeans this is somewhat a secondary issue in terms of trade, politics, and the like. By the same token, I think it is quite unrealistic to conceive of some kind of tightly structured institutional development, either economic cooperation or even less—some kind of viable political unit. At the same time, I would argue, although I concede it might now seem a little whimsical, the general idea does make sense, and I do think something along the line of just a little bit more cooperation could be achieved. It would seem to me that there are certain powers in the Mediterranean having a real interest to do so.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. If you could write the most optimistic scenario you could write, how would it work itself out?

Mr. BROWN. I should think, in the next generation, it would be that of a rather more effective economic cooperation among the states of the Mediterranean littoral, a willingness of all states directly concerned to simply put in cold storage some of these pressing political issues that are not going to be easily solved.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. In Europe we see in the last few years, it seems to me, a growing economic unit, growing in scope, intensity and importance that may well develop into a political unit. Is that the same parallel scene?

Mr. BROWN. I would see much of the oil producing area of the Middle East being clearly linked to Europe, because Europe is the major importer of that oil, Western Europe and Japan together.

I personally can't now see any kind of integration of the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean, compared to what is emerging in the EEC.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Dr. Brown, you noted, on page 8 of your statement, that the United States had stepped into the Eastern Mediterranean because it felt a weakness on the part of the European powers. Do you have a view as to whether the United States might have or should attempt to influence its NATO Allies into a more active role there? If so, how do you do it, and should NATO then become involved as NATO in Near East disputes?

POSSIBLE ROLE FOR NATO

Mr. BROWN. A major theme I tried to stress in the paper is my conviction that the United States should try to interest the NATO Allies

in more active participation in Mediterranean affairs. I think my proposal fits clearly into the rethinking now going on in many quarters now concerning U.S. posture to the outside world. We have to take a somewhat more realistic appraisal of what this country can do and be sure that is done effectively.

In terms of immediate political, strategic, and economic considerations, there is a clear and undeniable Western and Southern European interest in the Eastern Mediterranean, but they see the United States taking the lead, and, in effect, they respond, "Why not let them?"

We need to find ways and means of bringing the European states more effectively into these issues, but I would be the first to say this would be very difficult indeed.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Everybody has said that. We are inclined to respond, "Well, how do you do it?" What recommendations do you have?

Mr. BROWN. I don't have any very precise recommendations. Let me try to answer it in the negative scenario of what can also happen.

I am sure you have heard in various testimony the way in which the European states either traditionally or because of existing interests may find it advantageous to strike a bargain with the oil-producing countries; that is to say, almost exclusively, with the Arab States.

I submit that this potential can, of course, be quite disruptive in causing a whole pattern of reactions by this country, by Israel, of the sort that could get us off the track to a possible settlement.

Now, the question, then, and I certainly would not say this is a very precise answer to your very precise question, how does one anticipate this potential, this possibility, that the European powers can play this card and cause embarrassment to us as well as real danger to states in the area with whom we have close contacts. Part of the answer is to begin the chore of making it clear to France, Italy, the United Kingdom, that there is a real disposition on the part of this government, on the part of this country, not to wash its hands of the Eastern Mediterranean—that would be foolish and quite unnecessary, but a real disposition to work in cooperation with those more directly involved. Such reorientation does have its risk, because the European powers would envisage their interests, or an appropriate policy, in the Eastern Mediterranean different from our own. But it does seem to me that by working out a common policy along those lines, we can reach a more realistic settlement that the powers can live with. If we try to get a settlement that lets the European powers stay out and decide whether they like it or not at the later date, I think we are building up another problem.

SIZE OF EUROPEAN INVESTMENT

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Dr. Landes, you mention on page 4, that European policies are primarily a function of politics rather than business. Why is this so? Most of us thought the contrary, principally because there have been sizable European investments in the Middle East.

It is the view of some Americans that investments, in the case of Great Britain, at least, did have an influence on policy.

Mr. LANDES. I pose the counterfactual assumption: suppose they had less business investment, would this make a difference in their policies? I don't think it would. I think Britain and France follow policies that

are to be understood more in terms of their experience in the area, the image they have of their role in the area, than of any particular business interest as such. Their economic interest in this area has diminished over time in proportion to their overall economic interests. Even in oil their place has shrunk over the last generation by comparison, say, with that of the United States.

Also other countries—Japan and Italy—have come in since. Their ambitions and behavior in the area are very different. I don't see investments, then, as a critical factor in determining what the British foreign office or the Quai d'Orsay think they want to do. They are more influenced by political considerations, though obviously they will, as they have in the past, often cite economic advantages as a justification.

The French have done this since 1967. I have seen numerous articles in newspapers like *Le Monde* citing newly established business connections or even preliminary conversations as evidence of the wisdom of French foreign policy. But these gains are small in comparison with their larger economic interests and are not the determining factor.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. How much assistance are the Middle Eastern countries giving to each other? For example, are the oil rich countries sharing in any measureable degree their resources with their poorer neighbors, and does that have any influence on policy?

KUWAIT AIDS OTHERS

Mr. LANDES. Well, the major flow of that type has been from Kuwait, which set up a government fund a few years back and has since supplemented the resources from this fund by further gifts to Egypt and to Jordan in the aftermath of the June 1967 war.

Most of this assistance, however, is not in the nature of development assistance, but subsidies to cover the current expenditures of these countries and replace revenues lost as a result of the June war. The agreement at Khartum between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to provide resources to Egypt and Jordan was of this sort. With the Suez Canal cut off, Egyptian revenues had been lost, and the oil countries agreed to replace it.

But the bulk of the oil income in this area has not been used in this way. Insofar as the oil countries have found ways to invest in their own development, they have done so. But they have more money than they know what to do with, and a great deal of it flows back to Europe. The Eurodollar market has been fueled to a great extent by moneys coming in from the Middle East.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. You suggested that economic considerations have played less an influence in foreign policy among the European countries. What about public opinion? What effect has public opinion had on European policy toward the Middle East?

Mr. LANDES. Well, the most extreme case of contradiction between public opinion and policy decisions, of course, is that of France, where public opinion was generally extremely favorable to Israel in May and June of 1967, but where the government followed a very different course and did so in accordance with the old tradition of France and of most other countries that foreign policy is the prerogative of the sovereign and not of the people, so to speak.

PUBLIC OPINION IN FRANCE

Even in a modern parliamentary system, where there is no longer a monarchy, the conduct of foreign affairs continues to be the province of the successor to the monarch, the chief executive, whether president or prime minister. De Gaulle was a very special man who had strong opinions about what was good for France and the world and was not particularly responsive or susceptible to public opinion. (Of course he was very sensitive to and resentful of unfavorable opinion, and there were some unpleasant incidents at the time in which the French Government hinted that the press was strongly influenced by "outside parties." The Minister of Information made such a statement. It created quite an outcry because there were those French who thought that the statement had an anti-Semitic implication.) Current French policy in the Middle East is perhaps the most striking instance of this divergence between foreign policy and public opinion.

In the British case, I think public opinion is much more divided and British policy is pretty much free to take what direction it will. I don't thnk that there is any particular preponderance of opinion within Britain on one side or the other. If anything, I think the British public tends on the whole to be sympathetic to the Arab rather than the Israeli position.

In Germany, the problem is complicated by the history of the Germans in the 1930's and 1940's. The country is on the whole extremely sensitive to accusations of anti-Semitism and is, therefore, reluctant to take a position that would be interpreted as systematically anti-Israeli. I think, for example, if a German President were to say, as De Gaulle did a few years back, that the Jews are an elite, domineering people, I think it would arouse a much stronger reaction than the De Gaulle statement did. The De Gaulle statement did arouse considerable apprehension among French Jews and Jews generally, as you will recall, but coming from a French President, it had much less impact than it would have if it had come, say, from a President of the German Federal Republic.

I think the Germans have been careful here, with perhaps a distinction to be made between the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats.

The Social Democrats feel their hands to be realtively clean by comparison with their political competitors who don't have the same sense of guilt, perhaps, about participation in Germany's past, about complicity with the Hitler regime, and are less sensitive to this issue of anti-Semitism than other German parties.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Hamilton?

Mr. HAMILTON. We have heard a lot in this committee about the dependence of Western Europe on the oil reserves of the Middle East, and, if anything, that dependence is going to increase in the years ahead. If this is a fact, why is it that we have such a hard time getting the Western Europeans to take a more active role in the Middle East? Are they not as afraid as we are of Soviet domination of the Middle East and its oil reserves, or Soviet control of those reserves, or Soviet capacity to deny them to the West?

EUROPEAN VIEW DIFFERENT

Mr. LANDES. Mr. Hamilton, I am not sure, first, whether our desire to have the European nations take a more active role means the same to them as it does to us. I think when we use the term, we mean, "Why can't we get the European nations to cooperate more with us in the effort to extrude the Russians from the region." The Europeans see the prospect of their intervention in the area, their participation in the politics of the region, in somewhat different terms. They see it in terms of giving expression to their national interests and bolstering their national prestige. I think, again, that the French are the most striking case of this. The French clearly do not have to be encouraged to play a role in the Middle East. This is what they want to do. This is what they have been pressing for, and all the calls to four power conferences are a reflection of this. But, of course, their interpretation of what their role should be diverges markedly from ours. In particular they don't want simply to line up with the United States in these matters, and they prefer to try and take a position which will in some sense even the balance between the two superpowers—a position that by implication, therefore, will give them that much more leverage in the diplomacy of the region.

Mr. HAMILTON. What is their attitude toward Soviet control or dominance of the oil reserves? Are they concerned about that at all?

Mr. LANDES. Well, I think Professor Brown put it very well when he said that to a great extent their position in this reflects underlying the conviction that when all is said and done, when the chips are down, we will pull their chestnuts out of the fire. (I think I am mixing metaphors.) They take for granted, I think, a sort of a last-gasp recourse to the United States.

When you look at French diplomacy in the Middle East, it is simply another aspect of their larger foreign policy—like their attitude toward NATO, or their flirtation with a position of full defense; the French term was "tous azimuths," a 360-degree defense perimeter.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do they see any need to decrease Soviet influence in the eastern Mediterranean today?

Mr. LANDES. I think they would like to see it reduced.

Mr. HAMILTON. They are not willing to do much about it?

SOVIET THREAT ASSESSED

Mr. LANDES. They are not willing to pay very much of a price, and they are not at all sure that the situation is as dangerous as it is made out to be. I cited the statement of Courve de Murville, the former foreign minister. He said:

> Yes, there are Soviet developments in the Mediterranean, but there are American developments in the Mediterranean. Why should one be surprised at seeing Soviet vessels there if American vessels are there?

Mr. HAMILTON. They don't see nearly the threat to their oil supply that we see: is that right?

Mr. LANDES. I'll tell you; I think they say one thing at one time and another thing at another.

Mr. HAMILTON. They are acting as if that were true.

Mr. LANDES. Yes. Sometimes they say to the United States that we must put pressure on Israel, because if we antagonize the Arabs, our oil supplies will be cut off.

But when the United States expresses worry about the oil supply and Soviet threats to this supply, they say, "Who else can the Arabs sell it to?"

There's some truth in that. Previous experience shows that the Arabs are reluctant to cut off oil to Europe. There has not been a successful embargo, even in moments of the greatest pique. That's not to say, of course, that there isn't a price to be paid. I mean, even a partial cut entails increased costs of one kind or another, and the Europeans have an interest in not paying more than they have to.

Mr. HAMILTON. What is the attitude of our West European allies toward our efforts to promote an interim settlement? Either of you gentlemen may answer.

I put that in this context: that when he was before the General Assembly, Secretary Rogers made it very clear that this was the alternative to pursue peace in the Middle East, thus rejecting the big four power talks, and the Jarring approach. He indicated that we were going to concentrate on the interim settlement efforts. Do our allies agree with that?

Mr. LANDES. I think they would prefer the other approaches—another Jarring intervention, or the four power talks, because they are keen to have a hand in any settlement, and the prospect of the United States acting as the primary negotiator of a settlement does not appeal to them. As a result they have not particularly done anything to support the objective of an interim arrangement and have tended to argue along the Egyptian line that any agreement that doesn't commit all parties in advance to the ultimate settlement is not satisfactory.

EUROPEAN VIEWS DIFFER

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you think the Western European countries are unified on the view you are expressing here?

Mr. LANDES. No, I don't think they are, although the French have done their best to try and get some unity of opinion. This statement of the six that I referred to earlier was a statement by the members of the European Common Market. The French pushed for it on the grounds that it was time for the market members to go beyond trade agreements and show their ability to cooperate in the diplomatic and political sphere, and that one area where they might be able to do that was the Middle East. One could have thought of others as well, but this seemed to be one where they could get agreement on a statement. But my understanding is that a number of the signatories of that statement have made it clear informally that they did so as a kind of concession to France and do not think themselves bound by it.

So you are dealing here with something like two levels of public statement and perhaps some private reservations, and I don't know myself how to interpret the reservations or the statement. In the Middle East one of the things which strikes anyone who follows the history of European powers in the area is that all of them have always

engaged to some degree in equivocation. The United States has done this to a great extent, going back to the 1940's. So a big question at any time is to ask, "What precisely do they mean?" I mean, on which side do they stand?

This declaration of the six would seem to indicate some unity of attitude, and yet, as I say, there is good reason to believe that this is simply the surface and not the reality.

Mr. HAMILTON. We hear a lot about opening the Suez Canal. It is usually brought up in context with some kind of interim settlement.

OPENING SUEZ CANAL

What is the attitude of the Western European countries on opening Suez?

Mr. LANDES. They all want the canal opened.

Mr. HAMILTON. How much pressure are they willing to bring to bear to get it opened?

Mr. LANDES. That is an impossible question to answer, really.

Mr. HAMILTON. How much of an economic benefit is it to get the canal open? Obviously it is not a necessity because they have gotten along without it but how much of an economic advantage is there to them to open it?

Mr. LANDES. I think the cost of trade has been increased since 1967 to the group as a whole by some billions of dollars by this closure. That is a lot of money, though different sources give different estimates of the cost. But it is quite clear that there are some alternatives. One alternative has been to use more oil than otherwise from North Africa. Oil doesn't have to come through the canal. That is one thing.

The European countries have also, obviously, paid higher freight rates. But the burden of this increase falls unevenly. The closure of the canal is more important for those European countries on the Mediterranean because the proportionate increase in the length of their trade routes as a result of closure is greater than for countries on the Atlantic, such as Great Britain. So there are differences of interest here.

Then there are the bypasses, the pipelines, although these are not always secure.

The Germans, for example, are interested at this time in the construction of the pipeline from the Red Sea to near Alexandria in Egypt. It costs money to build a pipeline, and oil users will pay. But the Germans can console themselves with the money earned building it. There's a lot of steel tubing going to go into that pipeline.

On balance, the closure of the canal can't be described in any sense as a matter of life or death for these countries, which may be one reason why they are prepared to go along with the present situation and just bring, if you will, diplomatic pressure, so far as it can be exerted.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Gross?

Mr. GROSS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The committee has a biographical sketch of Mr. Brown but I see nothing with reference to your background, Mr. Landes. Would you briefly state your background?

Mr. LANDES. May I apologize first for not having included such a sketch? I was supposed to and I forgot to bring it with me.

I am professor of history at Harvard University. My special interest is the economic history of Western Europe.

Mr. GROSS. How long have you been at Harvard?

Mr. LANDES. Since 1964.

BRITAIN AND ISRAEL

Mr. GROSS. I note with interest, Mr. Landes, your statement on page 4 in which you say that Great Britain in spite of its old ties to the area has never provided assistance to Israel; that its main efforts were directed to maintaining the state of Jordan, and that Britain has "relinquished its role in this respect to the United States."

I like that statement that it has relinquished its role to the United States. A great many things have been relinquished to us, haven't they? I suppose with this went the relinquishment of support for Jordan, particularly military equipment and so on and so forth.

Mr. LANDES. No, I don't want to imply that the British have ceased sending aid to Jordan. I am just saying that in terms of its share in this support, it has relinquished the principal role to the United States.

Mr. GROSS. Do either of you gentlemen suggest that we ought to become more heavily involved in spending money in the Middle East, dumping more of our resources in terms of money into the Middle East? Or do you think we have put enough in?

Mr. BROWN. I would suggest that there could be certain contingencies in which our "dumping" considerably more money in the Middle East might be a very wise policy indeed. One might be if ever the Arab States and Israel got close to a settlement and one of the remaining obstacles was that of a complex pattern of symbolic repatriation of Palestinian refugees and compensation of the balance. I would suggest that it would be, not just good philanthropy and a proper settlement of a difficult and awkward situation, but also hardheaded good business sense for this country to participate very heavily financially in such a settlement.

That is very, very far down the road. The burden of my earlier statement was that we may have inadvertently gotten out ahead of our own interests, and it might be wise to get into a somewhat more reserved posture, wait for others to take the initiative, and try to cooperate with others directly concerned. Even so, there are certain ineluctible commitments we have to that part of the world, which, if they go the wrong way, could cause us trouble.

POSSIBLE AID INCREASES

It follows that we might find it very definitely to our interest to, at certain junctures, put a lot of money into the Middle East.

Mr. GROSS. Put a lot of money in the Middle East?

Mr. BROWN. Under certain circumstances, yes.

Mr. GROSS. I won't ask you to give me some examples.

Mr. BROWN. I was suggesting one, that if there should be sufficient progress in settlement between Israel and the Arab States and we could make a financial contribution toward the Palestinian refugees, it would be a good use of our money.

That is very speculative now.

Mr. GROSS. Do you agree with that, Dr. Landes?

Mr. LANDES. Yes. If I may add a few words, I do, and I think it would be a mistake to stigmatize the prospects of assistance to the area on the basis of the present situation in such a way as to preclude the possibility of commitment of funds later. I think that kind of decision would be a function of the situation at that time and that given prospects for cooperation among the countries in the area—prospects that we can't envisage now, perhaps, but that might come into fruition in other circumstances—that we would be well-advised to support such a thing with our resources because it would be the cheapest way to solve this other problem of the Russian penetration into the area and the arms race that has accompanied it.

I think that under normal circumstances the area is bound to be drawn to the West by considerations of economics, of interest, and everything else so long as this fundamental conflict between the Arabs and Israel can be solved and if the contingency envisioned by Professor Brown were realized, I think we would be well-advised to put a great deal of money into the region if the money would help.

Mr. GROSS. What is our legal commitment to do it?

Mr. LANDES. We have no legal commitment to do anything for anybody.

Mr. GROSS. What is the legal or statutory commitment to do what you gentlemen suggest?

Mr. LANDES. Nothing that I know of.

Mr. GROSS. I didn't think so.

You speak of commitments, but what are the commitments, specifically? You are both aware, are you not, of the financial condition of this country and the efforts that must be made to curtail spending if we are to avoid financial collapse?

U.S. MILITARY ROLE

Let me ask you this, would you suggest that the United States, as it has been suggested, participate with military forces should the Suez Canal be reopened? Should we participate with military forces to keep it open? Do you suggest we do this?

Mr. BROWN. I would have to admit first, Mr. Gross, that the way I would approach that question would not be primarily a concern for the financial or economic implications, or financial implications.

I think for a lot of other reasons it might well be best not to think in terms of joint United States and Soviet troops in the area to guard some projected armistice lines. Such a proposal received an absolutely negative reaction from the area, first. Also, it would put us into a pattern of greater political commitments in the area, whereas I would urge that a somewhat more withdrawn posture of commitment to the area would be more effective.

But I will return to the point. I am not an expert on economic affairs and what I know about the financial difficulties of this country is what any layman knows, but there is always the problem of balancing the long term and short term. I think one would agree that we should not overlook some of the potential difficulties in other parts of the world, including the Middle East. We cannot play any role without some kind of commitment of our resources. I would prefer an approach

that looks first at the military, political, and strategic problems involved.

But it seems to me a little bit lopsided, if I may say so, to try to approach the issue in terms of, whatever the other contingencies involved we must not spend any more money in the Middle East. I have heard this argument concerning other parts of the world and when it is followed we end up spending too much money when some explosion occurs that might have been avoided.

Mr. GROSS. There is no assurance whatever that if this country undertook to underwrite all of the costs of the Middle East by way of so-called peacekeeping that we would still not have an explosion; is that not true?

Mr. BROWN. Well, this is a pretty tricky world we live in.

FINDING PROPER U.S. ROLE

Mr. GROSS. We have had explosions all over the world, haven't we, or certainly in parts of the world?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, we have, and we certainly will have more. I think there is no doubt about that, but I am sure you are not arguing that there is no effective role that this country can play because I am sure we all agree that there is one and the question is to concern ourselves with what is the best way to play that role.

Mr. GROSS. What I am advocating is that we withdraw from a lot of these so-called commitments until we can put our own house in order. You can take exception to that if you want but I think that is what we are going to have to do sooner or later.

The opening of the Suez Canal would benefit Russia probably more than any other of the so-called superpowers, would it not?

Mr. BROWN. That is certainly a very convincing argument that many have made. Perhaps you could give a better answer on that.

Mr. LANDES. I think that is clear, that the power most interested in getting the canal open is the Soviet Union.

Mr. GROSS. Yes.

Mr. LANDES. But, Mr. Gross, if I may simply use some of the reasoning that I used earlier in the paper, the United States has a national income of about $1 trillion. Even if, under hypothetical circumstances, we were to spend as much as $100 million in that area in a given year, that is one-hundredth of 1 percent of our national income.

I would agree with you that we are perhaps overextended and our economy is not in very good shape, but I would say that the Middle East is a very small part of the problem and there are other places where we could do a great deal more to solve the difficulties that we are encountering because of the outflow of funds.

Mr. GROSS. The tax on this one package of cigarettes is not a great deal but taken in total it amounts to a good many millions of dollars in this country each year, doesn't it?

Mr. LANDES. Yes.

Mr. GROSS. So I don't have very much regard for the argument that just because it is a small unit by comparison that it can't add up to quite a bill. Your argument doesn't impress me very much.

This country had at the first of this year a public and private debt of $1,800 million in round figures and it will cross the $2 trillion mark by the end of this year. With a Federal debt now standing at about $430 billion and no prospects of any of it being paid off in the forseeable future it is ridiculous to think that Americans can support everybody in the world.

I won't prolong this but I am not at all impressed with the argument that because the United States has a gross national product of thus and so, that it can afford to take care of the rest of the world. That doesn't impress me in the least.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Hamilton?

PRESENT AMERICAN POLICY

Mr. HAMILTON. If we may shift away from the financial problems for a moment, I would like to give each of you an opportunity to comment on present American policy in the Middle East and where you agree and where you disagree.

Mr. BROWN. Well, if I may start, I will mention just a few points. Some aspects of what I said in my prepared statement may have given the impression of considerable criticism of the existing efforts over the past several years of Secretary Rogers and Assistant Secretary Sisco. I would like to clarify that possible interpretation.

I think, without necessarily subscribing to every twist and turn of this very difficult and tortuous effort, that the work of these gentlemen and the people behind them, and the whole thrust of the administration's effort over the months to try to exercise extreme patience and caution and never let the door be completely shut, is very commendable indeed. I think just that kind of patience and perserverance is going to be required.

Mr. HAMILTON. Where do you disagree?

Mr. BROWN. I don't see any major disagreements at the moment. I am suggesting that over the next several years the United States should try to some extent to phase out this role of almost unsolicited, and perhaps to some extent unnecessary, stewardship. I don't think that is too harsh a word.

But, in a sense, as so often happens in a diplomatic maneuver, one is often locked into the immediate past and the pattern of the present tactics. I think it wouldn't necessarily be all that profitable to try to dismantle the efforts that have been going on over so many months and to, say, go back in terms of generating greater response and interest in, say, a four-power meeting on the Middle East.

I think we are now locked for the next several months or perhaps even years into the existing effort, and there is quite a bit to commend it.

WORKING THROUGH NATO

To the extent that there is a possible disagreement, I would hope we could try rather more aggressive talks with our NATO Allies, with the Western European countries, pointing out that our ultimate aim is to work with them in achieving a certain cooling of the crises there that could provoke a great power struggle, as we all realize, and in

certain fairly tangible ways make it clear than when this position is reached we would like to step back a bit, we would like to see a somewhat greater engagement of the European countries, such as Italy, France and the United Kingdom, and not excluding others, who can justifiably say they are powers in the area, powers directly relying in a way this country is not, on Middle East oil resources and the like.

I don't think we can have it both ways. We have to make the best of an extremely persistent diligent, and largely well-advised position of trying to push through a settlement now.

Mr. HAMILTON. Dr. Landes?

Mr. LANDES. Well, like Dr. Brown, I am impressed by the persistence of the State Department in sticking to the talk of finding some settlement, but I am less impressed by the tactics employed, which I think have often been counterproductive.

I would raise the question why we want an intermediate settlement as a first step toward peace. I think the answer lies first in the fact that we think we have found an issue here that both sides might find it possible to agree on; namely, the opening of the canal and, secondly, because we want to keep things going, and since an overall settlement seems to be so difficult of accomplishment, we feel we ought to try this first and go on from there.

Now, why should opening the canal be of interest in some ways to both parties? To Egypt, obviously, because it will make available revenue which Egypt sorely needs.

To the Israelis, primarily as a means of disengaging the two armies. If the canal is open and running and the armies are separated by a busy waterway, the likelihood of the kind of war of attrition that went on a little over a year ago is very small.

REDUCING TENSION

And presumably we feel, as the Israelis do, that anything that will reduce the possibility of armed conflict is a good way to keep things going until we can achieve a lasting peace, as the formula puts it.

Mr. HAMILTON. Dr. Landes, if I may interrupt you, what I am after is your evaluation of current policy, not necessarily the pros and cons of opening the Suez Canal from the standpoint of the Egyptians or the Israelis.

Do you favor the efforts for an interim settlement?

Mr. LANDES. I do favor them, but the point I was trying to make is that in the light of our purpose, everything we have done has in a sense militated against that settlement by conveying to the Egyptians the notion that the canal can be opened without disengagement, and that, I think, is the crux of the matter. It is counterproductive to somehow convey to one side that the canal can be opened without any quid pro quo. There is no such thing as an arrangement that doesn't have a quid pro quo disengagement is precisely what we are aiming at, and it is precisely this we have given the Egyptians reason to think we are prepared to do without. In that sense we have been working at cross-purposes with ourselves.

There are other aspects where I would suggest that we have been less than successful. I think in connection with the whole business of

arms supply that there has been so much disparity between what we have done and the way we have done it that to some extent we have lost the impact of such arms supplies as we have provided. I mean, one of the purposes, presumably, of maintaining an equilibrium of force in the Middle East is to convey to the Soviet Union the sense that this escalation of arms shipments to the area is pointless, that in a sense you just keep going back and forth raising the ante and it is in the interest of both parties to stop it.

U.S. HESITATION ON ARMS

But the way we have handled it, with long hesitations and long intervals between the time we first think about a shipment and the time we deliver, we have, I think, conveyed to the Russians the feeling a man might get, say, in a poker game, where someone stays in on the deal but hesitates so long before he puts his money in the pot that the other players get the sense that he will be pushed out the next time there is a raise.

I think that psychologically we have handled this very badly. If I may again use the poker analogy, if we are going to stay in the pot, we should stay in convincingly.

Mr. HAMILTON. Go ahead, Dr. Brown.

Mr. BROWN. I think this is a point on which there is some slight disagreement between the two of us, and it might be useful for us to clarify the issues involved for this subcommittee. I am certainly not unimpressed with the poker analogues. There is much of that in diplomacy, I think we would all agree on that.

At the same time, if one is looking at the rather fragile political leadership that exists in so many countries of the eastern Mediterranean, the Arab countries especially, there is another way of analyzing how we get from the rather delicate situation we are in now to something that all sides can live with.

One way of looking at the situation is not so much in terms of the signals that we give to the other side or the possible misunderstandings of our long term intentions but perhaps of working to build up certain objective factors which will make the political leaders in the area less interested in moving into a hot war or in tilting the balance in any way.

Now, I think a very strong argument can be made that once the Suez Canal is open, this situation would serve as a slight deterent to any Egyptian leadership from entering into operations that might cause the canal to be closed again.

I don't think we could expect Israel to put all her chips on that approach but I think it is an important approach that should be kept in mind.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. One important factor is the cease fire. That is what the Israelis get in return.

SOVIET GAIN FROM CANAL

Mr. HAMILTON. One of you indicated in response to a question from Mr. Gross that it is in the interests of the Soviet Union to open up the canal. Would you also think it is in the national interest of the

United States to open up the canal provided it is part of an interim settlement?

Mr. BROWN. Yes. I am trying to answer it in a way that doesn't mislead by distortion.

As in any complicated diplomatic negotiations, we can't very well have it both ways and we have to see any single step in terms of a process that we hope we can control and we hope we can keep going in the appropriate channels.

To answer negatively, I think the argument that this might have some economic, and even under certain circumstances strategic, importance to the Soviet Union somewhat more than our economic or strategic importance is an argument that should be, if not dismissed, at least given a very, very low priority. I think there is a good argument to say when you can open up patterns of interest, national trade and commerce and the like, it is better to do it than to try to call on the short term advantages.

Certainly our major aim in this tactic of opening up the canal now is that this step can lead to other steps. Considering all the alternatives, this is a good option to seize now and I am for it.

Mr. LANDES. It is a very clear thing for the Soviet Union. They have there everything to gain and nothing to lose, and they will have their naval vessels running down the Red Sea and up the Persian Gulf not long after the canal is opened.

For us, there is a balance of advantages and disadvantages. The disadvantages are in part defined in terms of the advantges to the Soviet Union but I think on balance I would also say it would be better to have the canal open than closed.

TUNISIA

Mr. HAMILTON. We are not giving the Soviets any strategic capability they don't already have by opening up the canal. After all, they can get their ships into the Persian Gulf and into the Indian Ocean now if they want to. It is a convenience for them to go through the Suez Canal but the strategic capability they have already.

I wanted to clarify that point because of your response to Mr. Gross' question.

May I ask two other quick questions?

Bourguiba in Tunisia is ill. How unstable will the political situation be there if he passes on.

Mr. BROWN. The nature of his illness and the extended period when matters are almost out of political control because of his illness is certainly unfortunate. One would have hoped he would have retired because he is a very sick man. Nevertheless, the Socialist Distour Party shows a greater organizational capacity than any political organization in that part of the world, or certainly in the Arab world, and there is an identifiable body of competent individuals, one of whom will emerge as Bourguiba's successor. I don't see any prospect of a military coup or a breakdown of stability within the country. I think there are going to be some rather difficult times, especially to Tunisians, who are accustomed to a despotic, paternalistic rule. There will be some breakdowns that will bother them, but I feel optimistic about the long-term stability of that country.

Mr. HAMILTON. Should the United States reestablish diplomatic relations with Algeria?

Mr. BROWN. This is not something that one should spend a great amount of political capital on trying to get done right away. Indeed, I have been interested by the situation where, in so many of the Arab States, we have developed a quite workable pattern of relations without relations. This seems to be the case in Algeria and in Egypt. That being so, there is nothing to be gained by our insisting on reestablishing formal relations. We should simply show a willingness to move in that direction at any time they wish.

Mr. HAMILTON. That is all the questions I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Thank you both very much. We are very pleased that you could join us.

(The full text of Mr. Brown's statement follows:)

THE COLONIAL LEGACY AND THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST

In 1963 the preceptive British authority on the modern Middle East, Elizabeth Monroe, published a book treating Britain's role in that area from the time of World War I to the Suez crisis in 1956. It was entitled *Britain's Moment in the Middle East*.[1]

To those who had begun to concern themselves with Middle Eastern affairs before the Suez crisis of 1956 the title might seem a classic example of British understatement. The pre-1956 generation of scholars and observers studying the Middle East were nurtured on ideas of an area tightly controlled from imperial centers in Europe (Britain and France until the latter's defeat in the Second World War and thereafter Britain alone). The rise of the Arab League, schemes for unity of Syria and Iraq, the once seemingly all-important Hashemite-Saudi rivalry—these and similar issues were all interpreted as parts of a play initiated or at least controlled by the master puppeteers from outside the area.

Now second thoughts are in order. Perhaps the entire period of formal Western control of the Middle East was no more than a moment, an interlude. It was a period too short in time, too disjunctive and divisive in its impact, to have left any clearly discernible legacy.

In a sense the brief period of Western hegemony in the Middle East may be likened to a vigorous kick at an anthill. It brought down an earlier elaborately-constructed edifice, and there has ensued a frenetic stirring and agitation in all directions; but the Western period left behind no master plan according to which a new synthesis of state and society could be built.

The reason for this lies obscured behind the language conventionally adopted to label the period. One speaks of the time of Western hegemony, Western rule, or Western colonialism. All these terms imply a consistency and a uniformity that was utterly lacking. The "Western period" was actually one of great disunity and diversity. Instead of at least the ideal of a single cultural and political unity as represented by the Ottoman Empire, there were many smaller units connected disjointedly to different outside focal points of power.

The Middle East (and North Africa) is an area that in the past had known the unity that comes from a single emperor, caliph, or sultan, a single free trade zone, and the common denominator of one language as the vehicle of administration, government, and the expression of political ideas—Ottoman, Turkish, Arabic, Greek, or Latin.

Instead of this, during the "Western period" there were portions under British, others under French, and, as Toynbee observed a half century ago, the "crumbs from the table" for Italy and Spain. Adding to the complexity were interspersed areas (as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen) that escaped formal outside control.

Further, no uniformity governed even the specifically British or French controlled areas (for only these two approached the creation of a Middle East/North

[1] Chatto and Windus, London, 1963.

African "empire"). There was legal incorporation into the home country as in French Algeria. There was the anomalous "occupation" as the British in Egypt from 1882 to 1914 (when a Protectorate was declared). There were protectorates, mandates, trucial states, and even a condominium.

DIRECT EUROPEAN CONTROL

The period of direct European control over the several parts of the Middle East and North Africa was equally patternless. It ranged in time from 126 years (France in Algeria, only slightly less for the British in Aden) to less than a generation, e.g., formal British rule in Iraq from *ca.* 1918 to 1932.

As a result, during this Western period no modern Saint Paul could have moved from Libya to Tunisia or from Syria to Iraq and then, when he ran afoul of the authorities, appeal to a common set of ground rules with the plea of *civis Romanum sum.*

In another sense, the Middle East (but not North Africa which was different at least in this regard) received the worst possible imperial experience, a kind of wishy-washy colonialism on-the-cheap. Bernard Lewis, the British historian has brutally diagnosed this weakness[2]; "There is a case to be made for as well as against the imperial peace—Persian, Roman, Arab, Turkish, French, or British—as a stage in the development and spread of civilizations; there is little that can be said in defence of the so-called imperialism encountered by the Middle East in the first half of the twentieth century—an imperialism of interference without responsibility, which would neither create nor permit stable and orderly government." And he goes on to point up the different experience separating the Middle East from much of the formerly colonized world: "Perhaps one of the most significant distinctions in the ex-imperial countries of Asia and Africa is between those that were directly administered through a colonial or imperal civil service, and those that were under some form of indirect rule or influence. The people of the latter group of countries got the worst of both worlds, receiving neither the training in administration of the colonial territories, nor the practice in responsibility of the old independent states."

By contrast, in French North Africa the colonial experience was both more intensive and more uniform; and quite likely the somewhat more effective political structures in these countries (measured, to the extent possible, in strictly instrumental and non-normative terms) owe something to this appreciably different legacy. Tunisia, for example, can boast the most coherent political party in the Arab world—the Socialist Destour—as gauged both in terms of fostered national integration and mobilizing resources for development. The most thoroughly and brutally colonized of all, Algeria, now seems to be emerging from its traumatic war of independence characterized by a hard-bitten pragmatism that suggests comparison with Tito's Yugoslavia. Even Morocco, that cannot point to the same national cohesion or developmental dynamism, has thus far been able to maintain one important legacy from the French period. Pre-colonial Morocco had traditionally been divided into that area where the Sultan's writ held sway (*blad al-Makhzan*) and those more forbidding mountainous and desert areas where tribes resisted centralized control (*blad al-siba*). French rule brought all Morocco into the *blad al-makhzan*, and in spite of many other political vicissitudes this administrative triumph remains intact.

Although Libya at one time also seemed fated to undergo the intensive colonial challenge always brought by great waves of settlers, the ironies of recent history created, instead, a much more disjunctive legacy. Mussolini's ambitious plans for "demographic colonization" during the 1930s were largely destroyed in the several North African campaigns of the Second World War. When, following the battle of El-Alamain (October 1942), the British took Cyrenaic for the third time, all Italian nationals were withdrawn and much of Libya's eastern province reverted to pastoralism. Only 40,000 Italian nationals remained in Tripolitania, of which 18,000 were in the city of Tripoli. Then, since the Great Powers were deadlocked and could not arrive at any acceptable transitional plan, Libya emerged as an independent kingdom in December 1951 under the rule of the Saunis leader, Idris. Denied most of the fruits of economic modernization that Italian settled colonization might have been able to establish and equally denied any practical experience

[2] *The Middle East and the West,* Indiana University Press, 1964, pp. 59–60.

in the daily administration of a modern state, the newly independent state got off to a very shaky start. This helps to explain the generally poor performance record that followed and serves to clarify how the monarchy could so easily crumble following Colonel Qaddafi's coup in September 1969.

LEGACY OF COLONIAL PERIOD

The above mixed verdict on the "Western period" in the Middle East and North Africa is not intended to denigrate the many commendable efforts of individual administrators, soldiers, teachers and technicians. Nor is there any interest here in praising or deploring colonialism in general, or any of its sub-species. At a time when the "Western period" seems to be drawing to an end (with the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf) no useful purpose is served in raking among the ashes of old confrontations now resolved or at least transcended.

It is, however, of continuing relevance to draw attention to the weak legacy from the "Western period," a legacy that is in many cases quite inconsequential in terms of present-day political orientations and options. And, accordingly, the scholar or policy-maker concerned with contemporary reality in the Middle East and North Africa will usually be advised to give little attention to assaying the possible continued vitality (or virulence, for that matter) of the old colonial legacy. He should, rather, be more on the look-out for more tangible and immediately present factors.

To put the issue almost too schematically certain historical periods are to be classified as "formative", laying foundations for new systems and world—views likely to survive for generations. Other historical periods are more dispersive. The forces at work are expended more nearly in tearing down old institutions and ideologies which must, of course, be replaced by something new; but in such ages while there are many innovations, whether imposed or eagerly sought, no new pattern emerges. The "Western period" in the Middle East (but perhaps not in formerly French North Africa) belongs in that latter category.

This is not to deny that the Western colonial period played a role in developing modern economic infrastructures (but, again, with appreciable differences in emphasis and impact distinguishing the several countries involved), but in almost no case has the colonial legacy governed the type of economic policy now employed significantly shaped existing economic institutions, or dictated current trade patterns. That Egypt and Syria espouse an Arab Socialist orientation or that Lebanon embraces laissez-faire economic policy have little to do with the colonial legacy. That Western Europe and Japan are the major consumers of Middle Eastern oil is infinitely more important than circumstances surrounding the origins of the oil enterprise in the Middle East. The existence of some 300,000 Turks working in Germany and other parts of Europe and perhaps 750,000 North Africans working in France looms larger today than earlier efforts, in most cases now completely eroded, to establish essentially bilateral trade patterns between "colony" and "home country."

The legacy of French or English as a second language can be very important (e.g. dictating a preference for foreign technical advisers and businessmen fluent in that language, maintaining—if only through inertia—a tendency to seek higher education abroad in these languages, etc.) ; but it can well be argued that English maintains its standing more because of its present prestige and utility as an international language than because of the colonial legacy. And French hangs on to its privileged position in North Africa, in part, because of a major French governmental effort to provide some 15,000 French teachers (with the French government paying part of the cost) to Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco.

CONTINUING TIES

The end of a period of Western hegemony in the Middle East and North Africa does not, however, spell the end of a period of Europe's close involvement with that region. On the contrary, Western and Southern Europe is ineluctably linked to the Middle East and North Africa. The economic complementarity of Western Europe and the Middle East/North Africa (oil, workers and agricultural surplus in exchange for manufacturers in addition to equipment and technical services required for the area's own industrialization) fits too neatly to be completely disrupted by different political consideration arising either from within the area or without (e.g. the Soviet Union or China).

Also, the Arab states, Turkey and Israel share the Mediterranean with much of Europe. Given present tensions such as that pitting Arabs against Israel and Greece against Turkey (over Cyprus) the idea that the littoral states might rally to the cry of the Mediterranean for the Mediterraneans may seem farfetched. Nevertheless, its potential emotional pull as well as its economic, political and strategic practicality should not be overlooked.

This line of approach suggests that the conventional Man-from-Mars coming to consider present-day politics and diplomacy in the Mediterranean might well be surprised to hear that it is usually viewed in terms of regional disputes spilling over internationally into a potentially very dangerous Great Power confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union—neither of which borders the Mediterranean. Is there some possible confusion of roles here? Have the principals involved deluded themselves concerning the real issues either by embracing old slogans and myths or by misreading existing strategic realities?

For example, the potential strategic threat of Soviet moves in the Mediterranean is simply (and not too inaccurately) described as that of outflanking Western Europe, but in that case why is not the region directly threatened more directly involved in working out an effective response. There is considerable evidence that the French government is concerned, but nevertheless even France seems willing to let the United States take the leading role.

And why not? For as long as the United States pre-empts the position of leadership against Soviet incursions in the Mediterranean the Western European power directly involved can enjoy whatever protection the United States policy provides if and for as long as it is successful while maintaining relative freedom of maneuver to consider other options when the opportunity or the need arises. In the eastern Mediterranean, the United States is, therefore, paying the price of pre-emptive leadership.

NEW FACTORS

Ever since the Eisenhower Doctrine (or, in a broader sense, ever since the Truman Doctrine) the United States has been acting on the assumption that the Western European hand is too weak in the Eastern Mediterranean to achieve the minimal goals shared by both. At an earlier period this was not a completely whimiscal estimate, but power relations have changed since the immediate post-World War II period. Even the idea that Britain and France were so discredited after their abortive Suez campaign as to be unable to play any significant role in the Eastern Mediterranean has lost whatever validity it might have had. In such matters the states of the area (just like other states) have very short memories. The notion—still to be read in a standard text on the Middle East in International Affairs—that the United States has some special operating advantage in the Middle East because of its anti-colonial past is unadulterated nonsense, and has been for over 15 years. Just as Britain and France (and, for that matter, Italy and Spain) are under no special liability for having colonized parts of the Middle East and North Africa in an earlier period, the United States reaps no benefit for having avoided the scramble for colonies, at least in this part of the world.

Of course, it is easier to point out the penalty of pre-emptive leadership than to find an effective way of working back to a diplomatic position more consistent with the immediacy and intensity of the interests at stake. The clear—and legitimate—United States interest in preventing Soviet domination of the Mediterranean is in no way lessened because of an identical interest on the part of Western and Southern Europe. It must also be admitted that United States spokesmen (public and private) often tend to confuse United States ties with and informal commitments to Israel with the aim of preventing the spread of Soviet influence in the Mediterranean. In certain ways, the policy interests in preserving a strong and secure Israel and in avoiding Soviet domination of the Mediterranean can be reconciled. Indeed, an approach that merges these two interests would represent the best feasible strategy for the United States in the area. Nevertheless, it serves no interest to willfully—or unwittingly—confuse the two; for one part of the problem in getting Western Europe more directly involved in defense of a common Mediterranean interest is to work out a commonly-accepted approach to the Arab-Israeli issue.

The above approach suggests bringing Europe more directly into the resolution of Eastern and Southern Mediterranean affairs not—let it be repeated—because of any special role earned by Europe during the period of colonial rule but only because of a complementary of geographical and economic interests.

Nor are any of the European powers showing at this time any nostalgic yearnings for the old Empire. The eminently patient and correct attitude of the Italian government to the expulsion of Italian subjects from Libya seems to suggest a more modest and realistic approach.

Or, to end on a more pessimistic and cynical note, it may be only part of a dismally long pattern of stagnant balance characterizing the now two-centuries old problem of struggle over the Eastern Mediterranean that earlier diplomats labelled the "Eastern Question." During this entire period the Middle East has never been dominated, never unified, only tantalized and tormented. There has been just enough outside pressure to keep political forces in the area off balance, not enough to provoke clearly delineated strongly rooted indigenous forces in response to the challenge.

And the bitter fruit is that Middle Eastern leaders still tend to conduct their politics the way it was done during—and even before—the "Western interlude" of colonial rule, that is, with an eye over one's shoulder to see what the outside powers are up to.

And the outside powers still jockey for position in this absurd race that never ends and thus never pays a purse to the victor.

So today as yesterday we see little wars, constant tensions, the hypocritical clucking of Great powers, within the region the deepening cynicism that comes from being constantly tantalized and in the outside world a poor replay of the times of Lord Palmerston and M. Thiers, of Muhammad Ali and the Ottoman sultans, leading perhaps to another Crimean War which we can only hope will be no worse than the first.

(The full text of Dr. Landes' statement follows:)

WESTERN EUROPEAN RELATIONS WITH THE MIDDLE EAST

Any effort to understand the interest of the major West European countries (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) in the Middle East in terms of economic relations is unpersuasive. The data make it clear that the primary commercial tie of Europe to the region takes the form of oil imports—a subject that I understand will be treated by someone else. Even these, which constitute a substantial fraction of the value of imports from the region, are but a small fraction of total imports of all commodities. At the same time European exports to these countries run even lower than imports both in absolute terms and in share of aggregate trade. The oil-exporting-nations of the Middle East buy less from Europe than they sell to it; much of their trade surplus, however, returns to Europe directly or indirectly via trade with non-European countries or direct transfer to European accounts.

This is not to say that European nations are not interested in developing their trade with the countries of the Middle East, just as they are interested in expanding trade in other parts of the world. Trade considerations, therefore, do influence policy, especially insofar as diplomacy can create a favorable reception for European products and business. The major European nations are very candid about this; and the French, for example, have pointed to a number of successful transactions, beginning in 1967, as evidence of the success of their foreign policy vis-a-vis the Arab States.

ECONOMIC HAVES AND HAVE-NOTS

As for foreign aid to the area, one has to distinguish between the haves and have-nots. The haves are those countries that export oil. They have, as noted above, a surplus on commodity account and can buy such material and technical assistance as they need. They receive little by way of gifts from Europe, but the European countries do via to serve them, insofar as such services can be translated into favorable diplomatic relations and profitable contracts for the industry of the country concerned.

To be sure, the more populous oil-producing countries—Iraq, Iran, and Algeria—have problems and needs that exceed what they can solve with oil royalties. All three have received foreign assistance, but only the last is particularly linked to Western Europe. Algeria has continued to maintain close economic ties with France since independence, and in spite of recent differences, this common-law marriage continues. On the other hand, the French commitment of resources to Algeria, much of which has taken the form of human technical assist-

ance (teaching personnel especially), has diminished considerably over the years. This reflects partly the growing reliance of Algeria on East Bloc countries for aid, partly a waning of French enthusiasm, and a certain amount of disenchantment. France continues to be the country that expends the highest proportion of its income in foreign aid, in the entire world; and most of its assistance goes, as before, to Africa; but more and more of it, to the countries south of the Sahara.

The have-not countries of the Middle East—that is, those which do not have oil to export—can all use assistance. The ones that need it the most, however, Egypt and Syria, look for help to the Communist countries rather than to Western Europe. This pattern is not likely to change in the near future, and European countries would deem the provision of assistance to them a poor political and business risk. They are already heavily indebted to the Soviet bloc and have mortgaged their future for years to come.

Israel is a special case. It is richer, in terms of income per head, than the other Middle Eastern countries, with the exception of small states like Kuwait, with enormous oil royalties to be distributed among a small population. Even so, Israel's large outlays for armaments, its ambitious development projects, and its heavy social commitments have made it dependent on outside assistance to a significant degree, either in the form of loans or gifts. Almost none of this comes now from Europe. German reparations, once very important to Israeli survival, have long since tapered of and would constitute in any case a much smaller fraction of income than they did in the 1950's. French assistance, once particularly active in the military sphere, has dwindled almost to nothing since the June war. If anything, the French contribution is negative: The French Government is holding under embargo airplanes for which the Israelis have already paid hard cash. Great Britain, in spite of its old political tie to the area, has never provided significant assistance to Israel; its main efforts were directed originally to sustaining the state of Jordan, but Britain has since more or less relinquished this role to the United States.

EUROPEAN VIEWPOINT

So far I have been looking at the problem from the point of view of the Middle Eastern countries. From the European side, there is no question that Middle East policies are primarily a function of politics rather than business. The two countries most interested in the area, by history and vocation, are Great Britain and France. The former long had a major stake in the area by virtue of its link to India. The second was motivated by national ambition and pretensions that went back, in some instances, to the crusades. The interwar mandates reflected this interest; in effect, Britain and France shared the Middle East between them. The War and the Arab independence movement changed all that, while the intrusion of the United States and Russia into the region inevitably conduced to a subordination of the former primary powers. Even so, neither France nor Britain has ever given up the hope of playing an active role in the politics of the Middle East. Each recognizes, of course, that this role cannot be what it was, and if anything, each now puts itself forward in the name of its weakness rather than of its strength; that is, as a better potential friend for the countries of the region than either of the superpowers ever can be, precisely because they are superpowers.

Inevitably, both French and British have become involved in the primary political issue of the region, the Arab-Israeli conflict. Through the years, each has had a fluctuating relationship with Israel, though the British have been on the whole more consistent. The British were opposed to partition in 1947, to the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, and to most Israeli policy since. The only real exception to this record is the interlude of the Sinai campaign, when Britain was drawn by France into an alliance with Israel that would have as one objective the recapture of the Suez Canal from Egypt. Since that fiasco, the British have returned to their traditional policy of courting influence with the Arabs whenever possible. To be sure, the stakes are far less important. India is gone, and the route to India is no longer the sacred cow of British imperialism. Still, the British have old, established ties in the area, particularly with the Trucial sheikhdoms of the Persian (Arabian) Gulf; and the British foreign service is still staffed by men who made their careers in the region and brought home with them a strong affection for the Arabs and an identification with Arab

interests. (It goes without saying that this is precisely the pattern that tends to develop in any diplomatic relationship: The Ambassador is less the representative of the country that sends him than a spokesman and intermediary to his own people for the country to which he is accredited.)

FRANCE

The French record has been very different. Partly because of France's own conflict with the rebels in Algeria, who were receiving assistance at the time from other Arab countries, France linked herself to Israel in the mid-1950's and continued to support Israel, materially and diplomatically, right into the middle of the next decade. This connection, which found expression in strong personal ties and sundry statements of loyalty and affection, was, however, like all other such connections, fundamentally a function of national interest. Once the Algerian question was settled, France buried her grievances against the Arabs and sought to renew connections that had lain fallow over the preceding decade. While assistance to Israel continued, efforts were made to balance this by support to Arab countries. The showdown came in 1967, when France made it clear that it would throw its support to Egypt in the crisis over the closing of the Strait of Tiran. The Israelis, who ordinarily think of themselves as hardheaded, were shocked. They were to be even more disappointed in the years that followed, as France shifted her friendship completely to the side of the Arabs, undertook an overtly one-sided policy of military assistance, and embargoed further shipments of arms to Israel. To be sure, this change of posture was disguised for a while under a rhetoric of evenhandedness. The French, for example, insisted at first that they would send arms to neither side; then distinguished between those Arab countries in the field of conflict, and those, like Libya, that lay outside. Given the connections among the Arab States, however, this deception fooled no one. If anything, it has been a source of embarrassment to the French Government, which has been criticized on this score by French opinion, as well as reproached by old Israeli friends. The answer, as given by Foreign Minister Schumann recently, is that France looks forward to renewed friendship with Israel, though only on certain conditions, among them a commitment by Israel not to challenge French discrimination along these lines. In short, we will be your friend if you don't complain about how we treat you.

French policy is also influenced by European diplomatic interests. For some time now, France has sought to depolarize the rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States, and to gain for itself once again a position of influence in the international arena. Hence the frequent references and summonses to four-power conferences concerning the Middle East, going back to the crisis preceding the June war. As part of this campaign, the French have been concerned to make their initiative acceptable to the Soviet Union by assuming a roughly parallel position; at the same time, they have tended to play down whenever possible, the significance of Soviet intervention in the region. Here, as in other areas, the flirtation has been made possible by French confidence of continued American concern.

GERMANY

Germany is a special case. One has to go back to pre-World War I days to find a historical basis for a German interest in this area; though there was some revival of this in World War II. At present, Germany's position is dictated partly by a concern for the reaction of the two superpowers and the implications of such reaction for the German position in Europe. (It is much less affected by intra-European pressure; I say this in spite of German adherence to the recent declaration of the Six regarding a Middle East settlement.) In this respect, then, the German involvement is at once more removed than that of either Britain or France and is much less dictated by a history of previous commitments. As a result, economic considerations are probably more important determinants for Germany than they are for the other two.

Germany presently has no formal diplomatic relations with several major Arab States. She has been moving, however, to restore these—if only because no major power is comfortable with that kind of hole in its network of diplomatic connections. The Arabs in turn would like to compel Germany, as the price of resumption, to adhere to their interpretation of U.N. Resolution 242 and line up in effect with France, Britain, and the Soviet Union.

EUROPEAN TRADE TO THE MIDDLE EAST IN 1970

[Monthly average in millions of dollars]

	France	Germany	United Kingdom
Imports from—			
Middle East[1]	68.96	66.71	103.16
Algeria	53.10	12.51	4.23
Tunisia	3.60	1.77	.50
Libya	22.85	55.36	33.38
Egypt	2.67	4.71	2.17
Iran	7.18	19.83	15.21
Israel	2.95	6.93	9.02
Total	1,593.24	2,484.50	1,810.29
Exports to—			
Middle East[1]	39.59	63.02	79.28
Algeria	46.87	8.25	3.36
Tunisia	9.02	2.31	.86
Libya	3.56	3.83	4.87
Egypt	5.29	10.20	3.75
Iran	5.61	26.80	13.27
Israel	6.61	14.49	19.23
Total	1,494.97	2,849.05	1,612.55

[1] Lebanon, Israel, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Iran, and lesser states. Note inclusion of Iran and Israel.

Source: OECD, Statistics of Foreign Trade: Overall Trade by Countries, uly 1971.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The subcommittee stands adjourned until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the joint subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, November 3, 1971.)

SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE WESTERN RESPONSE

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1971

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
SUBCOMMITTEES ON EUROPE AND THE NEAR EAST,
Washington, D.C.

The joint subcommittee met at 10:10 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lee H. Hamilton (chairman of the Subcommittee on the Near East) presiding.

Mr. HAMILTON. This joint meeting of the Europe and Near East Subcommittees will come to order.

Today's hearing will conclude this initial series of joint hearings on Soviet involvement in the Middle East and the Western response. After an examination of the importance of Middle East oil to Western Europe, we would like to discuss the U.S. policy options in the Middle East and the role that we think Europe should play.

We are very fortunate to have with us today Mr. John Lichtblau of the Petroleum Industry Research Foundation in New York, who will first examine the oil picture. He will be followed by Mr. John Campbell, of the Council on Foreign Relations, and Mr. Eugene Rustow, professor at Yale University Law School.

Mr. Lichtblau, you may proceed as you wish to read the statement, or summarize as you choose.

STATEMENT OF JOHN LICHTBLAU, OIL EXPERT, PETROLEUM INDUSTRY RESEARCH FOUNDATION

(The biography of Mr. Lichtblau appears on p. 187.)

Mr. LICHTBLAU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In the interests of time, I will summarize my statement. However, I would like to submit the entire statement for the record, if I may.

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, each of the three statements will be printed in full in the record.

MIDDLE EAST OIL

Mr. LICHTBLAU. Any analysis of the role of the Middle East in world affairs must start with the recognition that three-fourths of the non-Communist world's known oil reserves are located there. While this is, of course, generally known, the political and economic consequences which follow from it are often ignored or overlooked. There is a tendency to treat the area's oil wealth as an interesting natural phenome-

non that bears mentioning but is not basic to the political, geographic, and national complexities which make up the Middle East problem. It is probably true that the problem would exist even if there were no oil in the area. But the rest of the world would be far less concerned. The Middle East is not highly populated and the vast majority of its people live on a subsistence level, it does not represent a major market for exports from industrial countries, and outside of oil it has virtually no exports that are essential to other countries.

Hence, the Middle East's economic importance—and, consequently, much of its political and strategic importance—derives primarily from the single factor of its immense and growing oil wealth.

IMPACT OF OIL

The historic growth of this wealth in terms of direct government income from oil operations over the last 10 years is shown in table I in my prepared statement.

An indicator of the impact of this wealth on the economy of the oil-exporting countries is seen in their per capita national income. For all of the Middle East oil-exporting countries, except Algeria, the collective income per capita amounted to about $370 in 1969. This year, following the sharp increase in oil revenues, the figure is likely to exceed $400. By comparison, per capita income is $90 in India, $130 in Pakistan and $232 in Turkey, one of the more advanced nonindustrial countries.

OIL IMPORTS DOMINATE WESTERN EUROPE'S ENERGY SECTOR

The converse of the Middle East's oil surplus is the immense need for this commodity throughout the Eastern Hemisphere. In Western Europe oil accounted in 1970 for 61 percent of total energy requirements from all sources and 80 percent of it came from the Persian Gulf and North Africa. Thus, Western Europe's energy dependence last year on the Middle East was nearly 50 percent of total requirements. And in some countries, such as Italy, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries, Middle East oil already supplies two-thirds or more of all energy requirements.

This dependency has, of course, existed for quite some time. Europe was first made dramatically aware of it during the Suez Canal crisis of 1957 when an oil shortage was averted only by the combination of U.S. emergency oil exports and a mild winter. At that time there was much public and private concern over Europe's dependence on Middle East oil and the potential threat this represented to the Continent's economic and strategic security. It was held that alternate energy sources had to be developed in Europe and new oil sources had to be found outside the Persian Gulf area.

To some extent this was actually done in the 1960's but it was largely overshadowed by Europe's massive shift from domestic coal to oil from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and later Libya. In 1960, coal supplied still nearly 65 percent of Western Europe's energy needs. By 1970 the share had declined to 30 percent.

OIL CHANGES SINCE SUEZ WAR

If we now look at the diversification of oversea oil supplies since the first Suez crisis, geographically a great deal has been accomplished. At that time 66 percent of Western Europe's oil supplies came from the Persian Gulf. By 1970 that region's share had dropped to 46 percent. The difference was made up primarily by North Africa whose oil production rose from virtually nothing before 1959 to 4.4 million barrels daily in 1970, equal to about one-third of total Persian Gulf production last year.

Logistically, the shift to west of Suez has been of tremendous significance, for it has substantially reduced the importance of the Suez Canal as a route for oil shipments to Europe. If Libyan and Algerian production had not been developed and the entire growth in European oil demand since 1957 would have some from the Persian Gulf, the closure of the Suez Canal in June 1967 would have had catastropic consequences on European oil supplies, as would the shutdown of the Trans-Arabian pipeline during 1970. Because of the availability of substantial oil supplies from north Africa plus the more recent development of Nigerian oil exports and the growing number of mammoth tankers, current spot freight rates for tankers are no higher than they were in the comparable period of the year preceding the closure of the canal.

SUEZ CANAL'S FUTURE ROLE

Parenthetically, I would like to say that none of these developments have rendered the Suez Canal obsolete or insignificant. At the beginning of this year more than 75 percent of the world tanker fleet was of a size that could have transited the canal full or in ballast. Thus, while the shift of oil production to west of Suez has made the Suez Canal nonessential for oil importing nations, its reopening would certainly lower freight rates from whatever the prevailing level.

But other than deemphasizing the importance of the Persian Gulf's supply routes, the diversification of oil exports due to the North African discoveries cannot be said to have improved Europe's security of oil supplies economically or politically.

LIBYAN OIL

Economically, the large volumes of Libyan oil coming on the market after 1962 did have an impact on world crude oil prices from 1964 through 1969. However, in 1970 and 1971 the Libyan Government became the initiator and leader in the worldwide round of raising posted crude oil prices and tax rates.

Libya provided, in fact, a protective umbrella for the other major oil exporting countries to raise prices and taxes. The move was fully coordinated through the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) whose membership includes all principal oil exporting nations. OPEC's earlier successes in raising unit oil revenues for its members through bargaining with the international oil companies had gained it the loyalty and respect of all major oil exporting countries. Thus, concerted action through OPEC on matters of prices and revenues has introduced considerable rigidity into the world oil trade.

Politically, too, the diversification of oil production to North Africa did not bring about an improvement in the security of supplies (as opposed to the political security of transit which was, of course, improved). Both Libya and Algeria are members of the Arab League. Both are actively involved in the major struggles in the Middle East, and during the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 both restricted oil and gas exports for a time, totally or selectively, for political reasons.

By contrast, Nigeria represents a true political diversification of European oil import sources. But Nigeria's current production of 1.5 million barrels daily is only one-third that of north Africa.

1980 PROJECTIONS

Looking at the period between now and 1980, there can be no doubt that not only the volume but also the share of oil in Western European energy consumption will increase substantially.

We have assumed that total European energy demand will rise at an annual rate of 4.5 percent over the next 10 years. This is a moderate rate which might be exceeded by as much as half a percentage point. By comparison, the growth rate of the previous decade was 5.5 percent. The expected decline reflects the current slowdown in European economic activity, the underlying long-term decline in the ratio of energy to GNP which characterizes mature industrial economies, and the fact that energy demand is not totally price-inelastic so that the increases in energy costs will have some retarding effect on demand growth.

Oil will continue to grow faster than total energy. Coal, on the other hand, which is still the second largest European energy source, will register a substantial further decline in domestic production as more mines are being shut.

NATURAL GAS

Natural gas supplies will grow considerably more rapidly than total energy supplies but not nearly enough to close the gap created by the growth in total energy demand and the declining coal supplies. The bulk of the new gas will come from the North Sea but more than one-eighth of West Europe's gas demand in 1980 may be provided by imports from the Soviet Union and North Africa. Nuclear power will be of significance in the U.K. where it may provide some 6 percent of total energy demand. But for continental Europe the atomic power age will not begin in earnest until the next decade.

So oil will carry the burden of the growth in European energy demand for the 1970's. Oil's growth will be slower than in the 1960's, reflecting both the decline in the growth of total energy demand and the expected growing inroads of natural gas, but overall, we see oil demand rising at an annual rate of 6.0–6.5 percent through 1980, compared to a growth rate of 13.7 percent in the first half and 10 percent in the second half of the 1960's.

OIL IN WEST EUROPE

In my prepared statement is a summary of the projected changes in European energy consumption between 1970 and 1980. For our

purpose we have selected an annual growth rate of 6.25 percent for oil demand and, as pointed out, 4.5 percent for total energy demand.

As the above table shows, oil will dominate the European energy demand pattern still more by 1980 than it does today. The question, then, is where will this oil come from. Obviously, the Middle East will continue to be the principal supply source.

(The table referred to appears on p. 170.)

When I say "Middle East," I mean both the Persian Gulf and north Africa.

But while the volume of Europe's oil supplies from that area will substantially increase, there are indications that the Middle East's share, which amounted to 80 percent of total European oil supplies last year, may moderately decline in the 1970's.

NORTH SEA AND WEST AFRICA

The principal reason for this are the North Sea and West Africa. North Sea production has not yet started and information on reserve figures is still very scanty. However, the area has been compared by some experts with Alaska's North Slope. If this is approximately correct, we can assume an ultimate production of perhaps 3 million barrels daily, which is what the North Slope will have. We assume this production will probably be reached by 1980 in the North Sea.

The impact of the new production will fall primarily on the countries adjacent to the discoveries. Thus, for England, dependence on Middle East oil might be reduced much more than for Europe as a whole.

The other major new area, West Africa, currently produces about 1.8 million barrels daily, of which 1.5 million barrels daily are from Nigeria, the newest giant in world oil. By 1980 the area might well be able to export in excess of 3 million barrels daily. Some of this oil will go to other African nations and some to North American and Caribbean refineries. But it is not unreasonable to assume that about 2 million barrels daily of West African crude oil will go to Western Europe by 1980. By contrast—oil shipments from the Western Hemisphere to Europe will have more or less ceased by 1980 since the Western Hemisphere will be a major net importing area by then.

The table in my prepared statement below sums up these various possibilities into our best guess of Western European oil supply sources by 1980.

CONCLUSIONS ON BASIS OF 1980 PROJECTIONS

The 1980 figures are, of course, nothing more than rough indications of magnitudes and shares. However, the principal conclusion, namely, that the Middle East's share in European oil supplies will decline somewhat between now and 1980, is likely to stand up. From the point of view of diversification of supply sources, this is obviously a desirable development. But the improvement is modest. A 70-percent dependence on a politically, economically, and nationally interlocked foreign supply area must still be considered critical if the supply area is insecure.

An interesting development, not shown in the table, is expected to occur within the two subregions of Middle East oil supplies. In contrast to the 1960's when more of the increases in European oil requirements came from North Africa than from the Middle East, the 1970's

will see a return to the Persian Gulf for the bulk of the increase in European oil import requirements. The reason is that the total reserves in North Africa appear insufficient to permit a major further growth in production from the 5 million barrels daily level attained last year. Consequently, European reliance on the Persian Gulf will grow substantially from the 46-percent level attained last year. This return to the heartland of the Middle East is likely to have significant political implications for the 1970's.

FACING RISK OF DEPENDENCE

What, if anything, can Western Europe do to limit the risk of this dependency on the Middle East for its principal energy source? In the short run, the only corrective is increased storage. Currently the only official guideline for security stocks exists in the six Common Market nations where there is a directive for a 55-day security stock level based on the previous year's consumption. The Common Market Commission is now recommending an increase to 90 days by 1975. The OECD has also recently recommended a stock level of 90 days but has not set a time limit when this is to be reached.

The existing 65-day figure and the nonurgent approach to the 90-day figure indicate a relatively low concern with the threat of a sustained massive supply interruption. It is interesting to contrast this with the attitude of the U.S. Government which for the past 13 years has been extremely concerned with the potential threat of relying on overseas supplies, though even today only about 20 percent of our oil needs come from overseas. In general, the reason for the difference between the U.S. and European attitudes may be that we have an option between foreign and domestic oil, while the Europeans do not, although our option is declining.

Another factor which continues to influence Europe's approach to security stocks may be a carryover from the time the United States had ample spare producing capacity which could be, and was, used as an international emergency stock when required.

However, our spare producing capacity has greatly declined in the last few years. Presently it is probably below 1 million barrels daily on a sustained basis (6 to 12 months), compared to about 2.4 million barrels daily just prior to the Suez Canal shutdown in mid-1967. Within 2 years the United States will have no spare producing capacity left.

It would therefore seem to make good sense for Western Europe to build its emergency stocks up speedily and substantially from the prevailing 60–65 day level. The likelihood of minor and medium-sized supply interruptions in the future is certainly high enough to warrant such a step.

OTHER EUROPEAN OPTIONS

For the longer pull Europe may want to speed up the construction of atomic powerplants. In this regard the Continent is way behind the United States and the United Kingdom. By 1980 atomic power in these two countries will account for 9 and 6 percent respectively of total primary energy demand, against less than 2 percent on the Continent.

No security stocks or other measures would be effective against a sustained total oil export boycott by all or even a majority of the five largest Middle East producing countries. Such a massive boycott has only happened once, for 5 days in June 1967, and that was spontaneous rather than coordinated. But the possibility of a concerted all-Arab oil boycott was on the agenda of the Khartoum Conference of Arab leaders in the fall of 1967.

OPEC'S ROLE

The threat of an OPEC oil export embargo could also arise for economic reasons. Intimations of this were heard at the Teheran Conference last February. In theory, OPEC, acting in concert could unilaterally set any given price level for their oil, then permit no exports below that level.

In practice the OPEC nations—at least those at the Persian Gulf—have generally not completely ignored the realities of the market in their negotiations with oil companies. However, the real possibility that at some future point the Middle East's oil policy may be based on less rational criteria, economically or politically, makes for the inherent instability of Europe's oil supplies.

It is sometimes argued that since oil revenues are at least as important to the economies of most exporting countries as the oil itself is to the economies of most importing countries, the OPEC members would be unlikely to engage in a sustained oil export embargo. It is, of course, true that in all OPEC countries, except possibly Algeria, oil and related activities provide the principal source of foreign exchange and government revenue. For these and other reasons the oil exporting countries would certainly not hold all the trump cards in a real showdown with their customers, particularly if the latter had sufficient stocks to assure them a bargaining position for some time. But who would give in first in such a confrontation and at what price is by no means certain.

But much more likely than a full-scale confrontation between oil exporting and importing countries is the chance of mounting economic pressure on the latter in the form of periodic administered price increases, with each increment not quite steep enough for the importing countries to risk a confrontation.

We have seen dramatic evidence of such developments in the last 12 months. Government revenue on Kuwait crude rose in a series of steps by 63 percent between November 1970 and June 1971. Similarly, Government revenue on Libyan crude oil (40° API gravity) rose from $1.10 to $1.99 per barrel between August 1970 and October 1971, an 81-percent increase. The movements were the result of a series of tax and price rises decided by the OPEC members and more or less imposed on the oil companies. As a result, Government revenue now represents some 75–80 percent of the open market value of Middle East crude oil, with production costs and profits accounting for the balance. Thus, producing Government revenue is now by far the principal determinant of world oil prices.

In the absence of any further increases in Government revenues per barrel between now and the end of 1975, Western Europe will have to pay an extra $3.5 billion annually through 1975 to meet the cost of

the increases in the Government take of OPEC members. There is, of course, no question as to the inherent right of a sovereign country to raise revenues in any way it sees fit. But there was certainly no underlying economic justification, that is, change in the supply-and-demand relationship, that would justify a cost increase even remotely approaching the one imposed.

OPEC'S FUTURE DEMANDS

Yet, there are indications that OPEC is about to ask for more. The organization has recently resolved to seek direct participation for its members in the private foreign oil enterprises operating within their territories. A 20-percent participation target has been unofficially reported, although a higher figure has been quoted for Libya. There is nothing new in the idea of government participation in private business; in principle, it should not be objectionable to the oil companies. But, according to unofficial reports, at least some OPEC members do not expect to buy into the companies' equity by contributing capital but by selling the share of oil production allotted them under a participation agreement back to the companies at a price above tax-paid cost. The companies, in turn, would try to pass this cost on in the form of higher prices.

This, then, is the more likely threat to Western Europe of the OPEC Government cartel operations: a steady unrelenting increase in the cost of imported oil with the implicit possibility that a refusal to pay up could result in a stoppage of the flow.

There are still other consequences resulting from the increase in the Government take of OPEC members. Even if there is no participation or other further increase in government take, the Persian Gulf countries will receive a total of $11.1 billion in oil revenues in the year 1975, and Libya and Algeria together will receive close to $4 billion, giving the Middle East a total of nearly $15 billion in oil revenues in 1975.

Some countries, such as Iran and Algeria, are large enough to absorb most of this cash inflow by converting it into imports for development purposes. Their revenues will therefore return largely to the industrial nations of the West. Most Middle East OPEC members, however, will not be able to absorb amounts of this magnitude within their relatively small and limited economies. These countries will therefore either accumulate large capital funds abroad or they will become major lenders (or givers) for whatever purposes they deem desirable. Again, such a development might have significant political consequences in the future.

The net investment in fixed assets in private foreign oil enterprises in the Middle East amounted to nearly $5 billion at the end of 1969. What is the outlook for this investment? One thing is certain, the role of private oil companies in the Middle East will change significantly in the next 10 years. In Iran, for instance, the 25-year agreement with the International Oil Consortium lapses in 1979 and the Shah has already indicated that he does not expect a continuation of the existing arrangement. In Algeria the state oil company has already a controlling share of 51 percent in all oil enterprises.

The change for the oil companies may range from outright nationalization to partnerships or subcontractor relations with state companies. The private oil companies will probably accept any role which permits them to operate efficiently and earn an acceptable rate of return. If this is no longer possible they will still be very much in the picture, since they own or control most of the tankers, refineries and distribution networks through which the crude oil is transported, converted and moved to its ultimate consumers.

However, it is not a matter of indifference to Western Europe, or to the United States, whether Middle East oil will be produced by private Western companies or by local state companies. The latter are by nature political instruments of the Government by whose authority they function. Private companies, on the other hand, are essentially a political, commercially oriented institutions. The difference is sometimes obscured by the fact that private foreign companies can be made by law or government order to do what state companies would do voluntarily by virtue of political allegiance.

Nevertheless, the fact that the actual production and exportation of Middle East oil has always been carried on by purely commercial institutions whose best interests are never served by supply interruptions or export embargoes has had a restraining influence on the use of oil for political purposes. If the role of these institutions should be taken over by local state agencies, it would probably lead to the further politization of Middle East oil.

SOVIET INTEREST IN MIDDLE EAST OIL

Now I would like to turn to the question of Soviet interests in Middle East oil. My remarks will be much briefer than on the subject of Western Europe's interest in this oil because there is less to say, since I will try to limit my comments largely to the area of economics.

Russia's interest in the Middle East exists quite independent of the area's oil wealth and had its historic origin well before oil was a factor in that region. However, it is one of the lucky accidents of nature that the Soviet Union, as the world's second largest oil and gas producer, is more than self-sufficient in both these fuels, so that access to foreign oil is not a factor in her energy policy considerations.

If the Soviet Union were a substantial net oil importer, her policy towards the Middle East would probably be quite different. An indication of this was seen in the aftermath of World War II when Soviet domestic oil supplies appeared inadequate. The Soviet Union then refused to withdraw its wartime forces from northern Iran until it had received an oil concession in that area from the Iranian Government (which the Iranian Parliament later refused to ratify).

To be sure, Russia's oil self-sufficiency does not mean that she is disinterested in Middle East oil. The Soviet Union knows as well as everyone else that the Middle East is the power storehouse for Western Europe and Japan and will supply substantial volumes of oil to the United States before the end of the current decade. Political control over the area entails therefore far more than just control over the Middle East itself. If the Soviet Union were to establish effective political influence in the majority of Middle East oil countries, this

would have a profound impact on the long-term, overall foreign policy considerations of both Western Europe and Japan. There is no doubt that this plays an important part in the Soviet Union's Middle East policy. Furthermore, while the U.S.S.R. itself has no need for Middle East oil, most of her East European satellites are beginning to do so. This gives the Soviet Union a somewhat more direct interest in the area's oil production than was previously the case.

EASTERN EUROPE'S INTEREST

For the Middle East, the U.S.S.R. is a minor competitor, since some Soviet oil is shipped to the West. On the other hand, Communist Eastern Europe represents a small but growing export market for the Middle East. More important to the Middle East may be the Soviet Union's technical expertise in all phases of oil production and refining. Some countries seeking to develop oil production without relying on Western companies have made use of this expertise. Thus, the impact of any future withdrawal of Western oil technicians from the Middle East would probably be greatly mitigated by the availability of Soviet or Soviet-trained personnel.

How important a market potential for Middle East oil does Eastern Europe provide? In 1970 the Soviet bloc countries, excluding the U.S.S.R., consumed about 1.2 million barrels daily, equal to less than 10 percent of Western European demand. Local production supplied over 31 percent of this demand, imports from the U.S.S.R. slightly more than 67 percent, and imports from the West less than 2 percent. Thus, at the moment Eastern Europe is hardly a significant outlet for Middle East or north African oil.

However, this situation is rapidly changing. The U.S.S.R. has now withdrawn its objections to oil imports from the West because it does not expect to be able to meet all of the bloc's steadily growing import requirements, since Russian domestic demand is growing even more rapidly. It is expected that the U.S.S.R. will continue to be the principal supplier of the East bloc countries but the share of non-Communist oil imports will undoubtedly rise sharply.

According to private estimates, the East bloc countries might import 400,000–450,000 barrels daily from Western sources by 1975 and as much as 1 million barrels daily by 1980. Even that last figure would still be a very modest volume, compared to West European needs or Middle East availabilities. We may therefore conclude that the East bloc will not be a major outlet for Middle East oil even 10 years from now.

On the other hand, the import volumes required would appear to be large enough to justify a more direct involvement of the Soviet Union in Middle East or North African oil. The Soviet bloc market might be especially interesting for Middle East and North African state companies which initially might prefer to make barter or other government-to-government deals with Eastern Europe than to plunge into the highly competitive private industry-controlled Western markets.

For the same reason for which the Soviet Union's share in East European oil imports will decline, its share in Western European imports will also fall. Last year the U.S.S.R. exported about 800,000

barrels daily of oil to Western Europe, equal to 6.3 percent of total West European consumption. These imports will rise very little in the next 10 years. Given Western Europe's growing demand prospect, the Soviet Union's share in oil imports will show a decline by 1980.

SOVIET NATURAL GAS EXPORTS

By contrast, Soviet natural gas exports to Western Europe are beginning to take on some importance. By 1980 they might account for 10 percent of total Western European natural gas requirements. While this in itself is not a large share, gas shipments, particularly by pipeline, tie a consumer much more rigidly to the supplier than oil shipments. Hence, a continentwide average dependency ratio is less meaningful for gas than for oil.

Altogether, then, it would seem that the Soviet Union has a tremendous political interest in Middle East oil because of the overriding role of this oil in supplying the Western world, and a small but growing economic interest because of the future oil import requirements of the European Satellite countries. The combination suggests that the Soviet Union's involvement in Middle East oil—politically and economically—is likely to grow.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

(The full text of Mr. Lichtblau's statement appears on p. 167.)

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Mr. Lichtblau.

Dr. Campbell, you may proceed with your statement.

STATEMENT OF JOHN C. CAMPBELL, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW AND MIDDLE EAST SPECIALIST, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NEW YORK CITY

(The biography of Mr. Campbell appears on p. 184.)

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, having in mind the time limit, I will stick closely to the text of this statement but may depart from it or condense it.

I am going to attack your problem, which is the Soviet role in the Middle East and the Western response to it, in the following order, first to look at American and Western interests in that region, then consider how they relate to Soviet policies, and finally look at what needs to be done.

U.S. INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The United States, it seems to me, has two principal interests which can be called vital. The first is that the conflicts and rivalries there, whether on the local or great-power level or both at once, must be kept from developing into a major war. The second is that the region be free of the domination of any outside power; if it fell under Soviet control that would represent a perilous shift in the world balance against the United States and the West. Those vital interests are simply stated. The policies needed to sustain them, by contrast, are enormously complex, for they require changing combinations of military posture and diplomacy, of toughness and conciliation, of harmon-

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izing approaches to the Arab-Israel conflict—which is difficult enough in itself—with the wider questions of security and global balance.

We have other important interests in the Middle East. Some come under the broad rubric of access: freedom of trade, transit, communication, and the transport of oil; the ability to communicate with governments and peoples. We have economic interests, including oil investments which add about $1.5 billion per year on the plus side of the U.S. balance of payments. We have defense commitments in that area: to NATO partners (to Italy, Greece, and Turkey) under the North Atlantic Treaty; a more vague obligation to Iran under a security agreement concluded in 1959, which is not a treaty but an executive agreement; an even vaguer one to Saudi Arabia; what might be called a moral commitment to the defense of Israel generally assumed on both sides but nowhere defined in writing; and this obligation has to be taken together with many statements of the executive branch that the United States stands for the independence and integrity of all the states in the area of the Arab-Israel conflict. Whether all those commitments correspond to interests—to refer to a concept put forward by President Nixon—is a subject on which the administration has made no pronouncements for this area.

WEST EUROPE'S INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Now let us look for a moment at the interests of the nations of Western Europe, as they see them. Their concern with avoiding a big war or Soviet control of the Mediterranean and Middle East parallels our own, but they are less worried about the danger of either of those possibilities and they do not believe that their own military efforts, at this stage, anyway, can affect them much one way or the other. On the Arab-Israel conflict, all Western European nations would like to see a settlement, but they have not agreed on how they can help to bring it about; again, they regard the real responsibility as falling on the parties to the dispute, the Arab states and Israel, and on the two big powers who are supporting them against each other.

As for the oil of the Middle East and north Africa, Western Europe, as Mr. Lichtblau has just explained with figures, is utterly dependent on access to it, now and for the next 10 years. How to protect it is, as they see it, a matter of economic policy and diplomacy, not for military commitments and the disposition of forces.

SOVIET POLICY

Now let me look for a moment at Soviet policy. The general line of Soviet policy toward the West in the last few years has been away from tension and cold war toward detente and limited agreements. This is evident in Europe, to some extent elsewhere, and in bilateral relations with the United States as exemplified by the strategic arms limitation talks now in process.

The dispute with China is one reason for it; domestic concerns provide others. But the spirit of detente has been slow to touch Soviet policy in the Middle East, where a combination of military buildup and support of the Arab side in the conflict with Israel has appeared

as a challenge to American interests, positions, and commitments such as I have just described: the need to avoid war; the interest in preventing domination of the region by any power; NATO's commitments to its members in that area and to security in the Mediterranean; and, not least, the American concern for Israel's independent existence and for normal relations with the Arab world.

SOVIET GOALS

What are the Soviet leaders trying to do and what are the prospects? They are not looking at the Middle East alone. Their military buildup in nonnuclear forces, which has run parallel to their heavy program in strategic weapons, has marched steadily ahead since about 1962, the year of the crisis over Cuba. The motive has been to bring the Soviet Union out of the status of a continental power and match the United States in the exercise of sea and air power on a global basis.

Thus they have been aiming at effective equality—almost an obsession with them—and counting on this new military strength to give them a backing for political action they had hitherto lacked. I do not think the Soviet political leaders took this course with the idea of fighting the United States in big or little wars on the five oceans and seven continents—although their marshals and admirals sometimes talk that way. But they certainly have not ruled out using force when and where they see a favorable balance of gain and risk.

And there is no doubt at all that they mean to take every advantage of the psychological effect of their growing military might at a time when the United States is obviously contracting its military reach, reconsidering its commitments, and trying to rearrange its priorities after the experience in Indochina.

SOVIET EAST MEDITERRANEAN POLICY

The Mediterranean-Middle East region happens to be where these Soviet efforts have flowered, for geographical and political reasons. For one thing it is close to home, as they see it. The Russians see the Mediterranean as an extension of the Black Sea, just as we see it the other way round. It is a pathway to the oceans which they reach now through the Strait of Gibraltar and hope again to reach through the Suez Canal, perhaps a Soviet-controlled one. They now maintain a permanent naval force in the Mediterranean, which at times has over 60 ships, and they support it both from home bases and from facilities in littoral countries like Egypt and Syria, where they also have the use of airfields to compensate for the lack of attack carriers, which they don't have in their naval forces.

Illustrating the point made a short while ago, the main purpose of these forces is political: to reduce American influence and establish their own; to block out the Chinese; to give confidence to their friends and allies; to intimidate our friends and allies; and to bring their weight to bear on the decisions of governments both in the region and outside it.

One other point should also be made, however. The history of the Soviet penetration shows that the political opportunities and gains

have generally preceded rather than followed the military presence in local countries. Egypt, for example, which is the keystone of the whole Soviet position, originally invited the Soviets in for its own political reasons, to support Egyptian and Arab nationalist aims against the West and against Israel. After military defeat in 1956 and again in 1967, each time Nasser turned desperately to Moscow to renew his supply of arms, and Moscow obliged.

In the past few years the Egyptian leadership has so feared Israel's power that it has called in Soviet "advisers"—the Soviets were quite ready to provide them and some estimates were as high as 17,000—roughly the number of American "advisers" President Kennedy sent to Vietnam if the comparison has any interest—including combat personnel manning missile sites and aircraft.

In stressing the political antecedents of the Soviet military foothold in Egypt, I do not mean to say that the Soviets are in there just to help their friends against Israel and would withdraw if Israel met some Egyptian demands. They might welcome a less dangerous involvement on the front line, but they are in Egypt for their own reasons and will not easily be persuaded to leave. The 15-year treaty they signed with Egypt in May of this year—whatever it turns out to mean in practice—shows their intention to hold on to this relationship.

Yet it is well to remember one of the basic facts of international relations today, one which the British and French have had to learn in this region and with which the United States and the Soviet Union itself have had experience in various parts of the world. It is that the strong, despite their possession of overwhelming military superiority, often find it unusable in trying to impose their will on the weak.

Thus, in considering America's and Western Europe's policies, we should not think of Soviet policy as a fixed schedule for conquest or domination, or as a program made in Moscow which somehow unrolls by autonomous action without reference to the politics of the area. Success depends upon opportunities. They have had opportunities and have made good use of most of them.

RISKS FOR SOVIET UNION

However, it seems to me, this raises a number of questions, because this is an area of many small countries, most of them unstable, an area of sudden changes of regime and even alinements, and it will not be all one way. The Soviets will experience, I think, the resentment of local nationalism, as the West has.

They will run into mounting costs, both on the military side and in meeting the demands of their clients. They will run afoul of local conflicts between rival states and leaders, and between Communists and Nationalists (as they recently have in Sudan and to some degree in Egypt itself). The question of Israel has been their "Open Sesame" to the Arab world, but even this key can lose its magic. These factors of local difficulty for the Russians, however, can hardly be effective if the Soviet Union is left all alone in the field, and this is where Western policy comes in.

All of which leads to the conclusion that what the Western nations do in their own relations with the States of the Mediterranean and

Middle East will have a great deal to do with the question of response to Soviet policy. Let us look first at the military posture that is required, and then at the political factors. In both it will be apparent that the Arab-Israel dispute is close to the heart of the problem.

MILITARY BALANCE: EAST AND WEST

First, military balance: The Soviet naval buildup in the Mediterranean has aroused concern in Washington and in the councils of NATO. Successive meetings of NATO ministers since 1968 have resulted in repeated calls for vigilance about the Mediterranean, a warning to the Soviets (after the invasion of Czechoslovakia) that NATO would regard any intervention in the Mediterranean with grave concern, and a number of specific decisions: to improve the effectiveness of allied naval forces; to set up a new command for coordinated surveillance of Soviet forces; and to earmark vessels of various national naval forces to provide the nucleus of a NATO force which would come together for maneuvers, training, and possible combined operations. The American, British, Italian, Greek, and Turkish navies have taken part in these measures. The French have not, but nevertheless, they have given a certain amount of cooperation on the naval and technical side in the Mediterranean regardless of the official attitude of their government.

What more is to be done? That depends on the purpose. The first is to maintain an adequate balance of military power. By that I mean that the 6th Fleet has to stay where it is and should retain at least the relative position which it now has and should continuously undergo modernization; and that NATO members' forces should also make their presence count in the military equation. The idea is not to assure victory in war—the Soviet Mediterranean squadron is in the nature of a suicide force if it came to that, and a big war would bypass the Mediterranean anyway.

Somehow a military wrapping up of NATO from the south by the Russians seems to me to be of an alarmist nature rather than a reality.

The real questions are how to prevent adventurous Soviet moves, or a "Cuba in reverse," should they come to believe their own strength on the spot sufficient to cause us to back down in a crisis. Not that a military balance is precisely reflected in political decisions. But it is a necessary part of the background for them. It is an open Russian boast that we could not now repeat the Lebanon landing of 1958 because their fleet would be in the way, and we would, therefore, be deterred from doing so.

Would we be similarly blocked from military action to defend Israel? Does the presence of the 6th Fleet prevent the Soviets from exploiting their military position in Egypt? After all, there are some limitations on that position. They do have a lack of air power, and they are also dependent on their ability to come through the straits, which are still controlled by the Turks.

Whatever one's conclusions on those hypothetical cases may be, there is little doubt that the presence of each force puts restraints on the other. That is not such a bad situation insofar as it reduces the chances of any big-power intervention in local affairs.

The second purpose of military policy is to give confidence to states associated with the West and substance to our commitments and to the working of deterrence. It is here that the NATO role is important. Italy, Greece, and Turkey are members of NATO, not special wards of the United States, and they are interested in joint defense. A stronger NATO posture also enables the Turks to move toward detente with Russia on their own terms and not through weakness. It also helps, going beyond the NATO area, to show a Western interest in Yugoslavia, to help prevent a Soviet move there.

ISRAEL AND ITS SECURITY

The other case is the far more difficult one of Israel. Israel, to protect its own security, has become a factor not only in the local balance of power but in the big-power balance between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Thus, because of the deep Soviet involvement in Egypt, Israel faces what is a combined Egyptian-Soviet force across the Suez Canal. The United States, in its avowed policy of not permitting the balance to be tipped against Israel, continues to arm Israel as a counterforce not only to Arab armies but to the advance of Soviet power in the Middle East.

I know very well, Mr. Chairman, that this is seen as a clear and logical policy necessary for American security, by many in the Congress and in the country. It seems to me rather to illustrate the dilemma in which we find ourselves.

Israel's raids deep into Egypt before the ceasefire of 1970, many of them with American planes, helped to bring Soviet combat personnel into Egypt. Now the upward spiral of Soviet aid to Egypt and United States aid to Israel in ever more powerful and complex weapons—it avails little to argue about who started it—increases the danger that if the ceasefire does not hold, the United States and the U.S.S.R. will draw closer to involvement in hostilities against each other, even though that is a situation they both want to avoid.

WEST EUROPE AND ISRAEL

The other part of the dilemma is that our European allies do not support the idea that Israel is a bastion of Western strength preventing the Soviets and their Arab clients from overrunning the Middle East. They support the aim of bringing about a negotiated settlement between Israel and the Arab States, but are not very sanguine of our success in pulling it off unless we can get Israel to accept the principle of withdrawal from occupied territories.

The French are openly following a policy of their own aimed at building their own position in the Arab world, and Britain, Germany, and Italy are definitely uneasy about a situation which seems to threaten their oil supply. The result is that insofar as they want to see Soviet power countered, they do not see military support of Israel, while Israel stands at Suez, as the right of way to do it. There is no possibility of the acceptance of Israel in NATO, certainly not without an Arab-Israel settlement, and probably not then.

I realize, Mr. Chairman, that Israel sees its very existence at stake, and that the Soviet Union is doing its best to get us to do the job of putting pressure on Israel and thus winning a political victory for the most belligerent Arabs and for the U.S.S.R. as well.

MIDDLE EAST DILEMMAS

President Sadat's setting of deadlines and threats to start up the war do not help the situation. But there is no broad Western policy in the Middle East if the United States and Israel are alone trying to hold a military position, with the possibility that American military force in the area would cease to deter and would have to be used, without the support of its allies or approval from the U.N.

The State Department's desperate efforts to get a negotiated settlement are justified in the light of that possibility. This is our traditional policy: to try to get a compromise. But how to get it when we have lost our standing with the Arabs and seem to have no real leverage with Israel is the question.

Finally, as to policies of the United States and the West. What is indicated on the political and diplomatic side? First, to keep alive the goal of a settlement on the basis of the U.N. resolution of November 22, 1967, to which all concerned give lipservice, although they don't agree on what it means or how to bring it about. It is hard to see the possible success now of outside attempts to bring the parties to a compromise when they are not of a mind to take steps which make compromise possible.

The Jarring mission can hardly be revived unless Israel is willing to yield on the territorial question (subject to final agreement on demilitarized zones, guarantees, and so forth, thus putting the Arabs' pledges to the test). Possibly the United States can be more persuasive than it has; possibly, too, Israeli views will change with political change at home. But the world may have to continue to live with what it has had for over 20 years and has now, an unresolved conflict.

NEED FOR TALKS WITH SOVIET UNION

That brings us to the second point, the need to resume serious talks with the Soviet Union on the Middle East. Earlier attempts, we have had no great success to negotiate with them, and that brought deception and recriminations, but it is clear that if the Arab-Israel conflict cannot be settled it has to be controlled. Only the two superpowers can do that, but they cannot be sure of doing it without some understanding of the limits of risk, and without an agreement, probably tacit, to give priority to their common interest in containing the conflict over their separate concerns in their respective ties with the contesting parties and their fears of losing ground to each other. The Soviet leaders have shown a good deal of flexibility in modifying the cold war elsewhere and in negotiating on other outstanding issues. In the Middle East they have made gains because of the Arab-Israel conflict. They will be reluctant, I think, to make any agreement or promote any agreement which would really make that conflict disappear or cease to be the factor that it has been. But prudence in controlling the conflict would scarcely have that result.

NEED FOR GREATER EUROPEAN ROLE

Third, and for the longer run—and here the argument comes back to the question of Western rather than American policy—Europe has not played a role commensurate with its interests in security, political relations with the Middle East, and the supply of oil. Beyond individual national policies, beyond the participation of Britain and France in four-power talks, there is a new Europe of six, soon to be 10, which has great actual and potential importance for all Middle Eastern and north African States, including Israel. A European presence—military (through NATO or later possibly outside it), political and economic—could help to reduce the rigidity of the direct Soviet-American confrontation there.

It could exert a greater influence on the Arab-Israel problem and help to settle or stabilize it, despite the fact that Israel now distrusts the European powers as promoters of a sellout. And Europe could and should take on greater responsibility for what is essentially its own vital interest in oil, in which we, of course, have a supportive interest.

Such a Europe, exerting influence on its own, would not be a junior partner of the United States whom we called upon to share our burdens. It might cross or compete with some U.S. interests in one way or another. The weight of its contribution to those larger aims which Europe and America share, however, would depend largely on its ability to be an independent factor and to act as such.

The least the United States should do would be to refrain from blocking or undermining that assertion of independent interest. It could help give substance and reality to our proclaimed desire to have someone else help carry the load.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

(The full text of Mr. Campbell's statement appears on p. 177.)

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you, Dr. Campbell.

Mr. Rostow.

STATEMENT OF HON. EUGENE VICTOR ROSTOW, STERLING PROFESSOR, YALE UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL AND FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS

(The biography of Mr. Rostow appears on p. 188.)

Mr. ROSTOW. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman, that I was unable to prepare a statement for the committee but I thought I would talk to these problems and answer your questions with regard to them.

Let me say as a former official of the previous administration I am in favor of a nonpartisan, bipartisan foreign policy. I have generally supported the Nixon administration in its foreign policy moves and, if in my remarks here and in response to questions, I do differ with the administration in detail on certain aspects of its handling of the Middle East situation, I wish my criticism to be understood in this context. After all, even we in our time were capable of making mistakes. The mistakes to which I may call attention in the course of my remarks do not diminish the basic fact that I am in support of the approach that has so far been taken.

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS AND NATO

I view the crisis in the Middle East very much as Dr. Campbell does, although with some differences in emphasis and detail. In my opinion, that crisis is not a regional quarrel about Israel's right to exist, but a threat to NATO.

The Arab-Israel quarrel in itself is a symptom of the crisis, to my way of thinking, and not its cause. Without Soviet support in the Arab-Israel quarrel, and without the process of Soviet penetration which is going on throughout the area, and which threatens even wider ranges in the area, I believe the Arab nations would have made peace long ago.

The Soviet goal is strategic and tactical control of the Mediterranean basin, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf area. On that basis, the Soviets would confront us, and could well hope to drive us out of the Mediterranean and force us to dismantle NATO. That is to say, their goal, fundamentally, is to outflank our forces in Europe, and at least to neutralize Europe to bring it to the status of Finland, or something of that kind, if not directly to occupy it. Soviet policy in the Middle East is therefore a challenge to the relationship of Western Europe and of the United States, as it has developed over the last 20 years, and thus a threat to the underlying balance of power on which our national security rests.

I think President Pompidou summed up the problem in the Middle East and in the Mediterranean basin very well a year or so ago when he said that the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean constitutes a threat to the soft underbelly of Europe and a continuing Cuban missile crisis.

These are words of tremendous resonance for all of us. I do not believe that they are exaggerated.

I think the same thought is reflected in President Nixon's statement that he would regard Soviet dominance in the area as a matter of vital concern to the United States and its allies, a statement which Dr. Campbell has repeated now, I think very properly.

SOVIET THREAT

It is not so much that the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean is a threat of warfare directly against southern Europe, but it represents a policy of political pressure backed by the threat of force which could well force a political retreat.

Since there is a Soviet threat, it can be deterred only by a firm, calm, steady, and credible manifestation of the will of the United States, hopefully backed by its NATO allies. That is the only deterrent to war that we have in this imperfect world. The deterrent quality of that threat depends upon the extent to which it is effectively supported, both politically and in public opinion.

Public support for our position can rest only on an understanding of what is in fact happening. The Soviet threat to outflank our forces in Europe, and to force the dismantling of NATO and the neutralization of Europe, will not be resolved simply by achieving peace between Israel and its neighbors, as devoutly as such a peace is to be

sought and hoped for. There is, however, no chance of protecting the vital U.S. and NATO interests in the area as a whole without achieving a peace between Israel and its neighbors.

Arab hostility to the existence of Israel has been used by the Soviets as a catalyst to radicalize Arab politics, to destroy classes and regimes friendly to the West, and to weaken our influence in the area.

SOVIET STRATEGIC INTEREST

The nature of NATO's strategic interest in the Middle East has been well brought out by both the papers you have before you this morning. Europe's dependence on Middle Eastern oil is a reality, and a reality that is going to continue, as Mr. Lichtblau has pointed out, for at least a decade to come.

The strategic importance of the space of the area is altogether obvious. Land-based planes threaten the very possibility of maintaining our fleet in the Mediterranean. Our entire strategic position is affected by the growing number of Soviet naval and air bases within the region.

The Soviet penetration of the area which in one sense began in 1955, has become a massive policy. It is no longer a matter of taking advantage of opportunities on the cheap, of feints that could be withdrawn without political cost. It is a policy to which the Soviet Union is committed, and to which it has made almost unbelievable investments, both in the volume of military aid to Egypt and a number of other countries, and through the establishment of bases which are a matter of vital concern to the military authorities in NATO.

Soviet policy has no timetable, no fixed schedule, as Dr. Campbell has said; but it has great momentum, nonetheless, and that momentum will not easily be reversed.

M. Courve de Murville, the experienced French Foreign Minister, has said that Soviet policy has continuity and momentum, and cannot readily be deterred. It moves forward, sometimes taking risks, as in the Cuban missile crisis, but it moves forward, generally flowing around obstacles. It can be assumed it will not be altered except through the confrontation of unacceptable costs.

THE 1967 WAR

In this perspective, the 1967 war between Israel and its Arab neighbors should be seen not as an accident, but as a miscalculation, which is an entirely different matter.

The reason for the war at that time, I conclude in retrospect, was the failure of the Egyptian campaign in the Yemen, and therefore the frustration of Nasser's Pan-Arab plans, his plans to drive to the east to gain control of the weak states in the Persian Gulf, and of the enormous oil resources and strategic positions involved. At that time, Nasser could not take control in Libya, because we and the British were there. The drive to the east was a carefully planned set of maneuvers, starting with the circulation by the Soviet Union of false intelligence at the highest level, to the effect that the Israelis were about to attack Syria. The fatal events of May and June 1967 were triggered by that report.

The U.S. position on the question of Middle Eastern peace has been constant, at least so far as public statements are concerned, since June 5, 1967. It rests on the judgment that our national interests and the interests of our allies require that peace finally be achieved after more than 20 years of waiting. Such a peace would fulfill the promises of various Security Council resolutions and of the armistice agreements of 1949. It should be a peace fair to both parties, a peace which would assure the security of Israel and of its neighbors equally.

The position of both administrations, stated many times by Secretary of State Rogers, is that we will not recommend any Israel withdrawal from the cease-fire lines of 1967 until there is a complete package deal, an agreement among the parties, fulfilling paragraph 3 of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967. Such an agreement would establish a condition of peace, and would deal with all the issues of the controversy, as specified in Resolution 242, in accordance with the principles stated in that resolution.

THE 1957 SETTLEMENT

There is considerable concern that the efforts of our Government to achieve an interim settlement for Suez might involve some deviation from this approach, raising the question whether we are on the road back to the ideas of the settlement of 1957, which turned out to be such a disaster.

It is worth recalling that settlement of 1957, because it is the immediate background of the Security Council resolution and of the positions which were taken both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council in 1967 and thereafter.

In 1957, the United States, acting as broker, negotiated an understanding between Egypt and Israel, in terms of which Israel agreed to withdraw its forces altogether from Sinai, Sharm el-Sheik, and from the Gaza Strip in return for certain assurances. Those assurances were not written down in any one document, but are represented in a scenario of public statements, designed to protect Nasser from seeming to negotiate with Israel.

THE 1957 UNDERSTANDINGS

The understanding of 1957 included these elements: That there be freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal; that if the United Nations Forces placed in the Sinai, Sharm el-Sheik, and the Gaza Strip were to be withdrawn, the Secretary of the United Nations would undertake a series of consultations and negotiations to prevent any rapid or precipitate movement in that area; that the Strait of Tiran would be kept open in any event as a maritime outlet for Israel to the south; and that peace would be made.

It was clearly understood and stated in that succession of statements that if force were used to close the Strait of Tiran to Israel shipping, Israel would be justified in using force under article 51 of the charter in overturning such use of force by Egypt to close the strait. In other words, the closing of the strait would be regarded as a blockade, an act of force violating article 2, section 4.

All the terms of the 1957 understanding were violated one by one, the final stages being taken in May of 1967 when the U.N. forces were precipitately withdrawn at the request of the Government of the United Arabian Republic, and force was used to close the Strait of Tiran.

In other words, as officials of our Government said at the time, those violations of the 1957 agreement cut our throat from ear to ear. That experience, I believe, led the United States, the Western nations, and the United Nations majority to take the firm position that Israel should not be asked to move from the cease-fire lines until the parties reached an agreement of 1967 dealing with all the issues in the controversy and establishing peace.

CURRENT TALKS FOR INTERIM SETTLEMENT

The question raised about our present efforts to secure an interim plan for Suez may involve a deviation from this course. Such a plan might require Israel to withdraw from the cease-fire lines before an agreement of peace is made. In that sense, they constitute a problem to be faced, a problem to be faced with the utmost seriousness.

Dr. Campbell referred to the misunderstandings, or differing views taken by some as to the meaning of the Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, and the history of our efforts since the fall of 1967 to achieve an agreement of the parties implementing that resolution.

I do not myself believe that there are misunderstandings or real differences of opinion about what the resolution means. But I fully agree with Dr. Campbell that there is absolutely no political alternative at this time to working under the resolution and trying to achieve its implementation. That resolution represents one of the rare moments when we and the Soviet Union agreed. It was not put through the Security Council until all the parties to the conflict had assured us they would cooperate with Dr. Jarring in carrying out the resolution. We simply have no alternative political frame for seeking a settlement, and a settlement, above all, that would result in peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

OBSTACLES TO IMPLEMENTING U.N. RESOLUTION 242

Mr. ROSENTHAL. What is holding up implementation of that resolution?

Mr. ROSTOW. What is holding it up has been, until very recently, the refusal of the United Arab Republic to agree either to make an agreement of peace as required by the resolution, or to agree to any practical procedure for negotiating on the specific issues that are mentioned in the resolution as requiring agreement.

President Sadat has recently said that he is ready to make peace with Israel, and King Hussein has said he is ready to follow Egypt's lead in this regard. But thus far it has been impossible to reach agreement on any procedure for negotiating the specific terms of such an agreement. That brings us to the question of withdrawal, to which Dr. Campbell alluded.

The resolution requires Israeli withdrawal from "territories occupied in the course of the recent conflict." It does not require withdrawal from all the territories occupied in the recent conflict. Efforts in the Security Council to amend that resolution by putting in the word "the," or equivalent language, were all beaten down.

The reason for that the question of withdrawal is so difficult is not semantic; it is fundamental. It deals with political and security problems of great moment. The Israelis wanted to negotiate from the cease-fire lines. The U.S. position, the position of the majority in the Assembly and the Security Council, and the position taken ultimately, I believe, by the Security Council itself in Resolution 242, is the same as the position taken in 1949 in the armistice agreements. It was provided in terms in those documents that the armistice demarcation lines do not constitute political boundaries, and they can be modified by agreement as part of the transition from armistice to peace.

The Government of Israel has said publically and assured us over and over again that its interest in these questions is an interest in security, not in territories as such.

JUSTIFICATION FOR CHANGES IN BOUNDARIES

Under the Security Council resolution, there are two ideas put forward as justification for changes in boundaries, one is to guarantee maritime rights in the waterways of the region, that is, in the Strait of Tiran and the Suez Canal; and the other is to guarantee the security of the recognized boundaries that would emerge from the process of peacemaking. The security arrangements for those boundaries, the resolution says, could include demilitarized zones.

Those arrangements, including ways of guaranteeing maritime rights and providing security for the new secure and recognized boundaries which the resolution calls for, are subjects on which the parties have to agree. No one can agree for them. It is impossible to conceive of negotiations on such delicate matters taking place through competing newspaper interviews, or even through the good offices of go-betweens.

In other words, there has to be a conference of the parties in the presence, presumably of Ambassador Jarring, like the conference that reached the armistice agreements of 1949.

Thus far it has been impossible to get Egyptian agreement to the convocation of such a conference. We had thought at various times, in the spring of 1968 and other times, that we were very close to achieving that result. But we did not do so. At the last moment on each such occasion, President Nasser withdrew.

In 1968, and again more recently, the United States has indicated that in such a conference of peace, so far as Egypt is concerned, it would support the return to Egyptian sovereignty of the full Sinai Peninsula. But in 1968 that proposition was based on the principle that the Sinai Peninsula be completely demilitarized.

The legitimate security interests of Israel, which has had to fight twice to open the Strait of Tiran, would be best assured by complete demilitarization of the Sinai, whereas the political interests of the

United Arab Republic, or as it now is, the Arab Republic of Egypt, would be met through a return of these territories ultimately to Egyptian control through a withdrawal of Israeli troops.

PHASED WITHDRAWAL SETTLEMENT

I myself have reached the conclusion, in view of the anxieties and fears and threats of the last 20 years, and the history of the last 20 years, that such a solution is feasible if it takes place in stages, subject to a timetable agreed to in advance which might require a good many years to carry out. Under such a timetable, gradual withdrawal would result or could result, hopefully, in the achievement of conditions of genuine peace between Israel and Egypt. Achieving that state would also be a condition for moving to the final stages of the timetable.

The actual problems of peacemaking between Israel and Jordan are more complex than those between Israel and Egypt because of the nature of the armistice demarcation lines of 1949, and of course, the overriding problem of Jerusalem.

But I think the key to the entire problem is the Egyptian settlement, and I rather suppose that no other party can make peace until Egypt decides to do so. When you look at the actual issues between the parties, they seem pathetic and trivial. It is hard to believe that they are issues that might precipitate another war. But from the point of view of Israel the primary problem in the Sinai area is security, not territory. That was the premise on which the Security Council resolution was built. And that is the kind of solution which the Security Council resolution contemplates.

The effort has gone on for a very long time, ever since June of 1967, and thus far, for the reasons I have given, Mr. Rosenthal, in my judgment it has not yet reached fruition. Fundamentally, the Egyptian position has been very obvious, and it has been backed by the Soviet Union diplomatically, and through enormous supplies of arms and advisers and other military help.

WAR OF ATTRITION

The diplomacy of peace has gone through various stages. In April 1969, Nasser proclaimed a war of attrition. He denounced the cease-fire agreements which he had agreed to accept in June of 1967 until peace was made. For reasons I cannot explain, the U.S. Government and its allies did not react strongly. There was no attempt on our part to obtain from the Security Council a resolution which called on the parties to meet in a conference to make peace. We remained passive. The war of attrition turned out, of course, to be not only a crime but a folly. That fact led ultimately to the success of Secretary Rogers' effort to get a temporary cease-fire in 1970, and to the efforts which are now in train.

THREAT TO EUROPE

The reality of the Soviet threat to Europe is apparent, I think, in the nature of Soviet positions in the Middle East and their implications. They call into question, now even more vividly than in 1967, the implications of the Eisenhower resolution of 1957. When Dr.

Campbell reviewed our national interest in the field, I am sure he inadvertently omitted reference to that extremely important statement, which goes beyond the statement of individual Presidents, or Secretaries of State as a commitment of national policy. You will recall that when there was considerable movement in the Senate and in the House a year or so ago to rescind outstanding congressional authorizations to the President to use force in various situations, the sponsors of those moves decided, after reviewing the situation, not to touch the Eisenhower Middle Eastern resolution of 1957, which had been reiterated by the Congress in 1961.

I think that now, more obviously than in 1967, we are dealing with countries which could properly be called countries under the control of international communism, in the language of that resolution.

The problem of NATO and the problem of effective European action to support the defense of Europe in this process, of which Dr. Campbell spoke, is a most troublesome matter. It is part of a larger problem the United States has had to face since 1945 or 1947.

It should be recalled that in 1967, after a year's study, the NATO Council unanimously passed a resolution calling upon NATO to develop not only as a military but as a political entity. That resolution established machinery for consultation, and for the harmonization of political policy in the Mediterranean and other areas both within the NATO treaty, and outside it.

EUROPEAN WILL TO ACT IN AREA

There has been a problem of will both on our side and on the side of Europe. If I can refer to page 10 of Dr. Campbell's excellent statement, I believe two forces are at work here. The first is the generic problem of allied policy since 1945, a process through which we were helping to reconstruct Europe and Japan, to restore their social and political lives and their social and political self-confidence so that in the end, in due course, they would be able to take their place with us in joint and collective efforts to protect our joint and collective national interests.

That has been a slow process apart from the formation of NATO itself. It has been slow for a number of reasons, particularly for a reason that Dr. Campbell didn't mention. In my experience it is a reason which seems more and more essential, and that is the implacable nature of the nuclear threat and the development of nuclear technology in the last 20 years.

WESTERN INTERDEPENDENCE

There is now no way—well, let me put it this way, Europe and Japan are now more dependent on the United States in the security field, despite their recovery, than was the case 20 years ago. The reason for that is that the Soviet Union and ourselves are now possessed of nuclear weapons on such a scale as to make independent defense for Europe and Japan inconceivable for the near future, without the protection of the American nuclear umbrella.

To my way of thinking, that interdependence in defense precludes the evolution of the kind of autonomous third-force separate policy

for Europe or Japan which is implicit in the last page of Dr. Campbell's paper. On the contrary, our interdependence in the security field requires the steady development of methods of consultation and of harmonization of policy, and the development of joint policies contemplated by the Harmel resolution of 1967.

One of the grounds on which I should criticize the administration is that it has so far failed to use the NATO organization as a vehicle for harmonizing and concerting allied policy both in Europe, and outside the NATO area, as well.

The Harmel resolution contemplates that there might be a group of NATO members who would wish to take part in such consultations in order to harmonize and concert their policies. Under the resolution, they could act within NATO even though all the NATO members did not do so.

THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE

Therefore, I see no alternative in view of the nature of the national interests that are at stake, and of the threat to the entire balance of power which is implicit in the Soviet policy of expansion in the Middle East, but to continue to do what we have done, to hold the line alone, pending the rallying of Europe and Japan to us in security measures as well as in economic matters and in aid programs: that is to say, to build on the sense of collective responsibility which has been so manifest in the last 15 years in the field of trade and monetary policy and aid that does not yet exist in the field of collective security. One of the chief problems that our foreign policy faces, and will continue to face is a steady effort to build that sense of collective cooperation in the field of security as well as in the economic areas and in the area of aid.

How do we maintain the kind of steady, calm, deterrent posture which Dr. Campbell and I both believe must be the basis for our position in the Middle East? I think it has to rest on the taking of clear, fair positions—positions fair to all the parties—sticking to them, and making sure that in that process there be no ambiguities, and there be no hope of persuading us to repeat the mistakes we made in 1957, that is, that we insist that peace must be made by the parties and make it clear that all alternatives to peace involve totally unacceptable risks.

SUPPLY OF PHANTOMS

In that connection I might mention the great issue of the supply of Phantoms and other military equipment to Israel.

It is a relatively new problem, as far as the United States is concerned, because until 1967 we were not the primary suppliers of Israel in the military field. I think we tend to anguish too much on such questions. The question of military equipment, in my judgment, should be handled routinely as an issue of security; we should not allow it to be involved and embroiled in political discussions. We have made the mistake of falling in with the argument that withholding planes from Israel would obtain political cooperation from Egypt in implementing the resolution. That has never been true, and there is no reason to suppose it would be true at this time.

But a pattern of willingness on our part to yield to these arguments and threats has created a situation in which security issues are at the mercy of impalpable political hints, on which we cannot obtain delivery. I should recommend that the issue of military supplies be treated in a much crisper way, without attempting to use it on one side or the other for obtaining political concessions which have never come from such moves in any event.

CONCLUSIONS

It seems to me, to conclude, then, that a strong, steady policy backed by calm force is the only way to head off the risks of war in the Middle East, which are very grave risks, indeed. In that connection, I fully agree with Dr. Campbell that the fleet must be maintained and modernized, and forces be put at the ready, mobile forces in Europe and elsewhere, so that we are in a position to meet any crisis that emerges and thus deter the possibility of a crisis emerging.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SECRETARY ROGERS' U.N. SPEECH

Mr. HAMILTON. To each of you, gentlemen, we express our appreciation for excellent statements.

Dr. Campbell and Dr. Rostow, Secretary Rogers in his recent speech to the United Nations seemed to place exclusive emphasis on the interim approach, the interim effort at a peace agreement. He seemed to say U.S. policy was going to be directed solely in that direction. Now, both of you talk about a lot of other things. You talk about the Jarring mission; you, Dr. Campbell, talked about consultations with the Soviet Union. You are obviously not thinking of the interim settlement as an exclusive goal of American policy, and I take it you have a very deep difference of opinion as to where the energies of the U.S. foreign policy mechanism ought to be directed at this point.

Have you given up on the interim settlement idea? Is that an improper thrust for American policy at this time?

Mr. CAMPBELL. For my purposes, Mr. Chairman, I would think not. I would think it is quite proper, and have long thought, even before it was seriously undertaken by the executive branch, that attempts should be made to break the ice to some degree if one could get partial settlements which went in the direction of the general settlement which is laid out by the U.N. resolution. Separation of the forces at the Suez Canal front and the possible opening of the Suez Canal itself seem to me legitimate objectives of policy so long as these steps were not undertaken in a way which would interfere with the progress toward a more comprehensive package settlement which we have always supported.

I think the great difficulties have become evident, that the Israeli and Egyptian positions are as far apart on the interim settlement question as on the broader question, and therefore that what seemed like possibilities of bringing them together, seem to me rather remote at the present time.

The reason I didn't concentrate on interim settlement is because in the long term, I think it is a phase rather than something which is

likely to be accomplished in the near future, and I wanted to put the emphasis on the broader aim of moving toward something which would be more than that mere, partial settlement.

Mr. ROSTOW. I don't recall in detail, but I thought that Secretary Rogers in his United Nations address had said that of course our goal was the ultimate implementation of the United Nations resolution, but that in the meantime we could perhaps make progress toward an interim settlement.

EMPHASIS ON INTERIM SETTLEMENT

Mr. HAMILTON. Isn't it true, Professor Rostow, that almost all of the energies of the U.S. Government today with regard to a Middle East settlement, are going into the interim settlement? There is nothing going on today that I know of with respect to conversations with the Soviet Union and Ambassador Jarring.

Almost exclusively we are directing our Middle East settlement efforts toward the interim settlement.

Mr. ROSTOW. I live in New Haven, and I don't know what goes on in the White House and the State Department, so I can't comment on that remark.

But I would remind you, Mr. Chairman, that the idea of this plan emerged from remarks made publicly by President Sadat and General Dayan. We seized on those suggestions and moved forward to see whether they opened a possibility for progress.

From the Israeli point of view and from the Egyptian point of view, an interim settlement would have great attractions. What we don't know, and shouldn't know, is how much talk is going on behind the scenes, which would make an interim settlement compatible with the overall goal of an agreement under paragraph 3 of the Security Council resolution.

It may be that this is all that President Sadat feels he can do at this time. We should certainly encourage him to move forward at whatever pace is politically possible for him.

I have said in print that I assume that U.S. policy is still what it was before; that is, that no Israeli withdrawals would be recommended until there was an understanding on all aspects of the resolution.

That is the reason why the question of moving troops, Egyptian troops, across the canal is so sensitive. Such steps would immediately pose the question of ultimate policy. Once troops move over, it is very hard to move them back. The issue raises the question of what the ultimate settlement would be, whether the whole of the Sinai is to be demilitarized, or only partially so.

The implications of the decision go very far toward settling the ultimate question of Sharm el-Sheik.

U.S. INTERPRETATIONS OF U.N. RESOLUTION 242

Mr. HAMILTON. In your view, is Resolution 242 consistent with Secretary Rogers' comments about insubstantial border rectifications?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes. Those are phrases that we used, too.

Mr. HAMILTON. So you don't see any differences in his interpretation of that resolution and your own?

Mr. ROSTOW. No; I have read most of his statements on that subject, and many of them were derived from language that we ourselves used

very carefully, that those changes "should not represent the weight of conquest."

That was used in a speech by President Johnson in September 1968, here in Washington.

WITHDRAWAL BY STAGES

Mr. HAMILTON. I noticed your reference almost in a passing way to the possibility of withdrawals in stages, and you felt that this held some promise for a solution to this matter. I think you also said that this might occur over a very long period of time.

What would trigger the withdrawals; what things would have to happen before you would move to the next stage of withdrawals?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, I should think that conditions for each step would be agreed upon in advance. In the end, the key condition would have to be the realization of a condition of peace between the nations.

Mr. HAMILTON. Who would make the determination of whether or not the conditions had been met?

Mr. ROSTOW. Well, in the nature of things, I suppose each party to an international agreement retains the ultimate right to interpret it. This particular conflict of course, has been peculiarly within the ambit of the United Nations ever since 1947, and United Nations recommendations and resolutions, especially those of the Security Council would have a great deal of weight.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you envisage an agreement signed by the parties here providing for these staged withdrawals over a period of time?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes. I think the language that Secretary Rogers used in January of 1970 is—I think I have it here somewhere, provided I can find it—is very firm. He said that we have never recommended—wait a minute, maybe this is it. "We have never suggested any withdrawal," and this appears in volume 62, Department of State Bulletin, page 218:

> We think the security arrangements would be left to the parties to negotiate. written agreement that satisfied all aspects of the Security Council resolution. In other words, we have never suggested that a withdrawal occur before there was a contractual agreement entered into by the parties, signed by the parties in each others presence, an agreement that would provide full assurances to Israel that the Arabs would admit that Israel had a right to exist in peace.
>
> In the past the Arabs have never been able to do that and, if that could be done, we think it would be a tremendous boon to the world.
>
> We think the security arrangements would be left to the parties to negotiate.

I fully agree with the Secretary's statement. It represents the continuous policy position of the U.S. Government since June 1967.

Mr. HAMILTON. Dr. Campbell, your statement on page 10 is that Europe has not played a role commensurate with its interests in the Middle East. Why not?

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, could I say a few words on the interim settlement which you raised, before turning to that?

Mr. HAMILTON. You surely may.

INTERIM SETTLEMENT

Mr. CAMPBELL. I think this would add to the picture. You said there seemed to be a strong concentration on that effort rather than the more comprehensive one. I think this is partly a result of the fact that the Jarring mission is now stalled, at least for the moment, and

Ambassador Jarring has not gotten a responsive reply from Israel to his letter sent in February of this year, and he has given up for the moment and nobody has found a way to get him going again. So, in order to maintain the momentum of some kind of negotiation, I think we have put emphasis on trying to get a lesser arrangement, particularly in light of the fact that we had a certain judgment about the situation in Egypt and wanted to take advantage of what seemed to be a greater disposition on the part of Sadat, as compared to Nasser, to talk about the possibilities of settlement in a more serious way which might make possible some concessions on both sides.

The second point has to do with the question which Professor Rostow mentioned of no withdrawals until the comprehensive settlement is agreed upon and signed. If the Israelis themselves were willing to make an agreement for partial withdrawal and with no Egyptian forces coming across the canal and some kind of neutralized area in between, we would not necessarily be prejudicing that earlier position, it semes to me, and at the same time we would enable both sides to say something has been accomplished in the way of an agreement.

Mr. Rostow. I agree with that.

EUROPE'S ROLE IN MIDDLE EAST

Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Lichtblau has pointed out to us how dependent Europe is on Middle East oil and really much more so than we are, and yet they don't seem to display the same type of interest as we do in the security problems here. Why not?

They are the ones whose necks are on the chopping block.

Mr. Campbell. This is quite correct and I mentioned earlier that they have rather made a distinction between the military questions and their assurances of a supply of oil. For example, if you look at the British military position over the years in the Persian Gulf and in surrounding areas, Aden and elsewhere, that position was largely maintained with the idea that it was necessary for the security of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf.

But under the constriction of budgetary requirements, their inability, as they thought, to maintain the kind of military position they had had before, and with the tremendous difficulties they had dealing with local Nationalists in that area, the British have reached the conclusion, I think both the British oil companies and the British Government, that they did not require an impressive military presence in that area in order to get oil. What they required was a state of relations with the oil producing countries which would be based largely on economics, the assurance of a market for the producing countries and the assurance of access to oil for the consuming countries in Europe. They felt that they had the basis there for a continuing relationship which military force wouldn't have a great deal of effect on even if they had it there.

At the same time, I think there is another factor, in the Mediterranean at any rate, and that is that they knew the United States had military force in the area, and the fact is that it provided the counterbalance to the Russian force.

This may be less true in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, where nobody seems to be taking the place the British held in the past.

Mr. ROSTOW. Could I add to that answer?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, please do.

Mr. ROSTOW. I talked with all the foreign ministers involved in all the European countries in 1967, 1968, and 1969 on this question. There is no lack of awareness in the European governments of the vital importance of the Middle East to their security, and I quoted President Pompidou's powerful statement in the opening of my remarks here today.

What there is, as Dr. Campbell brings out, is a general reluctance in Europe to take an independent stand because the Soviet Union is involved and therefore nuclear power is involved.

That kind of threat can only be matched by the United States and, therefore, the political risks within Europe of taking an active or forward position weigh heavily. For example, the Germans have a great stake in their Ostpolitick.

The French have pursued a somewhat independent policy, although as Dr. Campbell has indicated on the naval question, not nearly so independent as it has seemed. But other states in Europe are both bound and paralyzed by their own internal political situations, by their hopes, in the case of Germany, for some kind of settlement in Berlin and in Eastern Europe generally, and by the kind of paralysis that pervades European foreign policy because of their nuclear impotence.

U.S. ROLE

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Frelinghuysen?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to congratulate the three witnesses and, before I ask any questions, I would like to make a mild complaint. It seems to me what we have had is a diet of testimony, or we could call it a flood, with no opportunity to participate in a discussion, which I think might have been useful.

I have been alternately very interested and bored to death, primarily because there has been no opportunity to break in, and break this discussion into reasonable segments.

It is too bad that the format is the way it is. It doesn't lend itself to an easy discussion of big problems. I have been interested, particularly in the last part of the discussion, about what is the role of the United States and why Europe hasn't done more in pushing for settlement.

Dean Rostow says it is because they are virtually paralyzed because they are nonnuclear powers. I would think that is not too strong an argument. Nuclear powers are not going to use their nuclear power, so it really is irrelevant to their usefulness as movers and shakers, I would think.

In other words, it does seem to me that the United States has done its share and I think perhaps we are too critical about what our share has been. It seems to me we should take a reasonable degree of pride in the fact that we have at least been the ones to provide some movement in what seems to be a situation that can be with us indefinitely, but which does provoke tensions which could precipitate a crisis down the road.

Dr. Campbell says that possibly the United States can be more persuasive than it has. Well, I am not sure whether that is a reflection, a criticism of U.S. policy. Is there something we haven't done correctly?

"More persuasive," I presume, means more persuasive with Israel. Dean Rostow sounds as if we are being too persuasive, we are being asked to undermine our own clear position about what is a fair settlement. So we can be caught off base in being persuasive I would think.

In other words, you two gentlemen seem to be arguing with each other about what is an appropriate role for the United States.

UNITED STATES AND SOVIET ROLES

I am not sure if Dr. Campbell is being a critic of what we have been trying to do. He says there is a need to resume serious talks with the Soviet Union on the Middle East. Well, of course, it would be nice if we could do that. We are not preventing serious talks with the Soviet Union. Dr. Campbell himself admits that the Soviets probably see certain advantages in not having a full settlement. I would suppose that there is already a tacit agreement of some kind that the major powers don't want to see a major war break out in the area, so we don't need to talk about that.

What I would assume we would like to do, if we could, would be to find a way to talk with the Soviet Union to see if we could limit the arms race. We do not want to define it more sharply as an arms race.

I think we tend, so far as I get anything out of this morning's discussion, we tend to minimize the significance of what we are doing. Perhaps we underestimate, or accept as inevitable, the fact that others aren't being as helpful as they could be. Perhaps this is the reason why we have serious problems.

This is a long response.

Dr. Campbell, on page 6 of your statement, you talk about the desirability of preventing adventurous Soviet moves. How could anyone prevent them if the Soviets want to engage in adventurous moves? I am not quite sure what such moves are, but how can we prevent them?

You say at another point, and let me put two things to you: On page 7 you said the U.S.S.R. have said their fleet would block another intervention by the United States in Lebanon if a need should develop.

Do you think that case can be made that the presence of the Soviet Fleet would block such a move on our part? Vice versa, would we be able to prevent a move by the Soviets because of our presence in the Mediterranean if they decided to move? We were unable to move in Hungary when they decided to move. It is certainly a question mark. The presence of another power is perhaps a form of restraint but I wonder if it does block anything. And how can you prevent adventurous moves by either side?

BIG POWER MOVES

Mr. CAMPBELL. You raise several questions and I don't know whether you want me to respond to the last ones first, or all of them, or some.

At any rate, let me begin at the end of your remarks and say

that I regard this question of restraint of adventurous moves on the Russian side as a question of deterence, really. It is a question of the degree, the point at which decisions may go one way or the other, and thus the presence of another large force—as the Russians see it, a Russian force—say, would prevent our landing as we did in Lebanon in 1958.

Our naval people say they wouldn't at all; that if we had to, we would do the same thing again.

On the other hand, I do think the existence of two forces there which make, obviously, a risky situation on the part of anyone undertaking a military operation, would cause second thoughts.

Similarly, I think the point of our having a 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean from this standpoint is in order not to give the Russians free rein to exert military pressure on political situations by virtue of the fact that they alone would have the military force which could be visible to those concerned who were making the decision. It is a question of a balance which would incline both sides toward greater caution in undertaking that kind of a policy.

I wasn't thinking so much of our intervening in case the Russians attempted to apply military force, but that they would, in considering the risks of such movement, have to take into account that they might come into a clash with us.

Another point you brought up, Congressman Frelinghuysen, had to do with my suggestion that further negotiations with Russians might be useful on this point. It is my impression that we have more or less largely because we achieved nothing very much when we talked to them previously, and because whenever we have posed the question of joint agreement on limitation of arms to the two sides, they have shied away from the question and said, "Only when the Israelis get out of occupied territory," will they talk about limiting arms.

On the other hand, there is no question that the continuing danger of the situation, a war or something serious arising from it, is there, and the Russians are concerned about it, as we are, and maybe even more concerned, perhaps, because they are in a vulnerable position in Egypt.

Yes, there is a tacit agreement that nobody wants war and, if hostilities began, I am sure the hotline would be used, and there would be an attempt on both sides: "Let's control the dangers here, let's not get involved ourselves." But it remains a situation where perhaps that general tacit agreement is not enough, and it seems to me there are possibilities that we and the Russians could perhaps agree on more concrete questions concerning control of delivery of certain armaments to both sides and giving certain kinds of advice to both sides which would decrease the possibility that they themselves would create a military situation which would very greatly increase the danger of Soviet and, therefore, American involvement.

As to the first point which you raised respecting our possibly being more persuasive, yes, I was talking about Israel, and partly because it seems to me there is a rather strong opinion on the part of not only France, but in Western Europe generally, that the United States has not exercised as much pressure or persuasion on Israel as it could have.

FRANCE'S ROLE

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. The French are the best backseat drivers I know, but I don't think they have been too useful in this area. I don't think we have to be concerned too much about their attitude.

I guess when Dean Rostow gets a chance to rebut he may say we are going at this too vigorously.

Mr. CAMPBELL. I think there is a difference. We agree on many things but we don't agree on this.

My position is that the Israelis' rather tough policy at the moment is making it difficult for us to get the Jarring mission reconstituted and going again, and this is one of the factors in the picture, and I think our position has perhaps been more rigid than it needed to be on their side.

Mr. ROSTOW. I think you have raised, Congressman, a number of points and I greatly sympathize with your boredom in hearing prepared statements read.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. It hasn't been all boredom, I must admit. I have been interested mostly, rather than bored.

PROTECTION OF U.S. INTERESTS

Mr. ROSTOW. I always prefer a more informal kind of colloquy, and I hope we can have one now.

First, let me indicate that I agree with you that we have done well, on the whole. When the President acted in September 1970, in connection with the crisis in Jordan and Syria, he acted effectively. The position taken by the administration throughout, I think, has been a sound position from the point of the long-run protection of American interests.

Now, on your question of whether we can persuade Europe to come in, perhaps my answer was too bleak. There are movements within NATO, and there is a movement within the Six to develop a political voice. The European leaders are immensely concerned that this crisis in their own backyard has been one in which they have largely been mute. They haven't all been mute. The British took an active role with us throughout the 1967 and 1968 developments. The Dutch and the Belgians were active behind the scenes.

Foreign Minister Harmel of Belgium, who is a most distinguished foreign minister, indeed, went to Egypt and Israel this summer as a representative of a political committee of the Six to explore the possibilities of developing a European voice in this area.

He is the father of the resolution to which I referred to develop the political side of NATO.

So movements have occurred. But thus far they have not been very effective. I think part of the responsibility might lie with us for not seeking to develop and use NATO procedures for consultation in the interest of concerting and harmonizing policy.

LACK OF USE OF NATO

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. But how fair is that charge, if it is a charge, that we have been indifferent to the use of the NATO mechanism? I would suppose we would welcome the develoment of a European

voice through NATO, that we have done everything we can to utilize NATO. You really give the impression that we are trying to bypass Europe in developing our own approach to these things.

Mr. Rostow. That policy requires—as President Nixon said—that Undersecretaries of State and other officers go to Brussels often to consult with their European partners in that framework. Well, it hasn't happened much.

Under pressures of time there is an impulse to move alone.

Now, second, on the question of Soviet talks, I speak as a veteran on that point. I am a great believer in maintaining contact with the Soviets, even when it is bleak, but Dr. Campbell is quite right, when he says that in all our efforts to get an understanding on the limitation of arms shipments, we have met with a blank refusal. The Soviets have not agreed even to the restoration of the 1967 cease fire, which was indefinite in duration.

I think they should be pursued, however.

I think the question you raised about deterrence is the heart of the matter. It is enormously difficult. When you consider the political implications of all these movements of troops and fleets and air forces, the question is, who deters whom?

The ultimate deterrent, I think, is the first shot. No shots have even been fired between American and Soviet forces. There is a great deal of maneuvering going on. The great problem is to establish a presence. They don't challenge our positions, but we don't challenge theirs, either. As you said, we don't go into Hungary, or Czechoslovakia, or East Germany. The problem is to obtain reciprocal respect for our own commitments.

In the Middle East, the game of chess is very complex. I thought that if things get much worse we might resume the practice which was popular in Saudi Arabia in tense moments of establishing a physical presence, which is an ultimate deterrent that the fleet cannot be.

Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Rosenthal.

MEANING OF PHYSICAL PRESENCE

Mr. Rosenthal. Could you give us an example of what you mean by a physical presence, and where, and with whose cooperation or assistance?

Mr. Rostow. Well, if the situation becomes extremely dangerous, I would consider a physical presence in the Sinai as perhaps a more powerful deterrent than even the presence of the fleet, just as we had air forces in Saudi Arabia at times when the threat to Saudi Arabia looked more ominous than it does today.

We had bases in Libya.

Mr. Rosenthal. You would need an Israeli agreement. That would be a highly provocative act.

Mr. Rostow. Very. I am not recommending it. I am saying this is the kind of thinking you have to do, if warfare breaks out, if attempts are made to cross the canal, and so forth. How do you put out that fire?

I should much prefer to move, if the risks become ominous, before the event rather than after the event.

Mr. Rosenthal. Let me go back a little, Dean Rostow, if I might.

ONE CAUSE OF 1967 WAR

When you spoke of the causes of the 1967 war, you listed a number of things. One was faulty Russian intelligence——

Mr. ROSTOW. I said the deliberate circulation of false intelligence.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. The net effect was that it fit into that category.

I have always wondered if the United States and other maritime powers had been more forthright in pursuing some kind of symbolic flag opening of the Strait of Tiran, might that have deflated the Israeli tenseness at the moment. I think they acted from a psychological isolation, at least. Had we done that, might events have been different?

Mr. ROSTOW. It might have been. We were pursuing that plan.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Not seriously, though.

Mr. ROSTOW. Very seriously. We thought we had more time to do it.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. You had only one other nation agreeing.

Mr. ROSTOW. We had the Dutch agreeing and the Australians agreed and the Canadians, probably, but we thought we had more time for that venture than in fact we did. As events developed, with the mobilization of armed forces in the Sinai, the establishment of a joint command, and especially the submission of the Jordanian forces to Egyptian command, that mobilization took over from Tiran as the center of the tornado. The key issue was no longer the Strait of Tiran, but the immediate threat of the movement of armed forces in the Sinai. But I agree that within that period of time, we might have moved quickly to escort vessels. We and the British had ships assembled for the purpose.

But there were risks. We had reason to suppose that those ships would not be fired upon but they might have been fired upon. There were risks and, while those risks were examined and plans prepared, mobilization became the center of the storm and not the opening of the Strait. But from my own knowledge of the subject, I believe that the impression that that was not a serious plan is entirely in error.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. I am only trying to discuss it in the sense of what can we learn from those events. I am not seeking out whose fault it was.

For the sake of discussion, I think we learned that sometimes forthright statements and acts, when people are tense and nervous, may cause them to calm down. This applies to nations and to individuals.

Mr. ROSTOW. That is right.

RUSSIA'S ROLE

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Some of the earlier witnesses have testified that the Soviet Union has now become, in its own mind, a great international power, which in fact they are, and it has a kind of a Victorian obsession with the prerequisites of that power, and the burdens of it. One of the things they do is to expand automatically. They have yet to learn the lessons we have learned of the great expense, internally and externally, of managing client states.

It then becomes the burden of those who would want to limit that expansion to be extremely precise and forthright and to indicate that the old scenario can't be played out the way it might have been 40 or 50 years ago.

If that supposition I make is correct, that you have to indicate a firm and forthright position of limiting that expansion, when and under what circumstances do you play out that role?

1967 CRISIS

Mr. Rostow. Well, in the 1967 crisis, the question of using naval escorts to keep the Strait of Tiran open is a very important one to think about because in the end, thinking back over that episode, the deterrent to prompt and immediate action which might have lanced the boil and changed the political atmosphere entirely was the feeling in the United States that because of the Vietnam controversy the President should not risk acting under the 1957–61 resolution but should get a new resolution from Congress. That resolution was prepared and discussed, and it would have been proposed if the war hadn't broken out.

That was the ultimate factor deterring the President from using that weapon to defuse the crisis more quickly.

Could we have succeeded? I think so.

I believed so at the time, and I think so now. If we had moved promptly, we might have done so. That was the British proposal and the British and others were keen on it, and we were. But then the thing exploded. You could look back over those events and say, "if you had done this, this might not have happened."

I reproach myself for not having fought that decision harder than I did but, nonetheless, it was a chancy thing, because great forces were involved, and great risks.

That approach was discussed within the Government and among the governments. As President Johnson's memoirs make clear, we thought we had a little more time to do it.

Mr. Rosenthal. I think your expression is quite appropriate, lancing of the boil. I think it might have happened that way.

Mr. Rostow. In order to carry out such a policy, the President has to be able to move promptly.

CREDIBILITY OF UNITED STATES

Mr. Rosenthal. How do you make people believe you are a credible world power?

We still have the problem of credibility in terms of world power, restraints, and limitations. How in the Middle East do either of you see how we can earn respect for our credibility and forthrightness? What should we do and not do, so that people can understand where we are?

Mr. Rostow. I agree that is the heart of the problem. I have proposed myself that we offer an American guarantee or a NATO guarantee to the terms of a peace satisfying the Security Council resolution, not simply to Israel but to all the states which are parties to that kind of agreement. I think that is one approach and I was very glad to see in 1970 that Senator Fulbright in a major speech on the Middle East came out in favor of such a guarantee.

SENATOR FULBRIGHT'S PROPOSAL

I think in the end that is one way of consolidating a position and having a posture which is supported not only by the President but by the Congress.

Mr. HAMILTON. Wasn't Senator Fulbright's proposal a bilateral guarantee to Israel alone?

Mr. ROSTOW. It was in part, but the fact simply is that he recommended that we consider a form of guarantee.

I would prefer a guarantee not simply to Israel but to the terms of a peace settlement consistent with the Security Council resolution. There are a number of variant possibilities in such an approach.

Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chairman, could I speak generally to Mr. Rosenthal's question?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.

U.S. CREDIBILITY

Mr. CAMPBELL. I think this is part of the problem, being a credible world power and not inviting situations where there is so much uncertainty that sometimes events get beyond us, and also that the Soviets make some miscalculations. I think your general thesis, taken from earlier discussions which you have had here in this committee, to the effect that the Russians do have an obsession about proving their worth and their power as one of the two great powers of the world, presents us in the Middle East with a situation much more complex than it is, for example, in Europe, where the line is fairly well understood, and we don't go venturing on the Eastern side and they don't on the Western, and there is a kind of understood basis for what amounts to a security system.

Whereas in the Middle East, where the alliances are not as firm, some of the commitments are shadowy, where there are numerous powers which are neutralist, or putting themselves somewhere in the middle, there is not a clear definition of where the commitments and the interests of the two powers lie, and thus there are possibilities of their coming in conflict with each other.

I think certainly, in places where there are NATO powers involved, that we must make absolutely clear that these commitments stand, just as they do in Western Europe.

The question of where we stand with respect to Israel and its ultimate independence is another area that I think the Russians should know about.

There are shadowy situations such as Jordan which we try to play them so that our power will have an influence on how various crises come out and do not turn disastrously in the wrong direction for us. But these are touchy questions each time they come up, and they cannot be totally defined in advance. We have to do the best we can in this respect, a mixture of firmness and to the degree we can to let the Russians know where the boundaries cannot be overstepped, but a willingness to talk at all times and a realization—and the hope that they have a realization—that there are possibilities where we have to get together and get out of the crisis through consultation directly between ourselves when those situations arise.

DÉTENTE AND CONFLICT

Mr. ROSENTHAL. How is it so, in the case of great powers—let's take the case of Russia—that you can have in one area, rapprochement, or a détente, and in another area have nothing but aggravation and turmoil. Why do nations act like this? Have they made a decision worldwide for rapprochement or détente, or have they made a decision in area "A" and do something else in group "B".

Professor Rostow, is this in your judgment what is happening and, if so, why?

And, is there any way of turning that around?

Mr. ROSTOW. I don't agree that the Russian policy is one of détente and hail fellow well met. As Courve de Murville has said, Russian policy has a line and a momentum of its own. It is a policy of expansion for reasonably clear ends that will go on until it is stopped, as it was in Cuba.

That means that if the risks are too great, as they are in Berlin, where, after all, we had two ultimata from Khrushchev with dates, on which he backed down, if the risks are clearly too great in Central Europe, then Soviet policy flows around obstacles towards targets where the risks are less. To me, as I started by saying, the process of Soviet expansion in the Middle East is addressed to Europe. It is addressed to neutralizing Europe and forcing the dismantling of NATO and the withdrawal of American Forces from Europe and the Mediterranean, with all sorts of consequences.

In the meantime, concessions are made, problems are discussed about Central Europe, or about West German diplomatic relations with the Eastern European countries, which in effect neutralize Germany and Europe as an active participant in any other forum.

But it is not a question of "hail fellow well met" in one place and not another.

IS RUSSIA'S ATTITUDE CHANGING

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Russia was a have-not nation. They had told President Nixon they were going to bury us in terms of consumer productivity. Has not time improved their domestic scene where the appetite has been whetted for consumer goods and, consequently, for peace? Hasn't there been some change in the past 10 to 15 years in their attitude? I am trying to put two factors in the computer.

Not only is it a geographical differentiation but isn't there a time differentiation, also?

Mr. ROSTOW. I have seen no evidence that that is true. It seems to be something we hope will be true and I think we delude ourselves into thinking it will occur, or it has occurred.

After the war there were terrible problems of hunger in Russia and yet they began to play an active role in the Middle East. While we were agreeing with the Russians about the creation of the State of Israel and the withdrawal of Britain from that area, they were pursuing all kinds of difficult policies in Czechoslovakia and Berlin and Eastern Europe generally. It is a question of how you perceive Soviet policy.

Yes, there is an overall Soviet interest in nuclear limitation which is a tremendous burden. We have to explore that possibility seriously because it is the one area in which I think we have profound mutual interests. We may, or may not, succeed.

But the Soviet Union now has amassed enormous forces in the Far East. It has increased the strength of its forces in Europe, not weakened them, and has strengthened its forces in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. I don't think the facts support the hypothesis that time has turned the Soviet Union into a peace-loving, static power, not at all.

U.S. AND MIDDLE EAST OIL

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Mr. Lichtblau, I feel as if we haven't had an opportunity to get at you very carefully this morning and I apologize to you for that.

I would like to ask you one question, however, and we will conclude the hearing with this.

Your statement, which is a very excellent one, did not touch upon U.S. interests or dependence upon Middle Eastern oil reserves and we have had some indication in this joint subcommittee that in 10 years or so the Middle East is going to become very important to the United States.

Could you comment on that?

Mr. LICHTBLAU. The reason I didn't put this in is precisely because I thought it was covered by previous witnesses here. But our own oil self-sufficiency is rapidly declining. Within less than 10 years a very large share of our oil supplies will have to come from overseas.

Latin America does not have much of an oil export potential left. There is some new production in Equador and other South American countries but it is not going to be very significant in terms of our needs. So, a growing share of our growing imports will have to come from the Eastern Hemisphere.

Mr. HAMILTON. Could you put a figure on it in, say, 1980, how much of our oil could we expect to come from the Middle East?

Mr. LICHTBLAU. It could well be 25 percent of our total oil requirements. It depends on developments in Alaska, on the domestic price structure and other factors. But certainly it will be in excess of 20 percent, and could go as high as 30 percent. This is not just the Middle East itself but the entire Eastern Hemisphere. We might get some oil from Nigeria and from the South China Sea. But, if we are going to import 8 or 9 million barrels daily of oil from overseas by 1980, the bulk of those imports will have to come from the Persian Gulf and north Africa.

So we are going to become more and more dependent on the Middle East. This is really a new situation for the United States. Today, we are only about 20 percent dependent on all overseas oil supplies, of which the Middle East accounts for just 5 percent. By 1980 it will be a multiple of that figure.

POSSIBILITY OF VIETNAM OIL

Mr. HAMILTON. We have been hearing talk of oil in Vietnam. Is there anything to that at all?

Mr. LICHTBLAU. Well, I don't know. There are some geological indications that oil is there. There are indications that oil is in the entire

South China Sea. A lot of oil is being found in the offshore area of Indonesia. But it is no more important than a number of other areas around the world. In the Gulf of Thailand there is some oil exploration going on now. But nobody is drilling in the offshore area of Vietnam now. No company is exploring there but the fact that the area may be oil-bearing has been used as an argument by some groups that this is the real reason why the United States is in Vietnam. Of course, this is nonsense.

Mr. HAMILTON. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

(The full text of Mr. Lichtblau's statement follows:)

MIDDLE EAST OIL: ITS ROLE IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET BLOC

Thank you for inviting me to participate in your Subcommittees' discussions of the economic ties between Europe and the Middle East. The particular topics assigned to me are (a) the role of oil in the economic and political relations between Western Europe and the Middle East and North Africa, and (b) the interest of the Soviet Bloc in Middle East oil.

OIL, THE KEY TO THE MIDDLE EAST'S IMPORTANCE

Any analysis of the role of the Middle East[1] in world affairs must start with the recognition that ¾ of the non-communist world's known oil reserves are located there. While this is of course generally known, the political and economic consequences which follow from it are often ignored or overlooked. There is a tendency to treat the area's oil wealth as an interesting natural phenomenon that bears mentioning but is not basic to the political, geographic and national complexities which make up the "Middle East Problem". It is probably true that the "Problem" would exist even if there were no oil in the area. But the rest of the world would be far less concerned. The Middle East is not highly populated and the vast majority of its people live on a subsistence level, it does not represent a major market for exports from industrial countries and outside of oil it has virtually no exports that are essential to other countries, and—except for Egypt—the countries of the Middle East are not located at today's trade or strategic crossroads of the world. Hence, the Middle East's economic importance—and, consequently, much of its political and strategic importance—derives primarily from the single factor of its immense and growing oil wealth.

The historic growth of this wealth in terms of direct government income from oil operations over the last ten years is shown in Table I below.

TABLE I.—TOTAL MIDDLE EAST OIL PAYMENTS[1]

[In millions of dollars]

	Persian Gulf	North Africa	Total
1960	1,439	20	1,459
1962	1,649	80	1,729
1964	2,131	262	2,393
1966	2,682	476	3,158
1968	3,370	1,214	4,584
1970	4,189	1,620	5,809

[1] For more details see appendix table 1 which appears on p. 176.

As indicator of the impact of this wealth on the economy of the oil exporting countries is seen in their per capita national income. For all of the Middle East oil exporting countries, except Algeria, the collective income per capita amounted to about $370 in 1969.[2] This year, following the sharp increase in oil revenues, the figure is likely to exceed $400. By comparison, per capita income is $90 in India, $130 in Pakistan and $232 in Turkey, one of the more advanced non-industrial countries.

[1] Unless otherwise stated, I include North Africa in this term.

[2] Source: OPEC, *Annual Statistical Bulletin 1970*. The Bulletin shows no figure for Algeria.

OIL IMPORTS DOMINATE WESTERN EUROPE'S ENERGY SECTOR

The converse of the Middle East's oil surplus is the immense need for this commodity throughout the Eastern Hemisphere. Virtually every inhabitant of Western Europe, Southeast Asia and Japan is a daily consumer of products made from Middle East crude oil. In Western Europe oil accounted in 1970 for 61% of total energy requirements[3] from all sources; and 80% of it came from the Persian Gulf and North Africa. Thus, Western Europe's energy dependence on the Middle East was nearly 50% of total requirements last year. And in some countries, such as Italy, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries, Middle East oil already supplies ⅔ or more of all energy requirements.

Oil is of course not the only primary commodity which Europe imports from overseas. But oil has a combination of characteristics which give it a unique economic position in Europe: its use is universal and basic to the functioning of the economy; its consumption can usually not be postponed without immediate consequence to the consumer; the demand for it has been growing steadily for the past twenty-five years and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future; for much of its use no readily available substitute exists; and, finally, most of the world's exportable supplies of this commodity are concentrated in two adjacent overseas areas—the Persian Gulf and North Africa. Hence, it is literally true that Western Europe is dependent on Middle East oil for the functioning of its material infra-structure.

This dependency has of course existed for quite some time. Europe was first made dramatically aware of it during the Suez Canal Crisis of 1957 when an oil shortage was averted only by the combination of U.S. emergency oil exports and a mild winter. At that time there was much public and private concern over Europe's dependence on Middle East oil and the potential threat this represented to the Continent's economic and strategic security. It was held that alternate energy sources had to be developed in Europe and new oil sources had to be found outside the Persian Gulf area. To some extent this was actually done in the 1960's but it was largely overshadowed by Europe's massive shift from coal to oil as the basis for its energy economy. The switch was a direct one from the collieries of Wales, the Ruhr and the Saar to the oil fields of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and, later, Libya. In 1960, coal supplied still nearly 65% of Western Europe's energy needs. By 1970 the share had declined to 30%. Between 1965 and 1970 the development of new indigenous natural gas supplies, principally in Holland and Britain, raised gas's share from 2.5 to over 6% of European energy demand. While this had some retarding effect on the rise in oil demand, it was not enough to arrest even temporarily the growth of oil's share in Europe's steadily expanding energy requirement.

SHIFT FROM THE PERSIAN GULF TO NORTH AFRICA

If we now look at the diversification of overseas oil supplies since the first Suez Crisis, geographically a great deal has been accomplished. At that time 66% of Western Europe's oil supplies came from the Persian Gulf. By 1970 that region's share had dropped to 46%. The difference was made up primarily by North Africa whose oil production rose from virtually nothing before 1959 to 4.4 million barrels daily in 1970, equal to about ⅓ of total Persian Gulf production last year.

Logistically, the shift to west of Suez has been of tremendous significance, for it has substantially reduced the importance of the Suez Canal as a route for oil shipments to Europe. If Libyan and Algerian production had not been developed and the entire growth in European oil demand since 1957 would have come from the Persian Gulf, the closure of the Suez Canal in June 1967 would have had catastrophic consequences on European oil supplies, as would the shut-down of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline during 1970. Because of the availability of substantial oil supplies from North Africa plus the more recent development of Nigerian oil exports and the growing number of mammouth tankers (125,000 dwt and over), current spot freight rates for tankers are no higher than they were in the comparable period of the year preceding the closure of the Canal.[4]

[3] Including petrochemical and other non-energy uses.

[4] The extremely low spot freight rates since August 1971 are unlikely to prevail much longer. However, average freight rates are expected to remain relatively low for some time in the absence of extraneous events.

Of these three developments, the availability of North African oil is by far the most important.

Parenthetically, I would like to say that none of these developments have rendered the Suez Canal obsolete or insignificant. At the beginning of this year more than 75% of the world tanker fleet was of a size that could have transited the Canal full or in ballast; and the average size of all new tanker deliveries in the first half of 1971—142,000 dwt—was also still slightly below the maximum size that could go through the Canal in ballast. Furthermore, despite its several enlargements, the Canal has not yet reached its ultimate size. In fact, plans to widen and deepen it existed at the time it was closed. Thus, while the shift of oil production to west of Suez has made the Suez Canal non-essential for oil importing nations, its reopening would certainly lower freight rates from whatever the prevailing level.

LIMITED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT OF GEOGRAPHIC SHIFT

Other than deemphasizing the importance of the Persian Gulf's supply routes, the diversification of oil exports due to the North African discoveries cannot be said to have improved Europe's security of oil supplies economically or politically. Economically, the large volumes of Libyan oil coming on the market after 1962 did have an impact on world crude oil prices from 1964 through 1969. However, in 1970 and 1971 the Libyan government became the initiator and leader in the worldwide round of raising posted crude oil prices [5] and tax rates. Libya provided, in fact, a protective umbrella for the other major oil exporting countries to raise posted prices and taxes. The move was fully coordinated through the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) whose membership includes all principal oil exporting nations. OPEC's earlier successes in raising unit oil revenues for its members through bargaining with the international oil companies had gained it the loyalty and respect of all major oil exporting countries. Thus, concerted action through OPEC on matters of prices and revenues has introduced considerable rigidity into the world oil trade.

Politically, too, the diversification of oil production to North Africa did not bring about an improvement in the security of supplies (as opposed to the political security of transit which was of course improved). Both Libya and Algeria are members of the Arab League. Both are actively involved in the major struggles in the Middle East, and during the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 both restricted oil and gas exports for a time, totally or selectively, for political reasons.

By contrast, Nigeria represents a true political diversification of European oil import sources. But Nigeria's current production of 1.5 million barrels daily is only ⅓ that of North Africa.

SLOWER GROWTH RATE AHEAD FOR EUROPE'S ENERGY DEMAND

Now let us turn to the future. Will oil's role in the European energy demand pattern continue to grow? Will the Middle East continue to provide the great bulk of European oil supplies? The relationship between Europe and the Middle East will hinge to a large extent on these two questions.

Looking at the period between now and 1980, there can be no doubt that not only the volume but also the share of oil in Western European energy consumption will increase substantially.

We have assumed that total European energy demand will rise at an annual rate of 4.5% over the next ten years. This is a moderate rate which might be exceeded by as much as half a percentage point. By comparison, the growth rate of the previous decade was 5.5%. The expected decline reflects the current slowdown in European economic activity, the underlying long term decline in the ratio of energy to GNP which characterizes mature industrial economies, and the fact that energy demand is not totally price-inelastic so that the increases in energy costs will have some retarding effect on demand growth.

Oil will continue to grow faster than total energy. Coal, on the other hand, which is still the second largest European energy source, will register a substantial further decline in domestic production as more mines are being shut. Coal imports, largely from the U.S., will supplement domestic coal supplies only moderately so that coal's share in total energy demand will drop steeply.

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[5] The price used for calculating royalties and taxable profits for the oil companies.

Natural gas supplies will grow considerably more rapidly than total energy supplies but not nearly enough to close the gap created by the growth in total energy demand and the declining coal supplies. The bulk of the new gas will come from the North Sea but more than ⅓ of West Europe's gas demand in 1980 may be provided by imports from the Soviet Union and North Africa. Nuclear power will be of significance in the UK where it may provide some 6% of total energy demand. But for continental Europe the atomic power age will not begin in earnest until the next decade.

OIL DEMAND IN THE 1970'S

Oil will carry the burden of the growth in European energy demand for the 1970's. Oil's growth will be slower than in the 1960's, reflecting both the decline in the growth of total energy demand and the expected growing inroads of natural gas and atomic energy into the conversion from coal to other fuels. Overall, we see oil demand rising at an annual rate of 6.0–6.5% through 1980, compared to a growth rate of 13.7% in the first half and 10.0% in the second half of the 1960's.

Below is a summary of the projected changes in European energy consumption between 1970 and 1980. For our purpose we have selected an annual growth rate of 6.25% for oil demand and, as pointed out, 4.5% for total energy demand.

WESTERN EUROPEAN ENERGY CONSUMPTION

[In million tons oil equivalent]

	1970		1980	
	Volume	Share	Volume	Share
Coal	301	29.6	212	13.4
Oil	[1] 619	60.9	[1] 1,135	71.7
Natural gas	63	6.2	175	11.1
Hydro	30	2.9	29	1.8
Nuclear	4	0.4	31	2.0
Total	1,017	100.0	1,582	100.0

[1] Equal to 12,528 barrels per day in 1970 and 22,971 barrels per day in 1980.

Sources for 1970: (1) "BP Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry, 1970" for all figures except oil. (2) "OECD Oil Statistics, 1970" for oil consumption, including bunker fuels, refinery fuels and losses, and nonenergy uses of oil, but excluding exports.

THE MIDDLE EAST VS. NEW SUPPLY SOURCES

As the above Table shows, oil will dominate the European energy demand pattern still more by 1980 than it does today. The question, then, is where will this oil come from. Obviously, the Middle East will continue to be the principal supply source. But while the volume of Europe's oil supplies from that area will substantially increase, there are indications that the Middle East's share, which amounted to 80% of total European oil supplies last year, may moderately decline in the 1970's.

The principal reason for this are the North Sea and West Africa. North Sea production has not yet started and information on reserve figures is still very scanty. However, the area has been compared by some experts with Alaska's North Slope. If this is approximately correct, we can assume an ultimate production of perhaps 3 million barrels daily. The North Slope will only produce 2 million barrels daily by 1980. But this is probably due in large part to the logistic and environmental problems peculiar to that area. These problems exist probably to a much lesser extent in the North Sea. It is therefore not unrealistic to assume a North Sea production of 3 million barrels daily by 1980. Another approach to estimate potential North Sea production is to compare the area with Libya. Production there was increased in eight years from a very modest beginning to a sustained level of about 3 million barrels a day. This was considered an exceptional feat. If the same can be done in the North Sea where production problems are more difficult it would also be remarkable. The impact of the new production will fall primarily on the countries adjacent to the discoveries. Thus, for England dependence on Middle East oil might be reduced much more than for Europe as a whole.

The other major new area, West Africa, currently produces about 1.8 million barrels daily of which nearly 1.5 million barrels daily come from Nigeria, the newest giant in world oil. The rest of West Africa also gives promise of substantial growth. By 1980 the area might well be able to export in excess of 3 million barrels daily. Some of this oil will go to other African nations and some to North American and Caribbean refineries which in the first half of this year took nearly 25% of Nigerian exports. But it is not unreasonable to assume that about 2 million barrels daily of West African crude oil will go to Western Europe by 1980. By contrast, oil shipments from the Western Hemisphere to Europe will have more or less ceased by 1980 since the Western Hemisphere will be a major net importing area by then.

The Table below sums up these various possibilities into our best guess of Western European oil supply sources by 1980. A comparison with 1970 is also given.

EUROPEAN OIL SUPPLY SOURCES, 1970 AND 1980

[Thousand barrels per day]

	1970	Percent	1980	Percent
Indigenous production, excluding North Sea	450	3.4	400	1.7
North Sea			3,000	13.0
Western Hemisphere	600	4.5		
Middle East	10,660	79.5	16,600	72.2
Persian Gulf	6,220			
North Africa	4,440			
West Africa	890	6.6	2,000	8.7
Soviet bloc	795	5.9	1,000	4.4
Southeast Asia	10	.1		
Total	13,405	100.0	23,000	100.0

Source for 1970: BP Statistical Review, 1970. Requirements for 1970 includes export demand. No oil exports from Western Europe are assumed for 1980.

The 1980 figures are of course nothing more than rough indicators of magnitudes and shares, with each figure subject to varying margins of error. However, the principal conclusion, namely that the Middle East's share in European oil supplies will decline somewhat between now and 1980, is likely to stand up. From the point of view of diversification of supply sources this is obviously a desirable development. But the improvement is modest. A 70% dependence on a politically, economically and nationally interlocked foreign supply area must still be considered critical if the supply area is insecure.

An interesting development, not shown in the Table, is expected to occur within the two sub-regions of Middle East oil supplies. In contrast to the 1960's when more of the increases in European oil requirements came from North Africa than from the Middle East, the 1970's will see a return to the Persian Gulf for the bulk of the increase in European oil import requirements. The reason is that the total reserves in North Africa appear insufficient to permit a major further growth in production from the 5 million barrels daily level attained last year. Consequently, European reliance on the Persian Gulf will grow substantially from the 46% level attained last year. This return to the heartland of the Middle East is likely to have significant political implications for the 1970's.

EMERGENCY STOCKS AND RELIANCE ON THE UNITED STATES

What, if anything, can Western Europe do to limit the risk of this dependency on the Middle East for its principal energy source? In the short run, the only corrective is increased storage. Currently the only official guideline for security stocks exists in the six Common Market nations where there is a directive for a 65-day security stock level based on the previous year's consumption. The Common Market Commission is now recommending an increase to 90 days by 1975. The OECD has also recently recommended a stock level of 90 days but has not set a time limit when this is to be reached.

The existing 65-day figure and the non-urgent approach to the 90-day figure indicate a relatively low concern with the threat of a sustained massive supply interruption. It is interesting to contrast this with the attitude of the U.S. govern-

ment which for the past thirteen years has been extremely concerned with the potential threat of relying on overseas supplies, though even today only about 20% of our oil needs come from overseas. In general, the reason for the difference between the U.S. and European attitudes may be that we have an option between foreign and domestic oil (although our domestic oil option is steadily declining), while the Europeans do not.

Another factor which continues to influence Europe's approach to security stocks may be a carry-over from the time the U.S. had ample spare producing capacity which could be, and was, used as an inter-national emergency stock when required. However, our spare producing capacity has greatly declined in the last few years. Presently, it is probably below 1 million barrels daily on a sustained basis (six to twelve months), compared to about 2.4 million barrels daily just prior to the Suez Canal shutdown in mid-1957. Within two years the U.S. will have virtually no spare producing capacity left.

It would therefore seem to make good sense for Western Europe to build its emergency stocks up speedily and substantially from the prevailing 60–65 day level. The likelihood of minor and medium-sized supply interruptions in the future is certainly high enough to warrant such a step. The cost of stocks is of course very substantial both in terms of storage facilities and tied-up capital for the oil. It will ultimately have to be borne by the public, either in their role as consumers or as tax payers.

For the longer pull Europe may want to speed up the construction of atomic power plants. In this regard the Continent is way behind the U.S. and the U.K. By 1980 atomic power in these two countries will account for 9% and 6% respectively of total primary energy demand, against less than 2% on the Continent.

No security stocks or other measures would be effective against a sustained total oil export boycott by all or even a majority of the five largest Middle East producing countries.[6] Such a massive boycott has only happened once, for five days in June 1967, and that was spontaneous rather than coordinated. But the possibility of a concerted all-Arab oil boycott was on the agenda of the Khartoum Conference of Arab leaders in the fall of 1967.

OPEC AND THE PRICE LEVELS

The threat of an OPEC oil export embargo could also arise for economic reasons. Intimations of this were heard at the Teheran Conference last February. In theory, OPEC, acting in concert could unilaterally set any given price level for their oil than permit no exports below that level. In practice, the OPEC nations—at least those at the Persian Gulf—have generally not completely ignored the realities of the market in their negotiations with oil companies. However, the real possibility that at some future point the Middle East's oil policy may be based on less rational criteria, economically or politically, makes for the inherent instability of Europe's oil supplies.

It is sometimes argued that since oil revenues are at least as important to the economies of most exporting countries as well as the oil itself is to the economies of most importing countries, the OPEC members would be unlikely to engage in a sustained oil export embargo. It is of course true that in all OPEC countries, except possibly Algeria, oil and related activities provide the principal source of foreign exchange and government revenue. For these and other reasons the oil exporting countries would certainly not hold all the trump cards in a real showdown with their customers, particularly if the latter had sufficient stocks to assure them a bargaining position for some time. But who would give in first in such a confrontation and at what price is by no means certain.

But much more likely than a full scale confrontation between oil exporting and importing countries is the chance of mounting economic pressure on the latter in the form of periodic administered price increases, with each increment not quite steep enough for the importing countries to risk a confrontation. We have seen dramatic evidence of such developments in the last twelve months. Government revenue on Kuwait crude rose in a series of steps by 63%, from 83¢/barrel to $1.35/barrel, between November 1970 and June 1971. Similarly, government revenue on Libyan crude oil ("45" API gravity) rose from $1.10 to $1.99/barrel be-

[6] Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya.

tween August 1970 and October 1971, an 81% increase. The movements were the result of a series of tax and price rises decided by the OPEC members and more or less imposed on the oil companies. As a result, government revenue now represents some 75–80% of the open market fob value of Middle East crude oil, with production costs and profits accounting for the balance. Thus, producing government revenue is now by far the principal determinant of world oil prices.

THE DEMAND FOR MORE

In the absence of any further increases in government revenues per barrel between now and the end of 1975 when the existing arrangements will come to an end, Western Europe will have to pay an extra $3.5 billion annually through 1975 to meet the cost of the increases in the government take of OPEC members. There is of course no question as to the inherent right of a sovereign country to raise revenues in any way it sees fit. But there was certainly no underlying economic justification, that is, change in the supply-and-demand relationship, that would justify a cost increase even remotely approaching the one imposed.

Yet, there are indications that OPEC is about to ask for more. The organization has recently resolved to seek direct participation for its members in the private foreign oil enterprises operating within their territories. A 20% participation target has been unofficially reported, although a higher figure has been quoted for Libya. There is nothing new in the idea of government participation in private business; in principle, it should not be objectionable to the oil companies. But, according to unofficial reports, at least some OPEC members do not expect to buy into the companies' equity allotted them under a participation agreement back to the companies at a price above tax-paid cost. If this is true, it would certainly increase the cost of oil to the oil companies who in turn would try to pass it on in the form of higher prices.

This, then, is the more likely threat to Western Europe of the OPEC government cartel operations: a steady unrelenting increase in the cost of imported oil with the implicit possibility that a refusal to pay up could result in a stoppage of the flow.

THE PROBLEM OF CAPITAL ACCUMULATION

There are still other consequences resulting from the increase in the government take of OPEC members. Even if there is no participation or other further increase in government take, the Persian Gulf countries will receive a total of $11.1 billion in oil revenues in the year 1975, and Libya and Algeria together will receive close to $4 billion, giving the Middle East a total of nearly $15 billion in oil revenues for that year. Some countries, such as Iran and Algeria, are large enough to absorb most of this cash inflow by converting it into imports for development purposes. Their revenues will therefore return largely to the industrial nations of the West. Most Middle East OPEC members, however, will not be able to absorb amounts of this magnitude within their relatively small and limited economies. These countries will therefore either accumulate large capital funds abroad or they will become major lenders (or givers) for whatever purposes they deem desirable. Again, such a development might have significant political consequences in the future.

THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE COMPANIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The net investment in fixed assets in private foreign oil enterprises in the Middle East amounted to nearly $5 billion at the end of 1969. What is the outlook for this investment? One thing is certain, the role of private oil companies in the Middle East will change significantly in the next ten years. In Iran, for instance, the 25-year agreement with the international Oil Consortium lapses in 1979 and though an option exists for a fifteen year renewal, the Shah has already indicated that he does not expect a continuation of the existing arrangement. Other Middle East leaders have voiced similar expectations. In Algeria the state oil company has already a controlling share of 51% in all oil enterprises.

The change for the oil companies may range from outright nationalization to partnerships or sub-contractor relations with state companies. The private oil companies will probably accept any role which permits them to operate efficiently and earn an acceptable rate of return. If this is no longer possible they will still be very much in the picture, since they own or control most of the tankers,

refineries and distribution networks through which the crude oil is transported, converted and moved to its ultimate consumers.

However, it is not a matter of indifference to Western Europe, or to the U.S., whether Middle East oil will be produced by private western companies or by local state companies. The latter are by nature political instruments of the government by whose authority they function. Private companies, on the other hand, are essentially apolitical, commercially oriented institutions. The difference is sometimes obscured by the fact that private foreign companies can be made by law or government order to do what state companies would do voluntarily by virtue of political allegiance. Nevertheless, the fact that the actual production and exportation of Middle East oil has always been carried on by purely commercial institutions whose best interests are never served by supply interruptions or export embargoes has had a restraining influence on the use of oil for political purposes. If the role of these institutions should be taken over by local state agencies, it would probably lead to the further politicalization of Middle East oil.

MIDDLE EAST OIL AND THE SOVIET BLOC

Now I would like to turn to the question of Soviet interests in Middle East oil. My remarks will be much briefer than on the subject of Western Europe's interest in this oil because there is less to say, since I will try to limit my comments largely to the area of economics.[7]

Russia's interest in the Middle East[8] exists quite independent of the area's oil wealth and had its historic origin well before oil was a factor in that region. However, it is one of the lucky accidents of nature that the Soviet Union, as the world's second largest oil and gas producer, is more than self sufficient in both these fuels, so that access to foreign oil is not a factor in her energy policy considerations.

If the Soviet Union were a substantial net oil importer, her policy towards the Middle East would probably be quite different. An indication of this was seen in the aftermath of World War II when Soviet domestic oil supplies appeared inadequate. The Soviet Union then refused to withdraw its war time forces from Northern Iran until it had received an oil concession in that area from the Iranian government (which the Iranian Parliament later refused to ratify).

To be sure, Russia's oil self sufficiency does not mean that she is disinterested in Middle East oil. The Soviet Union knows as well as everyone else that the Middle East is the power storehouse for Western Europe and Japan and will supply substantial volumes of oil to the U.S. before the end of the current decade. Political control over the area entails therefore far more than just control over the Middle East itself. If the Soviet Union were to establish effective political influence in the majority of Middle East oil countries, this would have a profound impact on the long term overall foreign policy considerations of both Western Europe and Japan. There is no doubt that this plays an important part in the Soviet Union's Middle East policy. Furthermore, while the U.S.S.R. itself has no need for Middle East oil, most of her East European satellites are beginning to do so. This gives the Soviet Union a somewhat more direct interest in the area's oil production than was previously the case.

For the Middle East, the U.S.S.R. is a minor competitor[9], since some Soviet oil is shipped to the West. On the other hand, Communist Eastern Europe represents a small but growing export market for the Middle East. More important to the Middle East may be the Soviet Union's technical expertise in all phases of oil production and refining. Some countries seeking to develop oil production without relying on Western companies have made use of this expertise. An example is the development of the Rumalian oil field in Iraq which the Iraqi National Oil Company is developing with Soviet help in return for Soviet participation in the production from the field. Soviet technicians have also established local training centers in several oil producing countries in the Middle East as well as in Algeria and Egypt. Thus, the impact of any future withdrawal of Western oil technicians from the Middle East would probably be greatly mitigated by the ready availability of Soviet or Soviet-trained personnel.

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[7] For a full discussion of the Soviet Union's political interest in Middle East oil see Prof. D. A. Rustow, *Dependability and Dependence: Political Prospects for Middle East Oil*, in *Oil Imports and the National Interest*, published by the Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, Inc., March, 1971.

[8] In this section the term Middle East does not include North Africa unless otherwise noted.

[9] Except for Iranian natural gas which is piped into the Soviet Union.

EASTERN EUROPEAN IMPORT DEMAND

How important a market potential for Middle East oil does Eastern Europe provide? In 1970 the Soviet Bloc countries [10] consumed about 1.2 million barrels daily, equal to less than 10% of Western European demand. Local production supplied over 31% of this demand, imports from the U.S.S.R. slightly more than 67%, and imports from the West less than 2%. Thus, at the moment Eastern Europe is hardly a significant outlet for Middle East or North African oil.

However, this situation is rapidly changing. The U.S.S.R. which in the past has discouraged Bloc countries from buying oil from outside the Bloc has now withdrawn its objections because it does not expect to be able to meet all of the Bloc's steadily growing import requirements, since Russian domestic demand is growing even more rapidly. It is expected that the U.S.S.R. will continue to be the principal supplier of the East Bloc countries but the share of non-Communist oil imports will undoubtedly rise sharply. According to private estimates, the East Bloc countries might import 400,000–450,000 barrels daily from western sources by 1975 and as much as one million barrels daily by 1980. Even that last figure would still be a very modest volume, compared to West European needs or Middle East availabilities. We may therefore conclude that the East Bloc will not be a major outlet for Middle East oil even ten years from now. On the other hand, the import volumes required would appear to be large enough to justify a more direct involvement of the Soviet Union in Middle East or North African oil. The Soviet Bloc market might be especially interesting for Middle East and North African state companies which initially might prefer to make barter or other government-to-government deals with Eastern Europe than to plunge into the highly competitive private-industry controlled western markets. The Iranian National Oil Company's deal with Rumania is a case in point.

RUSSIAN OIL EXPORTS

For the same reason for which the Soviet Union's share in East European oil imports will decline, its share in Western European imports will also fall. Last year the U.S.S.R. exported about 800,000 barrels daily of oil to Western Europe, equal to 6.3% of total West European consumption. These imports will rise very little in the next ten years. Given Western Europe's growing demand prospect, the Soviet Union's share in oil imports will show a decline by 1980.

By contrast, Soviet natural gas exports to Western Europe are beginning to take on some importance. By 1980 they might account for 10% of total Western European natural gas requirements. While this is not a large share in itself, gas shipments, particularly by pipeline, tie a consumer much more rigidly to the supplier than oil shipments. Hence, a Continent-wide average dependency ratio is less meaningful for gas than for oil.

Altogether, then, it would seem that the Soviet Union has a tremendous political interest in Middle East oil because of the overriding role of this oil in supplying the Western world, and a small but growing economic interest because of the future oil import requirements of the European Satellite countries. The combination suggests that the Soviet Union's involvement in Middle East oil—politically and economically—is likely to grow.

[10] Excluding the U.S.S.R.

APPENDIX TABLE I.—TOTAL MIDDLE EAST OIL PAYMENTS

[In millions of dollars]

	Kuwait	Saudi Arabia	Iran	Iraq	Abu Dhabi	Qatar	Others	Total Persian Gulf	Algeria	Libya	Total Middle East
1960	465.2	355.2	285.3	266.3	----------	54.0	13.0	1,439.0	20.0	----------	1,459.0
1961	454.3	400.2	301.2	265.5	----------	53.3	13.0	1,497.5	26.5	3.2	1,527.2
1962	526.3	451.1	333.8	266.6	2.8	55.8	13.0	1,649.4	40.8	38.5	1,728.7
1963	556.7	502.1	398.1	325.1	6.4	59.5	13.0	1,850.9	45.0	108.8	2,014.7
1964	655.0	561.0	469.7	353.1	12.4	65.5	14.3	2,131.0	65.0	197.4	2,393.4
1965	671.1	655.2	522.4	374.9	33.2	68.5	16.4	2,341.7	(1)	371.0	2,712.7
1966	707.2	776.9	593.4	394.2	99.8	92.1	18.5	2,682.1	(1)	476.0	3,158.1
1967	717.6	852.1	736.7	361.2	105.0	101.8	23.6	2,898.0	199.1	631.0	3,728.1
1968	765.6	965.5	817.1	476.2	153.2	109.5	83.1	3,370.2	261.8	952.0	4,584.0
1969	812.2	1,008.0	937.8	483.5	191.1	115.2	118.2	3,666.0	298.8	1,132.0	5,096.8
1970	896.5	1,200.3	1,076.4	513.3	230.5	122.0	150.2	4,189.2	325.0	1,294.8	5,809.0

[1] Not available.

Sources: Persian Gulf and Algerian figures obtained from Petroleum Information Foundation paper No. 12. Algerian figures for 1960-64 from John H. Lichtblau in "State and Society in Independent North Africa" published by the Middle East Institute, p. 276. Algerian statistics for 1967-70 obtained from OPEC's "Annual Statistical Bulletin" 1970, p. 115.

(The full text of Mr. Campbell's statement follows:)

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This committee is looking at the question of Soviet policy in the Mediterranean and Middle East, and the Western response to it. I should like to turn that definition around and look first at U.S. and Western interests in that region, and then consider how they relate to Soviet policies, and finally what needs to be done.

The United States has two interests which can be called vital. The first is that the conflicts and rivalries there, whether on the local or great-power level or both at once, must be kept from developing into a major war. The second is that the region be free of the domination of any outside power; if it fell under Soviet control that would represent a perilous shift in the world balance against the United States and the West. Those vital interests are simply stated. The policies needed to sustain them, by contrast, are enormously complex, for they require changing combinations of military moves and diplomacy, of toughness and conciliation, of harmonizing approaches to the Arab-Israel conflict—difficult enough in itself—with the wider questions of security and global balance.

We have other important interests in the Middle East. Some come under the broad rubric of access: freedom of trade, transit, communication, and the transport of oil; the ability to communicate with governments and peoples. We have economic interests, including oil investments which add about $1.5 billion per year on the plus side of the U.S. balance of payments. We have defense commitments: to Italy, Greece, and Turkey under the North Atlantic Treaty; a more vague obligation to Iran under a security agreement in 1959, and an even vaguer one to Saudi Arabia; what might be called a moral commitment to the defense of Israel generally assumed on both sides but nowhere defined in writing; and this obligation has to be taken together with many statements of the Executive Branch that the United States stands for the independence and integrity of all the states in the area of the Arab-Israel conflict. Whether all those commitments correspond to interests—to refer to a concept put forward by President Nixon—is a subject on which the Administration has made no pronouncements.

Now let us look for a moment at the interests of the nations of Western Europe, as they see them. Their concern with avoiding a big war or Soviet control of the Mediterranean and Middle East parallels our own, but they are less worried about the danger of either of those possibilities and they do not believe that their own military efforts can affect them much one way or the other. On the Arab-Israel conflict, all Western European nations would like to see a settlement, but they have not agreed on how they can help to bring it about; again, they regard the real responsibility as falling on the parties to the dispute, the Arab states and Israel, and on the two big powers who are supporting them against each other. As for the oil of the Middle East and North Africa, Western Europe is utterly dependent on access to it, now and for the next ten years. How to protect it is, as they see it, a matter of economic policy and diplomacy, not for military commitments and the disposition of forces.

SOVIET POLICIES

The general line of Soviet policy toward the West in the last few years has been away from tension and cold war toward detente and limited agreements. This is evident in Europe, to some extent elsewhere, and in bilateral relations with the United States including the strategic arms talks. The dispute with China is one reason for it; domestic concerns provide others. But the spirit of detente has been slow to touch Soviet policy in the Middle East, where a combination of military buildup and support of the Arab side in the conflict with Israel has appeared as a challenge to American interests, positions, and commitments such as I have just described: the need to avoid war; the interest in preventing domination of the region by any power; NATO's commitments to its members in that area and to security in the Mediterranean; the American concern for Israel's independent existence and for normal relations with the Arab world.

What are the Soviet leaders trying to do and what are the prospects? They are not looking at the Middle East alone. Their military buildup in non-nuclear forces, which has run parallel to their heavy program in strategic weapons, has marched steadily ahead since about 1962, the year of the crisis over Cuba. The motive has been to bring the Soviet Union out of the status of a continental power and match the United States in the exercise of sea and air power on a global basis. Thus they have been aiming at effective equality—almost an obsession with them—and counting on this new military strength to give them a backing for political action they had hitherto lacked. I do not think the Soviet political leaders took this course with the idea of fighting the United States in big or little wars on the five oceans and seven continents—although their marshals and admirals talk that way. But they certainly have not ruled out using force when and where they see a favorable balance of gain and risk. And there is no doubt at all that they mean to take every advantage of the psychological effect of their growing military might at a time when the United States is obviously contracting its military reach, reconsidering is commitments, and trying to rearrange its priorities after the experience in Indochina.

The Mediterranean-Middle East region happens to be where these Soviet efforts have flowered, for geographical and political reasons. For one thing it is close to home. The Russians see the Mediterranean as an extension of the Black Sea, just as we see it the other way round. It is a pathway to the oceans which they reach now through the Strait of Gibraltar and hope again to reach through the Suez Canal, perhaps a Soviet-controlled one. They maintain a permanent naval force in the Mediterranean, which at times has over 60 ships, and they support it both from home bases and from facilities in littoral countries like Egypt and Syria, where they also have the use of airfields to compensate for the lack of attack carriers in their naval forces.

Illustrating the point made a short while ago, the main purpose of these forces is political: to give confidence to their friends and allies, to intimidate our friends and allies, and to influence the decisions of governments both in the region and outside it. One other point should also be made, however. The history of the Soviet penetration shows that the political opportunities and gains generally preceded rather than followed the military presence in local countries. Egypt, which is the keystone of the whole Soviet position, originally invited the Soviets in for its own political reasons, to support Egyptian and Arab nationalist aims against the West and against Israel. After military defeat in 1956 and in 1967, each time Nasser turned desperately to Moscow to renew his supply of arms, and Moscow obliged. In the past few years the Egyptian leadership has so feared Israel's power that it has called in Soviet "advisers"—some estimates being as high as 17,000, roughly the number of American "advisers" President Kennedy sent to Vietnam if the comparison has any interest—including combat personnel manning missile sites and aircraft.

In stressing the political antecedents of the Soviet military foothold in Egypt, I do not mean to say that the Soviets are in there just to help their friends against Israel and would withdraw if Israel met some Egyptian demands. They might welcome a less dangerous involvement on the front line, but they are in Egypt for their own reasons and will not easily be persuaded to leave. The 15-year treaty signed in May of this year—whatever it turns out to mean in practice—shows their intention to hold on to this relationship.

Yet it is well to remember one of the basic facts of international relations today, one which the British and French have had to learn in this region and with which the United States and the Soviet Union itself have had experience in various parts of the world. It is that the strong, despite their possession of overwhelming military superiority, often find it unusuable in trying to impose their will on the weak.

Thus, in considering America's and Western Europe's policies, we should not think of Soviet policy as a fixed schedule for conquest or domination, or as a program made in Moscow which somehow unrolls by autonomous action without reference to the politics of the area. Success depends upon opportunities. They have had opportunities and have made good use of most of them. That they will continue at the same rate is questionable. They will experience the resentment of local nationalism, as the West has. They will run into mounting costs, both on the military side and in meeting the demands of their clients. They will run afoul of local conflicts between rival states and leaders, and between communists and nationalists (as recently in the Sudan). The question of Israel has been their "Open Sesame" to the Arab world, but even this key can lose its magic.

All of which leads to the conclusion that what the Western nations do in their own relations with the states of the Mediterranean and Middle East will have a great deal to do with the question of response to Soviet policy. Let us look first at the military posture that is required, and then at the political factors. In both it will be apparent that the Arab-Israel dispute is close to the heart of the problem.

THE MILITARY BALANCE

The Soviet naval buildup in the Mediterranean has aroused concern in Washington and in the councils of NATO. Successive meetings of NATO ministers since 1968 have resulted in repeated calls for vigilance, a warning to the Soviets (after the invasion of Czechoslovakia) that NATO would regard any intervention in Europe or the Mediterranean with grave concern, and a number of specific decisions: to improve the effectiveness of allied naval forces; to set up a new command for coordinated surveillance of Soviet forces; and to earmark vessels of various national forces to provide the nucleus of a NATO force which would come together for maneuvers, training, and possible combined operations. The American, British, Italian, Greek, and Turkish navies have taken part in these measures. The French have not.

What more is to be done? That depends on the purpose. The first is to maintain an adequate balance of military power. By that I mean that the Sixth Fleet should retain at least the relative position which it now has and should continuously undergo modernization; and that NATO members' forces should also make their presence count in the military equation. The idea is not to assure victory in war—the Soviet Mediterranean squadron is in the nature of a suicide force if it came to that, and a big war would by-pass the Mediterranean anyway. Talk of the danger of Western Europe being rolled up from the south seems to me alarmist.

The real questions are how to prevent adventurous Soviet moves, or a "Cuba in reverse," should they come to believe their own strength on the spot sufficient to cause us to back down in a crisis. Not that a military balance is precisely reflected in political decisions. But it is a necessary part of the background for them. It is an open Russian boast that we could not now repeat the Lebanon landing of 1958 because their fleet would be in the way. Would we be similarly blocked from military action to defend Israel? Does the presence of the Sixth Fleet prevent the Soviets from exploiting their military position in Egypt? Whatever one's conclusions on those hypothetical cases may be, there is little doubt that the presence of each force puts restraints on the other. That is not such a bad situation in so far as it reduces the chances of any big-power intervention in local affairs.

The second purpose of military policy is to give confidence to states associated with the West and substance to our commitments and to deterrence. It is here that the NATO role is important. Italy, Greece, and Turkey are members of NATO, not special wards of the United States, and they are interested in joint defense. A stronger NATO posture enables the Turks to move toward detente with Russia on their own terms and not through weakness.

The other case is the far more difficult one of Israel. Israel, to protect its own security, has become a factor not only in the local balance of power but in the big-power balance between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Thus, because of the deep Soviet involvement in Egypt, Israel faces what is a combined Egyptian-Soviet force across the Suez Canal. The United States, in its avowed policy of not permitting the balance to be tipped against Israel, continues to arm Israel as a counterforce not only to Arab armies but to the advance of Soviet power in the Middle East.

I know very well that this is seen as a clear and logical policy, necessary for American security, by many in the Congress and in the country. It seems to me rather to illustrate the dilemma in which we find ourselves. Israel's raids deep into Egypt before the cease-fire of 1970 helped to bring Soviet combat personnel into Egypt. Now the upward spiral of Soviet aid to Egypt and U.S. aid to Israel in ever more powerful and complex weapons—it avails little to argue about who started it—increases the danger that if the cease-fire does not hold, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. will draw closer to involvement even though that is a situation both want to avoid.

The other part of the dilemma is our European allies do not support the idea that Israel is a bastion of Western strength preventing the Soviets and their Arab clients from overrunning the Middle East. They support the aim of bring-

ing about a negotiated settlement between Israel and the Arab states, but are not very sanguine of our success in pulling it off unless we can get Israel to accept the principle of withdrawal from occupied territories. The French are openly following a policy of their own aimed at building their own position in the Arab world, and Britain, Germany, and Italy are definitely uneasy about a situation which seems to threaten their oil supply. The result is that in so far as they want to see Soviet power countered, they do not see miltiary support of Israel, while Israel stands at Suez, as the right way to do it. There is no possibility of the acceptance of Israel in NATO, certainly not without an Arab-Israel settlement, and probably not then.

I realize that Israel sees its very existence at stake, and that the Soviet Union is doing its best to get us to do the job of putting pressure on Israel and thus winning a political victory for the most belligerent Arabs and for the U.S.S.R. as well. President Sadat's setting of deadlines and threats to start up the war do not help the situation. But there is no Western policy in the Middle East if the United States and Israel are alone trying to hold a military position, with the possibility that American military force in the area would cease to deter and would have to be used, without support or approval from any source. The State Department's desperate efforts to get a negotiated settlement are justified in the light of that possibility. This is our traditional policy: to try to get a compromise. But how to get it when we have lost our standing with the Arabs and seem to have no real leverage with Israel?

U.S. AND WESTERN POLICIES

What, then, is indicated on the political and diplomatic side? *First*, to keep alive the goal of a settlement on the basis of the U.N. resolution of November 22, 1967, to which all concerned give lip service. It is hard to see the possible success of outside attempts to bring the parties to a compromise when they are not of a mind to take steps which made compromise possible. The Jarring mission can hardly be revived unless Israel is willing to yield on the territorial question (subject to final agreement on demilitarized zones, guarantees, and so forth, thus putting the Arabs' pledges to the test). Possibly the United States can be more persuasive than it has; possibly Israeli views will change with political change at home. But the world may have to continue to live with what it has had for over 20 years and has now, an unresolved conflict.

That brings us to the *second* point, the need to resume serious talks with the Soviet Union on the Middle East. Earlier attempts brought deception and recriminations, but it is clear that if the Arab-Israel conflict cannot be settled it has to be controlled. Only the two superpowers can do that, but they cannot be sure of doing it without some understanding of the limits of risk, and without an agreement to give priority to their common interest in containing the conflict over their separate concerns in their respective ties with the contesting parties and their fears of losing ground to each other. The Soviet leaders have shown a good deal of flexibility in modifying the cold war elsewhere and in negotiating on other outstanding issues. In the Middle East they have made gains because of the Arab-Israel conflict; consequently, they do not want an agreement which would make it disappear. But prudence in controlling the conflict would scarcely have that result.

Thirdly, and for the longer run—and here the argument comes back to the question of Western rather than American policy—Europe has not played a role commensurate with its interests in security, political relations with the Middle East, and the supply of oil. Beyond individual national policies, beyond the participation of Britain and France in four-power talks, there is a new Europe of Six, soon to be Ten, which has great actual and potential importance for all Middle Eastern and North African states, including Israel. A European presence—military (through NATO or later possibly outside it), political and economic—could help to reduce the rigidity of the direct Soviet-American competition. It could exert a greater influence on the Arab-Israel problem and help to settle or stabilize it, despite the fact that Israel now distrusts the European powers as promoters of a sell-out. And Europe could and should take on greater responsibility for what is essentially its own vital interest in oil, in which we, of course, have a supportive interest.

Such a Europe would not be a junior partner of the United States whom we called upon to share our burdens. It might cross or compete with some U.S.

interests in one way or another. The weight of its contribution to those larger aims which Europe and America share, however, would depend largely on its ability to act independently. The least the United States should do would be to refrain from blocking or undermining that assertion of independent interest. It could help give substance to our proclaimed desire to have someone else help carry the load.

Mr. HAMILTON. The subcommittee stands adjourned.

(Whereupon at 12:30 p.m., the joint subcommittee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.)

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I

BIOGRAPHIES OF WITNESSES

1. VERNON V. ASPATURIAN

Vernon V. Aspaturian, Ph.D., U.C.L.A.; Research Professor of Political Science and Director, Slavic and Soviet Language and Area Center. Specializes in international politics, comparative foreign policy and Soviet politics and foreign policy. He is the author of *The Union Republics in Soviet Diplomacy* and *The Soviet Union in the World Communist System*, and co-author of *Modern Political Systems: Europe*, and of *Foreign Policy in World Politics*. He has contributed to Martin, *Neutralization and Non-Alignment*, Kaplan, *The Revolution in World Politics*, Kassof, *Prospects for Soviet Society*, Dallin and Larson, *Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev*, Farrell, *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics*, Keep, *Contemporary History, in the Soviet Mirror*, Macridis, *Modern European Governments: Case Studies in Comparative Policy Making*. He is currently completing two additional books, *Power and Process in Soviet Foreign Policy* and *Soviet and Chinese Images of the Kennedy Administration*. His articles have appeared in the *American Political Science Review*, *Journal of Politics*, *Journal of International Affairs*, *Survey*, *Yale Review*, *Reporter*, *International Organization*, and *Current History*. He has held a Rockefeller Fellowship, consultantships with the RAND Corporation, Army War College, Planning Research Corporation, the U.S. Disarmament Agency, and the Center for Strategic Studies. He has been a Research Associate at the Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research and has held visiting appointments at Columbia, Hopkins, U.C.L.A., and a Smith-Mundt Professorship in Geneva. His book, *Process and Power in Soviet Foreign Policy*, will be published by Little, Brown in Fall, 1970.

2. L. CARL BROWN

L. Carl Brown, Garrett Professor in Foreign Affairs in the Department of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, is interested in the modern history of the Near East and North Africa, with special emphasis on the Arabic-speaking world.

After graduating from Vanderbilt University in 1950, with a B.A. degree, he attended the University of Virginia for a year and then spent another year at the London School of Economics.

He then began a six-year career with the Foreign Service, first in Beirut, Lebanon, where he spent 18 months in the American Embassy's Arabic Language and Area Training Program, and then in Khartoum, Sudan, where he served as the Embassy's economics officer.

Returning to the United States in 1958, Professor Brown attended Harvard University and in 1962 completed his Ph.D. in History and Middle Eastern Studies. From 1962 until 1966 he served at Harvard as an Assistant Professor of Middle Eastern Studies.

He joined the faculty of Princeton University as Associate Professor of Oriental Studies in 1966, and was named to the post of Director of the University's Program in Near Eastern Studies on February 1, 1969. In July of the same year he was made Chairman of the Department of Near Eastern Studies [successor, with the Department of East Asian Studies of the former Oriental Studies Department] upon the retirement of T. Cuyler Young. Brown was promoted to Professor in July 1970 and at the same time named the second incumbent of

the Garrett Professorship, originally established in 1952 in memory of Horatio W. Garrett '95 and, through later gifts, in honor also of John W. Garrett '95 and Robert Garrett '97.

Brown is co-author, with Charles A. Micaud and Clement H. Moore, of *Tunisia: The Politics of Modernization* (1964), is editor of *State and Society in Independent North Africa* (Middle East Institute, 1966), and is translator (with commentary) of *The Surest Path—The Political Treatise of a 19th Century Muslim Statesman* (1967). He is a member of the African Studies Association, the Middle East Institute, the Middle East Studies Association, and he belongs to Phi Beta Kappa. In 1970 he was named a member of the Middle Eastern Civilization Visiting Committee at Harvard.

A native of Mayfield, Ky., where he was born April 22, 1928, Brown is the son of Mrs. Gwendolyn T. Brown, of Mayfield, and the late Leon Carl Brown. He was married in 1953 to the former Anne Winchester Stokes, also of Mayfield. The Browns have three children, Elizabeth B. (February 12, 1958), Joseph W. (April 30, 1959), and Jefferson T. (May 23, 1962).

Professor Brown is a veteran of 18 months service with the U.S. Air Force during 1946–47.

3. JOHN C. CAMPBELL

A native of New York City, Dr. Campbell graduated with an A.B. summa cum laude, from Harvard College in 1933. From Harvard University he received his A.M. in 1936 and Ph.D. in 1940.

Dr. Campbell has pursued a distinguished career in teaching, government service and writing. He has taught at Harvard, Columbia and the University of Louisville and has delivered regular or occasional lectures at the Foreign Service Institute, the National War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Yale, Princeton, Michigan, and many other colleges and universities.

Between 1942 and 1968 he served in a number of capacities with the Department of State, including assignments as Deputy Director, Office of East Asian Affairs, 1952, and member of the Policy Planning Council in 1967–68. He has served on the Council on Foreign Relations at various times between 1941 and the present.

His publications on the Middle East, Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and South America are legion. Best known in the field of Middle East studies is his "Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy". (Revised edition 1960) His article "The Arab-Israeli Conflict: An American Policy" appeared in the October 1970 issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Dr. Campbell is a member of the Board of Governors of the Middle East Institute.

4. RICHARD T. DAVIES

Mr. Davies was born in Brooklyn, New York, May 28, 1920. He was educated at Columbia University, receiving an A.B. in 1942. While serving in the United States Army (1942–45), he took Advanced German Area and Language Training at Ohio State University (1943–44) and served in Military Government in Germany (1944–45).

Following his Army service, Mr. Davies was employed as a Plant Correspondent with General Motors Overseas Operations (1946). He was later an instructor in German at the Brooklyn Polytechnic Institute (1946–47).

A career Foreign Service Officer since 1947, Mr. Davies has spent 16 of his 23 years in the Foreign Service working in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and in positions in Washington and Paris dealing with Soviet and Eastern European affairs. He served as political officer at Warsaw (1947–49) and Moscow (1951–53 and 1961–63) and on the International Staff of NATO in Paris (1953–55), and as Public Affairs Adviser in the Offices of Eastern European Affairs (1958–59) and Soviet Union Affairs (1959–61) in the Department of State. Before his first assignment to Moscow, Mr. Davies studied the Russian language and received Soviet area training at the Foreign Service Institute, Middlebury College, and Columbia University (1950–51). In 1963, following his second assignment to Moscow as Political Counselor, Mr. Davies was detailed to the Senior Seminar in Foreign Policy at the Foreign Service Institute. In 1964, he served as Deputy Executive Secretary of the Executive Secretariat in the Department. From 1965 to 1968, Mr. Davies was Assistant Director for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the United States Information Agency, which conferred its Superior Honor Award on him in 1968.

Mr. Davies also served as political officer at the American Embassy in Kabul from 1955 to 1958. His most recent assignment overseas was as Consul General in Calcutta (1968–69). He returned to Washington in August 1969 to become a Member of the State Department's newly formed Planning and Coordination Staff, with responsibility for United States relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Mr. Davies assumed his present duties as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affair in August 1970.

Mr. Davies is the author of "The Fate of Polish Socialism," in Philip E. Mosely, editor, *The Soviet Union, 1922–62* (1963), and "The American Commitment to Public Propaganda," in Clark C. Havighurst, editor, *International Control of Propaganda* (1967).

5. HERBERT S. DINERSTEIN

Education:

Born in New York City on March 3, 1919. Attended New York City Public schools. B.A. with Special Honors in the Social Sciences, The City College of the City of New York, 1939. Phi Beta Kappa, M.A. in History, Harvard, 1940. Ph.D. in History, Harvard, 1943.

Employment:

Soviet Regional Analyst, Office of War Information, Washington, D.C.

Instructor in History, New York University, Washington Square, New York City, 1945–46.

Social Science Research Council Demobilization Award, 1946–47.

Assistant Professor of History, Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, New Jersey, 1947–50.

Consultant: The RAND Corporation, 1948–50. Assigned to the project: Studies in Soviet Culture, directed by Dr. Margaret Mead.

Staff member and Head of Soviet Section RAND Corporation, (Santa Monica and Washington, D.C.) 1950–66.

Visiting Professor 1958–59 (on leave from RAND) at Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationales of the University of Geneva, Switzerland.

Taught courses at the University of California at Los Angeles, 1961, 1962, 1965.

Presently.—Professor, The School of Advanced International Studies, the Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., and Associate of The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, 1740 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Publications:

Communism and the Russian Peasant and with Leon Goure, *Moscow in Crisis*, Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1955.

War and the Soviet Union, Frederick Praeger, New York, 1959, British edition, 1959, German edition, 1960.

Soviet Military Strategy with Leon Goure and Thomas W. Wolfe, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1963.

Intervention Against Communism, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1967.

Fifty Years of Soviet Foreign Policy, The Johns Hopkins Press, June 1968.

"The Soviet Outlook" in *America and the World*, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970.

"The Sino-Soviet Conflict" in *International Conflict in the Nuclear Age*, Winthrop Publishers, 1970.

Magazine articles.

6. ROMAN KOLKOWICZ

Born 1929, US citizen, married, three children.

Education.—M.A. and Ph.D. received at the University of Chicago.

Professional activities.—Professor of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles; senior staff member, Institute for Defense Analyses, 1966–70; visiting professor, George Washington University, University of Virginia, CUNY; research staff member, The Rand Corp., 1961–66.

Areas of specialization.—Comparative politics; international relations; Soviet foreign and strategic policy.

Publications.—*The Soviet Military and the Communist Party*, Princeton University Press, 1967; *The Soviet Union and Arms Control*, Johns Hopkins Press, 1970 (editor, co-author); contributed to five volumes on Soviet affairs; also pub-

lished in *World Politics, Orbis, Comparative Politics, Aussenpolitik, Osteuropa, Survey, Problems of Communism, Interplay,* etc.

Related activities.—Delivered papers, lectures at international conferences at Evian, France; West Berlin; Moscow; Garmisch-Partenkirchen-Washington; Tel-Aviv. Also at Harvard, Columbia, War College, Pennsylvania, etc.

7. DAVID S. LANDES

Born: April 29, 1924, New York City.

Townsend Harris High School (New York); City College of New York, A.B., 1942; Harvard University, A.M., 1943, Ph.D. 1953.

Junior Fellow of the Society of Fellows, Harvard University, 1950–53; Assistant Professor of Economics, Columbia University, 1952–55; Associate Professor of Economics, Columbia University, 1955–58; Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the behavioral Sciences, Stanford, 1957–58; Professor of History and Economics, University of California, Berkeley, 1958–64; Professor of History, Harvard University, 1964–. Served Army of the U.S.A. 1943–46, to rank of First Lieutenant, Signal Corps.

Publications.—Bankers and Pashas: International Finance and Economic Imperialism in Egypt (Heinemann and Harvard, 1958); *The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present* (Cambridge University Press, 1968); "Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe, 1750–1914," in *Cambridge Economic History*, Vol. VI (Cambridge University Press, 1965); Editor, *The Rise of Capitalism* (Macmillan, 1965); Co-editor, *History as Social Science* (Prentice-Hall, 1971); "Japan and Europe: Contrasts in Industrialization," in William Lockwood, ed., *The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan: Essays in the Political Economy of Growth*, 93–182. Articles and reviews in the *Journal of Economic History, Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, and other journals.

Trustee, Economic History Association; President, Council on Research in Economic History, 1963–66; Director, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, 1966–68. Board of Editors, *Kyklos, Journal of Economic History.*

Fellow, Royal Historical Society (Great Britain), Member AHA, American Economic Association, Society for French Historical Studies, Société d'Histoire Moderne; and other professional societies.

Harvard Club of New York City, Harvard Club, Boston.

Phi Beta Kappa.

Fellow, American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

Ellen McArthur lecturer, The University of Cambridge, 1964.

Overseas Fellow, Churchill College, University of Cambridge, 1968–69.

Membre associé, Foundation Rayaumont pour le Progrés des Sciences de l'Homme.

Current work: A History of the Bleichröder bank (Berlin); Social Consequences of Industrialization in Western Europe.

Further biographical data in *Who's Who in America;* and in *American Men of Science: The Social and Behavioral Sciences* (9th edition).

Married to Sonia Tarnopol, graduate of George Washington University and Boston University.

Three children.

8. WALTER LAQUEUR

Born Breslau, Germany, 1921. 1938–1939—Student, Hebrew University, Jerusalem; 1939–1943—Agricultural Labourer; 1944–1953—Political journalist; 1955–1967—Founder and Editor of *Survey* (in London). Research in Russian and Central European history and Middle Eastern affairs; 1958—Visiting Professor, Johns Hopkins University; 1959, Visiting Professor, University of Chicago. Research Fellow, Harvard University, Russian & Middle East Center; 1962—Fellow S.C.R., St. Antony's College, Oxford; 1964—Director, Institute of Contemporary History (Wiener Library), and University Professor, University of Reading; 1966—Founder and co-editor of Journal of Contemporary History; 1967—Associate, Harvard Russian Research Center; 1967—Professor, History of Ideas and Politics (with full tenure), Brandeis University 1969—Recipient, Distinguished Writers Award, Georgetown University; 1971—Associate Counselor, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University.

Fellowships.—1958, Rockefeller Fellowship; 1962, Rockefeller Fellowship; 1966, Ford Fellowship.

Author.—Out of the Ruins of Europe, 1971; Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East, 1956; The Soviet Union and the Middle East, 1959; The Road to War, 1967; The Struggle for the Middle East, 1969; Europe since Hitler, 1970; Young Germany, 1961; Russia and Germany, 1964; The Fate of the Revolution, 1966; The Road to Jerusalem, 1957.

Edited.—The Middle East in Transition, 1958; The Israel-Arab Reader, 1969; The State of Soviet Studies, 1965; Dictionary of Contemporary History, 1970; (with G. Mosse): International Fascism: The Leftwing Intellectuals between the Wars; Literature and History; '1914'; and other volumes of the *Journal of Contemporary History* in the Harpers *Torchbook* series (also in Italian and German translations); (with L. Labedz): Polycentrism (New York, 1962); (with G. Lichtheim): The Soviet Cultural Scene (London), 1957.

9. JOHN H. LICHTBLAU

Office, 60 East 42d Street, New York, N.Y. 10017; Tel: TN 7-0052.

Education.—B.A., City College of New York, 1949; M.A. Economics, New York University 1951.

Current positions.—Executive director, Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, Inc., 60 East 42d Street, New York, 10017; market research consultant, National Oil Fuel Institute (NOFI); consultant on petroleum economics, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Washington, D.C.

Previous positions.—Petroleum economist, Walter J. Levy, Inc. (1954–55); economic analyst, National Industrial Conference Board (1953); economic analyst, U.S. Department of Labor (1951–53).

Author of books and monographs on oil imports, oil depletion, energy policy, oil taxation, etc.

Articles on oil and energy problems in Reporter Magazine, New York Times, Journal of Commerce, Financial Times (London), World Petroleum, Journal of Petroleum Technology, Oil Daily, Middle East Journal, Oil & Gas Journal.

Delivered papers on petroleum economics at:

University of Louisville, World Trade Conference; American University, Energy Institute; American Institute of Mining and Metalurgical Engineers; University of London, School of Economics; Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C.; New York Society of Security Analysts; Northwestern University, Annual Conference on Petroleum Economics; Rocky Mountain Institute on Petroleum Economics; Economic Seminar, Venezuelan Management Association, Caracas; Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Affairs.

Taught Course, "Economics and Politics of Energy" at New School for Social Research, New York, N.Y. (1961–62).

Attended Brookings Institution Conference of Experts on Oil and Gas Taxation (1962) and UN Seminar on Latin American Petroleum Policies, Santiago, Chile, (1967).

Testified on subject of petroleum imports before Congressional Committees, Government Departments and Regulatory Agencies.

Member National Petroleum Council.

10. JACK F. MATLOCK, JR.

Born North Carolina October 1, 1929. Married. Duke University, AB 1950; Columbia Univ., MA 1952; Private experience—translator-editor for magazine, 1952–53; Instructor of Russian, Dartmouth College, 1953–54, 55–56; joined State Dept. 1956; Consular Officer, Vienna, August 1958; Oberammergau, Russian language area studies August 1960; Political Officer, Moscow, October 1961; Accra, Sept. 1963; Principal Officer, Zanzibar, April 1967; DCM Dar es Salaam, Sept. 1969; Dept. det. Sr. Seminar in Foreign Policy August 1970; FSO–2, March 1969. Country Director for Soviet Union Affairs, June 1971. Languages: French, German, Russian.

11. RICHARD PIPES

Born. 1923, Cieszyn, Poland; 1940, came to the United States; 1943, naturalized; 1943–46, served with the Army of the United States.

Education.—Middle schools in Poland, 1945, Cornell University, A.B.; 1950, Harvard University, Ph.D.

Professional positions.—1950—, Harvard faculty member; 1963—, professor of History; 1962–64, associate director; 1968, director, Russian Research Center; 1956, visiting assistant professor of history, University of California at Berkeley; member Joint Committee Slavic Studies, American Council Learned Societies.

Affiliations.—1956, 65, Guggenheim Fellow; 1961, Rockefeller Fellow; 1965, Fellow, American Council Learned Societies; Fellow, American Academy Arts and Sciences.

Publications.—1954, *Formation of the Soviet Union;* 1964, Revised edition; 1959, *Karamzin's Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia;* 1963, *Social Democracy and the St. Petersburg Labor Movement, 1885–1897;* 1969, *Europe Since 1815;* 1970, *Struve: Liberal on the Left, 1870–1905;* 1961, *editor, Russian Intelligentsia;* 1966, editor, Giles Fletcher, *Of the Russe Commonwealth;* 1968, editor, *Revolutionary Russia.*

12. EUGENE VICTOR ROSTOW

Personal.—Born August 25, 1913, in New York, N.Y.; son of Victor A. and Lillian (Helman) Rostow; married Edna B. Greenberg; children: Victor, Jessica, Nicholas. Education. Yale University, A.B., 1933, LL.B., 1937, M.A., 1944; King's College, Cambridge University, graduate study, 1933–34. Politics: Democrat. Religion: Jewish. Home: 208 St. Roman St., New Haven, Conn.; (summer) Peru, Vt. 05152; Office: Yale Law School, New Haven, Conn.

Career.—Admitted to New York State Bar, 1937; Cravath, Swaine & Moore (law firm), New York, N.Y., attorney, 1937–38; Yale University Law School, New Haven, Conn., assistant professor, 1938–41, associate professor, 1941–44, professor of law, 1944—, dean 1955–1965. Visiting professor, University of Chicago, 1941; Pitt Professor of American History and Institutions, and Fellow of King's College, Cambridge University, 1959–60; Eastman Visiting Professor, and Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford University, 1970–71. Adviser, U.S. Department of State, 1942–44, 1961–65, Sterling Professor of Law and Public Affairs, 1965—; Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, 1966–69; assistant to executive secretary,. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Geneva, Switzerland, 1949–50. William W. Cook lecturer, Mich. University, 1958; John R. Coen lectr., U. Colo., 1961; Leary lectr., U. Utah, 1965, Brandeis lectr. Brandeis University, 1965. Rosenthal lectr. Northwestern Univ., 1965; atty. gen'ls nat. com. study Antitrust Laws, 1954–55. Mem. Advisory council of the Peace Corps, 1961; consultant to undersecretary of state, 1961-66, Trustee Walter Meyer Inst. Legal Research, 1958–65. Member, Judicial Council of Connecticut, 1955–65. Member: American Law Institute, American Academy of Arts and Sciences (fellow), Phi Beta Kappa, Alpha Delta Phi, Century Association (New York), Elizabethan Club (Yale), Yale Club (New York). Awards, honors: Guggenheim fellowship for study of American antitrust laws, 1959–60; M.A., 1959, LL.D., Cambridge University, 1962; Chevalier of Legion of Honor (France), 1960; Grand Commander, Order of the Crown (Belgium), 1969.

Writings.—(Editor with J. Douglass Poteat) The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Chicago Foundation Press, 1940; (editor) The Recession of 1937–38, University of Debtors' Estates, 4th edition, West Publishing, 1949; Planning for Freedom Press, 1948; (editor) Wesley Sturges, Cases and Other Materials on the Law of Debtors, Estates, 4th edition, West Publishing, 1949; Planning for Freedom, Yale University Press, 1959; The Sovereign Prerogative, Yale University Press, 1962; Law, Power, and the Pursuit of Peace (University of Nebraska Press and Harper & Row, 1968); Final Report, President's Task Force on National Communications Policy (E. V. Rostow, Chairman) (1968); Is Law Dead? (E. V. Rostow, editor, 1971); Nemesis, Reflections on Peace as a Problem of Law (in press).

APPENDIX II

SOVIET MIDDLE EAST POLICY: ORIGINS AND PROSPECTS

(By Arnold L. Horelick,* The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif.)

The high profile, deep involvement, and heavy commitment of the Soviet Union in the Middle East is unquestionable. Measured by almost any standard, the Arab Middle East is the non-Communist region with which the Soviet Union is most deeply involved. But there is real uncertainty about where Soviet policy in the area is headed, particularly with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict: How deep is the Soviet military commitment to the UAR? Now that Soviet military forces are operationally deployed, will they engage the Israelis if fighting resumes? Under what conditions? For what purposes? What risk of confrontation with the United States does Moscow think it is running? What are the constraints and limits on Soviet policy?

The events of the past year have raised these questions in particularly acute form, but any examination must start with an effort to comprehend the forces that drive Soviet policy in the Middle East, the basic factors and considerations that govern it. What are the wellsprings of Soviet policy, and how did the USSR get where it is today in the Middle East?

Let me say at the outset where I come out on this and offer the bare bones of the argument. Soviet policy in the Middle East is a classic example of opportunistic adaptation to events in an unusually fluid policy environment. The evolution of Soviet policy in the Middle East has been largely derivate arising out of pursuit of more highly valued extra-regional objectives, and reactive, or improvised, in response to opportunities that came up as a result of events over which the Soviet Union had little control, or as the unintended consequence of actions undertaken for other purposes. Some would argue that all foreign policies evolve in that manner. To those I would say, yes, but rarely more so than in the Soviet Union's Middle East policy. If this implies disagreement with those who emphasize the historical continuity of Soviet policy and harp on the age-old Russian imperial drive to warm-water ports in the south, that is what is intended.

EARLY SOVIET POLICY

Few, if any, observers of the post-World War II scene could have foreseen the pace and scope of the USSR's penetration of the Arab Middle East during the past decade and a half. To Stalin and his associates this must have seemed a most improbably susceptible and only marginally interesting target area. The Arab world, it must be emphasized, was never a high-priority region for Soviet foreign policy until the mid-1950s. Soviet Middle Eastern policy had always been fixed on the contiguous non-Arab Moslem states of Turkey and Iran. In this preoccupation, the Bolsheviks were in accord with the traditions of Tsarist foreign policy. For Tsarist Russia, the "Eastern Question" revolved around the fate of Constantinople and the Turkish Straits and the disposition of the Balkan territories of the crumbling Ottoman Empire. The Sultan's Arab domains aroused Russian interest intermittently, but only in response to opportunities for exploiting them to threaten Constantinople from the rear (e.g., the episode of Catherine's extension of military assistance to Egypt). Imperial Russia's primary ob-

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*Any views expressed in this Paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors. Papers are reprduced by The RAND Corporation as a courtesy to members of its staff.

The present Paper is the edited transcript of a talk given by the author on November 21, 1970 at a conference on Soviet Policy in the Near and Middle East at Airlie House, Warrenton, Virginia. The paper draws heavily on material published earlier in A. S. Becker and A. L. Horelick, *Soviet Policy in the Middle East*, The RAND Corporation, R–504–FF, September 1970.

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jective in seeking to control the Turkish Straits was not so much to challenge the West's naval monopoly in the Mediterranean as to prevent or limit the passage of Western men-of-war from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea.

The October Revolution temporarily changed the thrust of traditional Russian Middle East policy, but not its geographical locus. Abandoning territorial and commercial claims against its southern neighbors, the new Soviet Republic moved to cultivate good state-to-state relations with Turkey and Persia, at least to neutralize them and prevent them from falling into the camp of the British, whom the Soviets continued, until after World War II, to regard as their principal opponent to the south. It was this same anti-British impulse that led to the Bolsheviks to sound the call for a general uprising throughout the Arab world, divided as it was by a variety of dependency devices between the British and the French. But the call had little effect. The Soviet Union was physically denied entreé to that part of the world during the inter-war years and the small illegal CP's in the area, composed largely of minoritarian members and operating on the basis of incredibly inept Comintern directives, remained narrowly sectarian in outlook and failed to establish vital relationships with the rising forces of Arab nationalism.

It may be asked whether this prolonged Soviet quiescence in the Arab world signified low interest or merely lack of opportunity. In foreign policy matters, interest and opportunity are too interdependent to permit a definitive answer. Without interest, opportunity will neither be perceived nor seized; interest too long denied a chance for advancement will eventually fade. This much can be said, however: Neither ideological preconceptions, cultural affinity, historical inertia, or strategic calculations impelled the Soviet Union to search for opportunities for penetrating the Arab Middle East. At the same time, the Soviet Union's lack of physical access to the Arab world and the weakness of the Communist movement there acted as barriers to the stimulation of strong interest in Arab affairs in the Politburo.

There was one brief but fateful exception to this general rule of low Soviet political profile in the area: the Soviet Union's active support for the partition of Palestine and the creation of the State of Israel, 1947–1948. Moscow's sudden departure from Bolshevism's traditional hostility to Zionism in 1947–1948 was no shortsighted blunder soon corrected by the Soviet leaders, nor was it a Machiavellian ploy that worked out with brilliant success. In voting for partition, recognizing Israel, and facilitating the shipment of arms from Eastern Europe to defend the new state, the Soviet Union was not provoking the anger of tens of millions of Arabs merely to gain the goodwill of 600,000 Palestine Jews; but neither were the Soviet leaders so clairvoyant as to foresee the incredible chain of events that would eventually make Soviet clients of Israel's bitterest enemies. The USSR's Palestine policy in 1947–1948 was governed by the same objective that had guided it since the creation of the mandate system: the quickest possible expulsion of the British, whom early Bolsheviks regarded as the wily and powerful leaders of the international anti-Soviet camp (a role not unlike that attributed to it during the nineteenth century by the Tsar's ministers).

By 1947, the militant, disciplined, and highly organized Jews of Palestine had proven to be the only effective anti-British force in the country. With Britain about to withdraw, partition seemed the best alternative to ward off a UN-sponsored trusteeship plan that would doubtless have been administered by Western military forces.

Still, I think Soviet willingness to incur the wrath of the Arab world in 1947–1948 shows how little impressed Moscow was then with the anti-imperialist potential of Arab nationalism. But then the USSR showed little enthusiasm for any of the non-Communist Afro-Asian national liberation movements in the early postwar years, and was particularly suspicious of those that achieved statehood by peaceful means. By the early 1950s it was clear that the undifferentiated "imperialist lackey" model of the new nations no longer served Soviet purposes. The determination of developing nations, such as India and Burma, to pursue independent, neutralist and passionately anti-imperialist (hence potentially anti-Western) foreign policies could no longer simply be ignored, even if Soviet ideologists could not yet satisfactorily explain it. There was a real danger of foreclosing important foreign policy options for the USSR and permitting the budding neutralists to fall into the Western camp by default. Stalin's death speeded up the reorientation of Soviet policy toward the Third World, but the absence of an authoritative single leader and the stubborn opposition of influential

surviving members of the Old Guard prevented a sudden radical reorientation. The doctrinal underpinnings for the new policy were not built until the XX CPSU Congress in February 1956.

OPENING TO THE ARAB WORLD

But the real Soviet breakthrough in the Arab Middle East had already occurred the year before. More decisive than the ongoing process of ideological revision in Moscow was the new threat and the simultaneous opportunity for undermining it that was suddenly created by formation of the Baghdad Pact. The price paid by the West for the dubious advantage of bringing a single Arab state, Iraq, into its alliance system proved exorbitant. Formation of the Baghdad Pact created a community of interests between Egypt and the Soviet Union where none had existed before and set the stage for the USSR's dramatic breakthrough into the Arab Middle East.

Moscow's predictable ire had presumably been discounted by the signatory governments, but the Baghdad Pact's searing impact on the Arab world had not been so clearly foreseen. It polarized the states of the region between Iraq and Egypt, which assumed leadership of anti-Baghdad Arab nationalist forces, and it catapulted Nasser into world prominence as leader of anti-Western Arab nationalism. Nasser now shared with the Soviet Union a set of common objectives: to prevent other Arab states from joining the Baghdad Pact; to undermine Iraq's position as potential leader of a pro-Western group of Arab states; and to eliminate remaining Western military footholds in the Arab world.

Arms from the Soviet Bloc, in unprecedented volume, not only provided Nasser with a means to circumvent Western limitations on arms deliveries without having to align himself with the West as Iraq had done; it also provided Egypt with what must have seemed excellent prospects for overcoming Israeli military superiority, again demonstrated in February 1955 by a large Israeli raid on Egyptian positions in the Gaza Strip.

For the Soviets, on the other hand, the effect of their arms deliveries to Egypt on the Arab-Israel regional military balance was a marginal consideration, perhaps even slightly embarrassing; Communist spokesmen carefully avoided connecting the arms deal with the Arab-Israel conflict, representing it exclusively as "a commercial arrangement" intended to strengthen Egypt's independence of the West. Soviet relations with Israel had long since soured and the USSR in 1954 had begun to vote occasionally on the Arab side at the UN, but Moscow denied that the arms deal had anything to do with the Arab-Israel dispute. Moscow considered the possibility of sabotaging the Baghdad Pact more than enough reason for making the arms deal. The Soviet leaders hoped that Egypt's rejection of alliance with the West would prove contagious. If "reactionary" Arab monarchs should fall in the process, so much the better, but at this stage it was Nasser's anti-Westernism rather than the internal character of his regime that Moscow wished other Arab states to emulate. Soviet observers perceived no "socialist" tendencies in the pre-1956 Nasser regime. At best the revolution Nasser claimed to be leading could qualify in Soviet eyes as "anti-feudal" (agrarian reformist); it was expected that Egypt would rely on private capital for its industrialization and would follow an essentially capitalist path of development.

Khrushchev and his colleagues could hardly have expected that provision of Soviet Bloc arms to Egypt would make of Nasser an ally or even a steady client. They could not yet have had much confidence in Nasser's reliability; the West was still actively courting him, particularly with the Aswan High Dam offer. Nor was Soviet strategic power great enough to lend effective support to a distant ally who might come under armed attack, and who could not readily be disciplined to avert military confrontations. Locally, the Soviet Union had no military presence at all, lacking both reliable access to the region and instruments for projecting its military power.

It would be a mistake to infer from the prominent role that the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron came to play in the USSR's Middle Eastern policy a decade later that the 1955 "breakthrough" reflected revived Soviet aspirations in the Mediterranean. On the contrary, only the year before, Soviet naval policy had entered a decidedly anti-high seas phase, from which it did not change until the next decade. Precisely when the USSR was activating its Middle Eastern policy, Khrushchev dismissed Navy Minister Admiral Kuznetsov, a long-time proponent of a large blue-water Soviet fleet (including aircraft carriers and overseas naval

bases), and announced his intention to scrap virtually the entire Soviet cruiser force, downgrade surface ships, and concentrate naval investment on submarines. Achievement of the Soviet Union's limited "spoiling" objective in the Middle East did not require an actual Soviet military presence in the area; moreover, given the great disparity between U.S. and Soviet forces globally as well as regionally, a Soviet effort to establish a Middle East military foothold in the 1950s would probably have been rejected as "adventurist" as well as unnecessary.

SUEZ AND ITS AFTERMATH

The year that followed Nasser's announcement of the arms deal in September 1955 was crucial for the evolution of Soviet policy. The Suez crisis transformed the politics of the Middle East in ways that neither the Russians nor the Egyptians could have foreseen, opening broad new fields of action in the region for both. The Soviet leaders displayed for the first time during that period what have since emerged as recurrent traits of Soviet Middle East crisis behavior. Moscow's decision to provide arms to Nasser had deeply exacerbated Egypt's relations with the West and had helped to escalate the Arab-Israeli conflict as well. The first of these developments suited Moscow's interests, and the second was compatible with them, provided actual hostilities that might wipe out the center of Arab anti-Westernism could be averted. Once the catalytic effects of the arms deal began to make themselves felt, however, Moscow's control over events, including the behavior of its new friend, proved to be limited.

Bulganin was probably telling the truth when he wrote to Anthony Eden and Guy Mollet that "we learned about the nationalization of the Canal only from the radio." But if Moscow was not consulted or even informed in advance about the Suez nationalization, the Soviet leaders nonetheless enthusiastically endorsed the Egyptian President's provocative act of defiance and opposed all efforts to defuse the crisis by creating an international regime for the management of the Canal. The Soviet Union egged Nasser on, warned the British and French against using force to impose their will, and failed to take any initiative to avert a military conflict even when war clouds gathered ominously over the Mediterranean in mid-October.

When it became clear that the United States would insist upon British, French, and Israeli withdrawal, the Soviet leaders warned Israel that its very existence was threatened by participation in the attack on Egypt and even issued vague hints of a Soviet rocket attack against Britain and France. While these Soviet threats—Moscow's first tentative exercise in ballistic blackmail—evidently did not play a decisive role in the decision of the Western powers to liquidate the enterprise, they did gain for the Soviet Union politically valuable credit in the Arab world for achieving that outcome. These threats, though essentially empty, probably seemed reinforced by bold Soviet words during the 1957 and 1958 "crises" in Syria and Iraq and may also have aroused mistaken expectations in some Arab quarters about Soviet willingness to use force on behalf of Arab clients.

Instead of toppling Nasser and wiping out Russia's newly acquired foothold, the ill-fated Anglo-French-Israeli adventure at Suez enhanced still further the rising prestige of the Egyptian President and his Soviet supporters who took credit for securing the withdrawal. It succeeded only in turning the retraction of British power and influence from the Eastern Mediterranean into a headlong rout. Britain's expulsion, completed two years later by the overthrow of the Hashemites and Nuri as Said in Baghdad, left the Soviet Union face to face in the Middle East with the United States, which moved quickly to replace Great Britain as guardian of Western interests in the area.

The Suez War also increased the salience of the Arab-Israeli conflict, both in the local politics of the region and in Soviet Middle Eastern policy. After Suez the Soviet leader no longer had to pretend that their military support of Egypt and of other Arab states which they began to supply was unrelated to the Arab-Israel dispute. On the contrary, that festering conflict became the centerpiece of Soviet policy, which increasingly linked it with the broader struggle between "imperialism" (headed by the United States, which used Israel as its tool) and the "Arab national liberation movement" (headed by the Soviet-supported "progressive" Arab regimes).

During the two years that were bracketed by the Suez War of 1956 and the Baghdad coup of 1958, the limited objectives that had originally brought the

Soviet Union into the Arab Middle East were essentially realized. Not only was the West's attempt to incorporate the Arab states of the Eastern Mediterranean into an anti-Soviet military alliance paralyzed, but the original Baghdad Pact system was itself crippled by the defection of Iraq.

With the disintegration of the Baghdad Pact system, the Soviet Union ceased to regard its position in the Arab Middle East exclusively in instrumental terms as contributing to the realization of essentially extra-regional strategic goals; Moscow began to concern itself more directly with political objectives in the Middle East *per se*. For several years the Soviet leaders had evidently been prepared to trade their new position of special advantage as arms supplier to Egypt and Syria for Western agreement to desist from efforts to organize an anti-Soviet bloc in the Middle East. After the 1958 Iraq coup the Soviet leaders no longer advanced such proposals, evidently believing they now had more to gain from supplying arms to the radical Arab states than from curtailing U.S. military ties with the "Northern Tier" states, ties which were weakening in any case. By the end of the 1950s it was also already clear that the imminent advent of intercontinental missiles would greatly reduce the strategic significance of the Middle East in the overall U.S.-Soviet military balance.

Once Moscow determined that its presence in the Middle East was to be more than a transient, extra-regionally driven one, longer-term Soviet policy tied itself to exploiting the two central conflicts that were polarizing the political/military forces of the region. First, the inter-Arab struggle, initially within the ranks of the anti-Western states of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, but later chiefly between the radical Arab states and the Western-oriented conservative or traditional states, including the oil-rich Gulf states; and second, the Arab-Israel conflict, which, on the Arab side, had greatest salience for Egypt and Syria, the USSR's chief clients, and Jordan, an American protegé.

With respect to the first conflict—the one with the highest potential pay-off for the Soviet Union—Soviet policy found itself seriously hampered by chronic disputes among radical Arab clients, conflicts that compelled Moscow to make painful choices between disputants, and that weakened the effectiveness of the radical nationalist effort to subvert traditionalist pro-Western regimes elsewhere in the Middle East. Moreover, Nasser's refusal to reach a *modus vivendi* with his own Communists was a continuing source of embarrassment to the Soviet Union, particularly after 1960 when pressure against Moscow from leftist forces inside the world Communist movement began to grow. But while Khrushchev went so far as to make public criticisms of Nasser's harsh treatment of Communists in the UAR and showered favors on Kassem in Iraq, the USSR was careful not to permit state-to-state relations with Cairo to deteriorate. Substantial financial and technical assistance for Egypt's economic development continued despite tensions during 1959–1961. Moscow seems to have made a clear determination that Egypt was indeed the pivotal state for Soviet policy in the region and stuck doggedly to that decision.

Events soon proved the wisdom of Soviet restraint in dealing with Nasser during the tense years of their relationship. The alternatives, both Syrian and Iraqi, turned sour. Moreover, the Soviet view of Nasser improved considerably. By 1964, before Khrushchev's ouster, a *modus vivendi* between Nasser and his Communists was worked out and Egypt's internal course after 1961 took a progressively more leftist course, with wholesale expropriation and nationalization creating a large public sector in the economy.

THE SIX-DAY WAR

The June 1967 War was the third major turning point in the evolution of Soviet Middle East policy. It has already had profound effects on the depth of Soviet involvement, the scope of Soviet policy, and on the balance in Soviet political deliberations between regional and global factors. It set in motion a train of events and created a new set of circumstances that have placed Soviet policy on a new plane, with new branch points of decision which could have fateful consequences for the future of the region as well as for broader global questions involving U.S.-Soviet relations.

The conduct of the Soviet leaders in the pre-crisis period, during the war and its immediate aftermath have been variously interpreted: (1) Some observers concluded that the Soviet Union had deliberately encouraged a rise in tension, willingly accepting its war-provoking potential; (2) to others, the same behavior

suggested not so much (mis)calculated deliberation as gross irresponsibility, reflecting a radical underestimation of the volatile forces at work in the crisis. There is something to both of these perceptions.

The events of 1967 are still close enough to us in time so that the evidence bearing on the Soviet Union's role is probably still fairly fresh in your minds: Moscow's warnings to Egypt about an impending Israeli attack on Syria; public Soviet approval of the dispatch of Egyptian troops and armor into the Sinai and the USSR's endorsement of Nasser's demand for the removal of UNEF forces from Egyptian territory, though not for the blockade of the Tiran Straits; Moscow's obstructionist tactics in the UN against efforts to lift the blockade of the Tiran Straits through negotiations; and her failure to correct publicly or privately Egyption interpretations of Soviet promises of support that went far beyond anything that Moscow had theretofore asserted or subsequently stated it was prepared to endorse at the time. This evidence permits a range of interpretations regarding the extent of Soviet instigation and leaves unclear the point at which events slipped beyond Moscow's ability to influence them decisively. Certainly, however, Soviet miscalculations contributed in no small measure to the outbreak of the June 1967 War.

Soviet decisionmakers seriously underestimated the volatility of the festering Arab-Israel conflict. They displayed a poor understanding of the built-in escalatory pressures operating on the leaderships of both sides. Just as Moscow failed to appreciate before the May 1967 crisis how provocative Syrian-based terrorist activities were to Israel, the Soviet leaders overestimated the Israeli Government's willingness or ability to tolerate indefinitely the blockade of Eilat and the Egyptian mobilization in the Sinai. This may have reflected the Soviet leaders' underestimation of Israel's capacity for independent action. Moscow's strategy of promoting radical Arab unity on a militantly anti-Israel basis revealed a startling ignorance of the powerful association in the Arab national consciousness between unity and revenge against Israel. Finally, the Soviets evidently miscalculated the regional military balance, assuming considerably greater military capacities for their clients than they were to demonstrate.

Once Israel struck, the Soviet Union made clear by its reactions the rank order of its priority objectives in the Middle East at that time. Moscow's immediate resort to the hot line dramatically demonstrated its overarching interest in avoiding a military confrontation with the United States. For the USSR's clients, this meant there could be no direct Soviet intervention to prevent a calamious rout at Israel's hands.

Faced with one of the great debacles of its foreign policy, the Soviet Union might conceivably have chosen after June to disengage itself from the radical Arab cause, gradually if not all at once. Perhaps such an alternative was considered in Moscow in the aftermath of the June War; there is some evidence of division in the leadership at that time. If so, a decision was nonetheless taken quickly to keep all options open on the Arab side by instituting massive arms deliveries and extending full diplomatic and political support. This decision hardened into Soviet policy in the months and years that followed.

Nothing demonstrates more vividly than the evolving pattern of diplomacy with respect to the Middle East crisis—beginning with the UN debates, Kosygin's meeting with President Johnson at Glassboro, and later the Four Power and especially the Two Power consultations—how firmly established the Soviet Union has become since June 1967, despite the humiliating defeat of its clients, as one of the two Big Powers in the region. After what appeared to be a near fatal setback to the Soviet position in the region, the role and presence of the USSR continued to grow in several dimensions at once until in 1970 foreign observers were beginning to wonder whether the Soviet Union had not already supplanted the United States as the biggest of the biggest two external powers operating in the region.

First, the scope of Soviet policy in the Middle East was greatly enlarged after the June War. The creation of the People's Republic of South Yemen in November 1967 and Leftist coups in the Sudan and Libya in 1969, augmented the ranks of the "progressive" Arab states and created a still broader field for the growth of Soviet influence. However, while the Soviet Union's support was welcomed in the new radical states, patron-client ties were not firmly established. As for the radical Arab states of prewar vintage, while their overall dependence on the Soviet Union for arms and political support increased even more, the USSR did not succeed in achieving a high degree of political control in any

client state. Only with the UAR did the USSR appear to have an intimate political relationship, but clearly not one in which Egypt was a mere satellite.

Soviet lines of communication throughout the area generally and from the Middle East into East Africa have spread rapidly in the past several years. However, maritime expansion has been severely constrained by the closure of the Suez Canal, which makes the Persian Gulf less accessible to the Soviet Union's Mediterranean Squadron than to its Pacific Fleet.

In the wake of the June War the Soviet Union has entered a small opening wedge into Arab oil resources. In addition to assisting Syria in the development of its small oil fields, the USSR has acquired a contract from Iraq to explore new oil fields and is to be paid for its services in crude oil, a practice that is becoming common in Soviet technical deals with nationalized oil companies.

Since the June War, the Soviet Union has delivered arms to some ten states in the region, six of which (UAR, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, the Yemen, PRSY) have military establishments that are essentially Soviet-equipped and dependent almost exclusively upon the Soviet Union for spare parts and replacements.

At least until the spring of 1970 the most dramatic manifestation of the USSR's enhanced presence was the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, which has grown substantially in size and capabilities since the June War. The initial impetus for the creation of the Squadron around 1964 seems to have come from a requirement to cover the U.S. seaborne nuclear deterrent force in the Mediterranean, particularly the Polaris submarine force. The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron still appears to be configured primarily for anti-carrier attack force and anti-submarine missions. A desire to improve the Soviet Union's capability to project military power into remote areas was probably also a factor in the decision to deploy the Mediterranean Squadron. In any case this factor grew in significance as Soviet interests in the area came under military threat and opportunities grew for the Soviet Union to exercise its naval force in the Mediterranean. Even with its relatively modest present capabilities, the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron has already had a significant psycho-political effect in the region and has created some new military options for the USSR.

1. The West's naval monopoly in the Mediterranean has been broken. For the first time in its history, Russia has established a permanent naval presence there, giving it the advantage of visibility in both southern Europe and the Moslem littoral states.

2. By some unknown degree, the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron has degraded the strategic offensive capabilities of the U.S. Sixth Fleet and of Polaris submarines stationed in the Mediterranean.

3. Some measure of deterrent support for the Soviet Union's Arab clients is probably provided by the presence of Soviet ships from the squadron in Arab ports.

4. Although the principal constraint on the use of the Sixth Fleet in the Middle East is the dearth of Arab states that would welcome it, the presence of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron has probably also contributed in some measure to U.S. perceptions of reduced freedom of military action in the region.

5. The Soviet Union now has a capability to make at least small unopposed amphibious landings from waterways of the Middle East. This creates the possibility for future Soviet *faits accomplis* in remote unprotected areas where even small-scale operations might have large political consequences.

6. The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron also provides the Soviet Union with a possible force for use on request to help maintain internally threatened Arab clients.

7. Creation of the Soviet Squadron provides the basis for a possible future extension of Soviet naval operations into the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean, but this depends heavily on reopening of the Suez Canal.

The physical presence of the Soviet Union on the ground in the Middle East has grown substantially since the June War and most dramatically in the past year. Soviet military advisers and technicians attached to the UAR and Syrian armed forces, estimated around the end of 1969 at 3000 for UAR and 1000 in Syria, are believed to have trebled or quadrupled in strength during 1970 as the result of large infusions into Egypt. Soviet officers are reported to be not only with UAR training units in the rear but also with operational units along the Suez front. Elements of the Mediterranean Squadron are present a good deal of the time in Egyptian and Syrian ports, and toward the end of 1967 Soviet bomber squadrons made occasional publicized visits to Arab military

airfields. During 1968 it became known that Soviet crews in TU–16 aircraft with UAR markings were providing land-based reconnaissance support for the Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean.

Last spring there was a sudden and alarming increase in the Soviet on-site military presence in Egypt. Apparently implementing an agreement reached with Nasser during his January 1970 visit to Moscow, the Soviet Union began to emplace at key points in the Nile Delta highly advanced SAM–3 surface-to-air missiles, reportedly manned by Soviet personnel. In mid-April, Israel charged that Soviet pilots were flying "combat sorties" in the Nile Delta region; Washington confirmed that Soviet pilots had taken to the air in Egyptian MIG–21s, evidently to protect the new SAM–3 installations. During the first half of the year, the network of Soviet-supplied air defense missile weapons was moved forward into the Suez Canal Zone where the attempted deployment encountered heavy Israeli air attacks. At the end of July, just before the standstill cease-fire was agreed to by the UAR and Egypt, Soviet-piloted MIG–21–Js and Israeli aircraft clashed in the first reported direct combat between Soviet and Israeli military personnel. I shall comment further on the implications of these events in my concluding remarks.

NEW OPPORTUNITIES, NEW DANGERS

The enlarged Soviet role and presence in the Middle East since the June war means in the first instance that there are now powerful vested interests in Soviet Middle East policy operating at various levels in the Soviet policymaking structure. With 10,000–14,000 "instructor" and "adviser" personnel on the ground, 40 to 60 ships at sea nearby, Soviet pilots flying regular reconnaissance missions from Egyptian bases, others ready to scramble in MIG–21–J jets from UAR airfields, units manning SAM–3 missile sites, a huge (by Soviet standards) foreign aid program, etc., it is clear that there has been an expansion and proliferation of key bureaucracies whose fortunes are directly connected with course and outcome of Soviet policy in that area.

Unfortunately we know too little about the character of bureaucratic politics in the post-Khrushchev Soviet Union and about the weights and influences of competing groups to be able to predict policy outcomes with any confidence. We can employ logic to identify the agencies involved, but we can rarely make high confidence guesses about the positions they would take on given policy issues. For example, in the Soviet military, the interests of the Navy, the PVO (anti-air defense), tactical air and the Soviet version of our MAG are deeply involved. The Navy may argue against heavy ground involvement, the Air Force may stress the Navy's vulnerability to air attack since it lacks organic air defense, PVO might be straining for liberalized rules of engagement that would enable its units to try their hand against the Israeli Air Force. The Soviet MAG, if U.S. experience is any precedent at all, is probably reporting that the UAR army is making great progress and will soon be able to operate on its own if only an additional increment of advisers and extension of programs is authorized: "Egyptianization" is around the corner. The KGB doubtless is concerned about institutionalizing the Soviet presence through its own distinctive means. Somewhere in the Central Committee apparat, people worry about political and social conditions in Egypt, if not for ideological reasons, then for the practical one of protecting the heavy Soviet investment.

For large policy questions, what this means is that the range of operational objectives for which interested groups can now make plausible arguments in the Politburo has been greatly extended. Opportunities for Soviet policy have become more varied and far-reaching, and better instruments are now available for policy implementation. I would suspect that the Politburo has heard cases made for some, if not all of these, fairly ambitious Soviet policy goals in region:

1. Further restriction of American influence in the Arab world and of American access to its resources and people; eventually, expulsion of the United States and achievement of unchallenged Soviet predominance at the crossroads of the European, Asian, and African continents.

2. Replacement of British influence in the Gulf area as Britain liquidates its military presence east of Suez; at a minimum, frustration of any U.S. effort to fill the void.

3. Radicalization of politics in the currently moderate and traditionalist parts of the Arab world through support and encouragement of the undermining activities of the radical Arab states or of local insurgent movements.

4. Increased access to Arab oil, as well as attainment of some capacity to influence the terms on which the West receives Arab oil.

5. Establishment of the first substantial Soviet sphere of influence in a noncontiguous area.

6. Eventually, perhaps communization of the region or part of it—probably the remotest goal in the list.

The expanded Soviet role and presence in the Middle East also opens perspectives for the Soviet Union with respect to related extra-regional objectives.

1. While "turning NATO's southern flank" in the traditional military sense implies a level of war so high as to make such a maneuver extraneous even if technically feasible, the Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean, particularly if it were augmented and provided with air cover, could be exploited politically in peacetime to strengthen neutralist trends in the Mediterranean NATO states.

2. Creation of a base for future Soviet operations in East Africa (particularly through Egypt and the Sudan).

3. Establishment of a maritime communications base for a deepened Soviet strategic relationship with India, which may have become a long-term Soviet security objective in the light of deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations.

If opportunities to extend Soviet objectives in the Middle East have grown in the aftermath of the June 1967 War, so too have the dangers confronting Soviet policy in the region. The dangers are chronic and stem from the political instability, economic backwardness, and social dis-cohesiveness of the radical regimes that provide the USSR with its political base in the Middle East. These fundamental flaws and deficiencies were exacerbated by the traumatic shock of the Six Day War, which also revealed that in the absence of fundamental change in the Arab social order, even lavish supplies of advanced Soviet armaments could not make Arab armies perform like modern military forces.

In a sense, the increase of Soviet influence in client states after the June War is not so much a tribute to the diplomatic skill and persuasive powers of the Soviet leaders as a mark of the further weakening of their protégés, which only deepened their dependency on the patron. From Moscow's point of view, this weakness may appear so profound that it debases the political value of the dependency relationship that arises from it. A political base is built so that it can be used to achieve some political end. But the Soviet Union's extensive political base in the Middle East has seemed so insecure that shoring it up has become the major Soviet policy preoccupation in the region. Preserving that base has increasingly required Moscow to make as its own, causes that seem essential to its clients' survivial but are themselves of little or no intrinsic value to the USSR. Currently such a cause is "liquidation of the traces of the Israeli aggression," above all the withdrawal or eviction of Israeli military forces from Arab territories occupied during the June War. Pursuit of that cause by the necessary means could entail costs and risks that the Soviet Union is unwilling to assume on its client's behalf; failure to achieve that objective, however, could bring down those shaky clients upon whom the entire Soviet Middle Eastern position has been built.

Soviet policymakers are thus exposed in the Middle East to a set of risks and dangers that are a function of their clients' weakness and their enemies' strength and resolve. Those in Soviet policy circles impressed with the larger interests jeopardized by a high commitment-Soviet policy in the Middle East, or who are concerned with the opportunity costs of the present policy, or who are ideologically predisposed against close collaboration with bourgeois-nationalist regimes of the radical Arab type, have probably been making these kinds of arguments:

1. Client regimes may be toppled for any one of a variety of reasons which the Soviet Union cannot control or can control only at great cost and risk: if the clients seek a "military solution" and are again defeated by Israel; if they agree to a "political solution" that unleashed violent domestic reaction; if they make neither full-scale war nor peace and their "attrition" campaign fails to dislodge the Israelis; or if, through preoccupation with the struggle against Israel, they fail to make minimal economic, social, and political gains at home.

2. The Soviet Union faces the risk of military confrontation with the United States if it participates directly in an Arab war aganst Israel (Soviet estimates of this risk may be changing, however), but it faces humiliation for itself and

perhaps fatal defeat for its clients if they should launch a new war without active Soviet support.

3. The danger of betrayal has always haunted Soviet relations with bourgeois-nationalist allies. To the extent that Arab clients of the USSR come to perceive the United States as the only power capable of dislodging Israel—even if they are convinced of Washington's disinclination to do so—this danger will persist in Soviet eyes.

4. A real settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute, on the other hand, or limited agreements that drastically reduced its salience, including arms control agreements, or even habituation to a new status quo, would reduce critical Arab dependence on the Soviet Union for weapons and for political support in the Arab-Israel dispute. Dependence based on the need for foreign economic and technical assistance could readily be transferred to a Western donor.

5. Finally, even if all of these dangers can be averted and Soviet clients preserved, the question will still remain whether the costs and risks of maintaining and increasing Soviet influence in the Arab world will be justified by the benefits received. Maintenance and extension of the Soviet position is almost certain to grow in economic cost. The present clients of the USSR are all economically weak and have few resources needed by the USSR. Those that have some oil resources desperately need for development purposes the revenue they can earn from selling it. Their political instability makes the risk component of any Soviet investment in their future high and in that sense raises the cost of such an investment. Finally, increased Soviet political and economic investment in a growing number of "progressive" Arab states will almost certainly generate demands for a beefed-up and costly Soviet military presence in the region.

Because the Soviet position in the Middle East presents Moscow with such a mixed bag of opportunities and risks and because evidence bearing on how Soviet leaders weigh these factors and combine them in policy packages is so sparse, there is considerable disargeement in the foreign policy community about what the Soviet Union really is after, particularly with respect to the Arab-Israel conflict. In my view it is not very productive to think about these questions in sharply demarcated either/or terms:

Do the Russians want a peaceful settlement *or*

Do they want to maintain indefinitely a state of high but controlled tension?

Do they want to act in concert with the U.S., using Washington's influence with Israel to help bring about a settlement, *or*

Do they want to back the U.S. into a corner in the Middle East, isolating it by encouraging its exclusive identification as Israel's champion?

In introducing Soviet forces into the region, does Moscow want to provide the UAR with a military capacity to drive Israel out of occupied territories by force, even to gain the upper hand in a general war, *or*

Do the Soviets merely wish to strengthen Egypt's bargaining position in talks over settlement?

These questions cannot be answered with confidence because the Soviet Union is not pursuing a one-track policy in the Middle East. Soviet policy since at least the end of 1968 has been multi-tracked. It is a policy in which several options are being kept open while a variety of inter-related, partly overlapping and partly competing objectives are being pursued simultaneously, with events the chief determinant of which track is the inside track at any moment.

A Soviet *preferred* outcome is easier to describe than the one Moscow may ultimately prove willing to accept. The preferred outcome would be a *political solution* to the June War that restores the territorial status quo at the lowest cost in political concessions to Soviet clients and that gains for the Soviet Union credit in the Arab world for compelling Israeli withdrawal and condemnation of the U.S. for championing—unsuccessfully thanks to the Soviet Union—the Israeli cause. The Soviets have no serious reason to fear that any political solution acceptable to their Arab clients would so thoroughly pacify the region as to make external military assistance a dead issue; and they have every reason to be confident that they could continue to outbid even the most "evenhanded" U.S. administration for Arab favor in the arms transfer field.

Working to achieve this preferred outcome, in greater or lesser degree, requires a mixture of diplomatic activity and military and political pressure against Israel, of rivalry with the United States and cooperation with it, of military support for clients, but also the use of political leverage in dealing with them.

GROWING SOVIET INTERVENTIONIST PROPENSITIES

What has been thrown into question during the past year, introducing a new and dangerous element in the equation, is the stability of the assumption formerly strongly held in the United States as well as in Israel, and apparently in the UAR as well, about the strength of the USSR's disinclination to involve itself directly in military operations in the region. The cease-fire has provided a temporary breather, but Soviet forces are now so positioned that were the cease-fire to break down that key assumption might have to be tested in the most acute fashion.

I must say that since the beginning of this year I have revised my own estimates about Soviet willingness to have their own military forces become engaged in the Middle East conflict. The Soviet involvement and commitment have deepened in a more rapidly accelerated manner than I anticipated. Why this has happened may have a bearing on how far the process will go. Clearly the tactics chosen by the Israelis in responding to Nasser's unilateral denunciation of the cease-fire in the spring of 1969 had a great deal to do with it. The deep penetration raids forced the issue, prematurely if not unnecessarily. The key Soviet decision was taken during Nasser's secret January trip when it may have seemed to the Soviet leaders that nothing short of a Soviet-built, directed and partially manned integrated air defense system could save their man in Cairo. The deployment of SAM–3s and initiation of operational flights by Soviet pilots in April had an immediate and profound effect. Not only did the Israelis cease operations in the Delta region promptly, but the American reaction expressed more anxiety than it did resolve to stop the Soviet involvement, not to speak of undoing it. At least this is the way I think Moscow saw it.

The notion that the Soviet-built and partially manned air defense system would stop well short of the canal combat zone was, so far as I know, an Israeli and U.S. assumption, more the product of wishful thinking than of any formal Soviet undertaking.

The cease-fire made it possible for the Egyptians and Russians to complete under favorable conditions what they had already started and what they probably thought they could rush in had the Israelis, as expected, taken a longer time to make up their minds about accepting the U.S. initiative.

But in any case, Soviet willingness to cooperate with the Egyptians in violating the standstill agreement suggests confidence that for both military and political reasons the Israelis would not break off the cease-fire and that the Americans would be so preoccupied with getting the talks started that they would not permit the violations to stand in the way. While the U.S. reaction may have been stronger than Moscow expected, that analysis was not far from the mark.

I want to close by posing for the group's consideration two worrisome questions that the toughening of Soviet military policy in the Middle East in 1970 have raised. The first has to do with the future military balance in the Middle East; the second concerns the larger question of the future political role of military power in U.S.-Soviet relations generally.

First, if the cease fire breaks down, given the apparent willingness of the Soviet Union to inject its own military personnel into the equation, can the U.S. continue to make good its undertaking to prevent the military balance from tipping against Israel *merely* by supplying equipment, even in larger amounts and on good credit terms? If not, what are the alternatives?

Second, is this unexpectedly direct Soviet military involvement in the Middle East to be explained primarily by unique circumstances that obtain there, or does it portend a greater willingness generally by the Soviet leaders, now that their strategic forces have acquired rough parity with the U.S., to exploit conventional military strength for political purposes even in areas where expressed U.S. interests in the past placed such regions out of bounds to Soviet military forces?

Finally, if the latter is true, what are the alternatives for the U.S.?

APPENDIX III

[From World Affairs, Fall 1971, vol. 134]

THE SOVIETS AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

(By David P. Forsythe)

Soviet foreign policy in the Middle East entered a new phase in the period following the six-day war between the Arabs and the Israelis in 1967. The Soviets attempted to achieve influence over Arab decision making by embarking upon an extensive military aid program to the United Arab Republic (UAR), Iraq, and Syria. The United States government, after assessing the results of these efforts, apparently came to the conclusion that Soviet influence was so pervasive that it had become the crucial element in future Arab-Israeli relations, and the Soviet actions constituted a direct threat to United States interests in the region.[1]

"This analysis focuses upon the policies the Soviets have followed to achieve influence, particularly over the United Arab Republic, and upon the obstacles the Soviet Union has encountered both from its allies on the left and its opponents on the right." The study concludes by reviewing the limitations upon Soviet influence and by assessing the probable future course of Soviet foreign policy in broad perspective. It should be noted that the focal point for analysis is on the output of Soviet policy, with relatively little attention given to the inputs of Kremlin politics.[2]

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

The framework for current interaction between the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic is reasonably clear. The Soviets decided after the 1967 war to replace Arab losses of war material and thereby to try to increase Soviet influence in the Arab world. The extent of the Soviets' commitment to this goal, in military aid alone, can be seen in the following chart of Soviet arms shipments to selected states in the region, as of early 1970.[3]

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[1] On the subject of growing Soviet influence see Presidential Envoy William Scranton's comment in the *New York Times*, December 14, 1968, p. 1. For President Nixon's views, see especially the report of his foreign policy speech of July 1, 1970, particularly as analyzed in the *Christian Science Monitor*, July 7, 1970, p. 1. It is common knowledge that National Security Adviser Kissinger, in an off-the-record press briefing in 1970, referred to the need to "expel" the Soviets from the Middle East because of their threat to the West.

[2] It has not proven possible to construct any rigorous model or theory of Soviet foreign policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The most useful general study as background for the present inquiry is J. David Singer, "Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model," in James N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy*, rev. ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1969), particularly as it relates to the concept of reinforcement.

[3] Chart condensed from the *New York Times*, January 25, 1970, IV, p. 4. For background on Soviet Military aid programs to the Middle East, *see* J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimensions* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969) and Nadav Safran, *From War to War* (New York: Pegasus, 1969).

SOVIET ARMS SHIPMENTS, JUNE 1967—EARLY 1970

	United Arab Republic	Syria	Iraq
Jet fighters	250	135	130
Bombers	35	0	0
Helicopters	30	8	12
Tanks	300	150	150
Self-propelled guns	0	50	30
Armored personnel carriers	150	300	200
Artillery rockets	550	350	275

Soviet primary interest in the UAR was manifested more clearly during the course of 1970 than ever before. Increased numbers of Soviet military personnel and increased areas of Soviet functional independence could be documented.[4]

SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL AND INDEPENDENT INSTALLATIONS, UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, 1970

	Pilots	Missile crews	Others	SAM sites	Aircraft manned	Airfields controlled
Jan. 1, 1970	0	0	25-4000	0	0	0
Dec. 31, 1970	200+	12-15,000	25 4000	[1] 75-85	[2] 150	6

[1] SAM-3's.
[2] Mig 21J.

The Soviets continued major shipments of military weapons to the UAR during the first quarter of 1971.[5]

Major Soviet military aid, UAR, April, 1971

MIG-21's	100
MIG-17's	60
MIG-23's (est.)	10
Sukhoi-7	30

As a result of this military aid, the UOR, Syria, and Iraq are now dependent upon the Soviet Union for their miiltary equipment, a dependency which President Nasser of the UAR admitted to a Western correspondent before his death in 1970.[6] Undoubtedly Arab military dependence has enabled the Soviet Union to exercise influence over some decisions made in Arab capitals. During the period since the 1967 war the UAR has consulted directly with the Soviets before making many major foreign policy decisions.

Out of this process of consultation has come at least one major UAR concession to the Soviet point of view. The UAR apparently agreed to the Soviet demand that it seek the rollback of Israeli forces from the occupied territories by means of diplomacy rather than coercion.[7] How long the agreement was to last, and under what conditions, remains unclear. It is probable that the Soviets have never been as interested in complete withdrawal as has the UAR, for the Soviets have more to gain in the short run from a partial settlement that would reopen the Suez canal than in an agreement which would bring about a complete Arab-Israeli rapprochment.[8]

The framework for Soviet-UAR interaction is thus one of Arab dependency on Soviet military aid and of Soviet influence over a basic parameter Egyptian foreign policy in the post-1967 period. At the same time it can be argued that the Nasser and Sadat regimes have had some room to maneuver, and in some cases have exercised significant influence over the Soviet Union.

Most international relations are two-way streets as far as the exertion of influence is concerned, as the United States has discovered in dealing with Saigon. The difficulty for a patron or supplier state arises when there is a difference in viewpoint between the partners, and when the supplier, to exercise controlling influence, must run the risk of antagonizing its client. The supplier is reluctant to irritate a client unless the issue is of vital interest or unless an alternative client proves equally valuable. The UAR has exercised some independence and some influence over the USSR precisely because the Soviets have perceived few alternatives to their current arrangement with the Egyptians. The nature of the Soviets' left front in the Middle East offers little alternative to the Soviet policy of regarding the UAR as a beachhead for its presence in the region.

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[4] Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey*, 1970, London, 1971, p. 44.
[5] *New York Times*, April 18, 1971, IV, p. 3.
[6] See the coverage in the *New York Times*, February 19, 1970, p. 2., of Nasser's interview with a French journalist.
[7] Arthur Lall, *The UN and the Middle East Crisis, 1967* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 208-212; and Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 412.
[8] See for example John C. Campbell, "The Soviet Union and the Middle East, Part II," the *Russian Review*, vol. 29, no. 3 (July 1970), pp. 247-261. We return to this important point of interpretation later in this essay.

ALLIES ON THE LEFT

While the Soviet Union has been able to work out a rather satisfactory relationship with the United Arab Republic, Soviet policy makers have experienced considerable difficulty in dealing with their Arab allies on the left. Whatever the degree of Soviet commitment to revolutionary Marxism, the Kremlin is obviously concerned about "'leftist' adventurism" "leftist extremism" in the middle East.[9]

The Soviets now regard the Palestinian guerrilla movement as unreliable and counterproductive. It is true that the Soviets have endorsed the Palestinian movement as an anti-imperial "just war" of national liberation. Moreover, Soviet arms and aid wind up indirectly in the guerrilla organizations, as the following chart indicates.[10]

Name	Arms sources	Income sources
Al Fatah (Tha Palestine National Liberation Movement).	Communist China, open market, captured Israeli arms, rockets of own manufacture.	Mainly Palestinian private individuals channeling payments through governments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, and Abu Khabi.
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Popular Liberation Forces (PLF).	Same as Al Fatah; East Europe and Arab governments.	Same as Al Fatah, plus Arab government subsidies decided by Arab League.
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).	East Europe, Iraq, open market, captured Israeli arms.	Iraq, private.
Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDF).	Syria, East Europe, open market, captured Israeli arms.	East Europe, private.
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—General Command.	Miscellaneous	Miscellaneous.
Al-Saiqua (Thunderbolt)	Syria, Soviet Union, open market, captured Israeli arms.	Syria.
Arab Liberation Front (ALF)	Iraq	Iraq.
Popular Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (POLP).	Communist China	Mainly refugees in camps in Syria.
Popular Struggle Front (PSF)	Private	Private.
Arab Palestine Organization (APO)	United Arab Republic	United Arab Republic.
Action Group	Iraq, Egypt	Egypt.
Ansar (Partisans)	Soviet Union	Soviet Union.

Yet the Soviets have not consistently supported the guerrillas and their claims. In fact, the Soviet Union prefers to work with established governments in the Middle East, primarily the United Arab Republic. Thus the Soviets have done three things in fashioning policy toward the Palestinians. They have downgraded the importance of guerrilla activity and stressed the importance of diplomacy. One official Soviet commentator even stated bluntly, ". . . the conditions for guerrilla warfare are highly unfavorable." [11] Second, the Soviets have misrepresented the claims of the Palestinians to make them conform to Soviet policy. In this regard the Soviets have stated that the Palestinians do not question Israel's existence and legitimacy but only Israel's occupying of territory since 1967.[12] This interpretation is quite at variances with the published doctrines of Al Fatah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).[13] Third, the Soviets have directly criticized the more radical groups such as the Popular Front and have increasingly opposed their actions.[14] The Soviet stand at the 25th General Assembly of the United Nations in opposition to the hijacking of aircraft, regardless of the political cause, is a part of the Soviet Union's dissatisfaction with Palestinian revolutionaries.[15]

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[9] See G. Mirsky, "Rebirth of the Arab World," *New Times*, no. 25 (June 26, 1968), p. 12.

[10] Chart condensed from the *Christian Science Monitor*, July 13, 1970, p. 5.

[11] M. Kruglov, "The Palestine Liberation Movement," *New Times*, no. 37 (September 17, 1969), p. 13.

[12] See David Morrison, "Middle East: The Soviet Stance," *Mizan*, vol. 10, no. 4 (July–August 1968), pp. 141–150. Cf. Y. Dmitriev, "The Arab World and Israel's Aggression," *International Affairs* (September 1970), p. 23; and M. Kremnev, "The Israeli Aggressors Miscalculate," *New Times*, no. 13 (April 3, 1968), pp. 11–12.

[13] One useful source is Hisham Sharabi, "Palestine Guerrillas: Their Credibility and Effectiveness," *Supplementary Papers*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1970, appendices.

[14] "The words of adventuristic politicians do not warrant serious consideration." L. Belyaev, "Ways of Ending the Middle East Crisis," *International Affairs* (October 1968), p. 28.

[15] *UN Monthly Chronicle*, vol. VII, no. 11 (December, 1970), pp. 98–99; and the *New York Times*, November 26, 1970, p. 78.

There has been some wary acceptance by the Sovets of a role for Yasir Arafat, the leader of Al Fatah and the Palestine Liberation Organization, two guerrilla movements dedicated to opposing a Jewish state. The Soviets have patronized Arafat partly because of the ideological imperative to support a national liberation movement that is anti-Western and partly because of Arafat's popularity among the Arab masses. At the same time Moscow has not given him the red carpet treatment provided other leaders of the Arab world.[16]

The Soviets, rather than fully supporting Palestinian guerrilla goals, continue to base their public foreign policy stand on the need to implement Assembly Resolution 194 guaranteeing Palestinian repatriation or resettlement with compensation.[17] The Soviets also have refrained from endorsing violence against Israel outside the occupied territories and have opposed Popular Front efforts to promote revolution against all Middle Eastern bourgeois regimes, including Egypt. The Palestinian defeat in the Jordanian civil war of 1970 has undoubtedly encouraged the Soviet Union to continue this line of policy.

Soviet statements indicate they have concluded that the guerrillas only intensify Israel's desire to stay in the occupied territories for security reasons. The Soviets see the guerrillas as standing in the way of a negotiated withdrawal that would open the Suez Canal and boost Soviet and Egyptian images of successful diplomacy. As one commentator argued in Moscow's *International Affairs*, ". . . ill-considered and rash actions which do no substantial harm to Israel's military potential cannot solve the problem of eliminating the consequences of the Israeli aggression, and in certain circumstances they may help the Israeli extremists, who are seeking any pretext for frustrating a political settlement." [18]

If the Palestinian movement did not appear to be a reliable alternative to the UAR-USSR axis for the Soviets, neither have two other elements in the Soviet's left front. The reactivization of Communist China's foreign policy after the cultural revolution also presented the Russians with a number of theoretical and practical difficulties. The Chinese sought to embarrass the Soviets by pointing out the lack of Soviet support for the revolutionaries and other forms of "revisionism," and by directly supporting with small arms and money such groups as Al Fatah and the Popular Front. Russian and Western sources also indicate that the Chinese may have had a hand in fomenting the student and worker riots in the United Arab Republic during the fall of 1968.[19] Hence the Chinese seemed to be trying to undermine the UAR-USSR axis as well as the Soviet-led effort to negotiate rather than fight. In the context of more general Sino-Soviet antagonism, the Soviets were probably as interested in checking Chinese penetration of the Middle East as they were in reducing Western influence. Chinese policy and the Palestinian movement have thus had the same impact on Soviet policy. They have served to convince the Soviets that support for the Nasser and Sadat regimes was the best course of action, if not the only feasible path to follow.

Further support for this view came as a result of the actions of other allies on the Arab left, specifically the "progressive" Arab states of Algeria, Iraq, and Syria. From the beginning of Soviet efforts to influence the post-1967 situation, Algeria proved itself to be distressingly independent.[20] The Algerians were able to block Soviet efforts at the United Nations in the summer of 1967 to convince Arab delegations to support the Soviet-American agreements on conditions for an Israeli withdrawal. It was not until late fall that Algeria could be persuaded to acquiesce on the subject. Even after that, the Algerians continued to be vocal in support of the Palestinians and in opposition to a negotiated settlement, much to the Soviet's regret.

The Syrian government of General Salah Jadid and President Nur Atassi proved to be more recalcitrant than Algeria, from the Soviet view. The Syrian delegation at the United Nations was persistently at odds with the Soviets. It was perhaps the most outspoken of the Arab delegations in opposing the Soviet-American compromise agreement which was embodied in Security Council

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[16] *New York Times*, February 21, 1970, p. 2; and March 22, 1970, p. 11; cf. *Christian Science Monitor*, January 13, 1970, p. 1.

[17] For the contents of A/RES/194 and an analysis of its significance in Arab-Israeli negotiations, see David P. Forsythe, *United Nations Peacemaking* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971).

[18] Dmitriev, *op. cit.*

[19] G. Mirsky, "U.A.R. . . . Home Front," *New Times*, no. 50 (December 18, 1968), p. 10. The *Monitor's* correspondents also found evidence of Chinese involvement.

[20] See Lall, *op. cit.*, and Safran, *op. cit.*

Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967, which was to be the framework for Arab-Israeli negotiations. Soviet wining and dining of Syrian delegations in Moscow coupled with efforts at direct persuasion, failed to mute public disagreement between provider and client.[21] Syrian intervention into the Jordanian civil war in 1970 served as another source of friction between the Soviet Union and Syria. There is little reason to believe that the Soviets were happy with Syrian support of the Palestinians. The logic of the situation points to Syrian independence of action against Soviet preferences. One informed observer believes the Soviets counselled withdrawal of Syrian forces, and it is probable that the Soviet-advised army opposed the decision to intervene.[22]

Iraq proved to be no more easy for the Soviets to handle than was Algeria or Syria. Iraq never publicly accepted the United Nations guidelines for settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict embodied in Security Council Resolution 242. The Iraquis did not agree that a commitment to diplomacy rather than force should be accepted as a basis for bringing about a settlement. Iraq's willingness to examine Chinese overtures on their merits also distressed the Soviets.[23] Given the fact that Iraq possessed neither the strategic geographical position nor the leadership of a charismatic figure like Nasser, it is not surprising that the Soviets preferred to deal with the United Arab Republic rather than with Iraq.

In summary, mounting antagonism from their allies on the left caused the Soviets to increase their dependence upon the UAR. Military or economic aid to the three other "progressive" Arab states had not increased Soviet influence as far as policy toward Israel was concerned. Persistent Arab animosity toward the Zionist state, plus traditional Arab jealousies toward the UAR kept the Soviets from building a tight Arab coalition in support of the Soviet-UAR axis.[24]

OPPOSITION ON THE RIGHT

Because of the lack of reliable allies on the left, the Soviets hesitated to exert strong pressure on the United Arab Republic to accept a compromise solution on territorial boundaries with Israel. They also were reluctant to press the UAR because of the tough bargaining position of Israel and the United States. The Soviet Union saw little reason to follow a policy which might antagonize the Egyptians if prospects were dim for obtaining a desired response from Israel.

The Soviets saw clearly the military superiority Israel possessed after 1967,[25] and responded by speaking softly and hiding the big stick. The USSR delegation in the Security Council went to great lengths to disavow heated Arab statements questioning the legitimacy of Israel and, in general, Soviet policy sought to convey a pledge to recognize secure boundaries for a smaller Israel in return for withdrawal from occupied territory.[26] No doubt the Soviets were most interested in withdrawal from the Suez area. The expansion of the Soviet navy into the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean depended upon that waterway, as did increased trade with the east coast of Africa and expedited shipments to North Vietnam.[27] A radical rejection of Israel's legitimacy, demanded by the Palestinians and the "progressives," was to the Soviet mind a sure formula for ensuring the presence of Israeli troops from Golan to Suez.

The Soviet position, however, left room for Israeli doubts as to the Soviet Union's ultimate intentions. If the Soviets referred to Israel as the aggressor in 1967 and stressed Arab ownership of the occupied territories, it was only a short step to refer to other Israeli-controlled territory as occupied and to refer to Israel's post-1947 expansion as aggression. If the Soviets publicly endorsed the Palestinian resistance movement in the occupied territories as a just struggle, it was only a short step to endorse the Palestine movement *per se* as just struggle

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[21] *New York Times*, May 13, 1969, p. 13; July 5, 1969, p. 1; and August 13, 1970, p. 6.
[22] *Christian Science Monitor*, August 4, 1970, p. 3.
[23] *New York Times*, August 2, 1970, pp. 2, 10; August 6, 1970, p. 1.
[24] Jordan and other "non-progressive" Arab states were to some extent left to the West, although a Soviet delegation did discuss military aid with the Jordanians. *New York Times*, January 11, 1968, p. 29.
[25] "The political settlement of the Middle East crisis . . . is the only real alternative to Israel's policy of strength and military gambles." P. Demchenko and V. Kasis, "Israel: Escalation of Aggression," *New Times*, no. 9 (March 3, 1970), pp. 4–5. See also the *New York Times* commentary on a *Pravda* article speaking to the same point, August 9, 1970, p. 3.
[26] This policy becomes quite clear in a Security Council debate in the spring of 1969. See the *UN Monthly Chronicle*, vol. VI, no. 4 (April 1969) especially pp. 28–29, where the Soviet spokesman interjects, "nobody denies the right of Israel to exist. . . ."
[27] See further T. B. Millar, "Soviet Policies South and East of Suez," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 49, no. 1 (October 1970), pp. 70–80.

for national self-determination. Hence Israel viewed Soviet pledges of respect for its security with some misgivings and held out for a formal treaty with its Arab adversaries that would endorse Israeli control over East Jerusalem, Sharm El Sheik, the Golan Heights, and perhaps more.[28]

It is debatable whether Israeli leaders perceived another set of factors, increasingly understood by noninvolved observers, that cast doubt upon Soviet intentions. While some Israelis see themselves as a bulwark against communism in the Middle East, the Soviets have increased their presence in the region precisely because of the creation of the state of Israel and the resulting exacerbation of Arab anti-Westernism.[29] Because Zionism was, and is, reviewed by many Arabs as a front and tool of Western imperialism, the Soviets have profited from the Arab turnaway from the West. Thus the logic of the situation indicates little strategic gain for the Soviets from a rather complete solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. An Arab-Israeli *modus vivendi* could well lead to some Arab-Western rapport, which the Soviets would no doubt regard as the antithesis of their policy to reduce Western influence in the area. Hence there was further reason for Israel to question Soviet policy.

As for the United States, the Nixon Administration's quest for an "even-handed" approach to the region turned out to be not much different from President Lyndon B. Johnson's policy of general support for Israel. Soviet military aid to the United Arab Republic was regarded as provocative and destabilizing, and the United States seemed deeply disappointed that the Soviets would not agree to a limitation on arms shipments.[30] Apparently the United States was assuming the Soviets would enter such an agreement even though Israel would remain militarily superior to the UAR, thus making for friction in the Soviet-UAR axis.

It is possible that the Nixon Administration thought that Soviet interest in a reopened Canal would provide sufficient incentive for them to devise a solution to the stalemate which would be acceptable to both sides. As a result the United States, immediately after 1967, waited for the Soviets to convince the UAR to accept territorial compromise and to enter into a contractual arrangement with Israel. It seemed reasonable to assume that the Soviets would attempt to bring the Egyptians around if they really wanted the Suez open and if they wanted to reduce the risk of direct confrontation with the United States. According to James Reston, Soviet and American discussions in the interim led to agreement on some points in a compromise solution, but it soon became apparent that the Russians could not, or would not, bring the United Arab Republic into line with those agreements.[31] Then the United States tried dealing directly with the UAR but without results.

The strong bargaining position of Israel and the United States presented obvious difficulties to the Soviet Union. The USSR apparently decided that it could not press vigorously for further compromises beyond the terms of United Nations Security Council Resolution on the subject (242), especially since the UAR was under intense criticism from the Arab left for going that far. The Soviets foresaw increased friction with the United Arab Republic if they pushed for further compromise while the United States refrained from pressing Israel to reduce its territorial claims.

SOVIET INFLUENCE—STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Though it is necessary in studying contemporary Soviet foreign policy to be less than precise in analyzing influence, some points seem reasonably clear from the available evidence. First, limitations on Soviet influence are real, especially on the making of day-to-day policy. The Soviets have not had much success in altering Arab policies toward Israel when those policies are inconsistent with the Soviet stance. It is quite clear that Soviet military aid has not been translated into Soviet diplomatic influence over Algeria, Iraq, and Syria.[32]

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[28] See Foreign Minister Eban's assessment of the Soviet role in the *New York Times*, March 31, 1970, p. 3.

[29] For background see Walter Laqueur, "Russia Enters the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 47, no. 2 (January 1969), pp. 296–308.

[30] Assistant Secretary Sisco, "The Fluid and Evolving Situation in the Middle East," *Department of State Bulletin*, LXVII, no. 1643 (December 26, 1970).

[31] *New York Times*, January 13, 1971, p. 22. It was reported that the Soviets had agreed that Israel should be secure and have equal navigation rights, should withdraw from Sinai, and should negotiate Sharm El Sheik.

[32] For analysis of "meagre" political results from Soviet aid and trade policies, see Walter Laqueur, *The Struggle for the Middle East* (New York: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 143–144.

Soviet influence vis-à-vis the UAR is more difficult to analyze because public differences have been muted. In the Nasser period, despite proclamations of unity, the Soviets were probably unsure of their ability to keep Nasser committed to diplomacy rather than coercion.[33] Periodic reports from Cairo of impending violence caused the Soviets to increase arms shipments and decrease pressure for a compromise settlement.[34] If Nasser was interested in postponing a partial settlement or in extracting more "borrowed" power for the UAR, he was more successful than were the Soviets in their policy objectives.

In the Sadat period, there is further reason to believe that Soviet influence is quite limited vis-à-vis the UAR. There is virtually no evidence that the Soviets exerted direct influence in Sadat's rise to power, nor in his day-to-day policies toward Israel. Sadat's purge of Egyptian politicians linked to Moscow could not have been to Soviet liking; yet there are few reports of Soviet influence in that process. Finally, the USSR-UAR treaty of friendship, signed in 1971, does not really give to the Soviets any new or specific influence over UAR policy making.[35] If anything, the brief Sadat period of leadership in the UAR indicates more clearly than previously that the Soviets have a military presence without specific political influence. The Israelis remain in the occupied territories, the guerrillas remain independent, Suez remains closed, and the Arab governments remain at cross-purposes. These are hardly the marks of successful Soviet foreign policy.

It should be recognized, however, that the Soviets have been successful in some ways. Particularly after 1970 it would be difficult for the UAR to launch a ground offensive against Israeli positions without Soviet agreement to coordinate its independent air power; thus the Soviets did hold a trump to UAR military policy.[36] And it is probable that the Soviet military presence in the UAR reduces the putative power of the United States in the region, thereby facilitating Soviet efforts to influence the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean areas.[37] Yet direct military presence may be more a liability than an asset. For the Soviets in the Middle East, as for the Americans in Indochina, military involvement is not a substitute for the achievement of policy objectives and, in fact, may not contribute toward achieving those objectives.[38]

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

As was true for the British in the past, the Soviets will continue to find the UAR and the Suez instrumentally important to them in the future. Hence a continuation of the patern of military aid and deference to a number of UAR policies can be expected.

Western interests may indeed be endangered by this state of affairs. But the threat of Soviet military superiority in the Mediterranean or Indian Oceans and the accompanying loss of economic resources in the near future is not nearly so significant as the danger of accidental war between the superpowers.[39] The Soviets,

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[33] For a review of possible Soviet efforts to secure UAR backing for a negotiated settlement, see the *New York Times*, June 11, 1969, p. 8; June 12, 1969, p. 4; June 14, 1969, p. 11; and June 18, 1969, p. 16. Cf. the *Christian Science Monitor*, August 7, 1970, p. 10.

[34] It is significant that, while the Cairo press was consistently reporting the probability of future violence, the Soviet press was stressing the need for avoiding violence. See particularly *Pravda*, January 31, 1969, p. 4. Cf. *Pravda*, November 7, 1968, p. 5, and January 25, 1969, p. 4. See also M. Kremnev, "Middle East Detonator," *New Times*, no. 1 (January 1, 1969), pp. 12–13. It is to be recalled also that both domestic riots in the UAR and military criticism of conciliatory policies increased the probability of a show of force by Nasser.

[35] Article 7, requiring mutual consultation "on all important questions," is no more than a formalization of what has been occurring since 1967 and does not commit either party to agree with or follow the other. The concepts of "sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-interference in the internal affairs . . ." are reaffirmed in Article 1 and may be said to represent an obligation of the USSR to the UAR.

[36] See further, Robert E. Hunter, "The Soviet Dilemma in the Middle East, Part I," *Adelphi Papers*, no. 59 (September 1969).

[37] See further, Wynfred Joshua, *Soviet Penetration Into the Middle East* (National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1970); Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, "Pretext and Context: Evaluating the Soviet Role in the Middle East," *Mizan*, vol. 10, no. 3 (May–June 1968), pp. 86–93; and Aaron S. Klieman, *Soviet Russia and the Middle East* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970).

[38] It is likely that the Soviets view the Arab-Israeli conflict as an instrumental means toward the more important ends of Persian Gulf oil, trade and ports in the Indian Ocean, etc. Becoming ensnared in the military and financial vortex of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and its related inter-Arab rivalries, may be dysfunctional to other goals.

[39] See J. C. Hurewitz (ed.), *Soviet-American Rivalry in the Middle East* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), especially part I; and Millar, *op. cit.*

as they increase their military involvement with the United Arab Republic, increase the risk of unintended combat participation. They might also choose to fight to protect ever-increasing investments in prestige.[40]

The Soviets have not supplied the long-range offensive weapons that could directly jeopardize Israel's existence and in the process bring direct United States intervention. And Soviet pilots have been kept away from Suez to lessen Soviet-Israeli encounters. Thus the Soviets are not as reckless as they are coldly calculating.[41] Rational pursuit of self-interest, however, has a way of becoming submerged in the hot emotions of the Middle East. The spiral of escalation, with the final stage being a heavy Soviet "reprisal" that might trigger United States entry into the conflict is a contingency that threatens the interests of all.

Despite this ever-present sword of Damocles, Soviet policy in the Arab-Israeli conflict is not likely to undergo radical change. The future of the conflict depends much less on Soviet policy than on whether Arab elites come to accept territorial compromise and whether Israel sets unrealistic territorial terms in the bargaining. Without an agreement on boundaries there cannot be even a partial agreement that would then permit discussion of the status of the Palestinians. New developments may occur with the new regime in Egypt and the present demise of the Palestinian guerrillas. If not, the outlook is for more, and hopefully limited, violence. One cannot realistically look to the Soviets to alter their course.

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[40] Laqueur, *op. cit.*, pp. 158, 160–161.
[41] Cf. Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 413. See also, in general, Adam B. Ulam, *Coexistence and Expansion* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), especially pp. 743 and 747.

APPENDIX IV

[From the Congressional Record, Sept. 29, 1971]

THE SOVIET UNION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, some of the more dramatic political and strategic gains of the Soviet Union in the post-World War II period have been in the Middle East. In an area where Russia had few interests and certainly no real policy in 1945, she now has a deep involvement In assessing the role of the Soviet Union in the Middle East, it is useful to see both how Russia's policies and involvement in the area evolved and what is the balance of opportunities and risks for the Soviet Union in the area today. Regardless of one's perspective on Soviet foreign policy, no one could, in the early 1950's, perceive what would happen in the Middle East.

The Soviet Union, in approaching the third world, has sought generally to be able to do precisely what the United States and other powers do. In each area, her first goals were to make a presence and then try to obtain equal status with other powers. Other goals, such as eliminating great power competitors, and dominating the region, come later, if at all. For the Russians do realize that exclusive client states can be both expensive and hard to control. The question remains as to why Russian policies have been so successful. The answer lies less in their vague goals and specific policies and more in taking advantage of circumstances. A review of her Middle East policies reveals that that strategem is just as incoherent and piecemeal as much of the U.S. global strategy.

RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT UNTIL 1945

Until the mid-1950's, Russian efforts in the Middle East were concentrated on the northern tier—Turkey and Iran—and the Arab world was not very important. Traditional policy, inspired by an "Eastern Question" mentality, emphasized Russian interests in Istanbul and the Balkans. All other areas, that is, the Arab world and even the Mediterranean Sea, were secondary interests to an overriding czarist desire to control the Turkish Straits and thereby prevent foreign entry into the Black Sea.

The Soviet October Revolution increased policy emphasis on Iran and Turkey and a desire for good state-to-state relations in order to neutralize those states. Soviet interwar policy also tried to stimulate uprisings against the British and the French who had both substantial presence and interests in much of the Middle East. The ineptness of Soviet policy in this period resulted directly from her intention to pursue her policies through small minority-oriented Communist parties. In the final analysis, however, Soviet quiessence in the Arab world resulted from little interest in the area. Interests and opportunities are related, and the lack of the former narrows the range of the latter.

Despite recent attempts to the contrary, the Nazi-Soviet 1940 negotiations did not represent any change in Soviet policy. Those abortive negotiations do not support the notion of a concerted Soviet interest in reaching the Indian Ocean through the Arab world. Molotov's concerns were much nearer to home, especially the Turkish straits and Finland.

1945–55

The initial phases of the cold war completely isolated Turkey and Iran from any possible Soviet initiative and, in a sense, prompted Russia to go over the northern tier to the Arab world.

Oddly enough, in the first decade of the post-World War II period, Soviet initiatives in the Middle East were confined mainly to support of the 1947 partition plan for Palestine and helping the Zionists in Palestine to obtain Czechoslovakian arms. The Soviet Union's support of the Zionists in this period was not a ploy but a direct result of her main policy interest which concentrated on driving the British out of the Middle East. Palestinian Jews, rather than Arab nationalists, were, in the Soviet view, better able to deal with getting the British out. We see from this early period a very low enthusiasm for the Arab nationalist movement—an enthusiasm which remains low today. Soviet leaders

have always been suspicious of nationalist liberation movements which get results without struggles.

FIRST PHASE OF INVOLVEMENT: MID-1950'S AND THE SEEDS OF CHANGE

Joseph Stalin's death and the 20th Party Congress in 1956 afforded the Soviet Union an opportunity to reorient her policies and initiate certain doctrinal changes. The dangers of foreclosing a chance to change policies at a time of leadership upheaval in the Soviet Union induced some Russian leaders to initiate policy changes, especially toward developing countries.

In the Arab Middle East, the breakthrough was the arms deal with Egypt, called the Czech arms deal at the time so as to minimize direct Soviet involvement. This change was not a reconsideration of policy but a creative adaptation to the political situation in the area.

It was the threat of the U.S.-engineered Baghdad Pact, a multilateral, defensive alliance, that activated Soviet policy and set the stage for her policy of today. Russia loathed the Pact, particularly because it raised the possibility of having her southern flank ringed with nuclear bomb-carrying planes of the West. To President Nasser and the Egyptian Government, the pact had a polarizing effect on the Arab world and entrenched the West at a time when complete economic and political independence was the goal of an increasing number of Arabs. The momentary common objectives of Egypt and Russia —to undermine Iraq, the mainstay of the Baghdad Pact, and to remove the West from the area—joined these two states in 1955. The arms Nasser obtained helped him circumvent the West at a time when Egypt considered it in her vital interest to be able to counter Israeli attacks similar to the 1955 Gaza raid. For the Soviet Union, the arms deal was embarrassing and indeed she termed the pact a "strictly commercial arrangement" to end Egyptian exclusive support on the West for arms.

The underlying theme of Soviet policy in this period, then, was opposition to the Baghdad Pact. The Russians were seeking emulation of Egypt's defiance of the West and not of Egypt's type of regime. Capitalism was still the cornerstone of the Egyptian economy and her embryonic agrarian reform movement was hardly a full-scale socialist venture. Despite the Russian decision to build the Aswan Dam, Khrushchev did not, at this time, see Nasser as an ally. It is useful to remember that at the time of the Suez war of 1956, Russia did not have any military power in the area and the Soviet navy was only recently moving from a concern for a high sea military capability toward submarines. Military action in 1956 would not have produced any results for the Soviet Union.

SECOND PHASE: 1956–67

The 1956–58 period represents the start of a second phase of Soviet involvement in the Middle East, a phase dominated by the success of her initial objectives. The Suez war of 1956 effectively eliminated, for a while at least, France and England as Middle East powers, and the Iraqi Revolution of 1958 ruined the Baghdad Pact.

But the Suez war did more. It led the Soviets to perceive a pattern of recurrent traits about Arab-Israeli crises.

First, such crises tended to exasperate relations between the Arabs and the West.

Second, the Soviet Union could not control President Nasser. Indeed, Premier Bulganin heard about the nationalization of the Suez Canal on the radio. Although the Russians endorsed nationalization and egged the Egyptians on, they sat on the sidelines in October 1956 when the British, French, and Israelis attacked Egypt.

Third, the Suez crisis enhanced the position of the Soviet Union, and with the British eliminated from the area, Russia faced only the United States in the Middle East.

Finally, whereas the Russians had conceived of the Arab-Israeli issue as a nationalist struggle prior to Suez, the conflict was now considered a struggle of the Arabs against imperialism.

Another important key to this second phase of Soviet activity in the Middle East was a clear indication by the Russians in the late 1950's and early 1960's that they thought Egypt was the most important country in the area despite

increased Soviet presence in Syria and Iraq. While the Soviet Union was dismayed about the imprisonment of Egyptian Communists in the late 1950's, she became much happier with internal events in Egypt after the 1961 nationalizations. In this period, we also see continued Russian dislike for Arab nationalism and unity: relations with Syria and Egypt were strained during the United Arab Republic 1958–61 era. It can be postulated that the greater the Arab cooperation and the greater the feeling for Arab unity, the less the ability of the Soviet Union to increase its presence and influence in the Arab World: This same trait is descernible in 1971 as Egypt, Libya and Syria, and perhaps Sudan, move towards some federation.

Another important maxim of Arab politics to emerge during this period concerned the relative uselessness of local Communist parties to the Soviet Union in her quest for increased influence and prestige in the Arab World. The fragmented nature of the parties in Syria, Iraq and Egypt, Russian's three main clients at that time, and their inability to acquire a wide base of public support was a source of embarrassment to Russia. To support the parties openly was to alienate central governments and not to support them at all was anathema to any Communist. In short, although local Communist parties are becoming increasingly irrelevant to the Soviet Union's position in the Middle East, some support must be shown for local Communists as the recent events in the Sudan would suggest.

THIRD PHASE: 1967 TO 1970

Like the Suez war, the 6-day war of 1967 enhanced the Soviet position in the Middle East. But whereas in 1956, Bulganin and the Russians may have egged Nassar on, in 1967 the Soviet Union played a somewhat greater role in provoking war. It seems, in particular, that she accepted and encouraged Egyptian and Syrian moves in Sinai and the Golan Heights and did not correct some of the many pre-June Egyptian statements like "the Soviet Union will stand with us in battle." What remains unclear is when the Soviet Union lost control of events.

More significant than the Soviet Union's role in provoking war was its radical underestimation of the nature and volatility of Arab politics. Besides miscalculating the balance of power in the area, the Soviet Union did not realize how provocative Syrian and Egyptian moves in April and May of 1967 or the escalations that occurred were.

Perhaps the most encouraging reaction of the Soviet Union to the June 1967 war can be seen in the changes in diplomacy. Indeed, her first reaction to the start of the June war was to use the "hotline" to Washington in an effort to avoid any confrontation. The whole pattern of diplomacy after 1967 shows the differences with the period preceeding 1967: U.N. debates for Resolution 242, Glassboro, 4-power talks, 2-power talks, have dominated the international scene.

POST-1967 ERA

While circumstances have led the Soviet Union to seek greater diplomacy with other big powers in the area after 1967, the situation was also used by Russia to try to enhance its position in the Middle East. Several points should be made:

First. The Russians decided immediately after the 1967 war to reconstruct and continue to supply her defeated Arab clients. This was done to keep her options open and to protect past investments.

Second. The Russians have enlarged the scope of this policy. South Yemen, Yemen, and Sudan now have extensive ties with the Soviet Union but none have a client relationship with Russia, similar to that of Syria, Iraq, and Egypt.

Third. The Soviet Union continues to lack a high degree of political control over Arab countries with which she has extensive ties. The recent events in the Sudan and Egypt are cases in point.

Fourth. There has been, since 1967, a growth of Soviet communications in the Middle East, particularly her air and maritime units.

Fifth. Russia has also entered the Arab oil world and now has oil interests in Syria and Iraq.

Sixth. The Soviet Union sends arms to more than 10 Arab countries and, more significant, at least six states are committed to the Soviet Union for spare parts.

Seventh. The Soviet moves to beef up its Mediterranean squadron is indicative of a desire to improve her overall military potential in the area. Interestingly

enough, the initial impetus for this Soviet move came in 1964 when Russia saw the need to cover the U.S. forces in general and the Polaris submarine in particular. It should be noted that this Soviet buildup was defensive rather than offensive in nature and that it was an antiattack, antisubmarine phase.

Eighth. Increased assets in the area increased the need for greater presence. The military presence was important and significant in all three services, but it is significant that Soviet air presence in the immediate post-1967 war period was minimal. Indeed, Soviet air support in the Yemen civil war was pulled back immediately after the loss of a Soviet pilot. At that time, the Soviet Union was disinclined to have her men involved directly in combat despite TU–16 Soviet-piloted reconnaissance planes.

FOURTH PHASE: 1970 ON

The deep penetration raids by Israel into Egypt in late 1969 and early 1970 forced on the Soviet Union a big decision which seems to have been taken in January 1970 during President Nasser's secret Moscow trip. This decision led to the introduction of an integrated air defense system which Soviet leaders thought was needed to save their men in Cairo. SAM sites, missile units, networks of air bases, new Mig 23's and Foxbats, all with Soviet personnel, changed the character of Russia's presence in Egypt and her status in the Middle East. This increased military involvement gave Russia a new range of opportunities with many more varied instruments.

Another key to the post-1970 fourth phase of Soviet involvement in the Middle East has been the institutionalization of Soviet presence. In Egypt, this took the form of a treaty of friendship and cooperation signed in May 1971. For the Soviet Union, this new period witnesses the presence in the area of over 10,000 Russians, mostly military technicians. In terms of Kremlin politics, this presence means that there are bureaucracies in Russia with a stake in events and performances in the Middle East. As such, they represent a lobby in the Soviet Union for a certain position and involvement.

OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS

In this fourth phase, the Soviet Union has a number of possible objectives and opportunities in the Middle East which she must balance with many risks existing in the area. Some of her objectives might be:

First. Reduce further or eliminate the U.S. position in the Arab world.

Second. Promote the demise of pro-West, moderate Arab governments in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, in particular.

Third. Obtain greater influence over Middle East oil so as to determine the terms on which Western Europe gets its oil rather than cut it off.

Fourth. Help speed the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf and try to replace British in the gulf instead of permitting a U.S. presence.

Fifth. Use position in Middle East to try to neutralize further Western Europe and the northern tier of Turkey and Iran.

Sixth. With an open Suez Canal, try to extend influence eastward, particularly into the Indian Ocean.

Seventh. Use Middle East and North Africa as base for African operations in such countries as Tanzania, Somalia, and Zambia.

Eighth. Create in the Middle East a noncontiguous sphere of influence.

Despite these opportunities, the Soviet Union's position in the Middle East is fraught with many dangers. Some are:

The chronic instability of some of her client regimes and the prospect that client regimes may be overthrown.

The increased Soviet presence in the Middle East since 1967 has weakened some regimes. This increases the Soviet Union's stake without increasing her role as the final arbiter over acts of those client states.

If the military solution of the Arab-Israel conflict fails, social and political pressures may both bring down these regimes and demand new policies of which the Soviet Union may not approve.

Clients may betray the Soviet Union because they see the United States, other Western powers, or even China, as the only way to solve the Arab-Israel problem. While recent moves of Egypt might suggest such a pattern, the apparent lack of progress of the U.S. current peace initiative would minimize the likelihood that other states will turn to the United States for support.

Any real settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict that reduces the need for a big military machine will lessen the Arab countries' interest in and need for Soviet materiel. This could reduce Soviet posture in the area.

On the other hand, a military confrontation contains many risks and dangers for Russia. If she participates directly in such a war, she risks a bigger war. If she does not enter the fray, she risks being thrown out of the area.

At some point, the costs of Soviet involvement in the Middle East will have to be explained to the people in the Soviet Union. So far, their economic and military involvement has produced little real socialism and even fewer tangible results.

These risks and opportunities aside, the Soviet Union would, it seems, prefer a political solution of the Arab-Israel conflict that would give the Soviet Union credit in the Arab world and give the United States nothing.

ASPECTS OF PRESENT SOVIET POLICY

The Soviet Union is pursuing—not a policy of military conquest—but a political strategy designed to weaken U.S. influence and establish the Soviet Union as the preeminent power in the Middle East. In pursuit of this strategy, the Soviet Union will use propaganda, diplomacy, economic and military aid and, to a lesser degree, local Marxists. At the same time, the Russians have shown reluctance to get into a situation which would pit Soviet forces against the United States.

Much of present Soviet policy in the Middle East is ambiguous and in flux, although the Russians do have some well-articulated positions. But what remains most difficult for the Soviet Union is to determine how peace in the Middle East can be achieved and her interests maintained at the same time.

The Soviet Union supports U.N. Resolution 242 and considers the resolution the basis for peace in the Middle East. But in her interpretation of Resolution 242, she emphasizes, along with the Arab States, the immediate need for Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories, including Jerusalem. Her continued call for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East is usually, however, coupled with a denunciation of the "dangerous" American-Israeli alliance which prevents peace.

While the Soviet Union did, in early 1970, become increasingly friendly toward the Palestine Liberation Movement, she was before 1970 and is now giving little active financial or military support to the movement although the Soviet Union does deem it necessary for any Middle East peace settlement to bring justice to the Palestinean people. Obviously, the Russians adopted a "wait-and-see" attitude toward the guerrilla movement and wanted to support the movement only if it succeeded.

The Soviet Union's relations with Israel have been both weak and strong, depending on many related factors. Although Russia gave Israel early recognition and support in 1948, relations have deteriorated since the late 1950's. In short there is no greater anathema for the Communist movement in general and the Soviet Union in particular than pan-nationalisms, like pan-Turanism, pan-Islamism or Zionism—all of which appeal to segments of the Soviet population. The Soviet Union finds it difficult to accommodate the goals of the Zionist movement and the greater the appeal of Zionism to Soviet Jewry, the greater the tensions in Soviet-Israel relations.

In recent years the Soviet Union found it useful to have better relations with the Arab States and since 1967 she has had no relations with Israel. The lack of such ties, however, has limited the Soviet Union's ability to be an honest broker in peace negotiations—a role she played so skillfully in the mid-1960's in the Indian-Pakistan dispute. In the last couple of months, there has been many Israeli-Soviet contacts and increased Israeli-Soviet relations seem natural and imminent. Renewed relations might be a harbinger of a Soviet peace initiative in the Middle East.

While the Soviet Union was a firm supporter of Dr. Gunnar Jarring's peace mission, her enthusiasm for the U.S. peace initiative for an interim Egyptian-Israeli agreement has been minimal. Whereas the United States has maintained that final Egyptian-Israeli frontiers must be decided by the parties themselves, the Soviet Union demands that the Gaza strip, Sharm al-Shaykh, and all of Sinai be returned to Egypt. The Soviet Union continually chides the United States for calling for peace while simultaneously supporting Israel militarily.

The frustrations of all peace efforts since 1967 suggest that there will be no settlement until the United States and the Soviet Union recognize each other's legitimate interests in the Middle East and cooperate on the ground rules of peace negotiations. Such cooperation will not win the trust of the parties to the dispute unless both powers have good working relations with all parties to the dispute and each power is willing not to impose a peace nor to seek personal political gain from such a peace. But while the United States has looked with favor on improved Israeli-Soviet relations, the Russians have publicly warned Arab regimes about contacts with the United States because only Russia, they say, will bring Arabs the peace they want.

Unfortunately, military buildups in the region and the lack of any arms control efforts have helped to hamper peace efforts much more than any rhetoric. While France and Israel might have been responsible for the initial phases of the arms race in the Middle East in the early 1950's, the Soviet Union supplied the Arab world with about $2 billion worth of military hardware up to 1967, and in the 2 years subsequent to the June 1967 war, the Soviet Union equalled that figure. Over that same period, 1954 to 1967, Russia extended about $2 billion worth of economic credits, only about half of which were claimed. This means that Soviet military aid has been about four times economic assistance. There have been indications recently that Lebanon might become the eleventh Arab country to seek Soviet military assistance. This assistance to the Arab world, combined with the Soviet Union's naval buildup in the Mediterranean in the last 3 years, raises justifiable questions as to what the Soviet Union wishes to accomplish in the area.

The Soviet Union's policy toward her various Arab friends, however, does not provide a useful index of her ultimate goals in the area. Her continued and continual delicate exchanges with and warnings to Arab leaders support the hypothesis that her position is fragile and changed circumstances tomorrow could eliminate many of her gains in the Arab world today. The Soviet Union emphasizes her support for Egypt, its new President Anwar al-Sadat, and Egypt's "positive role in the Arab world and in the international arena." Such words of praise are less forthcoming in Soviet commentaries on the more unstable regimes in Syria and Iraq, to say nothing of Soviet reluctance to become tied to the regimes in Yemen, South Yemen, Libya, and the Sudan—her other so-called Arab Socialist friends.

The May 1971 Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation reaffirms Soviet respect for Egypt as the leading Arab country but it is still too early to conclude whether the treaty served as a basis for more arms deliveries or increased Soviet presence in Egypt.

Russia's strong support for President al-Sadat and Egypt has not extended to the recent move toward a Federation of Arab Republics—which will include, at least initially, Egypt, Syria, and Libya. Ever since 1958, Russia has shown a degree of disdain for Arab nationalism. She did not like the 1958–61 union of Syria and Egypt because her relations with and control over these states suffered. Indeed, the handwriting on the wall suggests that the greater the inter-Arab State cooperation, the less the need for Soviet support. The converse is also true.

CONCLUSION

The greatest question marks concerning current Soviet policy in the Middle East are: First, does the Soviet Union want war, peace, or stalemate on the Arab-Israeli issue; second, how far will the Russians go to protect their conception of their interests in the area; and third, how is Middle East policy decided in the Soviet Union. The institutionalization of Soviet presence has meant as mentioned above, that bureaucracies in Russia have a stake in Soviet presence in the Arab world. But the coats of the hawks and doves in the Kremlin remain obscure as do any differences within Soviet leadership on Middle East policy. As Soviet military and economic investment in the area continues without tangible results, there will be a growing pressure in the Soviet Union to reevaluate the relative benefits of this heavy financial commitment.

The Soviet Union has accomplished a lot in the Middle East during a period of stalemate on the Arab-Israel issue: The Russians have an extensive military and economic presence and stake there; they are a Mediterranean power for the first time in their history; United States and Western influence has been diminished;

and they have improving relations with two neighbors, Iran and Turkey, which were formerly enemies.

If the Soviet Union opts for continuing her present policies, it means that the Russians have fewer apprehensions about a stalemate in the Arab-Israel conflict than about war or peace. While the Soviet Union does want the Suez Canal open, it is opposed to an interim settlement that gives the United States credit. A final settlement poses greater potential problems. It would, in their eyes, remove the major incentives that attract the Arabs to the Soviet Union today—Arab quest for military supplies and political support in the Arab-Israeli conflict. War also presents a grave alternative for Russia's position; war is costly; an Arab defeat is embarrassing; and a confrontation with the United States should be avoided at all costs.

A stalemate in the Middle East makes the Soviet Union less apprehensive only because it represents the status quo. From the Russian viewpoint, there is little need to rock the boat if they can persuade the Arabs not to pursue war and if they cannot project what their role would be in the Middle East in peacetime. It would seem, then, that the Russians, in reaching the tentative conclusion that there is no need to rush to a settlement, are operating against the better interests of their Arab clients and the United States. The latter delights the Soviet Union, but there is no assurance that the Arabs will continue to view the Middle East the Soviet way. The implications of a continued stalemate are many: the Soviet Union will continue to refuse to enter into any arms control agreement in the area; U.S. interests might be further diminished; and the Soviet Union will continue to have predominant influence in the Arab world. However, this situation which the Russians might covet so much at present depends on their precarious relations with their Arab clients, the Arab resolve to make peace and the success of negotiations for a settlement.

At present the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States in the Middle East are both similar and dissimilar. The Soviet Union's interests are much more strategic and military and less economic, hence her concern over her influence in the Middle East in peacetime. The U.S. interests are more economic and cultural and less strictly military. Both have highly political interests when the Middle East is seen in terms of global strategy and communications. And the symbols of influence and prestige in the area are many. While the Aswan Dam in Egypt and the Tabqa Dam under construction in Syria have won the Soviet Union many plaudits, the role of the American University of Beirut and several U.S. supported educational institutions in Israel and Egypt in building present and future elites cannot be underestimated.

At the present there are also differences in strategy; the Soviet Union has, to date, pursued her interests in the Middle East by supporting the Arabs while the United States has strived to maintain a balance between Israel and the Arab States. The greater successes of the Soviet Union recently might suggest that balanced policies do not bring success. However, recent realizations by the Soviet Union that it must improve its relations with Israel, if she is to be an honest broker or mediator in the Middle East conflict and play the mediating role Russia likes to play internationally, suggest only short-term gains can be made by choosing sides and long-term interests necessitate greater options and more balance.

Recent politics in Asia would indicate that another force must be entered into the big power equation in the Middle East. China, with interests in many Arab countries and a declared policy of support for Palestine resistance groups, might well challenge Russia in the one area of the third world where the Soviet Union has gained substantial access and influence. For the United States, such a situation can only increase her options in an area where they seem to be running out quickly. We have, moreover, already seen in the last couple of months the effect of President Nixon's proposed trip to Peking in the diplomatic map of Asia. And we may well see in the coming months a changed diplomatic may in the Middle East. In an area where politics have been dominated by the confrontation of two powers, the increased presence of a third power from Europe or Asia can only reduce tensions.

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